repetitions of thought in the same words. Here and there Berkeley’s
writing is almost obliterated and difficult to decipher, apparently
through accident by water in the course of his travels, when, as he
mentions long after in one of his letters, several of his manuscripts were
lost and others were injured.
The letters of the alphabet which are interpreted on the first page, and
prefixed on the margin to some of the entries, may so far help to bring
the apparent chaos of entries under a few articulate heads.
I have added some annotations here and there as they happened to occur,
and these might have been multiplied indefinitely had space permitted.
Commonplace Book
I. = Introduction.
M. = Matter.
P. = Primary and Secondary qualities.
E. = Existence.
T. = Time.
S. = Soul—Spirit.
G. = God.
Mo. = Moral Philosophy.
N. = Natural Philosophy.
Qu. If there be not two kinds of visible extension—one perceiv’d by a
confus’d view, the other by a distinct successive direction of the optique
axis to each point?
(M1) No general ideas(46). The contrary a cause of mistake or confusion in
mathematiques, &c. This to be intimated in ye Introduction(47).
The Principle may be apply’d to the difficulties of conservation,
co-operation, &c.
(M2) Trifling for the [natural] philosophers to enquire the cause of
magnetical attractions, &c. They onely search after co-existing ideas(48).
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(M3) Quæcunque in Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum, militant pro me.
(M4) All things in the Scripture wch side with the vulgar against the
learned, side with me also. I side in all things with the mob.
(M5) I know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me, but yet I may
expect to be supported by those whose minds are not so far overgrown wth
madness. These are far the greatest part of mankind—especially Moralists,
Divines, Politicians; in a word, all but Mathematicians and Natural
Philosophers. I mean only the hypothetical gentlemen. Experimental
philosophers have nothing whereat to be offended in me.
Newton begs his Principles; I demonstrate mine(49).
(M6) I must be very particular in explaining wt is meant by things
existing—in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.—wn not perceiv’d as well
as wn perceived; and shew how the vulgar notion agrees with mine, when we
narrowly inspect into the meaning and definition of the word _existence_,
wh is no simple idea, distinct from perceiving and being perceived(50).
The Schoolmen have noble subjects, but handle them ill. The mathematicians
have trifling subjects, but reason admirably about them. Certainly their
method and arguing are excellent.
God knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings may be enlarg’d
from the Principles.
(M7) The reverse of the Principle I take to have been the chief source of
all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions and inextricable
puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a reproach to human
reason, as well as of that idolatry, whether of images or of gold, that
blinds the greatest part of the world, and that shamefull immorality that
turns us into beasts.
(M8) היה Vixit & fuit.
οὐσία, the name for substance, used by Aristotle, the Fathers, &c.
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If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques much more easie and
much more accurate, wt can be objected to us(51)?
We need not force our imagination to conceive such very small lines for
infinitesimals. They may every whit as well be imagin’d big as little,
since that the integer must be infinite.
Evident that wch has an infinite number of parts must be infinite.
We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great—therefore absurd to
talk or make propositions about it.
We cannot imagine a line, space, &c., quovis lato majus. Since yt what we
imagine must be datum aliquod; a thing can’t be greater than itself.
If you call infinite that wch is greater than any assignable by another,
then I say, in that sense there may be an infinite square, sphere, or any
other figure, wch is absurd.
Qu. if extension be resoluble into points it does not consist of?
No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas(52); therefore no
reasoning about infinitesimals.
No word to be used without an idea.
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(M9) If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. how shall we
will in heaven?
Bayle’s, Malbranch’s, &c. arguments do not seem to prove against Space,
but onely against Bodies.
(M10) I agree in nothing wth the Cartesians as to ye existence of Bodies &
Qualities(53).
Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed to have been
mistaken.
Lines not proper for demonstration.
(M11) We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea and
nothing more. The house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e. an
object—immediate object—of thought(54).
Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.
(M12) Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere(55)]. The
horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before.
(M13) In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but have
not leisure.
(M14) Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine.
Angle not well defined. See Pardies’ Geometry, by Harris, &c. This one
ground of trifling.
(M15) One idea not the cause of another—one power not the cause of
another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Hence trifling to
enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most suitable idea of
the Divinity(56).
(M16) Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as
speculative sciences.
(M17) The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for me.
How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies created before
man(57).
(M18) Impossible anything besides that wch thinks and is thought on should
exist(58).
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That wch is visible cannot be made up of invisible things.
M.S. is that wherein there are not contain’d distinguishable sensible
parts. Now how can that wch hath not sensible parts be divided into
sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into insensible parts, I say
these are nothings.
Extension abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, I grant; but
then there is no such idea, as any one may try(59). There is onely a
considering the number of points without the sort of them, & this makes
more for me, since it must be in a considering thing.
Mem. Before I have shewn the distinction between visible & tangible
extension, I must not mention them as distinct. I must not mention M. T. &
M. V., but in general M. S., &c.(60)
Qu. whether a M. V. be of any colour? a M. T. of any tangible quality?
If visible extension be the object of geometry, ’tis that which is
survey’d by the optique axis.
(M19) I may say the pain is _in_ my finger, &c., according to my
doctrine(61).
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Mem. Nicely to discuss wt is meant when we say a line consists of a
certain number of inches or points, &c.; a circle of a certain number of
square inches, points, &c. Certainly we may think of a circle, or have its
idea in our mind, without thinking of points or square inches, &c.;
whereas it should seem the idea of a circle is not made up of the ideas of
points, square inches, &c.
Qu. Is any more than this meant by the foregoing expressions, viz. that
squares or points may be perceived in or made out of a circle, &c., or
that squares, points, &c. are actually in it, i.e. are perceivable in it?
A line in abstract, or Distance, is the number of points between two
points. There is also distance between a slave & an emperor, between a
peasant & philosopher, between a drachm & a pound, a farthing & a crown,
&c.; in all which Distance signifies the number of intermediate ideas.
Halley’s doctrine about the proportion between infinitely great quantities
vanishes. When men speak of infinite quantities, either they mean finite
quantities, or else talk of [that whereof they have(62)] no idea; both
which are absurd.
If the disputations of the Schoolmen are blam’d for intricacy,
triflingness, & confusion, yet it must be acknowledg’d that in the main
they treated of great & important subjects. If we admire the method &
acuteness of the Math[ematicians]—the length, the subtilty, the exactness
of their demonstrations—we must nevertheless be forced to grant that they
are for the most part about trifling subjects, and perhaps mean nothing at
all.
Motion on 2d thoughts seems to be a simple idea.
(M20) Motion distinct from ye thing moved is not conceivable.
(M21) Mem. To take notice of Newton for defining it [motion]; also of
Locke’s wisdom in leaving it undefin’d(63).
Ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo partium spatii.
Moveantur hæ de locis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita dicam) de seipsis. Truly
number is immensurable. That we will allow with Newton.
(M22) Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his globules without
colour. Pellucidness is a colour. The colour of ordinary light of the sun
is white. Newton in the right in assigning colours to the rays of light.
A man born blind would not imagine Space as we do. We give it always some
dilute, or duskish, or dark colour—in short, we imagine it as visible, or
intromitted by the eye, wch he would not do.
(M23) Proinde vim inferunt sacris literis qui voces hasce (v. tempus,
spatium, motus) de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi interpretantur. Newton, p.
10.
(M24) I differ from Newton, in that I think the recession ab axe motus is
not the effect, or index, or measure of motion, but of the vis impressa.
It sheweth not wt is truly moved, but wt has the force impressed on it, or
rather that wch hath an impressed force.
_D_ and _P_ are not proportional in all circles. _d d_ is to 1/4_d p_ as
_d_ to _p_/4; but _d_ and _p_/4 are not in the same proportion in all
circles. Hence ’tis nonsense to seek the terms of one general proportion
whereby to rectify all peripheries, or of another whereby to square all
circles.
N. B. If the circle be squar’d arithmetically, ’tis squar’d geometrically,
arithmetic or numbers being nothing but lines & proportions of lines when
apply’d to geometry.
Mem. To remark Cheyne(64) & his doctrine of infinites.
Extension, motion, time, do each of them include the idea of succession, &
so far forth they seem to be of mathematical consideration. Number
consisting in succession & distinct perception, wch also consists in
succession; for things at once perceiv’d are jumbled and mixt together in
the mind. Time and motion cannot be conceiv’d without succession; and
extension, qua mathemat., cannot be conceiv’d but as consisting of parts
wch may be distinctly & successively perceiv’d. Extension perceived at
once & _in confuso_ does not belong to math.
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The simple idea call’d Power seems obscure, or rather none at all, but
onely the relation ’twixt Cause and Effect. When I ask whether A can move
B, if A be an intelligent thing, I mean no more than whether the volition
of A that B move be attended with the motion of B? If A be senseless,
whether the impulse of A against B be followed by ye motion of B(65)?
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Barrow’s arguing against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is a petitio
principii, for the Demonstration of Archimedes supposeth the circumference
to consist of more than 24 points. Moreover it may perhaps be necessary to
suppose the divisibility _ad infinitum_, in order to demonstrate that the
radius is equal to the side of the hexagon.
Shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not go on some false
supposition.
A great number of insensibles—or thus, two invisibles, say you, put
together become visible; therefore that M. V. contains or is made up of
invisibles. I answer, the M. V. does not comprise, is not composed of,
invisibles. All the matter amounts to this, viz. whereas I had no idea
awhile agoe, I have an idea now. It remains for you to prove that I came
by the present idea because there were two invisibles added together. I
say the invisibles are nothings, cannot exist, include a
contradiction(66).
I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am vain. Very well. I
shall endeavour patiently to bear up under the most lessening, vilifying
appellations the pride & rage of man can devise. But one thing I know I am
not guilty of. I do not pin my faith on the sleeve of any great man. I act
not out of prejudice or prepossession. I do not adhere to any opinion
because it is an old one, a reviv’d one, a fashionable one, or one that I
have spent much time in the study and cultivation of.
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Sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be employed about lines
and figures, these being things sensible; for as for those you call
insensible, we have proved them to be nonsense, nothing(67).
(M25) If in some things I differ from a philosopher I profess to admire,
’tis for that very thing on account whereof I admire him, namely, the love
of truth. This &c.
(M26) Whenever my reader finds me talk very positively, I desire he’d not
take it ill. I see no reason why certainty should be confined to the
mathematicians.
I say there are no incommensurables, no surds. I say the side of any
square may be assign’d in numbers. Say you assign unto me the side of the
square 10. I ask wt 10—10 feet, inches, &c., or 10 points? If the later, I
deny there is any such square, ’tis impossible 10 points should compose a
square. If the former, resolve yr 10 square inches, feet, &c. into points,
& the number of points must necessarily be a square number whose side is
easily assignable.
A mean proportional cannot be found betwixt any two given lines. It can
onely be found betwixt those the numbers of whose points multiply’d
together produce a square number. Thus betwixt a line of 2 inches & a line
of 5 inches a mean geometrical cannot be found, except the number of
points contained in 2 inches multiply’d by ye number of points contained
in 5 inches make a square number.
If the wit and industry of the Nihilarians were employ’d about the usefull
& practical mathematiques, what advantage had it brought to mankind!
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(M27) You ask me whether the books are in the study now, when no one is
there to see them? I answer, Yes. You ask me, Are we not in the wrong for
imagining things to exist when they are not actually perceiv’d by the
senses? I answer, No. The existence of our ideas consists in being
perceiv’d, imagin’d, thought on. Whenever they are imagin’d or thought on
they do exist. Whenever they are mentioned or discours’d of they are
imagin’d & thought on. Therefore you can at no time ask me whether they
exist or no, but by reason of yt very question they must necessarily
exist.
(M28) But, say you, then a chimæra does exist? I answer, it doth in one
sense, i.e. it is imagin’d. But it must be well noted that existence is
vulgarly restrain’d to actuall perception, and that I use the word
existence in a larger sense than ordinary.(68)
N. B.—According to my doctrine all things are _entia rationis_, i.e. solum
habent esse in intellectum.
(M29) [(69)According to my doctrine all are not _entia rationis_. The
distinction between _ens rationis_ and _ens reale_ is kept up by it as
well as any other doctrine.]
You ask me whether there can be an infinite idea? I answer, in one sense
there may. Thus the visual sphere, tho’ ever so small, is infinite, i.e.
has no end. But if by infinite you mean an extension consisting of
innumerable points, then I ask yr pardon. Points, tho’ never so many, may
be numbered. The multitude of points, or feet, inches, &c., hinders not
their numbrableness (i.e. hinders not their being numerable) in the least.
Many or most are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, if by infinite
idea you mean an _idea_ too great to be comprehended or perceiv’d all at
once, you must excuse me. I think such an infinite is no less than a
contradiction(70).
(M30) The sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me. They
commonly suppose a material world—figures, motions, bulks of various
sizes, &c.—according to their own confession to no purpose. All our
sensations may be, and sometimes actually are, without them; nor can men
so much as conceive it possible they should concur in any wise to the
production of them.
(M31) Ask a man, I mean a philosopher, why he supposes this vast
structure, this compages of bodies? he shall be at a stand; he’ll not have
one word to say. Wch sufficiently shews the folly of the hypothesis.
(M32) Or rather why he supposes all ys Matter? For bodies and their
qualities I do allow to exist independently of _our_ mind.
(M33) Qu. How is the soul distinguish’d from its ideas? Certainly if there
were no sensible ideas there could be no soul, no perception, remembrance,
love, fear, &c.; no faculty could be exerted(71).
(M34) The soul is the Will, properly speaking, and as it is distinct from
ideas.
(M35) The grand puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake, easily solv’d.
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Qu. Whether minima or meer minima may not be compar’d by their sooner or
later evanescence, as well as by more or less points, so that one sensible
may be greater than another, though it exceeds it not by one point?
Circles on several radius’s are not similar figures, they having neither
all nor any an infinite number of sides. Hence in vain to enquire after 2
terms of one and ye same proportion that should constantly express the
reason of the _d_ to the _p_ in all circles.
Mem. To remark Wallis’s harangue, that the aforesaid proportion can
neither be expressed by rational numbers nor surds.
We can no more have an idea of length without breadth or visibility, than
of a general figure.
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One idea may be like another idea, tho’ they contain no common simple
idea(72). Thus the simple idea red is in some sense like the simple idea
blue; ’tis liker it than sweet or shrill. But then those ideas wch are so
said to be alike, agree both in their connexion with another simple idea,
viz. extension, & in their being receiv’d by one & the same sense. But,
after all, nothing can be like an idea but an idea.
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No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my doctrine.
(M36) Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov’d by the
attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many other
the like absurditys.
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Enquire concerning the pendulum clock, &c.; whether those inventions of
Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.
The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and neglected, as so
many noughts or nothings.
Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their colours, whether
they have any or no, & whether they can be of that green wch seems to be
compounded of yellow and blue.
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(M37) Qu. Whether it were not better _not_ to call the operations of the
mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible(73)?
(M38) Mem. diligently to set forth how that many of the ancient
philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the existence of
motion, and of those other things they perceiv’d actually by their senses.
This sprung from their not knowing wt Existence was, and wherein it
consisted. This the source of all their folly. ’Tis on the discovering of
the nature and meaning and import of Existence that I chiefly insist. This
puts a wide difference betwixt the sceptics &c. & me. This I think wholly
new. I am sure this is new to me(74).
We have learn’d from Mr. Locke that there may be, and that there are,
several glib, coherent, methodical discourses, which nevertheless amount
to just nothing. This by him intended with relation to the Scholemen. We
may apply it to the Mathematicians.
Qu. How can all words be said to stand for ideas? The word blue stands for
a colour without any extension, or abstract from extension. But we have
not an idea of colour without extension. We cannot imagine colour without
extension.
Locke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one for communicating
& the other for recording our thoughts. ’Tis absurd to use words for
recording our thoughts to ourselves, or in our private meditations(75).
No one abstract simple idea like another. Two simple ideas may be
connected with one & the same 3d simple idea, or be intromitted by one &
the same sense. But consider’d in themselves they can have nothing common,
and consequently no likeness.
Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems not so easily
as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever are particular. I
can by no means conceive an abstract general idea. ’Tis one thing to
abstract one concrete idea from another of a different kind, & another
thing to abstract an idea from all particulars of the same kind(76).
(M39) Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental philosophy.
(M40) What means Cause as distinguish’d from Occasion? Nothing but a being
wch wills, when the effect follows the volition. Those things that happen
from without we are not the cause of. Therefore there is some other Cause
of them, i.e. there is a Being that wills these perceptions in us(77).
(M41) [(78)It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills being
unintelligible.]
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One square cannot be double of another. Hence the Pythagoric theorem is
false.
Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent place of
the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.
Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing terminate in green. This may
help to prove the composition of green.
There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to blew &
yellow. Therefore green is compounded.
A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours are all
compounded that we see.
Mem. To consider Newton’s two sorts of green.
N. B. My abstract & general doctrines ought not to be condemn’d by the
Royall Society. ’Tis wt their meeting did ultimately intend. V. Sprat’s
History S. R.(79)
Mem. To premise a definition of idea(80).
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(M42) The 2 great principles of Morality—the being of a God & the freedom
of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the Second Book(81).
Subvertitur geometria ut non practica sed speculativa.
Archimedes’s proposition about squaring the circle has nothing to do with
circumferences containing less than 96 points; & if the circumference
contain 96 points it may be apply’d, but nothing will follow against
indivisibles. V. Barrow.
Those curve lines that you can rectify geometrically. Compare them with
their equal right lines & by a microscope you shall discover an
inequality. Hence my squaring of the circle as good and exact as the best.
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(M43) Qu. whether the substance of body or anything else be any more than
the collection of concrete ideas included in that thing? Thus the
substance of any particular body is extension, solidity, figure(82). Of
general abstract body we can have no idea.
(M44) Mem. Most carefully to inculcate and set forth that the endeavouring
to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words unavoidably runs a man
into difficulties. This to be done in the Introduction(83).
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Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is meant by this
axiom: Quæ sibi mutuo congruunt æqualia sunt.
Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether, according to
their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly be equal to a
right line?
If wth me you call those lines equal wch contain an equal number of
points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is equal to a right
line wch contains the same points as the right one doth.
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