substance out of the reasonable world(84). I onely reject the philosophic
sense (wch in effect is no sense) of the word substance. Ask a man not
tainted with their jargon wt he means by corporeal substance, or the
substance of body. He shall answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible
qualitys. These I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec
quale, whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard
that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin’d or
conceiv’d.
(M46) In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or
chimerical. Wtever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be it never so
wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do you. You may enjoy it
for me. I’ll never deprive you of it.
N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers(85). They make a
thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may be deceiv’d. I assert the
direct contrary.
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A line in the sense of mathematicians is not meer distance. This evident
in that there are curve lines.
Curves perfectly incomprehensible, inexplicable, absurd, except we allow
points.
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(M47) If men look for a thing where it’s not to be found, be they never so
sagacious, it is lost labour. If a simple clumsy man knows where the game
lies, he though a fool shall catch it sooner than the most fleet &
dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men choose to hunt for truth and
knowledge anywhere rather than in their own understanding, where ’tis to
be found.
(M48) All knowledge onely about ideas. Locke, B. 4. c. 1.
(M49) It seems improper, & liable to difficulties, to make the word person
stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking things ideas.
(M50) Abstract ideas cause of much trifling and mistake.
Mathematicians seem not to speak clearly and coherently of equality. They
nowhere define wt they mean by that word when apply’d to lines.
Locke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extension and number, are
counted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or degrees of simple ideas.
What he terms such are complex ideas, as I have proved.
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Wt do the mathematicians mean by considering curves as polygons? Either
they are polygons or they are not. If they are, why do they give them the
name of curves? Why do not they constantly call them polygons, & treat
them as such? If they are not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons
in their stead. Wt is this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a
name that belongs not to it but to a different idea?
The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quæ congruunt sunt æqualia.
I know not what they mean by bidding me put one triangle on another. The
under triangle is no triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv’d. I
ask, must sight be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all
lines seen under the same angle are equal, wch they will not acknowledge.
Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and surfaces,
such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians themselves. Much
less can we touch a line or triangle that’s cover’d by another line or
triangle.
Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that they both
take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs, what mean you by equal
spaces? If you mean _spatia congruentia_, answer the above difficulty
truly.
I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than triangles
containing equal numbers of points.
I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines wch ’tis indifferent whether
of them I take, lines in wch I observe by my senses no difference, & wch
therefore have the same name.
Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases? but then
imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say you, pure intellect
must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles are not operations of the
mind.
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If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in things of
which I am certain, ’tis to avoid disputes, to make men careful to think
before they answer, to discuss my arguments before they go to refute them.
I would by no means injure truth and certainty by an affected modesty &
submission to better judgments. Wt I lay before you are undoubted
theorems; not plausible conjectures of my own, nor learned opinions of
other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or authority.
Let them stand or fall by their own evidence.
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(M51) When you speak of the corpuscularian essences of bodys, to reflect
on sect. 11. & 12. b. 4. c. 3. Locke. Motion supposes not solidity. A meer
colour’d extension may give us the idea of motion.
(M52) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one
particular at once. Lib. 4. c. 3. s. 15. Locke.
(M53) Well, say you, according to this new doctrine, all is but meer
idea—there is nothing wch is not an _ens rationis_. I answer, things are
as real, and exist _in rerum natura_, as much as ever. The difference
between _entia realia_ & _entia rationis_ may be made as properly now as
ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour rightly to comprehend my
meaning, and you’ll agree with me in this.
(M54) Fruitless the distinction ’twixt real and nominal essences.
We are not acquainted with the meaning of our words. Real, extension,
existence, power, matter, lines, infinite, point, and many more are
frequently in our mouths, when little, clear, and determin’d answers them
in our understandings. This must be well inculcated.
(M55) Vain is the distinction ’twixt intellectual and material world(86).
V. Locke, lib. 4. c. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more beautiful
than this.
(M56) Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for
(M57) them the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all. All ... of
introversion, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts, as if these
could be exerted before we had ideas from without by the senses, are
manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that it makes the happyness
of the life to come more conceivable and agreeable to our present nature.
The schoolemen & refiners in philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind
no more tempting idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.
The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is, that we do not
consider our own notions. I mean consider them in themselves—fix, settle,
and determine them,—we regarding them with relation to each other only. In
short, we are much out in study[ing] the relations of things before we
study them absolutely and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the
relations of figures to one another, the relations also of number, without
endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extension and number in
themselves. This we think is of no concern, of no difficulty; but if I
mistake not ’tis of the last importance,
(M58) I allow not of the distinction there is made ’twixt profit and
pleasure.
(M59) I’d never blame a man for acting upon interest. He’s a fool that
acts on any other principles. The not considering these things has been of
ill consequence in morality.
My positive assertions are no less modest than those that are introduced
with “It seems to me,” “I suppose,” &c.; since I declare, once for all,
that all I write or think is entirely about things as they appear to me.
It concerns no man else any further than his thoughts agree with mine.
This in the Preface.
(M60) Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one with
another. 1st. Words signifying the operations of the mind are taken from
sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the vulgar are taken in some
latitude, their signification is confused. Hence if a man use words in a
determined, settled signification, he is at a hazard either of not being
understood, or of speaking improperly. All this remedyed by studying the
understanding.
Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the word one. All
number consists in relations(87).
Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinction of the Schoolemen.
(M61) We have an intuitive knowledge of the existence of other things
besides ourselves & order, præcedaneous(88). To the knowledge of our own
existence—in that we must have ideas or else we cannot think.
(M62) We move our legs ourselves. ’Tis we that will their movement. Herein
I differ from Malbranch(89).
(M63) Mem. Nicely to discuss Lib. 4. c. 4. Locke(90).
(M64) Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doctrine of the
reality of things, rerum natura, &c.
(M65) Wt I say is demonstration—perfect demonstration. Wherever men have
fix’d & determin’d ideas annexed to their words they can hardly be
mistaken. Stick but to my definition of likeness, and ’tis a demonstration
yt colours are not simple ideas, all reds being like, &c. So also in other
things. This to be heartily insisted on.
(M66) The abstract idea of Being or Existence is never thought of by the
vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstract ideas.
(M67) I must not say the words thing, substance, &c. have been the cause
of mistakes, but the not reflecting on their meaning. I will be still for
retaining the words. I only desire that men would think before they speak,
and settle the meaning of their words.
(M68) I approve not of that which Locke says, viz. truth consists in the
joining and separating of signs.
(M69) Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without treating of
words and propositions. This makes for me against abstract general ideas.
Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.
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(M70) Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They have gone
a great way. But none have gone backward beyond the Principles. On that
side there lies much terra incognita to be travel’d over and discovered by
me. A vast field for invention.
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Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man may perfectly
conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.
A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this respect, viz.
they contain both the same number of points.
[Forasmuch as] to be used.
Mem. To mention somewhat wch may encourage the study of politiques, and
testify of me yt I am well dispos’d toward them.
(M71) If men did not use words for ideas they would never have thought of
abstract ideas. Certainly genera and species are not abstract general
ideas. Abstract ideas include a contradiction in their nature. Vide
Locke(91), lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.
A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or mixt effect.
This demonstrable from the definition of a cause; which way of
demonstrating must be frequently made use of in my Treatise, & to that end
definitions often præmis’d. Hence ’tis evident that, according to Newton’s
doctrine, colours cannot be simple ideas.
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(M72) I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with an
intuitive knowledge the existence of other things as well as my own soul.
This is wt Locke nor scarce any other thinking philosopher will pretend
to(92).
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(M73) Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the
sciences. Mem. Barrow’s remark. Entirely owing to language.
Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by words amongst
the uses and not the abuses of language.
(M74) Of great use & ye last importance to contemplate a man put into the
world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after long experience he
would know wthout words. Such a one would never think of genera and
species or abstract general ideas.
(M75) Wonderful in Locke that he could, wn advanced in years, see at all
thro’ a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was consequently thick.
This more to be admir’d than yt he did not see farther.
Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as including or
excluding identity of circumstances, such as time, place, &c.
(M76) I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, &c.
than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. ’Tis certain that if the
happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine not proportionably, mine
must decrease. The not understanding this & the doctrine about relative
good, discuss’d with French, Madden(93), &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of
mistake in judging of moral matters.
Mem. To observe (wn you talk of the division of ideas into simple and
complex) that there may be another cause of the undefinableness of certain
ideas besides that which Locke gives; viz. the want of names.
(M77) Mem. To begin the First Book(94) not with mention of sensation and
reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in
general.
(M78) I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an idea, or
an idea without perception.
(M79) Locke’s very supposition that matter & motion should exist before
thought is absurd—includes a manifest contradiction.
Locke’s harangue about coherent, methodical discourses amounting to
nothing, apply’d to the mathematicians.
They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an equation. Wt mean
they by this? Wt would they signify by the word points? Do they stick to
the definition of Euclid?
(M80) We think we know not the Soul, because we have no imaginable or
sensible idea annex’d to that sound. This the effect of prejudice.
(M81) Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine what
we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argue any defect in our
knowledge, no more than our not knowing a contradiction.
The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul(95).
(M82) Consciousness(96), perception, existence of ideas, seem to be all
one.
Consult, ransack yr understanding. Wt find you there besides several
perceptions or thoughts? Wt mean you by the word mind? You must mean
something that you perceive, or yt you do not perceive. A thing not
perceived is a contradiction. To mean (also) a thing you do not perceive
is a contradiction. We are in all this matter strangely abused by words.
Mind is a congeries of perceptions(97). Take away perceptions and you take
away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind.
Say you, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which perceives. I
answer, you are abused by the words “that a thing.” These are vague and
empty words with us.
(M83) The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may
have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination presupposeth
perception.
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(M84) That wch extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is yt we think we see
an empty space, which I shall demonstrate to be false in the Third
Book(98).
There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean in revealed
Theology, as contradistinguish’d from natural; for tho’ the principles may
be founded in faith, yet this hinders not but that legitimate
demonstrations might be built thereon; provided still that we define the
words we use, and never go beyond our ideas. Hence ’twere no very hard
matter for those who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be established _jure
Divino_ to demonstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to
demonstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here an
implicit faith becomes us.
(M85) Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas of
reflection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception and white,
black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, I pray you, does the perception of white
differ from white men....
I shall demonstrate all my doctrines. The nature of demonstration to be
set forth and insisted on in the Introduction(99). In that I must needs
differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes all demonstration to be about
abstract ideas, wch I say we have not nor can have.
(M86) The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions or
ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?
(M87) A good proof that Existence is nothing without or distinct from
perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into the world without
company(100).
(M88) There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv’d. Thus we see
that common speech confirms my doctrine.
(M89) No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals are
nothing; each person’s time being measured to him by his own ideas.
(M90) We are frequently puzzl’d and at a loss in obtaining clear and
determin’d meanings of words commonly in use, & that because we imagine
words stand for abstract general ideas which are altogether inconceivable.
(M91) “A stone is a stone.” This a nonsensical proposition, and such as
the solitary man would never think on. Nor do I believe he would ever
think on this: “The whole is equal to its parts,” &c.
(M92) Let it not be said that I take away existence. I only declare the
meaning of the word, so far as I can comprehend it.
(M93) If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts? I
answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and less.
Wt means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of words, as something
different from consequences of ideas? I conceive no such thing.
(M94) N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language(101).
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(M95) But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance may
exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other properties whereof
we have no idea. But even this I shall demonstrate to be impossible, wn I
come to treat more particularly of Existence.
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Will not rightly distinguish’d from Desire by Locke—it seeming to superadd
nothing to the idea of an action, but the uneasiness for its absence or
non-existence.
(M96) Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, viz. How it is
that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place, action, wn
nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts, wn they have no
perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested by my senses at the
present?
(M97) ’Tis not to be imagin’d wt a marvellous emptiness & scarcity of
ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his
meditations.
(M98) Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see
substances with.
(M99) Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming.
(M100) The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance by
angles(102), strengthens men in their prejudice that they see things
without and distant from their mind.
(M101) I am persuaded, would men but examine wt they mean by the word
existence, they wou’d agree with me.
c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the mathematicians.
(M102) The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away all
real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism; since all our
knowledge and contemplation is confin’d barely to our own ideas(103).
(M103) Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary to make
use of words to record his ideas, if not in memory or meditation, yet at
least in writing—without which he could scarce retain his knowledge.
We read in history there was a time when fears and jealousies, privileges
of parliament, malignant party, and such like expressions of too unlimited
and doubtful a meaning, were words of much sway. Also the words Church,
Whig, Tory, &c., contribute very much to faction and dispute.
(M104) The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea has
been one great cause of imagining material substances(104).
(M105) That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument
against Locke’s proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv’d, put into action,
without a previous uneasiness.
(M106) The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that
uneasiness may be without volition.
(M107) Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.
(M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together.
The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.
The Will not distinct from particular volitions.
(M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may
be without all volition or act.
The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will.
This allow’d hereafter.
(M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question,
for the word _can_ presupposes volition.
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(M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic
vertue, Hylaschic principle—all these vanish(105).
(M112) Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think
that’s all(106).
Qu. whether it be the vis inertiæ that makes it difficult to move a stone,
or the vis attractivæ, or both, or neither?
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Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may
be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections(107).
(M113) To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is
idem per idem.
Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the
essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from
thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.
An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.
There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the
greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....
(M114) Matter once allow’d, I defy any man to prove that God is not
Matter(108).
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(M115) Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but
settle the signification of the word _free_—if we had an idea annext to
the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.
(M116) We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can,
&c.
(M117) Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.
(M118) Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its
ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint
you with its nature.
(M119) Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth
& constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.
(M120) You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer,
tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you(109).
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(M121) Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body’s touching another? I
say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body
that I could say touch’d this or that other; for that if my optiques were
improv’d, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now
seem to touch.
Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to confute the
mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them
Nihilarians, &c.
N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature.
Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude. ’Tis wt cannot
be helpt. ’Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the
clear and determinate meaning of my words.
Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something unknown—wch
perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas(110). Say I, make it
appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to
take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.
I affirm ’tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be given why a
man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that
wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to
have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we
take it in, must be compleatly known.
’Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should
exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with
words.
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(M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge,
power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and
God may be imagin’d; or infinitely greater(112) difference.
(M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may
imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number
of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and
number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am
embrangled(113) in words—’tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.
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