his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the
real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by
(that is _exists in_) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at
first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this;
inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies
a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question
between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a _real_
existence out of the mind of this or that person(872), but, whether they
have an _absolute_ existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and
exterior to _all_ minds(873). This indeed some heathens and philosophers
have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the
Holy Scriptures will be of another opinion.
_Hyl._ But, according to your notions, what difference is there between
real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a
dream—since they are all equally in the mind(874)?
_Phil._ The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they
have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived
by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being
imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like
dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these
with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the
visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though
they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not
being connected, and of apiece with the preceding and subsequent
transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from
realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish _things_ from
_chimeras_ on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon
mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am
not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.
_Hyl._ But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but
spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very
oddly.
_Phil._ I own the word _idea_, not being commonly used for _thing_, sounds
something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary
relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is
now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the
understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet
it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in
effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things
perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is
necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some
mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind
of God, in whom ’we live, and move, and have our being.’ Is this as
strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that
we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their
real natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all
our senses?
_Hyl._ And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such
things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is the immediate
cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there be anything more
extravagant than this?
_Phil._ Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a thing which is
inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our
perceptions, [(875)without any regard either to consistency, or the old
known axiom, _Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself_].
Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so
extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred
places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all
those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to
Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much
the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by
citations.
_Hyl._ You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God the immediate
Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder,
sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.
_Phil._ In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt
is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an
instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of
an instrument, or occasion, called _Matter_, you as truly make Him the
author of sin as I, who think Him the immediate agent in all those
operations vulgarly ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or
moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion,
but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and
religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or
putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the
outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since,
therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the making God an
immediate cause of all such actions is not making Him the Author of sin.
Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all
the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents
besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking
rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers,
ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of
their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of
their actions(876).
_Hyl._ But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal Substance; there is
the point. You can never persuade me that this is not repugnant to the
universal sense of mankind. Were our dispute to be determined by most
voices, I am confident you would give up the point, without gathering the
votes.
_Phil._ I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted to the
judgment of men who had plain common sense, without the prejudices of a
learned education. Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who
thinks he knows the things he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of
their existence; and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your
paradoxes, and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce
in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is no substance
wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me evident. And that the
objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed(877). And
that sensible qualities are objects immediately perceived no one can deny.
It is therefore evident there can be no _substratum_ of those qualities
but spirit; _in_ which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as
a thing perceived in that which perceives it(878). I deny therefore that
there is any unthinking _substratum_ of the objects of sense, and _in that
acceptation_ that there is any material substance. But if by _material
substance_ is meant only _sensible body_—that which is seen and felt (and
the unphilosophical part of the world, I dare say, mean no more)—then I am
more certain of matter’s existence than you or any other philosopher
pretend to be. If there be anything which makes the generality of mankind
averse from the notions I espouse: it is a misapprehension that I deny the
reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that, and
not I, it follows that in truth their aversion is against your notions and
not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as of my own being,
that there are bodies or corporeal substances (meaning the things I
perceive by my senses); and that, granting this, the bulk of mankind will
take no thought about, nor think themselves at all concerned in the fate
of those unknown natures, and philosophical quiddities, which some men are
so fond of.
_Hyl._ What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the
reality of things by their senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking
the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot in diameter; or a square
tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the water,
crooked?
_Phil._ He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives,
but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus, in the
case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly
crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude that
upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same
crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont
to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from
what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the
moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is
mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately, and
at present, (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in
respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas
he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or,
concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines
would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with
regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the
earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were
placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other
planets, we should not then perceive its motion(879).
_Hyl._ I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible
enough. But, give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray,
Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you
are now that it does not?
_Phil._ I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was
founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon
evidence.
_Hyl._ After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things.
We agree in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with
ideas _from without_ is evident; and it is no less evident that there must
be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers without the mind(880),
corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by
themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted;
which I call _Matter_, and you call _Spirit_. This is all the difference.
_Phil._ Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers,
extended?
_Hyl._ It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the
idea of extension,
_Phil._ It is therefore itself unextended?
_Hyl._ I grant it.
_Phil._ Is it not also active?
_Hyl._ Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?
_Phil._ Now let me ask you two questions: _First_, Whether it be agreeable
to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name _Matter_ to
an unextended active being? And, _Secondly_, Whether it be not
ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of
language?
_Hyl._ Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so,
but some _Third Nature_ distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason
is there why you should call it Spirit? Does not the notion of spirit
imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?
_Phil._ My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of
meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from
volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit:
therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit.
Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in
itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be
a Spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be
possible. I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from
without, we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from
ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this
powerful Being(881). I will have it to be Spirit, you Matter, or I know
not what (I may add too, you know not what) Third Nature. Thus, I prove it
to be Spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are
actions; and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are
volitions, there must be a _will_. Again, the things I perceive must have
an existence, they or their archetypes, out of _my_ mind: but, being
ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an
understanding; there is therefore an _understanding_. But will and
understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The
powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a
_Spirit_.
_Hyl._ And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear,
little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction.
Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?
_Phil._ Without a doubt.
_Hyl._ To suffer pain is an imperfection?
_Phil._ It is.
_Hyl._ Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some
other Being?
_Phil._ We are.
_Hyl._ And have you not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not that
Spirit God?
_Phil._ I grant it.
_Hyl._ But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without
are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and
uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to
say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature: which, you
acknowledged, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction(882).
_Phil._ That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among
other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what
it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God,
though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself
suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits,
are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external Agent,
which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy.
But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense
as we do; whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and
liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a Being
as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or
indeed any sensation at all. We are chained to a body: that is to say, our
perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our
nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our
sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a
complexion of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from
being perceived by a mind. So that this connexion of sensations with
corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of
nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable. But
God is a Pure Spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy, or natural ties.
No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure
in His mind. To know everything knowable, is certainly a perfection; but
to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The
former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath
ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your
not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you
fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.
_Hyl._ But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of
Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of
bodies(883). And what can withstand demonstration?
_Phil._ Let me see how you demonstrate that point.
_Hyl._ I lay it down for a principle, that the moments or quantities of
motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the velocities and
quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are
equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in
each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small
inequalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an
equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies, and
consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that
motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be
demonstrated.
_Phil._ You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of
motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and _Matter_ taken
together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition from whence the
existence of _Matter_ is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?
_Hyl._ In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the
velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.
_Phil._ But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that
gravity is proportional to _Matter_, in your philosophic sense of the
word; except you take it for granted that unknown _substratum_, or
whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities;
which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude
and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as
likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not
dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers
producing them, do exist in a _material substratum_; this is what I deny,
and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not
yet proved.
_Hyl._ I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think, however, you
shall persuade me the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this
while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the
phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter(884)?
_Phil._ What mean you, Hylas, by the _phenomena_?
_Hyl._ I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.
_Phil._ And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?
_Hyl._ I have told you so a hundred times.
_Phil._ Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew how we come to be
affected with ideas, in that manner and(885) order wherein they are
imprinted on our senses. Is it not?
_Hyl._ It is.
_Phil._ Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained the
production of any one idea in our minds by the help of _Matter_(886), I
shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it
as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of
phenomena. That a Being endowed with knowledge and will should produce or
exhibit ideas is easily understood. But that a Being which is utterly
destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any
sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say,
though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its
qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so far from
explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the
world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have
been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of
ideas(887), they discover the laws and methods of nature, which is a part
of knowledge both useful and entertaining.
_Hyl._ After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you
imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of
Matter, if there was no such thing?
_Phil._ That every epidemical opinion, arising from prejudice, or passion,
or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe
you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be
either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or
because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and
given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from
it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the
belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, _taken for
something distinct from what we perceive by our senses_, is thought to
exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do
not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are
clear; and, when you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to
give you another answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell you,
I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.
_Hyl._ But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New
notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men’s minds, and
nobody knows where they will end.
_Phil._ Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either in
sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle
the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I
cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous,
and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But is there the like
reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything
known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all
such innovations had been forbidden, men would have made a notable
progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead
for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the
objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the
real nature of things, and can never be assured even of their existence:
that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and
motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there
are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or
figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a
spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended
parts:—these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock
the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted,
embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against
these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It
is true, in doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some _ambages_,
and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly
understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found
to amount to no more than this:—that it is absolutely impossible, and a
plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking Being should exist without
being perceived by a Mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame
it should be so, at this time of day, and in a Christian country.
_Hyl._ As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are
out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can
anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas?
You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with _scepticism_. This is so
plain, there is no denying it.
_Phil._ You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but
rather ideas into things(888); since those immediate objects of
perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I
take to be the real things themselves(889).
_Hyl._ Things! You may pretend what you please; but it is certain you
leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which
strikes the senses.
_Phil._ What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the
very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than
upon your supposition—that Matter(890) is an essential part of all
corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only
sensible forms: but herein we differ—you will have them to be empty
appearances, I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.
_Hyl._ You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that
in this you agree with the vulgar. According to you, therefore, the true
nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that
disagreement? Why is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities,
perceived all manner of ways? and why should we use a microscope the
better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to
the naked eye?