relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned
to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing
Principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth
and certainty of those things which may be proved _a priori_, with the
utmost evidence and rigour of demonstration(635). Secondly, but neither
are the received principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may
still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of
effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might
have been effected by the mere command of His will, without all that
_apparatus_. Nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection
may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of
those machines without the mind; for it has been made evident that
solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no _activity_ or
_efficacy_ in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in
nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing
the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it manifestly
to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they exist
unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth
cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.
62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though
the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary
to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of
things in a constant regular way, according to the laws of nature. There
are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural
effects: these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are
by men applied, as well to the framing artificial things for the use and
ornament of life as to the explaining the various phenomena. Which
explication consists only in shewing the conformity any particular
phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same
thing, in discovering the _uniformity_ there is in the production of
natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several
instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That
there is a great and conspicuous _use_ in these regular constant methods
of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And
it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and
disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing
any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical
laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the
Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might
if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the
dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put
them in it. But yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism,
by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is
necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby _he_ makes the
movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the
aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with the
perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being
once corrected all is right again(636).
63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature
display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the
ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of
nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the
Divine Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is
a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to
choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature,
which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such
plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than
to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising
events(637).
64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what
has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than
this:—_ideas_(638) are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a
certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and
effect: there are also several combinations of them, made in a very
regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the
hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret
operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of
the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the
philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what
purpose is that connexion? And since those instruments, being barely
_inefficacious_ perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the
production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made; or, in
other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a
close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas, so
artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being [(639)
credible] that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all
that art and regularity to no purpose?
65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas(640)
does not imply the relation of _cause_ and _effect_, but only of a mark or
_sign_ with the _thing signified_. The fire which I see is not the cause
of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns
me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this
or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign
thereof(641). Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines,
that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for
combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to
signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be
variously combined together. And to the end their use be permanent and
universal, these combinations must be made by _rule_, and with _wise
contrivance_. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us,
concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what
methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas(642).
Which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is
said(643) that, by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the
inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to
know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of
the thing.
66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a
cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are
altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities, may be very
naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them,
when they are considered only as marks or signs for _our_ information. And
it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if
I may so call it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment
of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by
_corporeal_ causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the
minds of men from that Active Principle, that supreme and wise Spirit “in
whom we live, move, and have our being.”
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67. In the _twelfth_ place, it may perhaps be objected that—though it be
clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert,
senseless, extended, solid, figured, moveable Substance, existing without
the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any man shall
leave out of his idea of Matter the positive ideas of extension, figure,
solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert,
senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or unperceived, which
is the _occasion_ of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased
to excite ideas in us—it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this
sense may possibly exist.—In answer to which I say, first, that it seems
no less absurd to suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to
suppose accidents without a substance(644). But secondly, though we should
grant this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be
supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind(645) is agreed; and that it
exists not in place is no less certain, since all place or extension
exists only in the mind(646), as hath been already proved. It remains
therefore that it exists nowhere at all.
68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of
Matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived: for this is all
that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance;
which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the
relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be
observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the
description of a _nonentity_ I desire may be considered. But, say you, it
is the _unknown occasion_(647), at the presence of which ideas are excited
in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be
present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor
capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor
hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words “to be present,” when
thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning,
and which I am not able to comprehend.
69. Again, let us examine what is meant by _occasion_. So far as I can
gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the
agent which produces any effect, or else something that is observed to
accompany or go before it, in the ordinary course of things. But, when it
is applied to Matter, as above described, it can be taken in neither of
those senses; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be
an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of
all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions
in the latter sense; as when the burning my finger is said to be the
occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant by
calling _matter_ an _occasion_? This term is either used in no sense at
all, or else in some very distant from its received signification.
70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is
nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting
ideas in our minds(648). For, say you, since we observe our sensations to
be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to
suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being
produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct
parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not
excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being
altogether passive, and unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God,
by whom they _are_ perceived(649), as it were so many occasions to remind
Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds: that so things may go on
in a constant uniform manner.
71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here
stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing
distinct from _Spirit_ and _idea_, from perceiving and being perceived;
but whether there are not certain Ideas (of I know not what sort) in the
mind of God, which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to
produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method: much
after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to
produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a
tune; though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be
entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter (which after all is
the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown
occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is
in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is
no senseless unperceived substance.
72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform
method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit
who excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably
concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a
Spirit—infinitely wise, good, and powerful—is abundantly sufficient to
explain all the appearances of nature(650). But, as for _inert, senseless
Matter_, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or
leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the
meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though
in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence; or
even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to
its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard
to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all,
the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we
have just now seen.
73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men
to suppose the existence of _material substance_; that so having observed
the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may
proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First,
therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the
sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and
for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking _substratum_
or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to
exist by themselves(651). Afterwards, in process of time, men(652) being
convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary
qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this
_substratum_ or material substance of _those_ qualities, leaving only the
primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike; which they still conceived to
exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material
support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly
exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows
that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter(653),
nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing;—so long
as that word is taken to denote an _unthinking substratum_ of qualities or
accidents, wherein they exist without the mind(654).
74. But—though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter
was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason
entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without
any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded
thereon: yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts that we
can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the
_thing_ itself is indefensible, at least to retain the _name_; which we
apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of _being_, or
_occasion_, though without any shew of reason, at least so far as I can
see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all
the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by
sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert,
thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of
an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or
even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our
minds?
75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and
much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness,
against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless _Somewhat_,
by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the
Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the
world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter;
though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on
the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the
full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor
possibility; yet the upshot of all is—that there are certain _unknown_
Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to
be meant by _occasion_ with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no
longer contending for the thing, but for the name(655).
76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether
_they_ may be called by the name _Matter_, I shall not dispute(656). But,
if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of
extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most
evidently impossible there should be any such thing; since it is a plain
repugnancy that those qualities should exist in, or be supported by, an
unperceiving substance(657).
77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless
support of extension, and the other qualities or accidents which we
perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or
_substratum_ of some other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours
are to a man born blind, because we have not a sense adapted to them. But,
if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of _their_
existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and
colours.—I answer, first, if what you mean by the word _Matter_ be only
the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is
such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us. And I do not see the
advantage there is in disputing about what we know not _what_, and we know
not _why_.
78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only furnish us with
new ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against
_their_ existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already
offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like.
_Qualities_, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but _sensations_ or
_ideas_, which exist only in a mind perceiving them; and this is true not
only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all
possible ideas whatsoever(658).
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79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to believe the existence
of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it, or explain anything by
it, or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no
contradiction to say that Matter _exists_, and that this Matter is _in
general_ a _substance_, or _occasion of ideas_; though indeed to go about
to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any particular explication of those
words may be attended with great difficulties.—I answer, when words are
used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please, without
danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that
_twice two_ is equal to _seven_; so long as you declare you do not take
the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, but for marks of
you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert
thoughtless substance without accidents, which is the occasion of our
ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the
other.
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80. In the _last_ place, you will say, What if we give up the cause of
material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown
_Somewhat_—neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea—inert,
thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no place?
For, say you, whatever may be urged against _substance_ or _occasion_, or
any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so
long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to.—I answer, You
may, if so it shall seem good, use the word _matter_ in the same sense as
other men use _nothing_, and so make those terms convertible in your
style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that
definition; the parts whereof, when I consider with attention, either
collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any
kind of effect or impression made on my mind, different from what is
excited by the term _nothing_.
81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is included
what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing—the positive abstract
idea of _quiddity_, _entity_, or _existence_. I own, indeed, that those
who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if
they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general
notion of all: that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others. That
there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities,
whose faculties, both in number and extent, are far exceeding those the
Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me
to pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of
perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may
imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly and presumption. Since
there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or
sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have
perceived, as colours are from sounds(659). But, how ready soever I may be
to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension, with regard to the
endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any
one to pretend to a _notion_ of Entity or Existence, _abstracted_ from
_spirit_ and _idea_, from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a
downright repugnancy and trifling with words.
It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on
the part of Religion.
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82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real
existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount
to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as
will sufficiently convince every good Christian, that bodies do really
exist, and are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ
innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber
and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies(660)—To
which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which
use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a
meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by
our doctrine. That all those things do really exist; that there are
bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has
been shewn to be agreeable to our principles: and the difference betwixt
_things_ and _ideas_, _realities_ and _chimeras_, has been distinctly
explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either
what philosophers call _Matter_, or the existence of objects without the
mind(661), is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.
83. Again, whether there be or be not external things(662), it is agreed
on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking _our_
conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us: whence
it plainly follows, that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing
inconsistent with the right use and significancy of language, and that
discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains
undisturbed. But all this seems so very manifest, from what has been
largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any
farther on it.