Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour, and touch, and is
gross; water has colour, taste, and touch, and is fine; fire has colour
and touch, and is finer yet; air is finest of all, and has the quality
of touch only. The question now arises whether the atoms constituting
the four elements are to be assumed to possess the same greater or
smaller number of qualities as the respective elements.--Either
assumption leads to unacceptable consequences. For if we assume that
some kinds of atoms have more numerous qualities, it follows that their
solid size (mûrti) will be increased thereby, and that implies their
being atoms no longer. That an increase of qualities cannot take place
without a simultaneous increase of size we infer from our observations
concerning effected material bodies.--If, on the other hand, we assume,
in order to save the equality of atoms of all kinds, that there is no
difference in the number of their qualities, we must either suppose that
they have all one quality only; but in that case we should not perceive
touch in fire nor colour and touch in water, nor taste, colour, and
touch in earth, since the qualities of the effects have for their
antecedents the qualities of the causes. Or else we must suppose all
atoms to have all the four qualities; but in that case we should
necessarily perceive what we actually do not perceive, viz. smell in
water, smell and taste in fire, smell, taste, and colour in air.--Hence
on this account also the atomic doctrine shows itself to be
unacceptable.
17. And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative
persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.
While the theory of the pradhâna being the cause of the world has been
accepted by some adherents of the Veda--as, for instance, Manu--with a
view to the doctrines of the effect existing in the cause already, and
so on, the atomic doctrine has not been accepted by any persons of
authority in any of its parts, and therefore is to be disregarded
entirely by all those who take their stand on the Veda.
There are, moreover, other objections to the Vai/s/eshika doctrine.--The
Vai/s/eshikas assume six categories, which constitute the subject-matter
of their system, viz. substance, quality, action, generality,
particularity, and inherence. These six categories they maintain to be
absolutely different from each other, and to have different
characteristics; just as a man, a horse, a hare differ from one another.
Side by side with this assumption they make another which contradicts
the former one, viz. that quality, action, &c. have the attribute of
depending on substance. But that is altogether inappropriate; for just
as ordinary things, such as animals, grass, trees, and the like, being
absolutely different from each other do not depend on each other, so the
qualities, &c. also being absolutely different from substance, cannot
depend on the latter. Or else let the qualities, &c. depend on
substance; then it follows that, as they are present where substance is
present, and absent where it is absent, substance only exists, and,
according to its various forms, becomes the object of different terms
and conceptions (such as quality, action, &c.); just as Devadatta, for
instance, according to the conditions in which he finds himself is the
object of various conceptions and names. But this latter alternative
would involve the acceptation of the Sâ@nkhya doctrine[372] and the
abandonment of the Vai/s/eshika standpoint.--But (the Vai/s/eshika may
say) smoke also is different from fire and yet it is dependent on
it.--True, we reply; but we ascertain the difference of smoke and fire
from the fact of their being apperceived in separation. Substance and
quality, on the other hand, are not so apperceived; for when we are
conscious of a white blanket, or a red cow, or a blue lotus, the
substance is in each case cognised by means of the quality; the latter
therefore has its Self in the substance. The same reasoning applies to
action, generality, particularity, and inherence.
If you (the Vai/s/eshika) say that qualities, actions, &c. (although not
non-different from substances) may yet depend on the latter because
substances and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to
exist without the other (ayutasiddhi[373]); we point out that things
which are ayutasiddha must either be non-separate in place, or
non-separate in time, or non-separate in nature, and that none of these
alternatives agrees with Vai/s/eshika principles. For the first
alternative contradicts your own assumptions according to which the
cloth originating from the threads occupies the place of the threads
only, not that of the cloth, while the qualities of the cloth, such as
its white colour, occupy the place of the cloth only, not that of the
threads. So the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras say (I, 1, 10), 'Substances
originate another substance and qualities another quality.' The threads
which constitute the causal substance originate the effected substance,
viz. the cloth, and the qualities of the threads, such as white colour,
&c., produce in the cloth new corresponding qualities. But this doctrine
is clearly contradicted by the assumption of substance and quality being
non-separate in place.--If, in the second place, you explain
ayutasiddhatva as non-separation in time, it follows also that, for
instance, the right and the left horn of a cow would be
ayutasiddha.--And if, finally, you explain it to mean 'non-separation in
character,' it is impossible to make any further distinction between the
substance and the quality, as then quality is conceived as being
identical with substance.
Moreover, the distinction which the Vai/s/eshikas make between
conjunction (sa/m/yoga) as being the connexion of things which can exist
separately, and inherence (samavâya) as being the connexion of things
which are incapable of separate existence is futile, since the cause
which exists before the effect[374] cannot be said to be incapable of
separate existence. Perhaps the Vai/s/eshika will say that his
definition refers to one of the two terms only, so that samavâya is the
connexion, with the cause, of the effect which is incapable of separate
existence. But this also is of no avail; for as a connexion requires two
terms, the effect as long as it has not yet entered into being cannot be
connected with the cause. And it would be equally unavailing to say that
the effect enters into the connexion after it has begun to exist; for if
the Vai/s/eshika admits that the effect may exist previous to its
connexion with the cause, it is no longer ayutasiddha (incapable of
separate existence), and thereby the principle that between effect and
cause conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated.[375]
And[376] just as conjunction, and not samavâya, is the connexion in
which every effected substance as soon as it has been produced stands
with the all-pervading substances as ether, &c.--although no motion has
taken place on the part of the effected substance--so also the connexion
of the effect with the cause will be conjunction merely, not samavâya.
Nor is there any proof for the existence of any connexion, samavâya or
sa/m/yoga, apart from the things which it connects. If it should be
maintained that sa/m/yoga and samavâya have such an existence because we
observe that there are names and ideas of them in addition to the names
and ideas of the things connected, we point out that one and the same
thing may be the subject of several names and ideas if it is considered
in its relations to what lies without it. Devadatta although being one
only forms the object of many different names and notions according as
he is considered in himself or in his relations to others; thus he is
thought and spoken of as man, Brâhma/n/a learned in the Veda, generous,
boy, young man, father, grandson, brother, son-in-law, &c. So, again,
one and the same stroke is, according to the place it is connected with,
spoken of and conceived as meaning either ten, or hundred, or thousand,
&c. Analogously, two connected things are not only conceived and denoted
as connected things, but in addition constitute the object of the ideas
and terms 'conjunction' or 'inherence' which however do not prove
themselves to be separate entities.--Things standing thus, the
non-existence of separate entities (conjunction, &c.), which entities
would have to be established on the ground of perception, follows from
the fact of their non-perception.--Nor, again[377], does the
circumstance of the word and idea of connexion having for its object the
things connected involve the connexion's permanent existence, since we
have already shown above that one thing may, on account of its relations
to other things, be conceived and denoted in different ways.
Further[378], conjunction cannot take place between the atoms, the soul,
and the internal organ, because they have no parts; for we observe that
conjunction takes place only of such substances as consist of parts. If
the Vai/s/eshika should say that parts of the atoms, soul and mind may
be assumed (in order to explain their alleged conjunction), we remark
that the assumption of actually non-existing things would involve the
result that anything might be established; for there is no restrictive
rule that only such and such non-existing things--whether contradictory
to reason or not--should be assumed and not any other, and assumptions
depend on one's choice only and may be carried to any extent. If we once
allow assumptions, there is no reason why there should not be assumed a
further hundred or thousand things, in addition to the six categories
assumed by the Vai/s/eshikas. Anybody might then assume anything, and we
could neither stop a compassionate man from assuming that this
transmigratory world which is the cause of so much misery to living
beings is not to be, nor a malicious man from assuming that even the
released souls are to enter on a new cycle of existences.
Further, it is not possible that a binary atomic compound, which
consists of parts, should be connected with the simple indivisible atoms
by an intimate connexion (sa/ms/lesha) any more than they can thus be
connected with ether; for between ether and earth, &c. there does not
exist that kind of intimate connexion which exists, for instance,
between wood and varnish[379].
Let it then be said (the Vai/s/eshika resumes) that the samavâya
relation must be assumed, because otherwise the relation of that which
abides and that which forms the abode--which relation actually exists
between the effected substance and the causal substance--is not
possible.--That would, we reply, involve the vice of mutual dependence;
for only when the separateness of cause and effect is established, the
relation of the abode and that which abides can be established; and only
when the latter relation is established, the relation of separateness
can be established. For the Vedântins acknowledge neither the
separateness of cause and effect, nor their standing to each other in
the relation of abode and thing abiding, since according to their
doctrine the effect is only a certain state of the
cause[380].--Moreover, as the atoms are limited (not of infinite
extension), they must in reality consist of as many parts as we
acknowledge regions of space[381], whether those be six or eight or ten,
and consequently they cannot be permanent; conclusions contrary to the
Vai/s/eshika doctrine of the indivisibility and permanency of the
atoms.--If the Vai/s/eshika replies that those very parts which are
owing to the existence of the different regions of space are his
(indestructible) atoms; we deny that because all things whatever,
forming a series of substances of ever-increasing minuteness, are
capable of dissolution, until the highest cause (Brahman) is reached.
Earth--which is, in comparison with a binary compound, the grossest
thing of all--undergoes decomposition; so do the substances following
next which belong to the same class as earth; so does the binary
compound; and so does, finally, the atom which (although the minutest
thing of all) still belongs to the same general class (i.e. matter) with
earth, &c. The objection (which the Vai/s/eshika might possibly raise
here again) that things can be decomposed only by the separation of
their parts[382], we have already disposed of above, where we pointed
out that decomposition may take place in a manner analogous to the
melting of ghee. Just as the hardness of ghee, gold, and the like, is
destroyed in consequence of those substances being rendered liquid by
their contact with fire, no separation of the parts taking place all the
while; so the solid shape of the atoms also may be decomposed by their
passing back into the indifferenced condition of the highest cause. In
the same way the origination of effects also is brought about not merely
in the way of conjunction of parts; for we see that milk, for instance,
and water originate effects such as sour milk and ice without there
taking place any conjunction of parts.
It thus appears that the atomic doctrine is supported by very weak
arguments only, is opposed to those scriptural passages which declare
the Lord to be the general cause, and is not accepted by any of the
authorities taking their stand on Scripture, such as Manu and others.
Hence it is to be altogether disregarded by highminded men who have a
regard for their own spiritual welfare.
18. (If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes,
(there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).
The reasons on account of which the doctrine of the Vai/s/eshikas cannot
be accepted have been stated above. That doctrine may be called
semi-destructive (or semi-nihilistic[383]). That the more thorough
doctrine which teaches universal non-permanency is even less worthy of
being taken into consideration, we now proceed to show.
That doctrine is presented in a variety of forms, due either to the
difference of the views (maintained by Buddha at different times), or
else to the difference of capacity on the part of the disciples (of
Buddha). Three principal opinions may, however, be distinguished; the
opinion of those who maintain the reality of everything (Realists,
sarvâstitvavâdin); the opinion of those who maintain that thought only
is real (Idealists, vij/ñ/ànavâdin); and the opinion of those who
maintain that everything is void (unreal; Nihilists,
/s/ûnyavâdin[384]).--We first controvert those who maintain that
everything, external as well as internal, is real. What is external is
either element (bhûta) or elementary (bhautika); what is internal is
either mind (/k/itta) or mental (/k/aitta). The elements are earth,
water, and so on; elemental are colour, &c. on the one hand, and the eye
and the other sense-organs on the other hand. Earth and the other three
elements arise from the aggregation of the four different kinds of
atoms; the atoms of earth being hard, those of water viscid, those of
fire hot, those of air mobile.:--The inward world consists of the five
so-called 'groups' (skandha), the group of sensation (rûpaskandha), the
group of knowledge (vij/ñ/ânaskandha), the group of feeling
(vedanâskandha), the group of verbal knowledge (samj/ñ/âskandha), and
the group of impressions (sa/m/skâraskandha)[385]; which taken together
constitute the basis of all personal existence[386].
With reference to this doctrine we make the following remarks.--Those
two aggregates, constituting two different classes, and having two
different causes which the Bauddhas assume, viz. the aggregate of the
elements and elementary things whose cause the atoms are, and the
aggregate of the five skandhas whose cause the skandhas are, cannot, on
Bauddha principles, be established, i.e. it cannot be explained how the
aggregates are brought about. For the parts constituting the (material)
aggregates are devoid of intelligence, and the kindling (abhijvalana) of
intelligence depends on an aggregate of atoms having been brought about
previously[387]. And the Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent
intelligent being, such as either an enjoying soul or a ruling Lord,
which could effect the aggregation of the atoms. Nor can the atoms and
skandhas be assumed to enter on activity on their own account; for that
would imply their never ceasing to be active[388]. Nor can the cause of
aggregation be looked for in the so-called abode (i.e. the
âlayavij/ñ/âna-pravâha, the train of self-cognitions); for the latter
must be described either as different from the single cognitions or as
not different from them. (In the former case it is either permanent, and
then it is nothing else but the permanent soul of the Vedântins; or
non-permanent;) then being admitted to be momentary merely, it cannot
exercise any influence and cannot therefore be the cause of the motion
of the atoms[389]. (And in the latter case we are not further advanced
than before.)--For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot
be accounted for. But without aggregates there would be an end of the
stream of mundane existence which presupposes those aggregates.
19. If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained)
through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality;
we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin
(of the immediately subsequent links).
Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature
either of a ruling Lord or an enjoying soul, under whose influence the
formation of aggregates could take place, yet the course of mundane
existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality[390] of
Nescience and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining
principle.
The series beginning with Nescience comprises the following members:
Nescience, impression, knowledge, name and form, the abode of the six,
touch, feeling, desire, activity, birth, species, decay, death, grief,
lamentation, pain, mental affliction, and the like[391]. All these terms
constitute a chain of causes and are as such spoken of in the Bauddha
system, sometimes cursorily, sometimes at length. They are, moreover,
all acknowledged as existing, not by the Bauddhas only, but by the
followers of all systems. And as the cycles of Nescience, &c. forming
uninterrupted chains of causes and effects revolve unceasingly like
water-wheels, the existence of the aggregates (which constitute bodies
and minds) must needs be assumed, as without such Nescience and so on
could not take place.
This argumentation of the Bauddha we are unable to accept, because it
merely assigns efficient causes for the origination of the members of
the series, but does not intimate an efficient cause for the formation
of the aggregates. If the Bauddha reminds us of the statement made above
that the existence of aggregates must needs be inferred from the
existence of Nescience and so on, we point out that, if he means thereby
that Nescience and so on cannot exist without aggregates and hence
require the existence of such, it remains to assign an efficient cause
for the formation of the aggregates. But, as we have already shown--when
examining the Vaijeshika doctrine--that the formation of aggregates
cannot be accounted for even on the assumption of permanent atoms and
individual souls in which the ad/ri/sh/t/a abides[392]; how much less
then are aggregates possible if there exist only momentary atoms not
connected with enjoying souls and devoid of abodes (i.e. souls), and
that which abides in them (the ad/ri/sh/t/a).--Let us then assume (the
Bauddha says) that Nescience, &c. themselves are the efficient cause of
the aggregate.--But how--we ask--can they be the cause of that without
which--as their abode--they themselves are not capable of existence?
Perhaps you will say that in the eternal sa/m/sâra the aggregates
succeed one another in an unbroken chain, and hence also Nescience, and
so on, which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have
to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another
aggregate of the same kind, or that, without any settled rule, it may
produce either a like or an unlike one. In the former case a human body
could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the
infernal regions; in the latter case a man might in an instant be turned
into an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which
consequences would be contrary to your system.--Moreover, that for the
purpose of whose enjoyment the aggregate is formed is, according to your
doctrine, not a permanent enjoying soul, so that enjoyment subserves
itself merely and cannot be desired by anything else; hence final
release also must, according to you, be considered as subserving itself
only, and no being desirous of release can be assumed. If a being
desirous of both were assumed, it would have to be conceived as
permanently existing up to the time of enjoyment and release, and that
would be contrary to your doctrine of general impermanency.--There may
therefore exist a causal relation between the members of the series
consisting of Nescience, &c., but, in the absence of a permanent
enjoying soul, it is impossible to establish on that ground the
existence of aggregates.
20. (Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because
on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases
to be.
We have hitherto argued that Nescience, and so on, stand in a causal
relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account
for the existence of aggregates; we are now going to prove that they
cannot even be considered as efficient causes of the subsequent members
of the series to which they belong.
Those who maintain that everything has a momentary existence only admit
that when the thing existing in the second moment[393] enters into being
the thing existing in the first moment ceases to be. On this admission
it is impossible to establish between the two things the relation of
cause and effect, since the former momentary existence which ceases or
has ceased to be, and so has entered into the state of non-existence,
cannot be the cause of the later momentary existence.--Let it then be
said that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full
development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence.--That
also is impossible; for the assumption that a fully developed existence
exerts a further energy, involves the conclusion that it is connected
with a second moment (which contradicts the doctrine of universal
momentariness).--Then let the mere existence of the antecedent entity
constitute its causal energy.--That assumption also is fruitless,
because we cannot conceive the origination of an effect which is not
imbued with the nature of the cause (i.e. in which the nature of the
cause does not continue to exist). And to assume that the nature of the
cause does continue to exist in the effect is impossible (on the Bauddha
doctrine), as that would involve the permanency of the cause, and thus
necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of general
non-permanency.--Nor can it be admitted that the relation of cause and
effect holds good without the cause somehow giving its colouring to the
effect; for that doctrine might unduly be extended to all
cases[394].--Moreover, the origination and cessation of things of which
the Bauddha speaks must either constitute a thing's own form or another
state of it, or an altogether different thing. But none of these
alternatives agrees with the general Bauddha principles. If, in the
first place, origination and cessation constituted the form of a thing,
it would follow that the word 'thing' and the words 'origination' and
'cessation' are interchangeable (which is not the case).--Let then,
secondly, the Bauddha says, a certain difference be assumed, in
consequence of which the terms 'origination' and 'cessation' may denote
the initial and final states of that which in the intermediate state is
called thing.--In that case, we reply, the thing will be connected with
three moments, viz. the initial, the intermediate, and the final one, so
that the doctrine of general momentariness will have to be
abandoned.--Let then, as the third alternative, origination and
cessation be altogether different from the thing, as much as a buffalo
is from a horse.--That too cannot be, we reply; for it would lead to the
conclusion that the thing, because altogether disconnected with
origination and cessation, is everlasting. And the same conclusion would
be led up to, if we understood by the origination and cessation of a
thing merely its perception and non-perception; for the latter are
attributes of the percipient mind only, not of the thing itself.--Hence
we have again to declare the Bauddha doctrine to be untenable.
21. On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect
takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle;
otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).
It has been shown that on the doctrine of general non-permanency, the
former momentary existence, as having already been merged in
non-existence, cannot be the cause of the later one.--Perhaps now the
Bauddha will say that an effect may arise even when there is no
cause.--That, we reply, implies the abandonment of a principle admitted
by yourself, viz. that the mind and the mental modifications originate
when in conjunction with four kinds of causes[395]. Moreover, if
anything could originate without a cause, there would be nothing to
prevent that anything might originate at any time.--If, on the other
hand, you should say that we may assume the antecedent momentary
existence to last until the succeeding one has been produced, we point
out that that would imply the simultaneousness of cause and effect, and
so run counter to an accepted Bauddha tenet, viz. that all things[396]
are momentary merely.
22. Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation
not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete)
interruption.
The Bauddhas who maintain that universal destruction is going on
constantly, assume that 'whatever forms an object of knowledge and is
different from the triad is produced (sa/m/sk/ri/ta) and momentary.' To
the triad there mentioned they give the names 'cessation dependent on a
sublative act of the mind,' 'cessation not dependent on such an act,'
and 'space.' This triad they hold to be non-substantial, of a merely
negative character (abhâvamâtra), devoid of all positive
characteristics. By 'cessation dependent on a sublative act of the
mind,' we have to understand such destruction of entities as is preceded
by an act of thought[397]; by 'cessation not so dependent' is meant
destruction of the opposite kind[398]; by 'space' is meant absence in
general of something covering (or occupying space). Out of these three
non-existences 'space' will be refuted later on (Sûtra 24), the two
other ones are refuted in the present Sûtra.
Cessation which is dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and
cessation which is not so dependent are both impossible, 'on account of
the absence of interruption.' For both kinds of cessation must have
reference either to the series (of momentary existences) or to the
single members constituting the series.--The former alternative is
impossible, because in all series (of momentary existences) the members
of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that
the series cannot be interrupted[399].--The latter alternative is
likewise inadmissible, for it is impossible to maintain that any
momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely
undefinable and disconnected (with the previous state of existence),
since we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states
through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence[400]. And
in those cases also where a thing is not clearly recognised (after
having undergone a change) we yet infer, on the ground of actual
observations made in other cases, that one and the same thing continues
to exist without any interruption.--For these reasons the two kinds of
cessation which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
23. And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either
case.
The cessation of Nescience, &c. which, on the assumption of the
Bauddhas, is included in the two kinds of cessation discussed hitherto,
must take place either in consequence of perfect knowledge together with
its auxiliaries, or else of its own accord. But the former alternative
would imply the abandonment of the Bauddha doctrine that destruction
takes place without a cause, and the latter alternative would involve
the uselessness of the Bauddha instruction as to the 'path'[401]. As
therefore both alternatives are open to objections, the Bauddha doctrine
must be declared unsatisfactory.
24. And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a
non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two
other kinds of non-entity).
We have shown so far that of the triad declared by the Bauddhas to be
devoid of all positive characteristics, and therefore non-definable, two
(viz. prati-sa/m/khyâvirodha and aprati) cannot be shown to be such; we
now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, âkâ/s/a).
With regard to space also it cannot be maintained that it is
non-definable, since substantiality can be established in the case of
space no less than in the case of the two so-called non-entities treated
of in the preceding Sûtras. That space is a real thing follows in the
first place from certain scriptural passages, such as 'space sprang from
the Self.'--To those, again, who (like the Bauddhas) disagree with us as
to the authoritativeness of Scripture we point out that the real
existence of space is to be inferred from the quality of sound, since we
observe that earth and other real things are the abodes of smell and the
other qualities.--Moreover, if you declare that space is nothing but the
absence in general of any covering (occupying) body, it would follow
that while one bird is flying--whereby space is occupied--there would be
no room for a second bird wanting to fly at the same time. And if you
should reply that the second bird may fly there where there is absence
of a covering body, we point out that that something by which the
absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity,
viz. space in our sense, and not the mere non-existence of covering
bodies[402].--Moreover, the Bauddha places himself, by his view of
space, in opposition to other parts of his system. For we find, in the
Bauddha Scriptures, a series of questions and answers (beginning, 'On
what, O reverend Sir, is the earth founded?'), in which the following
question occurs, 'On what is the air founded?' to which it is replied
that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this
statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a
positive entity, not a mere negation.--Further, there is a
self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three
kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they
are not positively definable, and, on the other hand, that they are
eternal. Of what is not real neither eternity nor non-eternity can be
predicated, since the distinction of subjects and predicates of
attribution is founded entirely on real things. Anything with regard to
which that distinction holds good we conclude to be a real thing, such
as jars and the like are, not a mere undefinable negation.