of words(114). This has occasion’d ignorance & confusion. This has ruined
the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.
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(M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will,
is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the
vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of
our ideas; whereas in truth ’tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it.
’Tis _toto cælo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our
ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer,
there is an homonymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply’d to ideas and
volition and understanding and will. All ideas are passive(116).
(M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning.
Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of
greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions.
Now these are no ideas(117).
(M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be
volition without perception?
(M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not
distinguish’d therefrom.
(M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at
once. Not so by the other senses. ’Tis this diversity of sensations in
other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity
of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it
seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time—or
_is_ time itself.
Wt would the solitary man think of number?
(M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118).
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(M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to
the mind(119).
(M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this
too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_—there is no time, no
succession of ideas(120).
(M132) To say the mind exists without thinking is a contradiction,
nonsense, nothing.
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(M133) Folly to inquire wt determines the Will. Uneasiness, &c. are ideas,
therefore unactive, therefore can do nothing, therefore cannot determine
the Will(121).
(M134) Again, wt mean you by determine?
(M135) (M136) For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existence,
&c., men are forc’d into such absurd contradictions as this, viz. light
moves 16 diameters of earth in a second of time.
(M137) ’Twas the opinion that ideas could exist unperceiv’d, or before
perception, that made men think perception(122) was somewhat different
from the idea perceived, i.e. yt it was an idea of reflection; whereas the
thing perceiv’d was an idea of sensation. I say, ’twas this made ’em think
the understanding took it in, receiv’d it from without; wch could never be
did not they think it existed without(123).
(M138) Properly speaking, idea is the picture of the imagination’s making.
This is ye likeness of, and refer’d to the real idea, or (if you will)
thing(124).
(M139) To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An idea
can resemble nothing but an idea.
(M140) If you ask wt thing it is that wills, I answer, if you mean idea by
the word thing, or anything like any idea, then I say, ’tis no thing at
all that wills(125). This how extravagant soever it may seem, yet is a
certain truth. We are cheated by these general terms, thing, is, &c.
(M141) Again, if by is you mean is perceived, or does perceive, I say
nothing wch is perceived or does perceive wills.
(M142) The referring ideas to things wch are not ideas, the using the term
“idea of(126),” is one great cause of mistake, as in other matters, so
also in this.
(M143) Some words there are wch do not stand for ideas, viz. particles,
will, &c. Particles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.
(M144) There seem to be but two colours wch are simple ideas, viz. those
exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays; [the others], being the
intermediate ones, may be formed by composition.
(M145) I have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any
other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.
N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort of
composition, tho’ it must be granted they are not made up of
distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition. Men are
wont to call those things compounded in which we do not actually discover
the component ingredients. Bodies are said to be compounded of chymical
principles, which, nevertheless, come not into view till after the
dissolution of the bodies—wch were not, could not, be discerned in the
bodies whilst remaining entire.
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(M146) All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to Locke.
All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident. Wt use then do we
make of abstract general ideas, since we neither know nor perceive them?
(M147) ’Tis allow’d that particles stand not for ideas, and yet they are
not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they stand for
operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.
(M148) Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray wt
is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis homo est
animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.” It amounts (if you
annex particular ideas to the words “animal” and “vivit”) to no more than
this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est
homo.” A mere sport and trifling with sounds.
(M149) We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral
actions(127). Wherefore it may be question’d whether we are capable of
arriving at demonstration about them(128), the morality consisting in the
volition chiefly.
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(M150) Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of
Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception) it is
brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection(129),
methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we best acquainted with it.
(M151) This I am sure, I have no idea of Existence(130), or annext to the
word Existence. And if others have that’s nothing to me; they can never
make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable by language.
(M152) Say you, the unknown substratum of volitions & ideas is something
whereof I have no idea. I ask, Is there any other being which has or can
have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be itself an idea; which you
will think absurd.
(M153) There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as ensue
upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. I turn my eyes
toward the sun: I open them. All this is active.
(M154) Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of active
things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv’d.
(M155) Distinct from or without perception there is no volition; therefore
neither is there existence without perception.
(M156) God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas wch are painfull &
unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby(131). Thus we
ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without any misery or
uneasiness at all.
(M157) Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral.
(M158) Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of
co-existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.
(M159) Gyant who shakes the mountain that’s on him must be acknowledged.
Or rather thus: I am no more to be reckon’d stronger than Locke than a
pigmy should be reckon’d stronger than a gyant, because he could throw off
the molehill wch lay upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove
the mountain that oppressed him. This in the Preface.
(M160) Promise to extend our knowledge & clear it of those shamefull
contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin the
Introduction in a modest way(132).
(M161) Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, I desire he would read
out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In the Preface or
Introduction(133).
(M162) Doctrine of identity best explain’d by taking the Will for
volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of consciousness of
wt are never acted surely solv’d thereby.
(M163) I must acknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers who have
gone before me. They have given good rules, though certainly they do not
always observe them. Similitude of adventurers, who, tho’ they attained
not the desired port, they by their wrecks have made known the rocks and
sands, whereby the passage of aftercomers is made more secure & easy.
Preface or Introduction.
(M164) The opinion that men had ideas of moral actions(134) has render’d
the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.
(M165) An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or image of
an active thing.
(M166) Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word _idea_,
viz. because it has obtain’d. But a caution must be added.
Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs(135) with Malbranch. Add to
these what he calls a great propension to think so: this perhaps may be
questioned. Perhaps men, if they think before they speak, will not be
found so thoroughly persuaded of the existence of Matter.
(M167) On second thoughts I am on t’other extream. I am certain of that
wch Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of bodies(136).
(M168) Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter of
abstraction to bring Locke’s general triangle in the last(137).
(M169) They give good rules, tho’ perhaps they themselves do not always
observe them. They speak much of clear and distinct ideas, though at the
same time they talk of general abstract ideas, &c. I’ll [instance] in
Locke’s opinion of abstraction, he being as clear a writer as I have met
with.
Such was the candour of this great man that I perswade myself, were he
alive(138), he would not be offended that I differ from him: seeing that
even in so doing I follow his advice, viz. to use my own judgement, see
with my own eyes, & not with another’s. Introduction.
(M170) The word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition,
usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind(139),
mischievous and useless.
(M171) To demonstrate morality it seems one need only make a dictionary of
words, and see which included which. At least, this is the greatest part
and bulk of the work.
(M172) Locke’s instances of demonstration in morality are, according to
his own rule, trifling propositions.
(M173) Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow’d by all to
be onely in the mind(140), and others as generally taken to be without the
mind(141), if, according to you, all are equally and only in the mind?
Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or pain ideas are attended
with desire, exertion, and other actions which include volition. Now
volition is by all granted to be in spirit.
(M174) If men would lay aside words in thinking, ’tis impossible they
should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. I mean it seems
impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was true wch in
truth is not so. Certainly I cannot err in matter of simple perception. So
far as we can in reasoning go without the help of signs, there we have
certain knowledge. Indeed, in long deductions made by signs there may be
slips of memory.
(M175) From my doctrine there follows a cure for pride. We are only to be
praised for those things which are our own, or of our own doing; natural
abilitys are not consequences of our volitions.
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(M176) Mem. Candidly to take notice that Locke holds some dangerous
opinions; such as the infinity and eternity of Space and the possibility
of Matter’s thinking(142).
(M177) Once more I desire my reader may be upon his guard against the
fallacy of words. Let him beware that I do not impose on him by plausible
empty talk, that common dangerous way of cheating men into absurditys. Let
him not regard my words any otherwise than as occasions of bringing into
his mind determin’d significations. So far as they fail of this they are
gibberish, jargon, & deserve not the name of language. I desire & warn him
not to expect to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in his own mind.
Wtever I see myself ’tis impossible I can paint it out in words.
(M178) N. B. To consider well wt is meant by that wch Locke saith
concerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to think of a
method affording the same use in morals &c. that this doth in
mathematiques.
(M179) _Homo_ is not proved to be _vivens_ by means of any intermediate
idea. I don’t fully agree wth Locke in wt he says concerning sagacity in
finding out intermediate ideas in matter capable of demonstration & the
use thereof; as if that were the onely means of improving and enlarging
demonstrative knowledge.
(M180) There is a difference betwixt power & volition. There may be
volition without power. But there can be no power without volition. Power
implyeth volition, & at the same time a connotation of the effects
following the volition(143).
(M181) We have assuredly an idea of substance. ’Twas absurd of Locke(144)
to think we had a name without a meaning. This might prove acceptable to
the Stillingfleetians.
(M182) The substance of Body we know(145). The substance of Spirit we do
not know—it not being knowable, it being a _purus actus_.
(M183) Words have ruin’d and overrun all the sciences—law, physique,
chymistry, astrology, &c.
(M184) Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar never
think they have any such, nor truly do they find any want of them. Genera
& species & abstract ideas are terms unknown to them.
(M185) Locke’s out(146)—the case is different. We can have an idea of body
without motion, but not of soul without thought.
(M186) God ought to be worship’d. This easily demonstrated when once we
ascertain the signification of the words God, worship, ought.
(M187) No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no
perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that which is
altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will.
(M188) I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho’ at the
same time that wch I call to mind was not in my thoughts before that
volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no uneasiness for the
want of it.
(M189) The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two distinct
beings.
(M190) Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke,
Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.
You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one with the m. v.
[minimum visibile], because they be both minima, just perceiv’d, and next
door to nothing. You may as well say the m. t. is the same with or like
unto a sound, so small that it is scarce perceiv’d.
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Extension seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible quality
according as it is seen or felt.
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(M191) The spirit—the active thing—that wch is soul, & God—is the Will
alone. The ideas are effects—impotent things.
(M192) The concrete of the will & understanding I might call mind; not
person, lest offence be given. Mem. Carefully to omit defining of person,
or making much mention of it.
(M193) You ask, do these volitions make _one_ Will? Wt you ask is meerly
about a word—unity being no more(147).
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N. B. To use utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the
Church or Churchmen.
(M194) Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Schoolmen, and shew that
they who blame them for jargon are not free of it themselves. Introd.
Locke’s great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with his third
book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first. Certainly the
2d & 4th books don’t agree wth wt he says in ye 3d(148).
(M195) If Matter(149) is once allow’d to exist, clippings of weeds and
parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho’ he seems
positive of the contrary.
Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about things
demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected this Treatise
will contain nothing but wt is certain & evident demonstration, & in truth
I hope you will find nothing in it but what is such. Certainly I take it
all for such. Introd.
(M196) When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not fully
and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing meant thereby,
this is not to be extended to propositions in the Scripture. I speak of
matters of Reason and Philosophy—not Revelation. In this I think an
humble, implicit faith becomes us (when we cannot comprehend or understand
the proposition), such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears
at mass in Latin. This proud men may call blind, popish, implicit,
irrational. For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to
dispute at, cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about
things that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When I
shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact, then I shall
yield an explicit belief. Introd.
Complexation of ideas twofold. Ys refers to colours being complex ideas.
Considering length without breadth is considering any length, be the
breadth wt it will.
(M197) I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there being
other intelligences to perceive them, before man was created(150).
(M198) There is a philosopher(151) who says we can get an idea of
substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to imagine that we
want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new sense it could only give
us a new idea. Now I suppose he will not say substance, according to him,
is an idea. For my part, I own I have no idea can stand for substance in
his and the Schoolmen’s sense of that word. But take it in the common
vulgar sense, & then we see and feel substance.
(M199) N. B. That not common usage, but the Schoolmen coined the word
Existence, supposed to stand for an abstract general idea.
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Writers of Optics mistaken in their principles both in judging of
magnitudes and distances.
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(M200) ’Tis evident yt wn the solitary man should be taught to speak, the
words would give him no other new ideas (save only the sounds, and complex
ideas which, tho’ unknown before, may be signified by language) beside wt
he had before. If he had not, could not have, an abstract idea before, he
cannot have it after he is taught to speak.
(M201) “Homo est homo,” &c. comes at last to Petrus est Petrus, &c. Now,
if these identical propositions are sought after in the mind, they will
not be found. There are no identical mental propositions. ’Tis all about
sounds and terms.
(M202) Hence we see the doctrine of certainty by ideas, and proving by
intermediate ideas, comes to nothing(152).
(M203) We may have certainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. without other
ideas than the words, and their standing for one idea, i.e. their being to
be used indifferently.
(M204) It seems to me that we have no certainty about ideas, but only
about words. ’Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel, &c. There
are no mental propositions form’d answering to these words, & in simple
perception ’tis allowed by all there is no affirmation or negation, and
consequently no certainty(153).
(M205) The reason why we can demonstrate so well about signs is, that they
are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.
(M206) The obscure ambiguous term _relation_, which is said to be the
largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.
(M207) Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does not
depend on some false principle; or at best on some principle of nature,
which is ye effect of God’s will, and we know not how soon it may be
changed.
(M208) Qu. What becomes of the _æternæ veritates_? Ans. They vanish(154).
(M209) But, say you, I find it difficult to look beneath the words and
uncover my ideas. Say I, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of my Book
the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made out.
(M210) To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.
(M211) “Cogito ergo sum.” Tautology. No mental proposition answering
thereto.
(M212) Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of ideas—as to
identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth; of relation,
becometh merely nominal; of co-existence, remaineth. Locke thought in this
latter our knowledge was little or nothing. Whereas in this only real
knowledge seemeth to be found(155).
(M213) We must wth the mob place certainty in the senses(156).
’Tis a man’s duty, ’tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of his
friend. Wonder not therefore that I do wt I do.
(M214) A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even my
shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this matter—’twill make
me bring the object nearer to my thoughts. A purblind person, &c. Introd.
(M215) Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk of _judicium intellectus_ preceding the
volition: I think _judicium_ includes volition. I can by no means
distinguish these—_judicium_, _intellectus_, _indifferentia_, uneasiness
to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g. the
motion of my hand.
(M216) Qu. Wt mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all the
perceptions I perceive or conceive(157), &c. are mine; all the volitions I
am conscious to are mine.
(M217) Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by _homo_ and _agens_ in
this place?
(M218) Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? I
believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of sensation, ’tis
strange they should want them(158).
(M219) It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more
time and pains men have consum’d in the study of philosophy, by so much
the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant & weak creatures. They
discover flaws and imperfections in their faculties wch other men never
spy out. They find themselves under a necessity of admitting many
inconsistent, irreconcilable opinions for true. There is nothing they
touch with their hand, or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides
much larger and more numerous than wt is perceived, & at length turn
scepticks, at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c.
Exord. Introd.(159)
(M220) These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common single
information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs & bundles. (’Tis
well if, catching at too much at once, they hold nothing but emptiness &
air.) They in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas.
It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive & sublime intellects
see more m.v.’s at once, i.e. that their visual systems are the largest.
Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary that, instead
of being (wn duly us’d or in their own nature) prejudicial to the
advancement of knowledge, or an hindrance to knowledge, without them there
could in mathematiques themselves be no demonstration.
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Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and recalling men to
Common Sense(160).
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(M221) We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so many
selves. We suppose ourselves affected wth such & such thoughts & such and
such sensations(161).
(M222) Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which chiefly
serves to discriminate us from brutes? I question whether a brute does or
can imagine a blue horse or chimera.
Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion. Useful to
enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.
(M223) Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.
(M224) Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore
there can be no idea of volition.
Algebraic species or letters are denominations of denominations. Therefore
Arithmetic to be treated of before Algebra.