things—the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The
former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the
mind of God(917). Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines?
or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But
you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.
To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this
one point. Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any
hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or
complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to
conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing
conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope
of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before
apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by
ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or
understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of
the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon
mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and
so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the
supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and
inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it
need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter(918) doth not
make the creation conceivable, the creation’s being without it
inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.
_Hyl._ I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of
the creation.
_Phil._ I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me
indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but
you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I
should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all
that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy
between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?
_Hyl._ And so I am.
_Phil._ Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain
obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?
_Hyl._ In the plain sense, doubtless.
_Phil._ When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been
created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by
those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?
_Hyl._ I cannot help thinking so.
_Phil._ And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied
a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?
_Hyl._ This I have already acknowledged.
_Phil._ The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation
of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain
unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might
terminate?
_Hyl._ True.
_Phil._ Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the
plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly
inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something
equally unintelligible to themselves and me?
_Hyl._ I cannot contradict you.
_Phil._ Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown
quiddities, of occasions, or _substratum_? No, certainly; but of things
obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if
you expect I should be reconciled to them.
_Hyl._ I see you can assault me with my own weapons.
_Phil._ Then as to _absolute existence_; was there ever known a more
jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible
that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain
anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute
existence to be as clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the
creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and
infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation?
That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the
minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a
Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so
impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the
ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought
Matter co-eternal with the Deity(919). Lay these things together, and then
judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of
things.
_Hyl._ I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the _creation_ is
the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been
sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be
overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself
towards your notions.
_Phil._ When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the
question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of
prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And indeed
in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the
advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.
_Hyl._ I confess it seems to be as you say.
_Phil._ As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw
into the scale the great advantages(920) that arise from the belief of
Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being of
a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of religion,
are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I
say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things,
whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of
the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence,
omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the
existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious
pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to
doubt than of our own being.—Then, with relation to human sciences. In
Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what
contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of
the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity,
gravity, divisibility, &c.—do they not pretend to explain all things by
bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are
they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting
there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a
cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to
another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions,
have they been able to reach the _mechanical_ production of any one animal
or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds,
tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course of things? Have they
accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even
of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But, laying aside Matter
and corporeal causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect
Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the
_phenomena_ are nothing else but _ideas_; God is a _spirit_, but Matter an
unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power
in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If
the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently
admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all
contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in _Physics_.
Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes
men to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more
cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on
their minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second
causes.—Then in _Metaphysics_: what difficulties concerning entity in
abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,(921)
substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of
Matter’s thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent
substances so widely different as _Spirit_ and _Matter_, should mutually
operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless
disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do
we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?—Even the _Mathematics_
themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things,
become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate
speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of
finite extension; which depends on that supposition.—But what need is
there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all
science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built
on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against
the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter
ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to
consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed,
the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon’s neck, or the
appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight.
But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being
of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas,
fleeting indeed, and changeable;—however, not changed at random, but
according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that
constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and
distinguishes that which is _real_ from the _irregular visions_ of the
fancy(922).
_Hyl._ I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can
incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is
attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment
in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement,
what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be
avoided by that single notion of _Immaterialism_!
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_Phil._ After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may
remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination
should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.
This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the
_absolute_ existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion
has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its
consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be a
greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the
marks of a true opinion and yet be false?
_Hyl._ I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.
But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full
assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty
will occur hereafter?
_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently
proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it
may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of
incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to
curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical
demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there
may be some particular things which _you_ know not how to reconcile with
it? If there are difficulties attending _Immaterialism_, there are at the
same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of
Matter(923) there is not one proof, and far more numerous and
insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty
difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are;
something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient
pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to
any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly
soever demonstrated.
_Hyl._ You have satisfied me, Philonous.
_Phil._ But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:
That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof
against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if you
can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the _Materialists_. Be not
deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot
conceive it easier by the help of _Materialism_, it is plain it can be no
objection against _Immaterialism_. Had you proceeded all along by this
rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in
objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that
is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than
without that supposition; and consequently makes rather _against_ than
_for_ it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty
arises from the _non-existence of Matter_. If it doth not, you might as
well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine
prescience, as from such a difficulty against _Immaterialism_. And yet,
upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often, if not
always, the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a _petitio
principii_. One is apt to say—The unknown substances ought to be esteemed
real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the
unthinking external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the
productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that
there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging
the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on
yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called _ignoratio clenchi_. You
talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible
Things. Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their
existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said,
positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way
perceived by the senses, is, on the principles I embrace, a real being;
but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown
Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed _somewhat_), which is quite stripped
of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor
apprehended by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object which
is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all
these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an
existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all
minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively
considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the
state of the question; without which your objections will always be wide
of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than
once they have been) against your own notions.
_Hyl._ I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from
agreeing with you more than this same _mistaking the question_. In denying
Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we
see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for it. What
think you, therefore, of retaining the name _Matter_, and applying it to
_sensible things_? This may be done without any change in your sentiments:
and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons
who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.
_Phil._ With all my heart: retain the word _Matter,_ and apply it to the
objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any
subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never quarrel
with you for an expression. _Matter_, or _material substance_, are terms
introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of
independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind:
but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the
immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the
names of all particular things, with the terms _sensible_, _substance_,
_body_, _stuff_, and the like, are retained, the word _Matter_ should be
never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the
best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing
that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind
towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.
_Hyl._ Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an
unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny
me the privilege of using the word _Matter_ as I please, and annexing it
to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I
freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than _Spirit_.
But I have been so long accustomed to the _term Matter_ that I know not
how to part with it: to say, there is no _Matter_ in the world, is still
shocking to me. Whereas to say—There is no _Matter_, if by that term be
meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by
_Matter_ is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being
perceived, then there is _Matter_:—this distinction gives it quite another
turn; and men will come into your notions with small difficulty, when they
are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about
_Matter_ in the strict acceptation of it, lies altogether between you and
the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so
natural, or so agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy
Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it
makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery.
But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do
with Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, _abstracted from all
relation to us_? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing
or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they
are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you
leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this
doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the philosophers; nor yet
altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that
respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former
notions.
_Phil._ I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours
tend only to unite, and place in a clearer light, that truth which was
before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:—the former being of
opinion, that _those things they immediately perceive are the real
things_; and the latter, that _the things immediately perceived are ideas,
which exist only in the mind_(924). Which two notions put together, do, in
effect, constitute the substance of what I advance.
_Hyl._ I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought I saw
things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are
removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly
convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in
pain about their _unknown natures_ or _absolute existence_. This is the
state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought
me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same
principles that Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do; and
for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their philosophical
Scepticism: but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to
theirs.
_Phil._ You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced
upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and
falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent, as well as
descent, proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation.
Just so, the same Principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism,
pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense.
DE MOTU: SIVE; DE MOTUS PRINCIPIO ET NATURA, ET DE CAUSA COMMUNICATIONIS
MOTUUM
_First published in 1721_
Editor’s Preface To De Motu
This Latin dissertation on Motion, or change of place in the component
atoms of the material world, was written in 1720, when Berkeley was
returning to Ireland, after he had spent some years in Italy, on leave of
absence from Trinity College. A prize for an essay on the “Cause of
Motion,” had, it seems, been offered in that year by the Paris Academy of
Sciences. The subject suggested an advance on the line of thought pursued
in Berkeley’s _Principles_ and _Dialogues_. The mind-dependent reality of
the material world, prominent in those works, was in them insisted on, not
as a speculative paradox, but mainly in order to shew the spiritual
character of the Power that is continually at work throughout the
universe. This essay on what was thus a congenial subject was finished at
Lyons, and published early in 1721, soon after Berkeley arrived in London.
It was reprinted in his _Miscellany_ in 1752. I have not found evidence
that it was ever submitted to the French Academy. At any rate the prize
was awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician and professor of
philosophy at Lausanne.
The _De Motu_ is interesting biographically as well as philosophically, as
a revelation of Berkeley’s way of thinking about the causal relations of
Matter and Spirit seven years after the publication of the _Dialogues_. In
1713 his experience of life was confined to Ireland. Now, after months in
London, in the society of Swift, and Pope, and Addison, he had observed
nature and men in France and Italy. His eager temperament and
extraordinary social charm opened the way in those years of travel to
frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the time, superseded
controversy with materialism and scepticism, and diverted his enthusiasm
to nature and high art. One likes to see how he handles the old questions
as they now arise in the philosophical treatment of motion in space, which
was regarded by many as the key to all other phenomena presented in the
material world.
For one thing, the unreality of the data of sense after total abstraction
of living mind, the chief Principle in the earlier works, lies more in the
background in the _De Motu_. Yet it is tacitly assumed, as the basis of an
argument for the powerlessness of all sensible things, and for refunding
all active power in the universe into conscious agency. _Mens agitat
molem_ might be taken as a motto for the _De Motu_. Then there is more
frequent reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than in his
more juvenile treatises. Plato and Aristotle are oftener in view. Italy
seems to have introduced him to the physical science of Borelli and
Torricelli. Leibniz, who died in 1716, when Berkeley was in Italy, is
named by him for the first time in the _De Motu_. Perhaps he had learned
something when he was abroad about the most illustrious philosopher of the
time. And it is interesting by the way to find in one of those years what
is, I think, the only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It is contained in
one of the German philosopher’s letters to Des Bosses, in 1715. “Qui in
Hybernia corporum realitatem impugnat,” Leibniz writes, “videtur nec
rationes afferre idoneas, nee mentem suam satis explicare. Suspicor esse
ex eo hominum genere qui per Paradoxa cognosci volunt.” This sentence is
interesting on account of the writer, although it suggests vague, and
perhaps second-hand knowledge of the Irishman and his principles. The name
of Hobbes does not appear in the _De Motu_. Yet one might have expected
it, in consideration of the supreme place which motion takes in his
system, which rests upon the principle that all changes in the universe
may be resolved into change of place.
In the _De Motu_ the favourite language of ideal realism is abandoned for
the most part. “Bodies,” not “ideas of sense,” are contrasted with mind or
spirit, although body still means significant appearance presented to the
senses. Indeed the term _idea_ occurs less often in this and the
subsequent writings of Berkeley.
I will now give some account of salient features in the _De Motu_.
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Like the _Principles_ the tract opens with a protest against the empty
abstractions, and consequent frivolous discussions, which even mechanical
science had countenanced although dealing with matters so obvious to sense
as the phenomena of motion. _Force_, _effort_, _solicitation of gravity_,
_nisus_, are examples of abstract terms connected with motion, to which
nothing in what is presented to the senses is found to correspond. Yet
corporeal power is spoken of as if it were something perceptible by sense,
and so found _within_ the bodies we see and touch (sect. 1-3).