feel(891); neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which
was by the naked eye(892). But, in case every variation was thought
sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number or
confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to
avoid this, as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a
little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers
senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different
circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature,
either with respect to co-existence or succession; all which they refer to
one name, and consider as one thing. Hence it follows that when I examine,
by my other senses, a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand
better the same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one
sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a
microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived
already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite
different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what
ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of
ideas(893), the more he is said to know of the nature of things. What,
therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all
circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence
follow they are not to be trusted; or that they are inconsistent either
with themselves or anything else: except it be with your preconceived
notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real
Nature, marked by each name. Which prejudice seems to have taken its rise
from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of
several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed,
there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers
are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes
not so much on notions as on words, which were framed by the vulgar,
merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without
any regard to speculation(894).
_Hyl_. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.
_Phil._ It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not
real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no
farther real than as our ideas are the true _representations_ of those
_originals_. But, as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown,
it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they
resemble them at all(895). We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real
knowledge(896). Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any
change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all
be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is
impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us
yet deeper in uncertainty(897). Again, when we consider the point, we
cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an
absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how
there should be any real thing in nature(898). The result of all which is
that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now,
give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain
absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the
source of all this scepticism(899)? Secondly, whether you are informed,
either by sense or reason(900), of the existence of those unknown
originals? And, in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose
them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything
distinctly conceived or meant by the _absolute or external existence of
unperceiving substances_(901)? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered,
it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying
aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances(902), admit
with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?
_Hyl._ For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I
would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the
objects perceived by the _senses_ of one, likewise perceivable to others
present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden,
the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner
affected with the ideas I frame in my _imagination_. Does not this make a
difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?
_Phil._ I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the
objects of sense and those of imagination(903). But what would you infer
from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived,
because they are perceived by many.
_Hyl._ I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into
another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the
ideas existing in our minds?
_Phil._ It is.
_Hyl._ But the _same_ idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in
any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from your principles, that
no two can see the same thing(904)? And is not this highly absurd?
_Phil._ If the term _same_ be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is
certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that
different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea
exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since
men are used to apply the word _same_ where no distinction or variety is
perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows
that, as men have said before, _several saw the same thing_, so they may,
upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any
deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But,
if the term _same_ be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who pretend
to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry
definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that
philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for divers
persons to perceive the same thing(905). But whether philosophers shall
think fit to _call_ a thing the _same_ or no, is, I conceive, of small
importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same
faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who
had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question,
agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of
speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call
it the _same_ thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons
who perceived, might choose the denomination of _different_ things. But
who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is
perceived by different persons may yet have the term _same_ applied to
it(906)? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining
unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built in their
place; and that you should call this the _same_, and I should say it was
not the _same_ house:—would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our
thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the
difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differed in our
notions; for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simple
abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know
not what you mean by the _abstracted idea of identity_; and should desire
you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood
yourself.——Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute
about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their
thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflexion
with you—that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is
exactly the same as to the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves
acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own
ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes
equally against the Materialists and me.
_Hyl._ [(907)Ay, Philonous,] But they suppose an external archetype, to
which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the
same thing.
_Phil._ And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may
you suppose an external archetype on my principles;—_external, I mean, to
your own mind_: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind
which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of
_identity,_ as well as if it existed out of a mind(908). And I am sure you
yourself will not say it is less intelligible.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
_Hyl._ You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that there is no
difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally
against both opinions.
_Phil._ But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions
can be a proof against neither.
_Hyl._ I acknowledge it.
But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you
advance against _Scepticism_, it amounts to no more than this:—We are sure
that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with
sensible impressions.
_Phil._ And how are _we_ concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel
it, I taste it: and I am sure _nothing_ cannot be seen, or felt, or
tasted: it is therefore _real_. Take away the sensations of softness,
moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not
a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a
congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses:
which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the
mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the
palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected
with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I
see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the
cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing
abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word _cherry_ you mean an
unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its
_existence_ something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I
own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.
_Hyl._ But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same
reasons against the existence of sensible things _in a mind_ which you
have offered against their existing _in a material substratum_?
_Phil._ When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to
them.
_Hyl._ Is the mind extended or unextended?
_Phil._ Unextended, without doubt.
_Hyl._ Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?
_Phil._ They are.
_Hyl._ Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?
_Phil._ I believe you may.
_Hyl._ Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be
room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended
things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine
impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects
are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on
it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to
understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then
be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my
_substratum_.
_Phil._ Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind,
or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal
sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an
impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or
perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being
distinct from itself(909). This is my explication of your difficulty; and
how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material
_substratum_ intelligible, I would fain know.
_Hyl._ Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of
it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?
_Phil._ None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is
the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for
philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as
things existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but what is
conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental
operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is
plain in the terms _comprehend_, _reflect_, _discourse_, &c., which, being
applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense.
_Hyl._ You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still
remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And,
indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others,
without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to
make me a proselyte to your principles.
_Phil._ Let me know this mighty difficulty.
_Hyl._ The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly
irreconcilable with your notions(910). Moses tells us of a creation: a
creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things,
solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and
I shall perhaps agree with you.
_Phil._ Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and
animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created
by God, I make no question. If by _ideas_ you mean fictions and fancies of
the mind(911), then these are no ideas. If by _ideas_ you mean immediate
objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist
unperceived, or out of a mind(912), then these things are ideas. But
whether you do or do not call them _ideas_, it matters little. The
difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or
rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same.
In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed _ideas_, but
_things_. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any
absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a
word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things,
of _real_ things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my
principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been
evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so
often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to
shew where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be
mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be
incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar
acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the
philosophic(913) acceptation, for Matter, or _an unknown __ quiddity, with
an absolute existence_. When you have proved these points, then (and not
till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.
_Hyl._ It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to
refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some
peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your
notions?
_Phil._ If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of
Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other,
then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you
may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all
you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither
do you pretend they exist without the mind.
_Hyl._ Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.
_Phil._ Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I
should have seen things produced into being—that is become perceptible—in
the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the
Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of
believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do
not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are
eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal
existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures,
are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin
a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading
therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the
several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits,
endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they
were in truth perceived by them(914). This is the literal obvious sense
suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included
no mention, or no thought, either of _substratum_, instrument, occasion,
or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found
that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those
things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in,
you only can tell.
_Hyl._ But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created
things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical
being: that is to say, upon supposition there were _men_ to perceive them;
without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein
creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly
impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of
man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?
_Phil._ In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to
exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not
therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions,
unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits
in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as
we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts
produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was present—that
this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles,
since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it
exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of
mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and
consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible
that important article of our faith should have in making men humble,
thankful, and resigned to their [(915)great] Creator. I say, moreover,
that, in this naked conception of things, divested of words, there will
not be found any notion of what you call the _actuality of absolute
existence_. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen
our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own
thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible
jargon.
_Hyl._ I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you
to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their
being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did
they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how
could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer
or better connected than this?
_Phil._ And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from
eternity?
_Hyl._ I am.
_Phil._ Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.
_Hyl._ This I acknowledge.
_Phil._ By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to
be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.
_Hyl._ What shall we make then of the creation?
_Phil._ May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of
finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to
begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become
perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He
then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a
_relative_, or _hypothetical existence_ if you please. But, so long as it
supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the
Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious
ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other
sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply
with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and
unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For,
allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal
world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as
well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth
either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and
immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem
to derogate from those attributes?
_Hyl._ Well, but as to this decree of God’s, for making things
perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either
execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to
will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If
the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in
finite things(916). If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new
to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues
imperfection.
_Phil._ Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection
concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every
other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which
can _we_ conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a
beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His
nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not,
therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or
Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His
attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything
against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of
our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme;
but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or
indirectly, in what you have now objected.
_Hyl._ I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are
such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to
that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring
myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation
and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.