what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction,
concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this
matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice
of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate
and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties
in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind
hath a power of framing _abstract_ ideas or notions of things(482). He who
is not a perfect stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers
must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract
ideas. These are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of
those sciences which go by the name of logic and metaphysics, and of all
that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime
learning; in all which one shall scarce find any question handled in such
a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is
well acquainted with them.
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7. It is agreed on all hands that the _qualities_ or _modes_ of things do
never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all
others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the
same object. But, we are told, the mind, being able to consider each
quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is
united, does by that means frame to itself _abstract ideas_. For example,
there is conceived by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved: this
mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent
parts, and viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the
abstract ideas of extension, colour, and motion. Not that it is possible
for colour or motion to exist without extension; but only that the mind
can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of
extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension.
8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions
perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some
other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which
distinguish them one from another, it considers apart, or singles out by
itself, that which is common; making thereof a most abstract idea of
extension; which is neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure
or magnitude, but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So
likewise the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by
sense that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that
only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in abstract; which is
neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. And,
in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly, not only from the body
moved, but likewise from the figure it describes, and all particular
directions and velocities, the abstract idea of motion is framed; which
equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be
perceived by sense.
9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of _qualities_ or
_modes_, so does it, by the same precision, or mental separation, attain
abstract ideas of the more compounded _beings_ which include several
coexistent qualities. For example, the mind having observed that Peter,
James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape
and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compound idea it has of
Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is peculiar to
each, retaining only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea,
wherein all the particulars equally partake; abstracting entirely from and
cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine
it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come
by the abstract idea of _man_, or, if you please, humanity, or human
nature; wherein it is true there is included colour, because there is no
man but has some colour, but then it can be neither white, nor black, nor
any particular colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein
all men partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is
neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, but
something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there
being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts, but
not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those parts
which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common to
all the living creatures, frames the idea of _animal_; which abstracts not
only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and
insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body,
life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By _body_ is meant body without any
particular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to
all animals; without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales,
&c., nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being the
distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason left
out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion
must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creeping; it is nevertheless a
motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to conceive.
10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas,
they best can tell(483). For myself, [(484)I dare be confident I have it
not.] I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining or representing to
myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of
variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two
heads; or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can
consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or
separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I
imagine(485), it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the
idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black,
or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized
man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive the abstract idea above
described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract idea
of motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor
slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other
abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to
abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or
qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in
some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I
deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive separately, those
qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; or that I can
frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the manner
aforesaid—which last are the two proper acceptations of _abstraction_. And
there is ground to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my
case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend
to abstract notions(486). It is said they are difficult, and not to be
attained without pains and study. We may therefore reasonably conclude
that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned.
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11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of
abstraction(487), and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the
men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as
that seems to be. There has been a late [(488)excellent and] deservedly
esteemed philosopher(489) who, no doubt, has given it very much
countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what
puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and
beast. “The having of general ideas,” saith he, “is that which puts a
perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the
faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident we
observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs for universal
ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty
of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words,
or any other general signs.” And a little after:—“Therefore, I think, we
may suppose, that it is in this that the species of brutes are
discriminated from man: and it is that proper difference wherein they are
wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For if
they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have
them(490)), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident
to me that they do, some of them, in certain instances, reason, as that
they have sense; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive
them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those
narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by
any kind of abstraction.”—_Essay on Human Understanding_, B. II. ch. 11. §
10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned author, that the faculties of
brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made the
distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of
those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. The reason
that is here assigned, why we have no grounds to think brutes have
abstract general ideas, is, that we observe in them no use of words, or
any other general signs; which is built on this supposition, to wit, that
the making use of words implies having general ideas. From which it
follows that men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their
ideas. That this is the sense and arguing of the author will further
appear by his answering the question he in another place puts: “Since all
things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms?” His
answer is: “Words become general by being made the signs of general
ideas.”—_Essay on Human Understanding_, B. III. ch. 3. § 6. But it seems
that a word(491) becomes general by being made the sign, not of an
abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which
it indifferently suggests to the mind. For example, when it is said “the
change of motion is proportional to the impressed force,” or that
“whatever has extension is divisible,” these propositions are to be
understood of motion and extension in general; and nevertheless it will
not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an _idea_(492) of motion
without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity; or that I
must conceive an _abstract general idea_ of extension, which is neither
line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red,
nor of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever
particular motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular,
horizontal, or oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it
holds equally true. As does the other of every particular extension; it
matters not whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that
magnitude or figure(493).
12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the better judge how
words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny
absolutely there are _general ideas_, but only that there are any
_abstract general ideas_. For, in the passages we have quoted wherein
there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed that they are
formed by abstraction, after the manner set forth in sections 8 and
9(494). Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and speak only of
what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea, which
considered in itself is particular, becomes general, by being made to
represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort(495).
To make this plain by an example. Suppose a geometrician is demonstrating
the method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a
black line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular
line, is nevertheless _with regard to its signification_ general; since,
as it is there used, it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so
that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other
words, of a line in general(496). And, as _that particular line_ becomes
general by being made a sign, so the _name_ line, which taken absolutely
is particular, by being a sign, is made general. And as the former owes
its generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or general line,
but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter
must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the
various particular lines which it indifferently denotes.
13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas,
and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage
out of the _Essay on Human Understanding_, which is as follows:—“Abstract
ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind,
as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by
constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect
upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances
of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer
themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some
pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none
of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be
neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor
scalenon; but all and none of these at once? In effect, it is something
imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea(497) wherein some parts of several
different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind, in
this imperfect state, has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to
them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of
knowledge; to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one
has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least
this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not
those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as
its earliest knowledge is conversant about.”—B. iv. ch. 7. § 9. If any man
has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is
here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor
would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and
certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this,
methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. What more easy than
for any one to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether
he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the
description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle—which is
neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but
all and none of these at once?
14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with
them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on
all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind,
to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to
those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From
all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a
thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for _communication_,
which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if
they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant
and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time it
is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing
themselves with those necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when
they are grown up; for then it seems they are not conscious of any such
painstaking. It remains therefore to be the business of their childhood.
And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract
notions(498) will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a
hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of
their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till
they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed
in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common
name they make use of?
15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the _enlargement of
knowledge_ than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted
on, that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to
which I fully agree. But then it does not appear to me that those notions
are formed by abstraction in the manner premised—_universality_, so far as
I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or
conception of anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars
signified or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things,
names, or notions(499), being in their own nature _particular_, are
_rendered universal_. Thus, when I demonstrate any proposition concerning
triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the universal idea of a
triangle: which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an
_idea_(500) of a triangle which was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor
equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I consider, whether of
this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all
rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense universal. All
which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it(501).
16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be
true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it
demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to
all? For, because a property may be demonstrated to agree to some one
particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to
any other triangle which in all respects is not the same with it. For
example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles
rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore
conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a
right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain
this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular
demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible; or once
for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all
the particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all
equally represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in
view(502) whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an
isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I
may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles,
of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle,
nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned
in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all
these particulars; but then there is not the least mention made of _them_
in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal
to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the
sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shews
that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and
for all that the demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is
that I conclude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I
had demonstrated of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not
because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle.
[(503)And here it must be acknowledged that a man may _consider_ a figure
merely as triangular; without attending to the particular qualities of the
angles, or relations of the sides. _So far he may abstract._ But this will
never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent _idea_ of
a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or
so far forth as animal, without framing the forementioned abstract idea,
either of man or of animal; inasmuch as all that is perceived is not
considered.]
17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen,
those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable
labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures
and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and
controversies, and what a learned dust have been raised about those
matters, and what mighty advantage has been from thence derived to
mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted
on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were confined
to those only who make the most avowed profession of it. When men consider
the great pains, industry, and parts that have for so many ages been laid
out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that
notwithstanding all this the far greater part of them remain full of
darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end;
and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and
cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly
irreconcilable to the understandings of men; and that, taking all
together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to
mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and
amusement(504)—I say, the consideration of all this is apt to throw them
into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps
cease upon a view of the false Principles that have obtained in the world;
amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide influence(505)
over the thoughts of speculative men than this of _abstract general
ideas_.
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18. I come now to consider the _source_ of this prevailing notion, and
that seems to me to be _language_. And surely nothing of less extent than
reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally
received. The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the
plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge
that they are made in order to naming; from which it is clear consequence
that if there had been no such thing as speech or universal signs, there
never had been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and
elsewhere of the _Essay on Human Understanding_.
Let us examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the origin of
that mistake.—First then, it is thought that every name has, or ought to
have, one only precise and settled signification; which inclines men to
think there are certain abstract determinate ideas that constitute the
true and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is
by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to
signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as
one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name, they
all signifying indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which
does evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly
appear to any one by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that
every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain
signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be “a plain surface
comprehended by three right lines”; by which that name is limited to
denote one certain idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the
definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small, black or
white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, nor with
what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be
great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits
the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a name
constantly to the same _definition_, and another to make it stand
everywhere for the same _idea_(506): the one is necessary, the other
useless and impracticable.