still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible
soever, to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the
evidence of sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the same.
That what I see, hear, and feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived
by me, I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the
testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything
which is _not_ perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn
sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give them all the
stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there any principles more
opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter
clearly shewn(601).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
41. _Secondly_, it will be objected that there is a great difference
betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or
imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so. [(602)If you suspect it to
be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and
you will be convinced with a witness.] This and the like may be urged in
opposition to our tenets.—To all which the answer is evident from what
hath been already said(603); and I shall only add in this place, that if
real fire be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real
pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and
yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly be, in
an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its idea(604).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
42. _Thirdly_, it will be objected that we see things actually without or
at a distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it
being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several
miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts(605).—In answer to this,
I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as
existing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are
acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.
43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to
consider how it is that we perceive distance, and things placed at a
distance, by sight. For, that we should in truth _see_ external space, and
bodies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to
carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing
nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that
gave birth to my _Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_, which was
published not long since(606). Wherein it is shewn that distance or
outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight(607), nor yet
apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a
necessary connexion with it(608); but that it is only suggested to our
thoughts by certain visible ideas, and sensations attending vision, which
in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with
distance or things placed at a distance(609); but, by a connexion taught
us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after the
same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to
stand for(610). Insomuch that a man born blind, and afterwards made to
see, would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his
mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the forementioned
treatise.
44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and
heterogeneous(611). The former are marks and prognostics of the latter.
That the proper objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor are
the images of external things, was shewn even in that treatise(612).
Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of _tangible
objects_;—not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for
establishing the notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my
purpose to examine and refute it, in a discourse concerning _Vision_. So
that in strict truth the ideas of sight(613), when we apprehend by them
distance, and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to
us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us what ideas
of touch(614) will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of
time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident,
from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in
sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas
are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us
what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this
or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this
point I refer to the Essay itself.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
45. _Fourthly_, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it
follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects
of sense exist only when they are perceived: the trees therefore are in
the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is
somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in
the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again
created(615).—In answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been
said in sect. 3, 4, &c.; and desire he will consider whether he means
anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being
perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not
able to discover that anything else is meant by those words; and I once
more entreat the reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself
to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his
ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I give up
the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for
him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, and pretend to charge on
me as an absurdity, the not assenting to those propositions which at
bottom have no meaning in them(616).
46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of
philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It
is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible
objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what
philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light
and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight,
are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again,
it may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every
moment creating; yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools.
For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter(617),
and that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of
opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation; which by
them is expounded to be a continual creation(618).
47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that, though we allow
the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably
follow, from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the
particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they
are not perceived. For, it is evident, from sect. 11 and the following
sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible
Somewhat, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies
falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make
this more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of
Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and
considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it
beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of
parts in each particle of Matter which are not perceived by sense(619).
The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite
magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not
because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite
number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern
them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it
perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object
appears greater; and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities
which were before unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very
different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And
at length, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes
infinitely acute, the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is
no alteration in the body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore,
considered in itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently void of all
shape and figure. From which it follows that, though we should grant the
existence of Matter to be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain,
the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to
acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, nor
anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each
particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless; and it is
the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible
world, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived.
48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45
will not be found reasonably charged on the Principles we have premised,
so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For,
though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas
which cannot exist unperceived, yet we may not hence conclude they have no
existence except only while they are perceived by _us_; since there may be
some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies
are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood
to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does
not therefore follow from the foregoing Principles that bodies are
annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the
intervals between _our_ perception of them.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
49. _Fifthly_, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure
exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured;
since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the Schools)
is predicated of the subject in which it exists.—I answer, those qualities
are in the mind only as they are perceived by it;—that is, not by way of
_mode_ or _attribute_, but only by way of _idea_(620). And it no more
follows the soul or mind is extended, because extension exists in it
alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those colours are on
all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what
philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and
unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition “a die is hard,
extended, and square,” they will have it that the word _die_ denotes a
subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure
which are predicated of it, and in which they exist. This I cannot
comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things
which are termed its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard,
extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject
distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning
of the word _die_.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
50. _Sixthly_, you will say there have been a great many things explained
by matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole
corpuscular philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which
have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In
short, whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern
philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition
that corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist.—To this I answer
that there is not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which
may not as well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by
an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to
shew why, upon such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such
ideas. But how Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in
it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore
evident there can be no use of Matter(621) in natural philosophy. Besides,
they who attempt to account for things do it, not by corporeal substance,
but by figure, motion, and other qualities; which are in truth no more
than mere ideas, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath
been already shewn. See sect. 25.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
51. _Seventhly_, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem
absurd to take away natural causes(622), and ascribe everything to the
immediate operation of spirits? We must no longer say upon these
principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a spirit heats, and
so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after
this manner?—I answer, he would so: in such things we ought to think with
the learned and speak with the vulgar. They who to demonstration are
convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say “the
sun rises,” “the sun sets,” or “comes to the meridian”; and if they
affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear
very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will make it
manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of
alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets(623).
52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long
as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a
manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if
taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since,
propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received
opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible—even in
the most rigid, philosophic reasonings—so far to alter the bent and genius
of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend
difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will
collect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse,
making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made
inevitable.
53. As to the opinion that there are no corporeal causes, this has been
heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others
among the modern philosophers; who though they allow Matter to exist, yet
will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all
things(624). These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was
none which had any power or activity included in it; and that by
consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to
exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But
then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings,
which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in
nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God
might have done everything as well without them—this I say, though we
should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant
supposition(625).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
54. In the _eighth_ place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may
be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the
existence of external things(626). Must we suppose the whole world to be
mistaken? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and
predominant an error?—I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it
will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the
existence of Matter or things without the mind(627). Strictly speaking, to
believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it(628),
is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort,
I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense,
indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists; that is, they act
as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which affects them every
moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking
being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those
words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not
able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men impose upon
themselves, by imagining they believe those propositions which they have
often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them.
55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so
universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak argument of
its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false
opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the
unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time
when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous
absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small
proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this
day those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the
world.
56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and
account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing
they perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were, not the
authors(629), as not being excited from within, nor depending on the
operation of their wills, this made them maintain _those_ ideas or objects
of perception, had an existence independent of and without the mind,
without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words.
But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of
perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected
the mistake of the vulgar(630); but at the same time run into another,
which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really
existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being
perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted
by those objects on the mind(631). And this notion of the philosophers
owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being
conscious that _they_ were not the authors of their own sensations; which
they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must
have _some_ cause, distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted.
57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by
things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to _Spirit_, which
alone can act, may be accounted for. First, because they were not aware of
the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas
existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly,
because the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not
marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of
sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and
motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform.
Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready
to own the presence of a Superior Agent. But, when we see things go on in
the ordinary course, they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order
and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power,
and goodness in their Creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us, that
we do not think them the immediate effects of a _Free Spirit_; especially
since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an
imperfection, is looked on as a mark of _freedom_(632).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
58. _Tenthly_, it will be objected that the notions we advance are
inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For
example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by
astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing
reasons. But, on the foregoing Principles, there can be no such thing.
For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it
exists not: but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.—I
answer, That tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the
Principles we have premised: for, the question whether the earth moves or
no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason
to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were
placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and
distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to
move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like
one of them: and this, by the established rules of nature, which we have
no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena.
59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of
ideas(633) in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures,
but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be
affected with pursuant to a great train of actions; and be enabled to pass
a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed
in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein
consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty
very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this
to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of
the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
60. In the _eleventh_ place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves
that curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts
of animals. Might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and
blossoms, and animals perform all their motions, as well without as with
all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put
together;—which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them,
nor have any _necessary_ connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If
it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a _fiat_, or act
of his will(634), we must think all that is fine and artificial in the
works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine,
though an artist hath made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a
watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the
motions he designed; yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and
that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour
of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without _his_ being
at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does
not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass, that
whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some
corresponding disorder to be found in the movements, which being mended by
a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the
Clockwork of Nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle
as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be
asked, how, upon our Principles, any tolerable account can be given, or
any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and
machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common
philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain
abundance of phenomena?