Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhâgavata system,
with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers.
Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory
are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place
spoken of as Selfs, holy Vâsudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with
passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance,
blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas
/S/â/nd/ilya studied this /s/âstra.'--For this reason also the
Bhâgavata doctrine cannot be accepted.
Notes:
[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness,
the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhâna. Sâ. Kâ. 12,
13.]
[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sâ. Kâ.
3.]
[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sâ.
Kâ. 15: Sâ. Sûtras I, 189 ff.]
[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause
from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance,
that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember
that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an
intelligent being, viz. the potter.]
[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring
therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and
effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhâna.]
[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the
cause.]
[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya
hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain,
&c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then
sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in
summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything
but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought,
on the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by
camels but by men also.' Bhâ.]
[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ânâ/m/
sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/ânekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]
[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of
cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).]
[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how
the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of
perception.--Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd
ity âha, prav/ri/ttîti. Anumânasiddhasya /k/etanasya na
pravr/i/ttyâ/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakâra/h/. Katham anumânam ity
apekshâyâ/m/ tatprakâra/m/; sû/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/
prâ/n/âdimattvam. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the
influence of intelligence.--Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sâdhyavati
pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy
upalaksha/n/am, anpanyâso na vyabhi/k/ârabhûmin ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass
into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the
cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the
omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.]
[Footnote 327: Anâdheyâti/s/ayasya
sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâti/s/aya/s/ûnyasyety artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature
cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims--ex
hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]
[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or
experience.]
[Footnote 330: T/ri/tîyes'pi katipaya/s/abdâdyupalabdhir vâ
samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva
mukti/h/ syâd iti manvâno dvitîya/m/ pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit sa/m/sârânu/kkh/edât; the
Bhâmatî's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad
d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edât.]
[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the
pradhâna's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for
the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]
[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyoga/h/. Ân. Gi.]
[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are
looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]
[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for
buddhi, aha@nkâra, and manas.]
[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which
literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the
context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers
are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the
souls live.]
[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly
essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with
its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away
while the substance remains.]
[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of
desire.]
[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the
Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there
can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in
the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]
[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience
pain.]
[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the
soul's essential purity.]
[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place
apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]
[Footnote 343: Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti
/s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]
[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious
resemblance.]
[Footnote 345: The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta
doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from
ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things
causing suffering.--The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on
the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable,
and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the
product of Nescience.]
[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called
above.]
[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive
knowledge on which--according to the Sâ@nkhya also--release depends.]
[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the
conjunction of soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence
of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]
[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire,
or air.]
[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the
specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms
themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small
spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 20.]
[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all
the atoms are isolated and motionless.]
[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]
[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]
[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are
the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those
atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity
which make them enter into conjunction.]
[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the
effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the
number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]
[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance
of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental
Vai/s/eshika principle.]
[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]
[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the
present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras, only the following words,
'Kâra/n/abahutvâ/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sûtra implying, according to
the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the
Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its
cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms
from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of
extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva,
i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting
'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for
instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In
other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to
pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskâra on Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1,
9; 10.]
[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the
nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedântin also
may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the
non-intelligent world.]
[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which
consists of parts.]
[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms
with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/âpeksham
ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/ñ/asa/my/ogâpeksham iti yâvat. Ãn. Gi.]
[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not
essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when
the soul is joined to an internal organ.]
[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]
[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because
sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by
samavâya.]
[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction.
The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires
another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each
other in the way of conjunction.]
[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavâya and sa/m/yoga
from the terms which they connect.]
[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavâya
relation to their substrates.]
[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sûtras read 'pratishedhabhâva/h/;' but
as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhâbhâva/h/' I have kept the
latter reading and translated according to Ânandagiri's explanation:
Kâryam anityam iti kârye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syâd yadi
kâra/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/ânâ/m/ nityateti
sûtrârtha/h/.]
[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary
aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima
perceptibilia.]
[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated
or destroyed.]
[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they
might have originated from avidyâ by a mere pari/n/âma and might again
be dissolved into avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction
of their cause taking place.]
[Footnote 372: The Sâ@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as
being the pradhâna in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with
Govindânanda that by the Sâ@nkhya of the text we have to understand the
Vedânta.]
[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad aparâ/s/ritam
evâvatish/th/ate tâv ayutasiddhau yathâvayavâvayavinau.]
[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavâya.]
[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into
connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no
longer samavâya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental
Vai/s/eshika principle.]
[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those
connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be
considered conjunctions.]
[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the
permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent
existence of the connexion.]
[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into
sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul
with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that
sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]
[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyâkarsha/n/e yatra
sambandhyantarâkarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu sâvayavânâ/m/
jatukâsh/th/âdînâ/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ sâvayâvânâm, ato
dvya/n/ukasya sâvayavasya niravayavena paramâ/n/unâ sa nopapadyate.
Brahmavidyâbh.]
[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the
practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause
and the effect is accounted for.]
[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an
eastern end, &c.]
[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as
the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]
[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size
constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of
size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of
old and the continual origination of new substances.]
[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken
exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhâshya, and no
attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts
of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on
the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of
the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Mádhyamikas; the
Idealists are the Yogâ/k/âras; the Sautrântikas and the Vaibháshikas
together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account
given of those sects in the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi
mâdhyamika-yogá/k/âra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamj/ñ/akâs /k/atvâra/h/
/s/ishyâ/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yân prati sarva/m/ /s/ûnyam ity
upadish/t/a/m/ te màdhyamikâs te hi guru/n/â yathokta/m/ tathaiva
/s/raddhayâ g/ri/hîtavanta iti k/ri/tvâ nâpak/ri/sh/t/â/h/ puna/s/ /k/a
taduktasyârthasya buddhyanusâre/n/âkshepasyâk/ri/tatvân
notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti mâdhyamikâ/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/â
sarva/s/ûnyatva upadish/t/e j/ñ/ânâtiriktasya sarvasya /s/ûnyatvam astu
nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhâshitopetâ/h/ tad upari /k/a
j/ñ/ânasya tu /s/ûnyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathâtve
jagadândhyaprasa@ngât sûnyasiddher apy asa/m/bhavâ/k/ /k/eti buddhamate
â/k/âratvena paribhâshita âkshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yogâ/k/ârâ/h/
vij/ñ/ânamâtrâstitvavâdina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/
pratîtisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/ûnyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/ñ/ânavad
vâhyârthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so
s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathâ@ngîk/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim
anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sûtra/m/ bhavishyatîti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am
atas te sautrântikâ/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratîtibalâd
vâhyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa katha/m/
parokshos'to vâhyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann
atas te vaibhâshikâ/h/.]
[Footnote 385: The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects,
colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here
re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought.
Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are
perceived by the senses.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises the series of
self-cognitions (ahamaham ity âlayavj/ñ/ânapravâha/h/), according to all
commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a,
the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things
(savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/ânasamj/ñ/itam).--
The vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/ñ/âskandha
comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va
ityâdi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, Ân. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/
nâmavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. Ân.; sa/m/j/ñ/â
yaj/ñ/adattâdipadatadullekhî savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe
vij/ñ/ânapadena savikalpapratyayo na grâhy/h/, Brahmavidyâbh.). The
sa/m/skâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and
adharma.--Compare also the Bhâmatî.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha is /k/itta,
the other skandhas /k/aitta.]
[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins as
well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva),
the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground
controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]
[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence
of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]
[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]
[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a explains the last clause--from
ksha/n/ikatvâ/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a paramâ/n/ûnâm api
ksha/n/ikatvâbhyupagamân melana/m/ na sambhavati, paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/
melana/m/ paramâ/n/ukriyâdhînam, tathâ /k/a svakriyâ/m/ prati
paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/atvât kriyâpûraksha/n/e paramâ/n/ubhir bhâvyam
kriyâ /s/rayatayâ kriyâksha/n/eszpi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam eva/m/
melanakshaneszpi, nahi melanâ/s/rayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ prav/ri/ttir
upapadyate, tathâ /k/a sthiraparamâ/n/usâdhyâ melanarûpâ prav/ri/tti/h/
katha/m/ teshâm ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ânanda Giri also divides and
translates differently from the translation in the text.]
[Footnote 390: The kâra/n/atvât of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvât
of the Sûtra; kârya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]
[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations
of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the
comment of the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of
considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure,
&c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c.,
and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/ñ/âna) is the
self-consciousness (aham ity âlayavij/ñ/ânasya v/ri/ttilâbha/h/)
springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or
bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six
(sha/d/âyatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which
the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the
sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedaná)
the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire
(t/ri/sh/n/â) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to
shun the painful ones.--Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting from
desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jâti) is
the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay
(jarâ).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature
when about to die (mumûrshâ).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes
connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that
account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five
senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies
death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from
there.]
[Footnote 392: Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain:
Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am
ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyâbhara/n/a says:
Nityeshv â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamâneshu
bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv ity
asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the
subsequent â/s/rayâ/s/rayi/s/ûnyeshu: â/s/rayâ/s/rayitva/s/ûnyeshu,
aya/m/ bhâva/h/, sthireshu paramâ/n/ushu yadanvaye paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/
sa/m/ghâtâpatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakârakam upakâryâ/h/
paramâ/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prârthyate sa tatra karteti
grahîtu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu
anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekaksha/n/asâdhyasyâsa/m/bhavân
nopakâryopakârakabhâvo nirdhârayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks
on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayakârt/ri/râhityam âhâ/s/rayeti. Another
reading appears to be â/s/ayâ/s/raya/s/ûnyeshu.]
[Footnote 393: Bauddhânâ/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/âdir eva padârtho
vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nâma hâlosti.
Brahmâvidyâbh.]
[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of
mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material
causes such as clay, &c.?]
[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause
(adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), the
immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause
(âlambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the
Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshurádirûpam
utpannasya j/ñ/ânasya rûpâdivishayatâ/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyâmaka/s/ /k/a
lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakârî âloka/h/.
Samanantarapratyaya/h/pûrvaj/ñ/ânam, bauddhamate hi
ksha/n/ikaj/ñ/anasa/m/tatau pûrvaj/ñ/ânam uttaraj/ñ/âsya kârana/m/ tad
eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Âlambana/m/ gha/t/âdi/h/. Etân hetûn pratîya
prâpya /k/akshurâdijanyam ity âdi.]
[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skâra iti, tanmate pûrvaksha/n/a eva hetubhûta/h/
sa/m/skâro vâsaneti /k/a vyavahriyate kârya/m/ tu tadvishayatayâ
karmavyutpattyâ sa/m/skâra/h/, tathâ /k/a kâryakâra/n/âtmaka/m/ sarva/m/
bhâvarûpa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/ñ/ârtha/h/. Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.]
[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the
intention of doing so.]
[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparîta
iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/âdînâ/m/ yuktyâ sâdhyamânoku/s/alair
avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sûkshmo vinâ/s/opratisa/m/khyânirodha/h/.
Brahmâv.]
[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of
causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary
existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to
produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter
alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since
the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp.
Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link
would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]
[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the
form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of
the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer
that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of
water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some
form.]
[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]
[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is
âvara/n/âbhâva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore
is something real.]
[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any
change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the
effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the
Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]
[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a
general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and
that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from
non-existence.]
[Footnote 405: According to the vij/ñ/ânavâdin the cognition specialised
by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour
is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is
consciousness (avabhâsa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so
far as it is power is mâna, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of
that power it is pramât/ri/, knowing subject.]
[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can
no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different
from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of
gross non-atomic bodies.]
[Footnote 407: Avayavâvayavirûpo vâhyosrtho nâsti /k/en mâ bhûd
jâtivyaktyâdirûpas tu syâd ity â/s/rankyâha evam iti. Jâtyâdînâ/m/
vyaktyâdînâm /k/âtyantabhinnatve svâtantryaprasa@ngâd atyantâbhinnatve
tadvadevâtadbhâvâd bhinnâbhinnatvasya viruddhatvâd avayavâvayavibhedavaj
gâtivyaktyâdibhedosxpi nâstîty artha/h/.]
[Footnote 408: Vâsanâ, above translated by mental impression, strictly
means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the
present actual idea.]
[Footnote 409: For all these doctrines depend on the comparison of ideas
which is not possible unless there be a permanent knowing subject in
addition to the transitory ideas.]
[Footnote 410: The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises vij/ñ/ânas of two
different kinds, the âlayavij/ñ/âna and the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna. The
âlayavij/ñ/âna comprises the series of cognitions or ideas which refer
to the ego; the prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna comprises those ideas which refer
to apparently external objects, such as colour and the like. The ideas
of the latter class are due to the mental impressions left by the
antecedent ideas of the former class.]
[Footnote 411: Viz. in the present case the principle that what presents
itself to consciousness is not non-existent.]
[Footnote 412: Soul and non-soul are the enjoying souls and the objects
of their enjoyment; âsrava is the forward movement of the senses towards
their objects; sa/m/vara is the restraint of the activity of the senses;
nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; the works
constitute bondage; and release is the ascending of the soul, after
bondage has ceased, to the highest regions.--For the details, see
Professor Cowell's translation of the Ârhata chapter of the
Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]
[Footnote 413: Cp. translation of Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha, p. 59.]
[Footnote 414: And so impugn the doctrine of the one eternal Brahman.]
[Footnote 415: Cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha translation, p. 58.]
[Footnote 416: The inference being that the initial and intervening
sizes of the soul must be permanent because they are sizes of the soul,
like its final size.]
[Footnote 417: The special nature of the connexion between the Lord and
the pradhâna and the souls cannot be ascertained from the world
considered as the effect of the pradhâna acted upon by the Lord; for
that the world is the effect of the pradhâna is a point which the
Vedântins do not accept as proved.]
[Footnote 418: I.e. a high one, but not an indefinite one; since the
omniscient Lord knows its measure.]