and its correlative Principle that there is not any other substance than
Spirit, which is thus the indispensable factor of all reality, both lead
on to the more obviously practical Principle—that the material world, _per
se_, is wholly powerless, and that all changes in Nature are the immediate
issue of the agency of Spirit (sect. 25-27). Concrete power, like concrete
substance, is essentially spiritual. To be satisfied that the whole
natural world is only the passive instrument and expression of Spiritual
Power we are asked to analyse the sensuous data of experience. We can find
no reason for attributing inherent power to any of the phenomena and
phenomenal things that are presented to our senses, or for supposing that
_they_ can be active causes, either of the changes that are continuously
in progress among themselves, or of the feelings, perceptions, and
volitions of which spiritual beings are conscious. We find the ideas or
phenomena that pass in procession before our senses related to one another
as signs to their meanings, in a cosmical order that virtually makes the
material world a language and a prophecy: but this cosmical procession is
not found to originate in the ideas or phenomena themselves, and there is
reason for supposing it to be maintained by ever-living Spirit, which thus
not only substantiates the things of sense, but explains their laws of
motion and their movements.
Yet the universe of reality is not exclusively One Spirit. Experience
contradicts the supposition. I find on trial that my personal power to
produce changes in the ideas or phenomena which my senses present to me is
a limited power (sect. 28-33). I can make and unmake my own fancies, but I
cannot with like freedom make and unmake presentations of sense. When in
daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to determine whether I
shall see or not; nor is it in my power to determine what objects I shall
see. The cosmical order of sense-phenomena is independent of my will. When
I employ my senses, I find myself always confronted by sensible signs of
perfect Reason and omnipresent Will. But I also awake in the faith that I
am an individual person. And the sense-symbolism of which the material
world consists, while it keeps me in constant and immediate relation to
the Universal Spirit, whose language it is, keeps me likewise in
intercourse with other persons, akin to myself, who are signified to me by
their overt actions and articulate words, which enter into my sensuous
experience. Sense-given phenomena thus, among their other instrumental
offices, are the medium of communication between human beings, who by this
means can find companions, and make signs to them. So while, at _our_
highest point of view, Nature is Spirit, experience shews that there is
room in the universe for a plurality of persons, individual, and in a
measure free or morally responsible. If Berkeley does not say all this,
his New Principles tend thus.
At any rate, in his reasoned exposition of his Principles he is anxious to
distinguish those phenomena that are presented to the senses of all
mankind from the private ideas or fancies of individual men (sect. 28-33).
The former constitute the world which sentient beings realise in common.
He calls them _ideas_ because they are unrealisable without percipient
mind; but still on the understanding that they are not to be confounded
with the chimeras of imagination. They are more deeply and truly real than
chimeras. The groups in which they are found to coexist are the individual
things of sense, whose fixed order of succession exemplifies what we call
natural law, or natural causation: the correlation of their changes to our
pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, makes scientific knowledge of
their laws practically important to the life of man, in his embodied
state.
Moreover, the real ideas presented to our senses, unlike those of
imagination, Berkeley would imply, cannot be either representative or
misrepresentative. Our imagination may mislead us: the original data of
sense cannot: although we may, and often do, misinterpret their relations
to one another, and to our pleasures and pains and higher faculties. The
divine meaning with which they are charged, of which science is a partial
expression, they may perhaps be said to represent. Otherwise
representative sense-perception is absurdity: the ideas of sense cannot be
representative in the way those of imagination are; for fancies are faint
representations of data of sense. The appearances that sentient
intelligence realises _are_ the things of sense, and we cannot go deeper.
If we prefer accordingly to call the material world a dream or a chimera,
we must understand that it is the _reasonable_ dream in which all sentient
intelligence participates, and by which the embodied life of man must be
regulated.
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Has Berkeley, in his juvenile ardour, and with the impetuosity natural to
him, while seeking to demonstrate the impotence of matter, and the
omnipresent supremacy of Spirit, so spiritualised the material world as to
make it unfit for the symbolical office in the universe of reality which
he supposes it to discharge? Is its potential existence in God, and its
percipient realisation by me, and presumably by innumerable other sentient
beings, an adequate account of the real material world existing in place
and time? Can this universal orderly dream experienced in sense involve
the objectivity implied in its being the reliable medium of social
intercourse? Does _such_ a material world provide me with a means of
escape from absolute solitude? Nay, if Matter cannot rise into reality
without percipient spirit as realising factor, can my individual
percipient spirit realise _myself_ without independent Matter? Without
intelligent life Matter is pronounced unreal. But is it not also true that
without Matter, and the special material organism we call our body,
percipient spirit is unreal? Does not Nature seem as indispensable to
Spirit as Spirit is to Nature? Must we not assume at least their
unbeginning and unending coexistence, even if we recognise in Spirit the
deeper and truer reality? Do the New Principles explain the _final_ ground
of trust and certainty about the universe of change into which I entered
as a stranger when I was born? If they make all that I have believed in as
_outward_ to be in its reality _inward_, do they not disturb the balance
that is necessary to _all_ human certainties, and leave me without any
realities at all?
That Berkeley at the age of twenty-five, and educated chiefly by Locke,
had fathomed or even entertained all these questions was hardly to be
looked for. How far he had gone may be gathered by a study of the sequel
of his book of _Principles_.
ii. Objections to the New Principles answered (sect. 34-84).
The supposed Objections, with Berkeley’s answers, may be thus
interpreted:—
_First objection._ (Sect. 34-40.) The preceding Principles banish all
substantial realities, and substitute a universe of chimeras.
_Answer._ This objection is a play upon the popular meaning of the word
“idea.” That name is appropriate to the phenomena presented in sense,
because they become concrete realities only in the experience of living
Spirit; and so it is not confined to the chimeras of individual fancy,
which may misrepresent the real ideas of sense that are presented in the
natural system independently of our will.
_Second objection._ (Sect. 41.) The preceding Principles abolish the
distinction between Perception and Imagination—between imagining one’s
self burnt and actually being burnt.
_Answer._ Real fire differs from fancied fire: as real pain does from
fancied pain; yet no one supposes that real pain any more than imaginary
pain can exist unfelt by a sentient intelligence.
_Third objection._ (Sect. 42-44.) We actually _see_ sensible things
existing at a distance from our bodies. Now, whatever is seen existing at
a distance must be seen as existing external to us in our bodies, which
contradicts the foregoing Principles.
_Answer._ Distance, or outness, is not visible. It is a conception which
is suggested gradually, by our experience of the connexion between visible
colours and certain visual sensations that accompany seeing, on the one
hand, and our tactual experience, on the other—as was proved in the _Essay
on Vision_, in which the ideality of the _visible_ world is
demonstrated(470).
_Fourth objection._ (Sect. 45-48.) It follows from the New Principles,
that the material world must be undergoing continuous annihilation and
recreation in the innumerable sentient experiences in which it becomes
real.
_Answer_. According to the New Principles a thing may be realised in the
sense-experience of _other_ minds, during intervals of its perception by
_my_ mind; for the Principles do not affirm dependence only on this or
that mind, but on a living Mind. If this implies a constant creation of
the material world, the conception of the universe as in a state of
constant creation is not new, and it signally displays Divine Providence.
_Fifth objection._ (Sect. 49.) If extension and extended Matter can exist
only _in mind_, it follows that extension is an attribute of mind—that
mind is extended.
_Answer._ Extension and other sensible qualities exist in mind, not as
_modes_ of mind, which is unintelligible, but _as ideas_ of which Mind is
percipient; and this is absolutely inconsistent with the supposition that
Mind is itself extended(471).
_Sixth objection._ (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds on the
assumption that Matter is independent of percipient mind, and it thus
contradicts the New Principles.
_Answer._ On the contrary, Matter—if it means what exists abstractly, or
in independence of all percipient Mind—is useless in natural philosophy,
which is conversant exclusively with the ideas or phenomena that compose
concrete things, not with empty abstractions.
_Seventh objection._ (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to spiritual agents
alone, and to regard the things of sense as wholly impotent, thus
discharging natural causes as the New Principles do, is at variance with
human language and with good sense.
_Answer._ While we may speak as the multitude do, we should learn to think
with the few who reflect. We may still speak of “natural causes,” even
when, as philosophers, we recognise that all true efficiency must be
spiritual, and that the material world is only a system of sensible
symbols, regulated by Divine Will and revealing Omnipresent Mind.
_Eighth objection._ (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men seems
inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent.
_Answer._ Not so when we consider that men seldom comprehend the deep
meaning of their practical assumptions; and when we recollect the
prejudices, once dignified as good sense, which have successively
surrendered to philosophy.
_Ninth objection._ (Sect. 56, 57.) Any Principle that is inconsistent with
our common faith in the existence of the material world must be rejected.
_Answer._ The fact that we are conscious of not being ourselves the cause
of changes perpetually going on in our _sense_-ideas, some of which we
gradually learn by experience to foresee, sufficiently accounts for the
common belief in the independence of those ideas, and is what men truly
mean by this.
_Tenth objection._ (Sect. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principles concerning
Matter and Spirit are inconsistent with the laws of motion, and with other
truths in mathematics and natural philosophy.
_Answer._ The laws of motion, and those other truths, may be all conceived
and expressed in consistency with the absence of independent substance and
causation in Matter.
_Eleventh objection._ (Sect. 60-66.) If, according to the foregoing
Principles, the material world is merely phenomena presented by a Power
not-ourselves to our senses, the elaborate contrivances which we find in
Nature are useless; for we might have had all experiences that are needful
without them, by the direct agency of God.
_Answer._ Elaborate contrivances in Nature are relatively necessary as
signs: they express to _us_ the occasional presence and some of the
experience of other men, also the constant presence and power of the
Universal Spirit, while the scientific interpretation of elaborately
constituted Nature is a beneficial moral and intellectual exercise.
_Twelfth objection._ (Sect. 67-79.) Although the impossibility of _active_
Matter may be demonstrable, this does not prove the impossibility of
_inactive_ Matter, _neither solid nor extended_, which may be the occasion
of our having sense-ideas.
_Answer._ This supposition is unintelligible: the words in which it is
expressed convey no meaning.
_Thirteenth objection._ (Sect. 80, 81.) Matter may be _an unknowable
Somewhat_, neither substance nor accident, cause nor effect, spirit nor
idea: all the reasonings against Matter, conceived as something positive,
fail, when this wholly negative notion is maintained.
_Answer._ This is to use the word “Matter” as people use the word
“nothing”: Unknowable Somewhat cannot be distinguished from nothing.
_Fourteenth objection._ (Sect. 82-84.) Although we cannot, in opposition
to the New Principles, infer scientifically the existence of Matter, in
abstraction from all realising percipient life, or form any conception,
positive or negative, of what Matter is; yet Holy Scripture demands the
faith of every Christian in the independent reality of the material world.
_Answer._ The _independent_ reality of the material world is nowhere
affirmed in Scripture.
iii. Consequences and Applications of the New Principles (sect. 85-156).
In this portion of the Treatise, the New Principles, already guarded
against objections, are applied to enlighten and invigorate final faith,
often suffering from the paralysis of the scepticism produced by
materialism; also to improve the sciences, including those which relate to
Mind, in man and in God. They are applied:—
1. To the refutation of Scepticism as to the reality of the world
(sect. 85-91) and God (sect. 92-96);
2. To the liberation of thought from the bondage of unmeaning
abstractions (sect. 97-100);
3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by making it an
interpretation of ideas of sense, simply in their relations of
coexistence and sequence, according to which they constitute the
Divine Language of Nature (sect. 101-116);
4. To simplify Mathematics, by eliminating infinites and other
empty abstractions (sect. 117-134);
5. To explain and sustain faith in the Immortality of men (sect.
135-144);
6. To explain the belief which each man has in the existence of
other men; as signified to him in and through sense-symbolism
(sect. 145);
7. To vindicate faith in God, who is signified in and through the
sense-symbolism of universal nature (sect. 146-156).
It was only by degrees that Berkeley’s New Principles attracted attention.
A new mode of conceiving the world we live in, by a young and unknown
author, published at a distance from the centre of English intellectual
life, was apt to be overlooked. In connexion with the _Essay on Vision_,
however, it drew enough of regard to make Berkeley an object of interest
to the literary world on his first visit to London, three years after its
publication.
Dedication
TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THOMAS, EARL OF PEMBROKE(472), &c.
KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER
MAJESTY’S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL
MY LORD,
You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to
be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner.
But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful
Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship
for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not
altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning,
and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to
both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my
poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness
which is so bright a part in your lordship’s character. I might add, my
lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to
shew towards our Society(473) gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to
countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations
determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship’s feet, and the rather
because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and
most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the
world so justly admires in your lordship,
My Lord,
Your lordship’s most humble
and most devoted servant,
GEORGE BERKELEY.
The Preface
What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry(474),
seemed to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known; particularly to
those who are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the
existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the
Soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially
examine; since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success
of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end
this may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his
judgment till he has once at least read the whole through, with that
degree of attention and thought which the subject-matter shall seem to
deserve. For, as there are some passages that, taken by themselves, are
very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation, and to
be charged with most absurd consequences, which, nevertheless, upon an
entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though
the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is
very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I
flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious.
As for the characters of novelty and singularity(475) which some of the
following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any
apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak, or very
little acquainted with the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is
capable of demonstration(476), for no other reason but because it is newly
known, and contrary to the prejudices of mankind.
Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, the
hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion
before they rightly comprehend it(477).
Introduction
1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth(478),
it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and
pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater
clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and
difficulties than other men. Yet, so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of
mankind, that walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed
by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them
nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend.
They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of
all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and
instinct to follow the light of a superior principle—to reason, meditate,
and reflect on the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in
our minds, concerning those things which before we seemed fully to
comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover
themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we
are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and
inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in
speculation; till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes,
we find ourselves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a
forlorn Scepticism(479).
2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the
natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said the
faculties we have are few, and those designed by nature for the support
and pleasure of life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and
constitution of things: besides, the mind of man being finite, when it
treats of things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at if
it run into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible
it should ever extricate itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not to
be comprehended by that which is finite(480).
3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault
originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of
them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true
principles should ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or
made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully
with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge
which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to
the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it
may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such
means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the
whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of
those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up
the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. We have first
raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see.
4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles
are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those
absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy;
insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable,
conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our
faculties. And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a
strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge; to sift
and examine them on all sides: especially since there may be some grounds
to suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the
mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and
intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much
as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been
avoided.
5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I
consider what a number of very great and extraordinary men have gone
before me in the like designs(481), yet I am not without some hopes; upon
the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and
that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer,
and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had
escaped far better eyes.
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