No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new
points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its
probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in
sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and
hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of
life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually
contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external
world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself
made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent
assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound
absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly
confused.--So that--and this the Sûtra means to indicate--Buddha's
doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard
for their own happiness.
33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one
thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the
Gymnosophists (Jainas).
The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jîva),
non-soul (ajîva), the issuing outward (âsrava), restraint (sa/m/vara),
destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412].
Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul
and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under
these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the
two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikâyas
('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul
(jîva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space
(âkâ/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful
ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning,
which they call the saptabha@ngînaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not;
somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and
is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is
and is not and is indescribable.
To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions
as that of unity and eternity[414].
This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is
inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to
say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and
non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just
as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the
same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many
and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in
the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of
indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt
is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than
one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny
this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive
nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative
predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a
definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion
and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are
not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the
knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how
can the Tîrthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can
his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether
indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is
known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation.
Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents
does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a
madman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the
five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are
five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of
view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it
logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are
so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are
described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction.
And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are
ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not
ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being
ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that
imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the
opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like
a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly
world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or
non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied
in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of
gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows
from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you
claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from
all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute
indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being
and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding
non-being and vice versâ non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the
Ârhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the
assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding
whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality,
permanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so
on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by
them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its
refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given
in a previous part of this work.
34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine)
non-universality of the Self.
We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting
from the syâdvâda, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory
attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it
would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not
omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size
as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite
extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar
things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of
different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the
size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former
deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not
be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being
relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient
room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to
the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old
age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as
consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing
compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask
in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul
may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows
that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of
limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the
space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle
only, the extension of all the particles together will remain
inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of
the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited
size contains an infinite number of soul particles.
Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the
soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw
from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next
Sûtra furnishes a reply.
35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts
acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c.
(of the soul).
Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be
satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive
accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve
the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually
being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of
parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is
liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and
similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine
of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the
soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of
works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sâra, rises when its bonds are
sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is
freed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which
in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and
cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the
body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently
remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine
which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further
to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the
soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it.
They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements;
for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence
of some other, general or special, reservoir of
soul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul
would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and
departing is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar
difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns
attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.
The Sûtra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sûtra
has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be
permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its
limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that
although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent,
just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually
changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of
the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth
and so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sûtra replies that
if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general
void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with
the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view
impossible.
36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and
the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no
difference (of size, at any time).
Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size
of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows
also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be
permanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three
sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies
of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter
into bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sûtra in a
somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is
permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also
is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the
same size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of
its bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be
set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.
37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the
inappropriateness (of that doctrine).
The Sûtrakâra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine,
according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as
he is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport
of the Sûtra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any
qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher
himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord
is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the
present Sûtra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general,
the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory,
and the Sûtrakâra would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore
must assume that the purport of the present Sûtra is to make an
energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is
not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause
of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedântic tenet of the
unity of Brahman.
The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedânta are of
various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga systems
assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the
pradhâna and of the souls, and that pradhâna, soul, and Lord are of
mutually different nature.--The Máhe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that
the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain,
were taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the
bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them,
the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others
also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow
the operative cause of the world.
Against all these opinions the Sûtra remarks 'the Lord, on account of
the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the
ruler of the pradhâna and the soul should be the cause of the world, on
account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is
supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low,
intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows
that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of
us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming
that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of
the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical
see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be
considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is
not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the
resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no
beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual
interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series
is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is,
moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyâyikas themselves that
'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action'
(Nyâya Sùtra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they
be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else,
are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted
that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by
an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the
Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives
only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with
pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that
you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it
follows that he must be devoid of all activity.
38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord
with the souls and the pradhâna).
Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the
further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhâna and the souls
cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a
certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be
conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhâna and
the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be
inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the
abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other
connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from
the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not
settled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the
Vedântins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord
and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the
connexion we assume is that of identity (tâdâtmya). The adherent of
Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the
basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets
throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand,
who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances
furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines
as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that
Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be
used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedântin; for that
would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord
being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of
Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For
all these reasons the Sâ@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid
of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on
the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.
39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the
Lord).
The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis,
for the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume
that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhâna, &c. just
as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be
admitted; for the pradhâna, which is devoid of colour and other
qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account
of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence
cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.
40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhâna
is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.
Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the
pradhâna in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the
other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not
objects of perception.
This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the
organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels
pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs).
But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c.
caused by the pradhâna. If the analogy between the pradhâna and the
bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is
affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.
Or else the two preceding Sûtras may be explained in a different way.
Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of
countries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if
we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of
earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve
as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to
the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not
previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid
of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires
a material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord
possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even
previously to creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the
Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary
transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.
41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration
or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).
The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the
following reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of
infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhâna, as well as the
individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord
either defines the measure of the pradhâna, the souls, and himself, or
does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under
discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhâna, the souls, and
the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of
finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of
definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist.
The numerical measure of pradhâna, souls, and Lord is defined by their
constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must
likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is
omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one[418]. From among this
limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sâra, that
means their sa/m/sâra comes to an end, and their subjection to the
samsâra comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so
there will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sâra and the sa/m/sâra
state of all souls. But the pradhâna which is ruled by the Lord and
which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by
sa/m/sâra. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for
the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer
any objects. But if the pradhâna, the souls, and the Lord, all have an
end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a
beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general
void.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions,
maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord
himself, the pradhâna, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But
that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet
granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.
For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers,
according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears
unacceptable.
42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the
individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas
cannot be accepted).
We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that
the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative
cause of the world. We are now going to refute the doctrine of those
according to whom he is the material as well as the operative
cause.--But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present
work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material,
as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on
the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti,
in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should
we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?--It is true, we reply, that
a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the
Vedânta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another
part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we
intend to attack.
The so-called Bhâgavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat)
Vâsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and
that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyûha), as
Vâsudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vâsudeva denotes the
highest Self, Sa@nkarsha/n/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind
(manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra). Of these four
Vâsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three
others are the effects.--The believer after having worshipped Vâsudeva
for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana),
procuring of things to be offered (upâdâna), oblation (îjyâ), recitation
of prayers, &c. (svâdhyâya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond
all affliction and reaches the highest Being.
Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the
doctrine that Nârâya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the
highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself
in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is
onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the
highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the
inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being
which appears in the Bhâgavata doctrine under the forms of reverential
approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well
from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the
doctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vâsudeva, Pradyumna from
Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from
Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a,
i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach
to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong
to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the
highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by
entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the
teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhâgavata
hypothesis is unacceptable.
43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the
agent.
The Bhâgavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that
observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the
like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman.
But the Bhâgavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul
termed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal
organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent
another instrument, viz. the aha@nkâra termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines
cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with
any scriptural passage in their favour.
44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vâsudeva,
&c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the
objection raised in Sûtra 42).
Let us then--the Bhâgavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and
so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e.
powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of
rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength,
valour, glory. All these are Vâsudevas free from faults, without a
substratum (not sprung from pradhâna), without any imperfections. Hence
the objection urged in Sûtra 42 does not apply.
Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the
'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of
origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to
say that the four individual Lords, Vâsudeva, and so on, have the same
attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you
commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the
work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby
against your own principle, according to which there is only one real
essence, viz. the holy Vâsudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that
from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing
equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sûtra 42 remains
valid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vâsudeva, nor
Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the
attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of
any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect
requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in
the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than
the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply
impossible. But the followers of the Pâ/ñk/arâtra do not acknowledge any
difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between
Vâsudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of
Vâsudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vâsudeva cannot
properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a
blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme
Being.