558.
The thing-in-itself is nonsense. If I think all the "relations," all
the "qualities" all the "activities" of a thing, away, the thing itself
does _not_ remain: for "thingness" was only _invented fancifully_ by
us to meet certain logical needs--that is to say, for the purposes of
definition and comprehension (in order to correlate that multitude of
relations, qualities, and activities).
559.
"Things which have a nature _in themselves_"--a dogmatic idea, which
must be absolutely abandoned.
560.
That things should have a _nature in themselves,_ quite apart from
interpretation and subjectivity, _is a perfectly idle hypothesis_:
it would presuppose that _interpretation_ and the _act of being
subjective_ are not essential, that a thing divorced from all its
relations can still be a thing.
Or, the other way round: the apparent _objective_ character of things;
might it not be merely the result of a _difference of degree_ within
the subject perceiving?--could not that which changes slowly strike
us as being objective, lasting, Being, "in-itself"?--could not the
objective view be only a false way of conceiving things and a contrast
_within_ the perceiving subject?
561.
If all unity were only unity as organisation. But the "thing" in
which we believe was _invented_ only as a substratum to the various
attributes. If the thing "acts," it means: we regard _all the other_
qualities which are to hand, and which are momentarily latent, as
the cause accounting for the fact that one individual quality steps
forward--that is to say, _we take the sum of its qualities--x--_as
the cause of the quality _x_; which is obviously _quite_ absurd and
imbecile!
All unity is _only so_ in the form of _organisation_ and _collective
action:_ in the same way as a human community is a unity--that is to
say, _the reverse of_ atomic _anarchy_; thus it is a body politic,
which _stands for_ one, yet _is_ not one.
562.
"At some time in the development of thought, a point must have been
reached when man became conscious of the fact that what he called
the _qualities of a thing_ were merely the sensations of the feeling
subject: and thus the qualities ceased from belonging to the thing."
The "thing-in-itself" remained over. 'The distinction between the
thing-in-itself and the thing-for-us, is based upon that older and
artless observation which would fain grant energy to things: but
analysis revealed that even force was only ascribed to them by our
fancy, as was also--substance. "The thing affects a subject?" Thus the
root of the idea of substance is in language, not in things outside
ourselves! The thing-in-itself is not a problem at all!
Being will have to be conceived as a sensation which is no longer based
upon anything quite devoid of sensation.
In movement no new _meaning_ is given to feeling. That which is, cannot
be the substance of movement: it is therefore a form of Being.
_N.B._--The explanation of life may be sought, in the first
place, through mental images of phenomena which _precede_ it
(purposes);
Secondly, through mental images of phenomena which follow
behind it (the mathematico-physical explanation).
The two should not be confounded. Thus: the physical explanation, which
is the symbolisation of the world by means of feeling and thought,
cannot in itself make feeling and thinking originate again and show
its derivation: physics must rather construct the world of feeling,
consistently _without feeling or purpose _ right up to the highest man.
And teleology is only a _history of purposes,_ and is never physical.
563.
Our method of acquiring "knowledge" is limited to a process of
establishing _quantities,_ but we can by no means help feeling the
difference of quantity as differences of _quality._ Quality is merely a
_relative_ truth for _us_; it is not a "thing-in-itself."
Our senses have a certain definite quantum as a mean, within the limits
of which they perform their functions--that is to say, we become
conscious of bigness and smallness in accordance with the conditions of
our existence. If we sharpened or blunted our senses tenfold, we should
perish--that is to say, we feel even _proportions_ as _qualities_ in
regard to our possibilities of existence.
564.
But could not all _quantities_ be merely tokens of _qualities_? Another
consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power
in fact, another point of view; growth in itself is the expression of
a desire _to become more;_ the desire for a greater _quantum_ springs
from a certain _quale,_ in a purely quantitative world, everything
would be dead, stiff, and motionless.--The reduction of all qualities
to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered that they can only stand
together, an analogy--
565.
Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help
feeling mere _differences of quantity_ as something fundamentally
different from quantity--that is to say, as _qualities,_ which we can
no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to
which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm
of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely,
all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to
the realm of qualities, _i.e._ to those truths which belong to us alone
and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be "known." It is
obvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different
qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest.
Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that
these our human interpretations and values, should be general and
perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.
566.
The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was
always the world of appearance _over again._
567.
The world of appearance, _i.e._ a world regarded in the light of
values; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in
this case, according to the standpoint of utility in regard to the
preservation and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.
It is _the point of view,_ then, which accounts for the character of
"appearance." As if a world could remain over, when the point of view
is cancelled! By such means _relativity_ would also be cancelled!
Every centre of energy has its _point of view_ of the whole of the
_remainder_ of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite
_valuation,_ its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The "world of
appearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world
proceeding from a centre.
But there is no other kind of action: and the "world" is only a word
for the collective play of these actions. _Reality_ consists precisely
in this particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against
the whole.
There no longer remains a shadow of a _right_ to speak here of
"appearance." ...
The _specific way of reacting_ is the only way of reacting; we do not
know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.
But there is no "_other,_" no "real," no essential being,--for thus a
world _without_ action and reaction would be expressed....
The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to
the antitheses "world" and "nonentity."
568.
A criticism of the concept "_real and apparent_ world."--Of these two
the first is a mere fiction, formed out of a host of imaginary things.
Appearance itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; _i.e._
in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable
world of _identical_ cases must first be created through _appearance;_
a _tempo_ in which observation and comparison is possible, etc.
"Appearance" is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our
_practical_ instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we
_live_ in it, we can live in it: _this is the proof_ of its truth as
far as we are concerned....
The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the
world, which we have _not_ adjusted to our being, our logic, and our
psychological prejudices--does _not_ exist as a world "in-itself"; it
is essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has
a _different aspect_ from every different point at which it is seen:
it presses against every point, and every point resists it--and these
collective relations are in every case _incongruent._
The _measure of power_ determines what _being_ possesses the other
measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, it acts or
resists.
Our particular case is interesting enough: we have created a conception
in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just
enough to enable us to _endure_ life in that world....
569.