of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that
language has no other end but the communicating ideas, and that every
significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal
certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do
not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway
concluded that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many names
in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others
determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody
will deny. And a little attention will discover that it is not necessary
(even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which stand for
ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the understanding the
ideas they are made to stand for: in reading and discoursing, names being
for the most part used as letters are in Algebra, in which, though a
particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is
not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that
particular quantity it was appointed to stand for(507).
20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief
and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends,
as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an
action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition; to which the
former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely
omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth(508) not
unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader
to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either in
hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love, hatred,
admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind upon
the perception of certain words, without any ideas(509) coming between. At
first, indeed, the words might have occasioned ideas that were fitting to
produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when
language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of the
characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first
were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now quite
omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the promise of a _good
thing_, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being
threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not
of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves an
idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little
reflection of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will
evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety
of language without the speakers designing them for marks of ideas in his
own, which he would have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper
names themselves do not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our
view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by
them. For example, when a schoolman tells me “Aristotle hath said it,” all
I conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the
deference and submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this
effect may be so instantly produced in the minds of those who are
accustomed to resign their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as
it is impossible any idea either of his person, writings, or reputation
should go before. [(510)So close and immediate a connexion may custom
establish betwixt the very word Aristotle(511) and the motions of assent
and reverence in the minds of some men.] Innumerable examples of this kind
may be given, but why should I insist on those things which every one’s
experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?
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21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have
considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and
endeavoured to shew they are of no use for those ends to which they are
thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from
whence they flow, which appears evidently to be Language.
It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their
means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased by the joint
labours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations may be drawn into the
view and made the possession of one single person. But [(512)at the same
time it must be owned that] most parts of knowledge have been [(513)so]
strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general ways
of speech wherein they are delivered, [that it may almost be made a
question whether language has contributed more to the hindrance or
advancement of the sciences(514)]. Since therefore words are so apt to
impose on the understanding, [I am resolved in my inquiries to make as
little use of them as possibly I can(515):] whatever ideas I consider, I
shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view; keeping out of
my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use
hath so strictly united with them. From which I may expect to derive the
following advantages:—
22. _First_, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely
verbal, the springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has
been a main hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge.
_Secondly_, this seems to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that
fine and subtle net of abstract ideas, which has so miserably perplexed
and entangled the minds of men; and that with this peculiar circumstance,
that by how much the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so
much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein.
_Thirdly_, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas(516), divested
of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I
consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking
I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that
any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern
the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what
ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is nothing
more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my own
understanding.
23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire
deliverance from the deception of words; which I dare hardly promise
myself, so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun,
and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which
difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of
_abstraction_. For, so long as men thought _abstract_ ideas were annexed
to their words, it does not seem strange that they should use words for
ideas; it being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and
retain the _abstract_ idea in the mind; which in itself was perfectly
inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those who have so
emphatically recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in
their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to
perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd
opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words.
And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well(517), that we attend
to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which
signify them(518). But, how good soever this advice may be they have given
others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so
long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas,
and that the immediate signification of every general name was a
determinate abstract idea.
24. But these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease
prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than
_particular_ ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and
conceive the _abstract_ idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names
do not always stand for ideas(519) will spare himself the labour of
looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to
be wished that every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear
view of the ideas he would consider; separating from them all that dress
and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment
and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens
and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings
of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only
draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose
fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand.
25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from
the embarras and delusion of Words, we may make infinite reasonings upon
them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be
never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more
irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.
Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that
he would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to
attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them.
By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of
what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words.
And I do not see how he can be led into an error by considering his own
naked, undisguised ideas(520).
Part First
1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the _objects of human
knowledge_, that they are either _ideas_ actually imprinted on the senses;
or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations
of the mind; or lastly, _ideas_ formed by help of memory and
imagination—either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of
light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I
perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance; and of all
these more and less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me
with odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the
mind in all their variety of tone and composition(521).
And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to
be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one _thing_. Thus, for
example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having
been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified
by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree,
a book, and the like sensible things; which as they are pleasing or
disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so
forth(522).
2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge,
there is likewise Something which knows or perceives them; and exercises
divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This
perceiving, active being is what I call _mind_, _spirit_, _soul_, or
_myself_. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing
entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same
thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists
in being perceived(523).
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3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the
imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody will allow. And to
me it seems no less evident that the various sensations, or ideas
imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is,
whatever objects they compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind
perceiving them(524). I think an intuitive knowledge may be obtained of
this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term _exist_
when applied to sensible things(525). The table I write on I say exists;
that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it
existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or
that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that
is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or
figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can
understand by these and the like expressions(526). For as to what is said
of the _absolute_ existence of unthinking things, without any relation to
their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their
_esse_ is _percipi_; nor is it possible they should have any existence out
of the minds or thinking things which perceive them(527).
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4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses,
mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence,
natural or real(528), distinct from their being perceived by the
understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever
this Principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in
his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to
involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects
but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our
own(529) ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one
of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?
5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet(530) it will, perhaps, be found at
bottom to depend on the doctrine of _abstract ideas_. For can there be a
nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible
objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing
unperceived(531)? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and
figures—in a word the things we see and feel—what are they but so many
sensations, notions(532), ideas, or impressions on the sense? and is it
possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from perception? For
my part, I might as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed,
divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things
which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine the
trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose
without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, I can
abstract; if that may properly be called _abstraction_ which extends only
to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really
exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining
power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or
perception. Hence, as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything
without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to
conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the
sensation or perception of it. [(533)In truth, the object and the
sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted from each
other.]
6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need
only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz.
that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all
those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any
subsistence without a mind; that their _being_ is to be perceived or
known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me,
or do not exist in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must
either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some
Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the
absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an
existence independent of a spirit. [(534)To be convinced of which, the
reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the
_being_ of a sensible thing from its _being perceived_.]
7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any other Substance
than _Spirit_, or that which perceives(535). But, for the fuller
proof(536) of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are
colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas
perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is
a manifest contradiction; for to have an idea is all one as to perceive:
that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must
perceive them. Hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or
_substratum_ of those ideas.
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8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves(537) do not exist without the
mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or
resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking
substance(538). I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a
colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure. If we
look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible
for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask
whether those supposed _originals_, or external things, of which our ideas
are the pictures or representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If
they are, then _they_ are ideas, and we have gained our point: but if you
say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a
colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something
which is intangible; and so of the rest.
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9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt _primary_ and _secondary_
qualities(539). By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest,
solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all
other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The
ideas we have of these last they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of
anything existing without the mind, or unperceived; but they will have our
ideas of the _primary qualities_ to be patterns or images of things which
exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call Matter.
By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert(540), senseless
substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But
it is evident, from what we have already shewn, that extension, figure,
and motion are only ideas existing in the mind(541), and that an idea can
be like nothing but another idea; and that consequently neither they nor
their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is
plain that the very notion of what is called _Matter_ or _corporeal
substance_, involves a contradiction in it. [(542)Insomuch that I should
not think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its absurdity. But,
because the tenet of the existence of Matter(543) seems to have taken so
deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws after it so many ill
consequences, I choose rather to be thought prolix and tedious than omit
anything that might conduce to the full discovery and extirpation of that
prejudice.]
10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or
original qualities(544) do exist without the mind, in unthinking
substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat,
cold, and suchlike secondary qualities, do not; which they tell us are
sensations, existing in the mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned
by the different size, texture, and motion of the minute particles of
matter(545). This they take for an undoubted truth, which they can
demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those
_original_ qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible
qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from
them, it plainly follows that _they_ exist only in the mind. But I desire
any one to reflect, and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought,
conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible
qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to
frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it
some colour or other sensible quality, which is acknowledged to exist only
in the mind. In short, extension, figure and motion, abstracted from all
other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible
qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere
else(546).
11. Again, _great_ and _small_, _swift_ and _slow_, are allowed to exist
nowhere without the mind(547); being entirely relative, and changing as
the frame or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension
therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the
motion neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. But, say
you, they are extension in general, and motion in general. Thus we see how
much the tenet of extended moveable substances existing without the mind
depends on that strange doctrine of _abstract ideas_. And here I cannot
but remark how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter,
or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by
their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed
notion of _materia prima_, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers.
Without extension solidity cannot be conceived: since therefore it has
been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same
must also be true of solidity(548).
12. That _number_ is entirely the creature of the mind(549), even though
the other qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to
whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of
number as the mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same
extension is one, or three, or thirty-six, according as the mind considers
it with reference to a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly
relative, and dependent on men’s understanding, that it is strange to
think how any one should give it an absolute existence without the mind.
We say one book, one page, one line, &c.; all these are equally units,
though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is
plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas
_arbitrarily_ put together by the mind(550).
13. Unity I know some(551) will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea,
accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea
answering the word _unity_ I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could
not miss finding it; on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my
understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be
perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it
is an _abstract idea_.
14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern
philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in
Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all
other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that
heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of
real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them; for
that the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.
Now, why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not
patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter; because to the
same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same
station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of
anything settled and determinate without the mind? Again, it is proved
that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing; because the thing
remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a
fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that
motion is not without the mind; since if the succession of ideas in the
mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower,
without any alteration in any external object(552)?