manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind, and he
shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of
extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of
arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an
outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true
extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing(553)
plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or
other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject
without the mind, or in truth that there should be any such thing as an
outward object(554).
16. But let us examine a little the received opinion. It is said extension
is a _mode_ or _accident_ of Matter, and that Matter is the _substratum_
that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant
by Matter’s _supporting_ extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter; and
therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet,
if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of
Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know
what relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting
them. It is evident _support_ cannot here be taken in its usual or literal
sense, as when we say that pillars support a building. In what sense
therefore must it be taken? [(555) For my part, I am not able to discover
any sense at all that can be applicable to it.]
17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare
themselves to mean by _material substance_, we shall find them acknowledge
they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being
in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents.
The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and
incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this,
as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of
those words: it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that
is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches
which make the signification of the words _material substance_, I am
convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we
trouble ourselves any farther, in discussing this material _substratum_ or
support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not
suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct
repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?
18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable substances
may exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies,
yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by
Sense or by Reason(556). As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge
only of our sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately
perceived by sense, call them what you will: but they do not inform us
that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which
are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.—It remains
therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things, it must
be by reason inferring their existence from what is immediately perceived
by sense. But ((557)I do not see) what reason can induce us to believe the
existence of bodies without the mind, from what we perceive, since the
very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary
connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands
(and what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it beyond
dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we
have now, though no bodies existed without resembling them(558). Hence it
is evident the supposition of external bodies(559) is not necessary for
the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes,
and might possibly be produced always, in the same order we see them in at
present, without their concurrence.
19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them,
yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of
their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather
than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things
as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be
said. For, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by
their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are
produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner
body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea
in the mind(560). Hence it is evident the production of ideas or
sensations in our minds(561), can be no reason why we should suppose
Matter or corporeal substances(562); since that is acknowledged to remain
equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it
were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so
must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without
any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are
entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.
20. In short, if there were external bodies(563), it is impossible we
should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very
same reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose—what no one can
deny possible—an intelligence, without the help of external bodies, to be
affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are,
imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask
whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence
of Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting them in
his mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this
there can be no question. Which one consideration were enough to make any
reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think
himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.
21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of
Matter(564), after what has been said, I could instance several of those
errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from
that tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in
philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall
not enter into the detail of them in this place, as well because I think
arguments _a posteriori_ are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if
I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated _a priori_, as because I shall
hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.
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22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in
handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which
may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one
that is capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own
thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound,
or figure, or motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived.
This easy trial(565) may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is
a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole
upon this issue:—If you can but conceive it possible for one extended
moveable substance, or in general for any one idea, or anything like an
idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it(566), I shall
readily give up the cause. And, as for all that compages of external
bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, though you cannot
either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to
it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your
opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.
23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine
trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody
by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it.
But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind
certain ideas which you call _books_ and _trees_, and at the same time
omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not
you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is
nothing to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining, or
forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can conceive it
possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind(567). To
make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived
or unthought of; which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to
conceive the existence of external bodies(568), we are all the while only
contemplating our own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is
deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or
without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by, or
exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one the truth
and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on
any other proofs against the existence of _material substance_.
24. [(569)Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with words, we should,
I believe, soon come to an agreement in this point.] It is very obvious,
upon the least inquiry into our own thoughts, to know whether it be
possible for us to understand what is meant by the _absolute existence of
sensible objects in themselves_, or _without the mind_(570). To me it is
evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else
nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or
fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts;
and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions
does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their conviction. It is
on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the _absolute existence of
unthinking things_ are words without a meaning, or which include a
contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly
recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.
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25. All our ideas, sensations, notions(571), or the things which we
perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly
inactive: there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that
one idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any alteration in
another(572). To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else
requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For, since they and every
part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in
them but what is perceived; but whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether
of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in them any power or activity;
there is, therefore, no such thing contained in them. A little attention
will discover to us that the very being of an idea implies passiveness and
inertness in it; insomuch that it is impossible for an idea to do
anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither can
it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from
sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion
cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are
the effects of powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion,
and size of corpuscles(573), must certainly be false.
26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are anew excited,
others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore _some_ cause
of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes
them(574). That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of
_ideas_, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a
_substance_; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material
substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal
active substance or Spirit(575).
27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided active being—as it perceives ideas
it is called the _understanding_, and as it produces or otherwise operates
about them it is called the _will_. Hence there can be no _idea_ formed of
a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vid.
sect. 25), they cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness,
that which acts. A little attention will make it plain to any one, that to
have an idea which shall be _like_ that active Principle of motion and
change of ideas is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of Spirit, or
that which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the
effects which it produceth(576). If any man shall doubt of the truth of
what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the
idea of any power or active being; and whether he has ideas of two
principal powers, marked by the names _will_ and _understanding_, distinct
from each other, as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in
general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of
the aforesaid powers—which is signified by the name _soul_ or _spirit_.
This is what some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words _will_,
[(577)_understanding_, _mind_,] _soul_, _spirit_, do not stand for
different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something
which is very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be
like unto, or represented by, any idea whatsoever. [(578)Though it must be
owned at the same time that we have some _notion_ of soul, spirit, and the
operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating—inasmuch as we
know or understand the meaning of these words.]
28. I find I can excite ideas(579) in my mind at pleasure, and vary and
shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than _willing_, and
straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it
is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of
ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain
and grounded on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of
exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with
words(580).
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29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas
actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on _my_ will. When
in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether
I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present
themselves to my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses;
the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of _my_ will(581). There is
therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.
30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of
the Imagination(582); they have likewise a steadiness, order, and
coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects
of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series—the admirable
connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its
Author. Now the set rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind we
depend on excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called _the laws of
nature_; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and
such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary
course of things.
31. This gives us a sort of foresight, which enables us to regulate our
actions for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally
at a loss: we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the
least pleasure, or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes,
sleep refreshes, and fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the
way to reap in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such
ends, such or such means are conducive—all this we know, not by
discovering any _necessary connexion_ between our ideas, but only by the
observation of the _settled laws_ of nature; without which we should be
all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more know how to
manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born(583).
32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays
the Goodness and Wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes
the laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it
rather sends them wandering after second causes(584). For, when we
perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas, and we
know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency
to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which
nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having
observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure,
we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat,
we do from thence conclude the sun to be the _cause_ of heat. And in like
manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with
sound, we are inclined to think the latter the _effect_ of the
former(585).
33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called
_real things_: and those excited in the imagination, being less regular,
vivid, and constant, are more properly termed _ideas_ or _images of_
things, which they copy and represent. But then our _sensations_, be they
never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas(586): that is, they
exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its
own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality(587) in
them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures
of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind.
They are also less dependent on the spirit or thinking substance which
perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more
powerful Spirit; yet still they are _ideas_: and certainly no idea,
whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving
it(588).
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34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in
answering Objections(589) which may probably be made against the
Principles we have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too
prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I desire I may be excused, since
all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature; and I am willing
to be understood by every one.
_First_, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all
that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and
instead thereof a chimerical scheme of _ideas_ takes place. All things
that exist exist only in the mind; that is, they are purely notional. What
therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars? What must we think of
houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are
all these but so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?—To all which,
and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the
Principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature.
Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains
as secure as ever, and is as real as ever. There is a _rerum natura_, and
the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force.
This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, where we have shewn what is
meant by _real things_, in opposition to _chimeras_ or _ideas of our own
framing_; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that
sense(590) are alike _ideas_.
35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can
apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my
eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least
question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which
_philosophers_ call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this
there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will
never miss it. The Atheist indeed will want the colour of an empty name to
support his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost
a great handle for trifling and disputation. [(591)But that is all the
harm that I can see done.]
36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of
things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the
plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been
said:—There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or
excite ideas(592) in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak,
and unsteady in respect of others they perceive by sense: which, being
impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak
themselves the effects of a Mind more powerful and wise than human
spirits(593). These latter are said to have _more reality_(594) in them
than the former;—by which is meant that they are more affecting, orderly,
and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving
them(595). And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun,
and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense
here given of _reality_, it is evident that every vegetable, star,
mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much a
_real being_ by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean
anything by the term _reality_ different from what I do, I entreat them to
look into their own thoughts and see.
37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take
away all _corporeal substances_. To this my answer is, that if the word
_substance_ be taken in the vulgar sense, for a _combination_ of sensible
qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like—this we
cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic
sense, for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind—then
indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away
that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination(596).
38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink
ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so—the word
_idea_ not being used in common discourse to signify the several
combinations of sensible qualities which are called _things_; and it is
certain that any expression which varies from the familiar use of language
will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the
proposition, which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and
clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our
senses(597). The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure,
and suchlike qualities, which combined together(598) constitute the
several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in
the mind that perceives them: and this is all that is meant by calling
them _ideas_; which word, if it was as ordinarily used as _thing_, would
sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about
the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree
with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of
sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall readily
grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be
called _things_ rather than _ideas_.
39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word _idea_, and do not rather
in compliance with custom call them _things_; I answer, I do it for two
reasons:—First, because the term _thing_, in contradistinction to _idea_,
is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind:
Secondly, because _thing_ hath a more comprehensive signification than
_idea_, including spirits, or thinking things(599), as well as ideas.
Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are
withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word _idea_;
which implies those properties(600).