stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses’ rod? was
it not _really_ turned into a serpent? or was there only a change of
_ideas_ in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our
Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the
sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the
appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other
miracles: which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be
looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy.—To this I
reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into
real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have
elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of
_real_ and _imaginary_ has been already so plainly and fully explained,
and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily
answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the
reader’s understanding to resume the explication of it in this place. I
shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and
smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me
there could be no doubt of its reality(663). So that at bottom the scruple
concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the
received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what
has been said.
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85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the
clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed
in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences(664).
Some of these appear at first sight—as that several difficult and obscure
questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are
entirely banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance can think?
Whether Matter be infinitely divisible? And how it operates on
spirit?—these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to
philosophers in all ages. But, depending on the existence of Matter, they
have no longer any place on our Principles. Many other advantages there
are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for
any one to deduce from what has been premised. But this will appear more
plainly in the sequel.
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86. From the Principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may
naturally be reduced to two heads—that of _ideas_ and that of _Spirits_.
Of each of these I shall treat in order.
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And First as to _ideas_, or _unthinking things_. Our knowledge of these
has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very
dangerous errors, by supposing a two-fold existence of sense—the one
_intelligible_ or in the mind, the other _real_ and without the mind(665).
Whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of
their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I
mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is
the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things
subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth
_real_ as it was _conformable to real things_, it follows they could not
be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be
known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which
are not perceived, or exist without the mind(666)?
87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so
many _sensations_ in the mind, are perfectly known; there being nothing in
them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or
images, referred to _things_ or _archetypes existing without the mind_,
then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and
not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or
motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible
for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our
senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary; and which of them, or
even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really
existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for
aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain
chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in _rerum
natura_. All this scepticism(667) follows from our supposing a difference
between _things_ and _ideas_, and that the former have a subsistence
without the mind, or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject,
and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the
supposition of external objects. [(668)But this is too obvious to need
being insisted on.]
88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things,
distinct from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to
know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that
it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and
doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or
feel, even of their own bodies. And after all their labouring and struggle
of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or
demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things(669). But, all
this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes
philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a
meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with the terms
_absolute_, _external_, _exist_, and such like, signifying we know not
what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things
which I actually perceive by sense: it being a manifest contradiction that
any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and
at the same time have no existence in nature; since the very existence of
an _unthinking being_ consists in _being perceived_.
89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of
sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of
Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of _what
is meant_ by _thing_, _reality_, _existence_; for in vain shall we dispute
concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge
thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. _Thing_
or _being_ is the most general name of all: it comprehends under it two
kinds, entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common
but the name, viz. _spirits_ and _ideas_. The former are active,
indivisible, [(670)incorruptible] substances: the latter are inert,
fleeting, [(671)perishable passions,] or dependent beings; which subsist
not by themselves(672), but are supported by, or exist in, minds or
spiritual substances.
[(673)We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and
that of other spirits by reason(674). We may be said to have some
knowledge or _notion_(675) of our own minds, of spirits and active beings;
whereof in a strict sense we have not _ideas_. In like manner, we know and
have a _notion_ of relations between things or ideas; which relations are
distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be
perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that
_ideas_, _spirits_, and _relations_ are all in their respective kinds the
object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the term
_idea_ would be improperly extended to signify _everything_ we know or
have any notion of(676).]
90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are _real_ things, or do really
exist(677): this we do not deny; but we deny they _can_ subsist without
the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any
archetypes existing without the mind(678); since the very being of a
sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like
nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed
_external_, with regard to their origin; in that they are not generated
from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from
that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be
“without the mind” in another sense, namely when they exist in some other
mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist; but it
must be in another mind(679).
91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the
least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received
principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities,
have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But
the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations
of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves(680).
Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things
perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance or support
wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received opinion of
their _reality_, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the
difference is that, according to us, the unthinking beings perceived by
sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot
therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible
substances, or _spirits_, which act, and think and perceive them. Whereas
philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an
inert, extended, unperceiving Substance, which they call _Matter_, to
which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking
beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the
Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they suppose only Ideas of the
corporeal substances(681) created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be
at all _created_(682).
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92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or Corporeal Substance to
have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the
same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and
Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive
Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient
philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have
thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him(683). How great a
friend _material substance_ has been to Atheists in all ages were needless
to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a
dependence on it, that when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole
fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground; insomuch that it is no longer
worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of
every wretched sect of Atheists(684).
93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those
systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding _immaterial
substance_, and supposing the soul to be divisible, and subject to
corruption as the body; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and
design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a
self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all
beings; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or
inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing
the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity,
arising from the impulse of one body on another—all this is very natural.
And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies
of religion lay so great a stress on _unthinking Matter_, and all of them
use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it; methinks
they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and
driven from that only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists,
and the like, have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most
cheap and easy triumph in the world.
94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the
main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth
Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider
that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are
only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but
barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship
_their own ideas_; but rather address their homage to that Eternal
Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.
95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our
faith, hath occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example,
about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised
by Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on
the supposition that a body is denominated the _same_, with regard not to
the form, or that which is perceived by sense(685), but the material
substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take away this
_material substance_—about the identity whereof all the dispute is—and
mean by _body_ what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to
wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination
of sensible qualities or ideas: and then their most unanswerable
objections come to nothing.
96. Matter(686) being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many
sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and
puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well
as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the
arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration
(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge,
peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.
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97. Beside the external(687) existence of the objects of perception,
another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal
knowledge is the doctrine of _abstract ideas_, such as it hath been set
forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are
most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are
considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and
incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or
concrete, are what everybody knows; but, having passed through the hands
of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by
men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you at such a _time_, in such
a _place_, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those
words. In conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by
which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if
_time_ be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that
diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in
abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.
98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of _time_,
abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly,
and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in
inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all: only I hear
others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as
leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence: since that doctrine lays
one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away
innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every
moment of his life: both which seem equally absurd(688). Time therefore
being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it
follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the
number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or
mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks. And in
truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the
_existence_ of a spirit from its _cogitation_, will, I believe, find it no
easy task(689).
99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract _extension_ and _motion_ from
all other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose
sight of them, and run into great extravagances. [(690) Hence spring those
odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot, nor the wall white; or that heat
and colour are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which
depend on a twofold abstraction: first, it is supposed that extension, for
example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and,
secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being
perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he
says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are
alike _sensations_, and alike _real_; that where the extension is, there
is the colour too, to wit, in his mind(691), and that their archetypes can
exist only in some other _mind_: and that the objects of sense(692) are
nothing but those sensations, combined, blended, or (if one may so speak)
concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist
unperceived. [(693) And that consequently the wall is as truly white as it
is extended, and in the same sense.]
100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may
think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded
from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good,
this is what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and
virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion
that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from
all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality
difficult, and the study thereof of less use to mankind. [(694)And in
effect one may make a great progress in school ethics without ever being
the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave himself in the
affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he
did before.] And in effect the doctrine of _abstraction_ has not a little
contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.
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101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas
received from sense and their relations, are Natural Philosophy and
Mathematics. With regard to each of these I shall make some observations.
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And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it
is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to
depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are
drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible
blindness as to the _true_ and _real_ nature of things. This they
exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they,
by our senses, and amused only with the outside and shew of things. The
real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest
object, is hid from our view: something there is in every drop of water,
every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding
to fathom or comprehend(695). But, it is evident from what has been shewn
that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false
principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know
nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend.
102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the
nature of things is, the current opinion that every thing includes _within
itself_ the cause of its properties: or that there is in each object an
inward essence, which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow,
and whereon they depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by
occult qualities; but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical
causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of
insensible particles(696): whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or
efficient cause than _spirit_, it being evident that motion, as well as
all other _ideas_, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour
to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion,
magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we
see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be
said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality is assigned
for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and
speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by
this doctrine(697).
103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is _attraction_. That a
stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some
appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being
told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner
of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of
their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But nothing is
determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we
know) be termed _impulse_, or _protrusion_, as _attraction_. Again, the
parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted
for by attraction; but, in this, as in the other instances, I do not
perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to
the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which
produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.
104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them
together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For
example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea
towards the moon, in cohesion and crystallization, there is something
alike; namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of
these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man
who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only
is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the
ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the
centre of the earth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive
every moment of our lives. But that they should have a like gravitation
towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men,
because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose
thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain
similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue
innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he
denotes by the general name _attraction_, whatever can be reduced to that,
he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the
attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon; which to him doth
not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general
rule or law of nature.
105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural
philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the
phenomena, we shall find it consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the
efficient cause that produces them—for that can be no other than the _will
__ of a spirit_—but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby
analogies, harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of
nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general
rules, see sect. 62: which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness
observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and
sought after by the mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is
present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures
touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and
place, as well as to predict things to come: which sort of endeavour
towards Omniscience is much affected by the mind.