(1) That _communication_ is necessary, and that for communication
to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of
being stated precisely (above all, in the so-called _identical_ case).
In order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something
_adjusted,_ as "_recognisable_." The material of the senses, arranged
by the understanding, reduced to coarse leading features, made similar
to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness
and the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, _made logical._
(2) The _phenomenal_ world is the adjusted world which _we believe
to be real,_ Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar,
familiar, and related things, in their _rationalised character,_ and in
the belief that we are here able to reckon and determine.
(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is not "the real world,"
but the amorphous and unadjustable world consisting of the chaos of
sensations--that is to say, _another kind_ of phenomenal; world, a
world which to us is "unknowable."
(4) The question how things-in-themselves are constituted, quite apart
from our sense-receptivity and from the activity of our understanding,
must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know
_that things existed?_ "Thingness" is one of our own inventions. The
question is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating
such a world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising,
adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed _reality_ itself:
in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things" is not
the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us"
be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects.... The
other "creatures" act upon us; our _adjusted_ world of appearance
is an arrangement and an _overpowering_ of its activities: a sort
of _defensive_ measure. _The subject alone is demonstrable_;
the _hypothesis_ might be advanced _that subjects are all that
exist,_--that "object" is only a form of action of subject upon
subject ... a _modus of the subject._
_(k)_ The Metaphysical Need.
570.
If one resembles all the philosophers that have gone before, one
can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees
only what _is._ But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the
philosophers had to deal with was a host of _fancies,_ this was their
"world."
571.
To assert the _existence_ as a whole of things concerning which we know
nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know
anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the
result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm
of morals and metaphysics.
572.
An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his
earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous
residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought;
he believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing
or a man becomes, _the more valuable he becomes: the less real,_ the
greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet
further audacity in the matter of turning tables--he measured the
degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more
there is of "idea" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept
"reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the
nearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'"--Is this
understood? It was the _greatest of all rechristenings:_ and because
Christianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At
bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, _placed appearance before_
Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before
actuality!--He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance,
that he granted it the attributes of "Being," "causality," "goodness,"
and "truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with
value.
The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.
The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.
573.
The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely spiritual,
intellectual, and good, is an _emergency measure_ to the extent to
which the _antagonistic_ instincts are all-powerful....
Moderation and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the
humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who
entertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were
pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.
The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a
sign of _progress_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads
Goethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is
felt as being upon a lower plane.
574.
The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of
the conditioned out of the unconditioned.
It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to
the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented
the "ego" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures
the world according to a host of self-devised measurements--according
to its fundamental fictions "the unconditioned," "end and means,"
"things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and
forms.
There would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did
not first so _re-create_ the world into "things" which are in its own
image. It is only _through_ thought that there is _untruth._
The _origin_ of thought, like that of _feelings,_ cannot be traced:
but that is _no_ proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply
shows that we cannot get _behind it,_ because we have nothing else save
thought and feeling.
575.
To know is to _point to past experience:_ in its nature it is a
_regressus in infinitum._ That which halts (in the face of a so-called
_causa prima_ or the unconditioned, etc.) is _laziness,_ weariness.
576.
_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics_--the influence of fear. That
which has been most feared, the cause of the _greatest suffering_ (lust
of power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest
amount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the "real" world. Thus
the _passions_ have been step by step _struck out,_ God posited as
the opposite of evil--that is to say, reality is conceived to be the
_negation of the passions and the emotions_ (i.e. _nonentity_).
_Irrationality,_ impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover,
hated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). _Consequently_
they denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as
absolute "rationality" and "conformity of means to ends."
_Change_ and _perishability_ were also feared; and by this fear an
oppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences
(the case with _Spinoza_: a man differently constituted would have
regarded this change as a charm).
A nature overflowing and _playing_ with energy, would call precisely
the _passions, irrationality_ and _change, good_ in a eudemonistic
sense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc.
577.
Against the value of that which always remains the same (remember
Spinoza's artlessness and Descartes' likewise), the value of the
shortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the
belly of the serpent _vita_----
578.
_Moral values in epistemology itself:_--
The faith in reason--why not mistrust?
The "real world" is the good world--why?
Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as
immoral: the desire for a world which _knows nothing_ of
these things.
The transcendental world discovered, _so that_ a place may
be kept for "moral freedom" (as in Kant).
Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates:
probably because sophistry was held to be the road to
immorality).
Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in
the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no
imperfection, a _justification_ of God.
Epicurus _denied_ the possibility of knowledge, in order to
keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the
highest.
Augustine does the same, and later Pascal ("corrupted
reason"), in favour of Christian values.
Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise
Spinoza's.
579.
_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics._--This world is only
apparent: _therefore_ there must be a real world;--this world is
conditioned: _consequently_ there must be an unconditioned world;--this
world is contradictory: _consequently_ there is a world free from
contradiction;--this world is evolving: _consequently_ there is
somewhere a static world:--a host of false conclusions (blind faith
in reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also _exist_). Pain
_inspires these conclusions_: at bottom they are _withes_ that such
a world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering
is likewise revealed by the fact that another and _better_ world is
imagined: the _resentment_ of the metaphysician against reality is
creative here.
_The second_ series of questions: _wherefore_ suffer? ... and from
this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real
world to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world:
(1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible?
(2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible?
(A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society,
universalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be
causally determined by the unconditioned, then the _freedom to err, to
be sinful,_ must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more
the question arises, _to what purpose?_ ... The world of appearance, of
Becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore _willed; to what
purpose?_
The error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are
formed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other
"_must_" also correspond to a reality. "_Whence_" would one otherwise
derive its contradictory concept? _Reason_ is thus a source of
revelation concerning the absolute.
But the _origin_ of the above contradictions _need not necessarily_ be
a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t_he real
genesis_ of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from
utilitarian spheres, hence the _strong faith_ it commands _(one is
threatened with ruin_ if one's conclusions are not in conformity with
this reason; but this fact is no "_proof_" of what the latter asserts).
_The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,_ is quite artless.
"Eternal blessedness": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men
never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental
conditions: both of them must be desired when one _will attain to_
something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians
and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and
pain into the foreground. Even _morality_ in their eyes derives its
great importance _only_ from the fact that it is regarded as an
essential condition for abolishing pain.
_The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error_
the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related
(confusion: happiness in "certainty," in "faith").
580.
To what extent are the various _epistemological positions_
(materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The
source of the highest feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") may
also judge concerning the problem of _reality_!
The measure of _positive knowledge_ is quite a matter of indifference
and beside the point; as witness the development of Indici.
The Buddhistic _negation_ of reality in general (appearance pain) is
perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of
categories, not only for an "absolute world," but a recognition of
the _erroneous procedures_ by means of which the whole concept has
been reached. "Absolute reality," "Being in itself," a contradiction.
In a world of _Becoming,_ reality is merely a _simplification_ for
the purpose of practical ends, or a _deception_ resulting from the
coarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming.
The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the
fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is
denied. ("_Something_" becomes.)
581.
_Being_ and _Becoming._--"_Reason_" developed upon a sensualistic basis
upon the _prejudices of the senses_--that is to say, with the belief in
the truth of the judgment of the senses.
"Being," as the generalisation of the concept "_Life_" (breath), "to be
animate," "to will," "to act upon," "become."
The opposite is: "to be inanimate," "_not_ to become," "_not_ to will."
_Thus_: "Being" is _not_ opposed to "not-Being," to "appearance," nor
is it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).
The "soul," the "ego," posited as _primeval facts;_ and introduced
wherever _there is Becoming._
582.
_Being_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from
"_living._"--How then can everything "be" dead?
583.
_A._
I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate
of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ
of knowledge for the real world--be it what it may.
At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this
contradiction established?...
The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also
understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we
should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are _no_ proofs
of the actual _possibility_ of an objective world. Who urges us to
believe that subjectivity _is_ real or essential?
The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence"
is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always _relative_ to us.
The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real,"
the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable"
have been spread abroad.
The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world;
appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real"
world can be absolutely "valuable"....
_Prejudice of prejudices!_ It is perfectly possible in itself that
the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the
first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to
make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of
situations--for instance, marriage.
Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits
to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that
as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the
species....
_(a)_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a
real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of
appearance, but not _our_ world of appearance.)
_(b)_ Taking the _real_ world for granted, it might still be the _less
valuable_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest
order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless
_appearance_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?)
_(c)_ That there exists a correlation between the _degrees of value_
and the _degrees of reality_ (so that the highest values also possessed
the greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which
starts out with the hypothesis that we _know_ the order of rank among
values; and that this order is a _moral_ one. It is only on this
hypothesis that _truth_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of
a superior value.
_B._
It is of cardinal importance that the _real world_ should be
suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and
depredator of values, concerning the _world which we are_: it was our
most dangerous_ attempt_ heretofore on the life of Life.
_War_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been
imagined. The notion that _moral values_ are the _highest_ values,
belongs to this hypothesis.
The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could
be shown to be the result of an _immoral_ valuation--a specific case
of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an _appearance,_
and as an _appearance_ it would cease from having any right to condemn
appearance.
_C._
Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it
is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have
to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every _immoral_ means
there is; above all, of the metaphysicians.
At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing
the assumption that moral values are the highest values, _Method in
research_ is attained only when all _moral prejudices_ have been
overcome: it represents a conquest over morality....
584.
The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that,
instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely
a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is
to say, especially, a useful _falsification_), they were taken to be
the criterion of truth--particularly of _reality._ The "criterion
of truth" was, as a matter of fact, merely the _biological utility
of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:_ and,
since a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own
preservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of "truth." Where
the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric
idiosyncrasy as the _measure of things,_ as the canon for recognising
the "real" and the "unreal": in short, in making a relative thing
absolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves,
"real" and "apparent": and precisely that world which man's reason had
arranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of
using the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable
and calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that
in these categories the concept of that world is given which does
not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The
means were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a
condemnation of their original purpose....
The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means
thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which
the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and
wieldy scheme.
But woe! a _moral category_ was now brought into the game: no creature
would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently
there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?
The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to
which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself,
cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.
That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really
fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a
criterion of reality had been found--whereas their only purpose was to
master reality, by _misunderstanding_ it intelligently....
And behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities
_which constitute its reality,_ namely, change, evolution,
multifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the
whole fatality was there.
1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was
the real and only one).
2. How does one become one's self as remote as possible from the
world of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast
to the real being; or, more correctly still, as _the contradiction of
life_....).
The whole direction of values was towards the _slander of life_; people
deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so
that the opposing parties also began to reject _science_ with horror.
Thus the road to science was _doubly_ barred: first, by the belief
in the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief.
Natural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2)
deprived of their artlessness....
Everything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in
the real world, that to condemn, or to _think away_ anything, means to
condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," "this
ought not to be," are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences,
one would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which
is in any sense whatever _dangerous or destructive._ Physiology proves
this _much better_!
We see how morality _(a) poisons_ the whole concept of the world, _(b)_
cuts off the way to _science, (c)_ dissipates and undermines all real
instincts (by teaching that their root is _immoral_).
We thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds
in remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it
assumes.
585.
The awful recovery of our _consciousness:_ not of the individual, but
of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us
follow the narrow and broad highway.
_A._
Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself,
that does not deceive, that does not change, a _real_ world--a
world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception,
variability---the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is
such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to
it. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and _not_ real.)
Whence does man derive the concept of _reality_? --Why does he make
variability, deception, contradiction, the origin of _suffering;_ why
not rather of his happiness? ...
The contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies:
whence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth
is _merely_ the longing for a _stable world._
The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: _therefore,_ it was
concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most _spiritual_
ideas must be nearest to the "real world."--It is from the senses that
the greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and
destroyers.
Happiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude
each other. The loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is
the formula for the way to happiness.
_In summa:_ The world as it _ought_ to be exists; this world in which
we live is an error--this our world should _not_ exist.
_The belief in Being_ shows itself only as a result: the real primum
_mobile_ is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the
scorn of all Becoming....
What kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, _suffering_
kind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind
of man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not
require the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead,
tedious, and indifferent....
The belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a
belief proper to the unfruitful, _who do not wish to create a world as
it should be._ They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways
of attaining to it. "The will to truth"--_is the impotence of the will
to create._
To recognise that something } Antagonism in
is _thus_ or _thus:_ } the degrees of
To act so that something will } energy in
be _thus_ or _thus:_ } various natures.
The fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological
artifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we
honour and regard as pleasant, with this _real world._
"The will to truth" at this stage is essentially _the art of
interpretation:_ to which also belongs that interpretation which still
possesses strength.
The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, _no longer possessed
of the power_ to interpret and to create fictions, produces the
Nihi_lists._ A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is,
that it ought _not_ to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that
it does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering,
willing, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the "in vain" is the
Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos it is moreover an _inconsistency_ on
the part of the Nihilist.
He who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without
either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, _i.e._
he believes that a will is already in them.
The degree of a man's _will-power_ may be measured from the extent to
which he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to
which he is able to endure a world without meaning: _because he himself
arranges a small portion of it._
The _philosophical objective view of things_ may thus be a sign of
poverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is
closest and next; the "scientists," whose only desire is to _ascertain_
what exists, are such as cannot arrange things _as they ought to be._
The _artists,_ an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol
of what should exist,--they are productive inasmuch as they actually
_alter_ and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as
it is.
_The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;_
the same species of man (_they attribute the highest degree of
reality_ to the _things which are valued highest_).
_The connection between philosophers and moral men_ and their
evaluations (the _moral_ interpretation of the world as the sense of
the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).
_The overcoming of philosophers_ by the annihilation of the world of
being: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient
strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of
becoming, and of appearance, the _only_ world to be deified and called
good.
_B._
Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing
_strength_ or of increasing _weakness_:--
Partly owing to the fact that the strength _to create_ and _to will_
has grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective
interpretation and introduction of a _sense_ ("present duties," state,
etc.);
Partly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary
to invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling
condition. The inability to _believe_ in a sense becomes "unbelief."
What is the meaning of _science_ in regard to both possibilities?
(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control; it shows an _ability_ to
dispense with healing, consoling worlds of illusion.
(2) It is also able to undermine, to dissect, to disappoint, and to
weaken.
_C._
_The belief in truth,_ the need of holding to something which is
believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations
that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.
At the same time _unbelief:_ Reduction. In what way does it acquire a
_new value,_ if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the
capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been _lavished_ upon the world
of being, becomes free once more).
586.