The philosopher who maintains that all things are momentary only would
have to extend that doctrine to the perceiving person (upalabdh/ri/)
also; that is, however, not possible, on account of the remembrance
which is consequent on the original perception. That remembrance can
take place only if it belongs to the same person who previously made the
perception; for we observe that what one man has experienced is not
remembered by another man. How, indeed, could there arise the conscious
state expressed in the sentences, 'I saw that thing, and now I see this
thing,' if the seeing person were not in both cases the same? That the
consciousness of recognition takes place only in the case of the
observing and remembering subject being one, is a matter known to every
one; for if there were, in the two cases, different subjects, the state
of consciousness arising in the mind of the remembering person would be,
'_I_ remember; another person made the observation.' But no such state
of consciousness does arise.--When, on the other hand, such a state of
consciousness does arise, then everybody knows that the person who made
the original observation, and the person who remembers, are different
persons, and then the state of consciousness is expressed as follows, 'I
remember that that other person saw that and that.'--In the case under
discussion, however, the Vainâ/s/ika himself--whose state of
consciousness is, 'I saw that and that'--knows that there is one
thinking subject only to which the original perception as well as the
remembrance belongs, and does not think of denying that the past
perception belonged to himself, not any more than he denies that fire is
hot and gives light.
As thus one agent is connected with the two moments of perception and
subsequent remembrance, the Vainâ/s/ika has necessarily to abandon the
doctrine of universal momentariness. And if he further recognises all
his subsequent successive cognitions, up to his last breath, to belong
to one and the same subject, and in addition cannot but attribute all
his past cognitions, from the moment of his birth, to the same Self, how
can he maintain, without being ashamed of himself, that everything has a
momentary existence only? Should he maintain that the recognition (of
the subject as one and the same) takes place on account of the
similarity (of the different self-cognitions; each, however, being
momentary only), we reply that the cognition of similarity is based on
two things, and that for that reason the advocate of universal
momentariness who denies the existence of one (permanent) subject able
mentally to grasp the two similar things simply talks deceitful nonsense
when asserting that recognition is founded on similarity. Should he
admit, on the other hand, that there is one mind grasping the similarity
of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one
entity endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of
universal momentariness.--Should it be said that the cognition 'this is
similar to that' is a different (new) cognition, not dependent on the
apperception of the earlier and later momentary existences, we refute
this by the remark that the fact of different terms--viz. 'this' and
'that'--being used points to the existence of different things (which
the mind grasps in a judgment of similarity). If the mental act of which
similarity is the object were an altogether new act (not concerned with
the two separate similar entities), the expression 'this is similar to
that' would be devoid of meaning; we should in that case rather speak of
'similarity' only.--Whenever (to add a general reflexion) something
perfectly well known from ordinary experience is not admitted by
philosophers, they may indeed establish their own view and demolish the
contrary opinion by means of words, but they thereby neither convince
others nor even themselves. Whatever has been ascertained to be such and
such must also be represented as such and such; attempts to represent it
as something else prove nothing but the vain talkativeness of those who
make those attempts. Nor can the hypothesis of mere similarity being
cognised account for ordinary empirical life and thought; for (in
recognising a thing) we are conscious of it being that which we were
formerly conscious of, not of it being merely similar to that. We admit
that sometimes with regard to an external thing a doubt may arise
whether it is that or merely is similar to that; for mistakes may be
made concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject
never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself; it
rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which
yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that
sensation.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Nihilists is to be
rejected.
26. (Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not
being observed.
The system of the Vainâ/s/ikas is objectionable for this reason also
that those who deny the existence of permanent stable causes are driven
to maintain that entity springs from non-entity. This latter tenet is
expressly enunciated by the Bauddhas where they say, 'On account of the
manifestation (of effects) not without previous destruction (of the
cause).' For, they say, from the decomposed seed only the young plant
springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has
ceased to be a lump when it becomes a jar. If effects did spring from
the unchanged causes, all effects would originate from all causes at
once, as then no specification would be required[403]. Hence, as we see
that young plants, &c. spring from seeds, &c. only after the latter have
been merged in non-existence, we hold that entity springs from
non-entity.
To this Bauddha tenet we reply, '(Entity does) not (spring) from
non-entity, on account of that not being observed.' If entity did spring
from non-entity, the assumption of special causes would be purportless,
since non-entity is in all cases one and the same. For the non-existence
of seeds and the like after they have been destroyed is of the same kind
as the non-existence of horns of hares and the like, i.e. non-existence
is in all cases nothing else but the absence of all character of
reality, and hence there would be no sense (on the doctrine of
origination from non-existence) in assuming that sprouts are produced
from seeds only, curds from milk only, and so on. And if
non-distinguished non-existence were admitted to have causal efficiency,
we should also have to assume that sprouts, &c. originate from the horns
of hares, &c.--a thing certainly not actually observed.--If, again, it
should be assumed that there are different kinds of non-existence having
special distinctions--just as, for instance, blueness and the like are
special qualities of lotuses and so on--we point out that in that case
the fact of there being such special distinctions would turn the
non-entities into entities no less real than lotuses and the like. In no
case non-existence would possess causal efficiency, simply because, like
the horn of a hare, it is non-existence merely.--Further, if existence
sprang from non-existence, all effects would be affected with
non-existence; while as a matter of fact they are observed to be merely
positive entities distinguished by their various special
characteristics. Nor[404] does any one think that things of the nature
of clay, such as pots and the like, are the effects of threads and the
like; but everybody knows that things of the nature of clay are the
effects of clay only.--The Bauddha's tenet that nothing can become a
cause as long as it remains unchanged, but has to that end to undergo
destruction, and that thus existence springs from non-existence only is
false; for it is observed that only things of permanent nature which are
always recognised as what they are, such as gold, &c., are the causes of
effects such as golden ornaments, and so on. In those cases where a
destruction of the peculiar nature of the cause is observed to take
place, as in the case of seeds, for instance, we have to acknowledge as
the cause of the subsequent condition (i.e. the sprout) not the earlier
condition in so far as it is destroyed, but rather those permanent
particles of the seed which are not destroyed (when the seed as a whole
undergoes decomposition).--Hence as we see on the one hand that no
entities ever originate from nonentities such as the horns of a hare,
and on the other hand that entities do originate from entities such as
gold and the like the whole Bauddha doctrine of existence springing from
non-existence has to be rejected.--We finally point out that, according
to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the
four skandhas discussed above and all material aggregates from the
atoms; why then do they stultify this their own doctrine by the fanciful
assumption of entity springing from non-entity and thus needlessly
perplex the mind of every one?
27. And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of
ends) in the case of non-active people also.
If it were admitted that entity issues from non-entity, lazy inactive
people also would obtain their purposes, since 'non-existence' is a
thing to be had without much trouble. Rice would grow for the husbandman
even if he did not cultivate his field; vessels would shape themselves
even if the potter did not fashion the clay; and the weaver too lazy to
weave the threads into a whole, would nevertheless have in the end
finished pieces of cloth just as if he had been weaving. And nobody
would have to exert himself in the least either for going to the
heavenly world or for obtaining final release. All which of course is
absurd and not maintained by anybody.--Thus the doctrine of the
origination of entity from non-entity again shows itself to be futile.
28. The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on
account of (our) consciousness (of them).
There having been brought forward, in what precedes, the various
objections which lie against the doctrine of the reality of the external
world (in the Bauddha sense), such as the impossibility of accounting
for the existence of aggregates, &c., we are now confronted by those
Bauddhas who maintain that only cognitions (or ideas, vij/ñ/âna)
exist.--The doctrine of the reality of the external world was indeed
propounded by Buddha conforming himself to the mental state of some of
his disciples whom he perceived to be attached to external things; but
it does not represent his own true view according to which cognitions
alone are real.
According to this latter doctrine the process, whose constituting
members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge, and the
result of knowledge[405], is an altogether internal one, existing in so
far only as it is connected with the mind (buddhi). Even if external
things existed, that process could not take place but in connexion with
the mind. If, the Bauddhas say, you ask how it is known that that entire
process is internal and that no outward things exist apart from
consciousness, we reply that we base our doctrine on the impossibility
of external things. For if external things are admitted, they must be
either atoms or aggregates of atoms such as posts and the like. But
atoms cannot be comprehended under the ideas of posts and the like, it
being impossible for cognition to represent (things as minute as) atoms.
Nor, again, can the outward things be aggregates of atoms such as
pillars and the like, because those aggregates can neither be defined as
different nor as non-different from the atoms[406].--In the same way we
can show that the external things are not universals and so on[407].
Moreover, the cognitions--which are of a uniform nature only in so far
as they are states of consciousness--undergo, according to their
objects, successive modifications, so that there is presented to the
mind now the idea of a post, now the idea of a wall, now the idea of a
jar, and so on. Now this is not possible without some distinction on the
part of the ideas themselves, and hence we must necessarily admit that
the ideas have the same forms as their objects. But if we make this
admission, from which it follows that the form of the objects is
determined by the ideas, the hypothesis of the existence of external
things becomes altogether gratuitous. From the fact, moreover, of our
always being conscious of the act of knowledge and the object of
knowledge simultaneously it follows that the two are in reality
identical. When we are conscious of the one we are conscious of the
other also; and that would not happen if the two were essentially
distinct, as in that case there would be nothing to prevent our being
conscious of one apart from the other. For this reason also we maintain
that there are no outward things.--
Perception is to be considered as similar to a dream and the like. The
ideas present to our minds during a dream, a magical illusion, a mirage
and so on, appear in the twofold form of subject and object, although
there is all the while no external object; hence we conclude that the
ideas of posts and the like which occur in our waking state are likewise
independent of external objects; for they also are simply ideas.--If we
be asked how, in the absence of external things, we account for the
actual variety of ideas, we reply that that variety is to be explained
from the impressions left by previous ideas[408]. In the beginningless
sa/m/sâra ideas and mental impressions succeed each other as causes and
effects, just as the plant springs from the seed and seeds are again
produced from the plant, and there exists therefore a sufficient reason
for the variety of ideas actually experienced. That the variety of ideas
is solely due to the impressions left on the mind by past ideas follows,
moreover, from the following affirmative and negative judgments: we both
(the Vedântins as well as the Bauddhas) admit that in dreams, &c. there
presents itself a variety of ideas which arise from mental impressions,
without any external object; we (the Bauddhas) do not admit that any
variety of ideas can arise from external objects, without mental
impressions.--Thus we are again led to conclude that no outward things
exist.
To all this we (the Vedântins) make the following reply.--The
non-existence of external things cannot be maintained because we are
conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are
conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea, whether it
be a post or a wall or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we
are conscious cannot but exist. Why should we pay attention to the words
of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its
approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward
thing, and that no such thing exists, any more than we listen to a man
who while he is eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction
avers that he does not eat and does not feel satisfied?--If the Bauddha
should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object
but only that he is conscious of no object apart from the act of
consciousness, we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement
he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the
outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be
accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody
when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perception only,
but all men are conscious of posts and walls and the like as objects of
their perceptions. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears
also from the fact that even those who contest the existence of external
things bear witness to their existence when they say that what is an
internal object of cognition appears like something external. For they
practically accept the general consciousness, which testifies to the
existence of an external world, and being at the same time anxious to
refute it they speak of the external things as 'like something
external.' If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the
existence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like
something external?' No one says, 'Vish/n/umitra appears like the son of
a barren mother.' If we accept the truth as it is given to us in our
consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us
as something external, not like something external.--But--the Bauddha
may reply--we conclude that the object of perception is only like
something external because external things are impossible.--This
conclusion we rejoin is improper, since the possibility or impossibility
of things is to be determined only on the ground of the operation or
non-operation of the means of right knowledge; while on the other hand,
the operation and non-operation of the means of right knowledge are not
to be made dependent on preconceived possibilities or impossibilities.
Possible is whatever is apprehended by perception or some other means of
proof; impossible is what is not so apprehended. Now the external things
are, according to their nature, apprehended by all the instruments of
knowledge; how then can you maintain that they are not possible, on the
ground of such idle dilemmas as that about their difference or
non-difference from atoms?--Nor, again, does the non-existence of
objects follow from the fact of the ideas having the same form as the
objects; for if there were no objects the ideas could not have the forms
of the objects, and the objects are actually apprehended as
external.--For the same reason (i.e. because the distinction of thing
and idea is given in consciousness) the invariable concomitance of idea
and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing
constitutes the means of the idea, not that the two are identical.
Moreover, when we are conscious first of a pot and then of a piece of
cloth, consciousness remains the same in the two acts while what varies
are merely the distinctive attributes of consciousness; just as when we
see at first a black and then a white cow, the distinction of the two
perceptions is due to the varying blackness and whiteness while the
generic character of the cow remains the same. The difference of the one
permanent factor (from the two--or more--varying factors) is proved
throughout by the two varying factors, and vice versâ the difference of
the latter (from the permanent factor) by the presence of the one
(permanent factor). Therefore thing and idea are distinct. The same view
is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a
jar; there also the perception and the remembrance only are distinct
while the jar is one and the same; in the same way as when conscious of
the smell of milk and the taste of milk we are conscious of the smell
and taste as different things but of the milk itself as one only.
Further, two ideas which occupy different moments of time and pass away
as soon as they have become objects of consciousness cannot
apprehend--or be apprehended by--each other. From this it follows that
certain doctrines forming part of the Bauddha system cannot be upheld;
so the doctrine that ideas are different from each other; the doctrine
that everything is momentary, void, &c.; the doctrine of the distinction
of individuals and classes; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an
impression giving rise to a later idea; the doctrine of the distinction,
owing to the influence of Nescience, of the attributes of existence and
non-existence; the doctrine of bondage and release (depending on absence
and presence of right knowledge)[409].
Further, if you say that we are conscious of the idea, you must admit
that we are also conscious of the external thing. And if you rejoin that
we are conscious of the idea on its own account because it is of a
luminous nature like a lamp, while the external thing is not so; we
reply that by maintaining the idea to be illuminated by itself you make
yourself guilty of an absurdity no less than if you said that fire burns
itself. And at the same time you refuse to accept the common and
altogether rational opinion that we are conscious of the external thing
by means of the idea different from the thing! Indeed a proof of
extraordinary philosophic insight!--It cannot, moreover, be asserted in
any way that the idea apart from the thing is the object of our
consciousness; for it is absurd to speak of a thing as the object of its
own activity. Possibly you (the Bauddha) will rejoin that, if the idea
is to be apprehended by something different from it, that something also
must be apprehended by something different and so on ad infinitum. And,
moreover, you will perhaps object that as each cognition is of an
essentially illuminating nature like a lamp, the assumption of a further
cognition is uncalled for; for as they are both equally illuminating the
one cannot give light to the other.--But both these objections are
unfounded. As the idea only is apprehended, and there is consequently no
necessity to assume something to apprehend the Self which witnesses the
idea (is conscious of the idea), there results no regressus ad
infinitum. And the witnessing Self and the idea are of an essentially
different nature, and may therefore stand to each other in the relation
of knowing subject and object known. The existence of the witnessing
Self is self-proved and cannot therefore be denied.--Moreover, if you
maintain that the idea, lamplike, manifests itself without standing in
need of a further principle to illuminate it, you maintain thereby that
ideas exist which are not apprehended by any of the means of knowledge,
and which are without a knowing being; which is no better than to assert
that a thousand lamps burning inside some impenetrable mass of rocks
manifest themselves. And if you should maintain that thereby we admit
your doctrine, since it follows from what we have said that the idea
itself implies consciousness; we reply that, as observation shows, the
lamp in order to become manifest requires some other intellectual agent
furnished with instruments such as the eye, and that therefore the idea
also, as equally being a thing to be illuminated, becomes manifest only
through an ulterior intelligent principle. And if you finally object
that we, when advancing the witnessing Self as self-proved, merely
express in other words the Bauddha tenet that the idea is
self-manifested, we refute you by remarking that your ideas have the
attributes of originating, passing away, being manifold, and so on
(while our Self is one and permanent).--We thus have proved that an
idea, like a lamp, requires an ulterior intelligent principle to render
it manifest.
29. And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the
waking state) are not like those of a dream.
We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the
Bauddha, that the ideas of posts, and so on, of which we are conscious
in the waking state, may arise in the absence of external objects, just
as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike.--The two sets of ideas,
we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the
difference of their character. They differ as follows.--The things of
which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking
consciousness. 'I wrongly thought that I had a meeting with a great man;
no such meeting took place, but my mind was dulled by slumber, and so
the false idea arose.' In an analogous manner the things of which we are
conscious when under the influence of a magic illusion, and the like,
are negated by our ordinary consciousness. Those things, on the other
hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state, such as posts and
the like, are never negated in any state.--Moreover, the visions of a
dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are
acts of immediate consciousness; and the distinction between remembrance
and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by every one as being
founded on the absence or presence of the object. When, for instance, a
man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but
merely wishes so to perceive him. As thus the distinction between the
two states is evident to every one, it is impossible to formulate the
inference that waking consciousness is false because it is mere
consciousness, such as dreaming consciousness; for we certainly cannot
allow would-be philosophers to deny the truth of what is directly
evident to themselves. Just because they feel the absurdity of denying
what is evident to themselves, and are consequently unable to
demonstrate the baselessness of the ideas of the waking state from those
ideas themselves, they attempt to demonstrate it from their having
certain attributes in common with the ideas of the dreaming state. But
if some attribute cannot belong to a thing on account of the latter's
own nature, it cannot belong to it on account of the thing having
certain attributes in common with some other thing. Fire, which is felt
to be hot, cannot be demonstrated to be cold, on the ground of its
having attributes in common with water. And the difference of nature
between the waking and the sleeping state we have already shown.
30. The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the
Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external
things).
We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety
of ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions,
without any reference to external things, and remark that on your
doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do
not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental
impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived.
How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things
were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental
impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum,
sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish
your position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the
impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external
things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground
of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that
ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We
rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to
establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the
perception of external things is admitted to take place also without
mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to
originate independently of the perception of external
things.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and
modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is
some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such
a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot
be cognised through any means of knowledge.
31. And on account of the momentariness (of the âlayavij/ñ/âna, it
cannot be the abode of mental impressions).
If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition
(âlayavij/ñ/âna[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the
mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being
admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of
impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions
(prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna). For unless there exists one continuous principle
equally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an
absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable
to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to
mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other
hand, you declare your âlayavij/ñ/âna to be something permanent, you
thereby abandon your tenet of the âlayavij/ñ/âna as well as everything
else being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sûtra in a different way) as
the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of
the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward
against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the
principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the
latter.
We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which
maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the
doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of
Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely
nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and
therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose
existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied,
unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could
impugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence
of contrary instances.