Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by
which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of
equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and
superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of
particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a
non-intelligent pradhâna left to itself, as no such activity is seen in
clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe
that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature
non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects
only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c.
in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is
seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the
world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity
without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.
But, the Sâ@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the
part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the
part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they
are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the Sâ@nkhya again
objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an
intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent
thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to
that in which it is actually observed (as the Sâ@nkhya says), or to that
on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedântin
avers)?--We must, the Sâ@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in
which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode)
are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand,
is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324]
existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are
the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the
inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies
and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this
very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is
observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists
consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence
activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.
To all this we--the Vedântins--make the following reply.--We do not mean
to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in
which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from
an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present
and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of
burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar
material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not
due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not
exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when
fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the
Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the
movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of
intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be
raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising
moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which
is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of
motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid
of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of
sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the
eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present,
the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself
unmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the
Vedânta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence
of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply
that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the
fact of the Lord being fictitiously connected with Mâyâ, which consists
of name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled
with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the
doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.
3. If it be said (that the pradhâna moves) like milk or water, (we reply
that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).
Well, the Sâ@nkhya resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As
non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the
nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own
nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhâna also,
although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature
merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.
This argumentation, we reply, is unsound again; for as the adherents of
both doctrines admit that motion is not observed in the case of merely
non-intelligent things such as chariots, &c., we infer that water and
milk also move only because they are directed by intelligent powers.
Scriptural passages, moreover (such as 'He who dwells in the water and
within the water, who rules the water within,' B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 4;
and, 'By the command of that Akshara, O Gârgî, some rivers flow to the
East,' &c., B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9), declare that everything in this world
which flows is directed by the Lord. Hence the instances of milk and
water as belonging themselves to that class of cases which prove our
general principle[325] cannot be used to show that the latter is too
wide.--Moreover, the cow, which is an intelligent being and loves her
calf, makes her milk flow by her wish to do so, and the milk is in
addition drawn forth by the sucking of the calf. Nor does water move
either with absolute independence--for its flow depends on the declivity
of the soil and similar circumstances--or independently of an
intelligent principle, for we have shown that the latter is present in
all cases.--If, finally, our opponent should point to Sûtra II, 1, 24 as
contradicting the present Sûtra, we remark that there we have merely
shown on the ground of ordinary experience that an effect may take place
in itself independently of any external instrumental cause; a conclusion
which does not contradict the doctrine, based on Scripture, that all
effects depend on the Lord.
4. And because (the pradhâna), on account of there existing nothing
beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)
The three gu/n/as of the Sâ@nkhyas when in a state of equipoise form the
pradhâna. Beyond the pradhâna there exists no external principle which
could either impel the pradhâna to activity or restrain it from
activity. The soul (purusha), as we know, is indifferent, neither moves
to--nor restrains from--action. As therefore the pradhâna stands in no
relation, it is impossible to see why it should sometimes modify itself
into the great principle (mahat) and sometimes not. The activity and
non-activity (by turns) of the Lord, on the other hand, are not contrary
to reason, on account of his omniscience and omnipotence, and his being
connected with the power of illusion (mâya).
5. Nor (can it be said that the pradhâna modifies itself spontaneously)
like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist
elsewhere (but in the female animal).
Let this be (the Sâ@nkhya resumes). Just as grass, herbs, water, &c.
independently of any other instrumental cause transform themselves, by
their own nature, into milk; so, we assume, the pradhâna also transforms
itself into the great principle, and so on. And, if you ask how we know
that grass transforms itself independently of any instrumental cause; we
reply, 'Because no such cause is observed.' For if we did perceive some
such cause, we certainly should apply it to grass, &c. according to our
liking, and thereby produce milk. But as a matter of fact we do no such
thing. Hence the transformation of grass and the like must be considered
to be due to its own nature merely; and we may infer therefrom that the
transformation of the pradhâna is of the same kind.
To this we make the following reply.--The transformation of the pradhâna
might be ascribed to its own nature merely if we really could admit that
grass modifies itself in the manner stated by you; but we are unable to
admit that, since another instrumental cause is observed. How? 'Because
it does not exist elsewhere.' For grass becomes milk only when it is
eaten by a cow or some other female animal, not if it is left either
uneaten or is eaten by a bull. If the transformation had no special
cause, grass would become milk even on other conditions than that of
entering a cow's body. Nor would the circumstance of men not being able
to produce milk according to their liking prove that there is no
instrumental cause; for while some effects can be produced by men,
others result from divine action only[326]. The fact, however, is that
men also are able, by applying a means in their power, to produce milk
from grass and herbs; for when they wish to procure a more abundant
supply of milk they feed the cow more plentifully and thus obtain more
milk from her.--For these reasons the spontaneous modification of the
pradhâna cannot be proved from the instance of grass and the like.
6. Even if we admit (the Sâ@nkhya position refuted in what precedes, it
is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a
purpose (on the part of the pradhâna).
Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sâ@nkhya's) belief,
should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sûtra, viz. that
the pradhâna is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open
to an objection 'on account of the absence of a purpose.' For if the
spontaneous activity of the pradhâna has, as you say, no reference to
anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding
principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your
doctrine that the pradhâna is active in order to effect the purpose of
man will become untenable. If you reply that the pradhâna does not
indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark
that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible
purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final
release, or both. If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to
the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or
pain)[327]? Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for
release[328].--If release, then the activity of the pradhâna would be
purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of
release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of
sounds, &c.[329]--If both, then, on account of the infinite number of
the objects of pradhâna to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be
no opportunity for final release. Nor can the satisfaction of a desire
be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhâna; for
neither the non-intelligent pradhâna nor the essentially pure soul can
feel any desire.--If, finally, you should assume the pradhâna to be
active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on
account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to
the pradhâna) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the
creative power of the pradhâna does not cease at any time any more than
the soul's power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to
an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].--It
is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhâna enters on its
activity for the purposes of the soul.
7. And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhâna) as the (lame)
man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also
(the difficulty is not overcome).
Well then--the Sâ@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by
parallel instances--let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the
power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the
back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter
move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul
moves the pradhâna.--Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine
from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an
abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhâna is
moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive) soul possesses no
moving power. And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhâna? A
man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the
like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot
possibly put forth any moving energy. Nor can it be said that it moves
the pradhâna by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for
from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhâna) a permanency of
motion would follow. The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to
the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the
adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and
the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.--The pradhâna then
being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third
principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two. If we
attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being
seen on the part of the pradhâna, of seeing on the part of the soul),
the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final
release.--Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sûtra) the
different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the
pradhâna's part) have to be considered[332].--The highest Self, on the
other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the
Vedântins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature,
and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Mâyâ and is thus
superior (to the soul of the Sâ@nkhyas).
8. And, again, (the pradhâna cannot be active) because the relation of
principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three
gu/n/as).
For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhâna is
not possible.--The condition of the pradhâna consists in the three
gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in
a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of
mutual superiority or inferiority. In that state the gu/n/as cannot
possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby
they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute
independence. And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the
gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other
effects--which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced
state of the gu/n/as--is impossible.
9. And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in
force) on account of the (pradhâna) being devoid of the power of
intelligence.
But--the Sâ@nkhya resumes--we draw another inference, so as to leave no
room for the objection just stated. We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to
be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since
there is no proof for such an assumption. We rather infer the
characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming
that their nature must be such as to render the production of the
effects possible. Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady
nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation
of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.
Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were
founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world,
&c., remain in force on account of the pradhâna being devoid of the
power of intelligence. And if (to escape those objections) the Sâ@nkhya
should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the
primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since
the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world
would be nothing else but the Vedântic doctrine of Brahman.--Moreover,
if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual
inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would
happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on
account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in
that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an
operative cause being a non-changing circumstance. And thus the doctrine
would again be open to the objection stated before[333].
10. And moreover (the Sâ@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of
its contradictions.
The doctrine of the Sâ@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.
Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334]. In some
places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed
from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from
self-consciousness. Sometimes they speak of three internal organs,
sometimes of one only[335]. That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts
/S/ruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and
Sm/ri/ti, based on /S/ruti, is well known.--For these reasons also the
Sâ@nkhya system is objectionable.
Here the Sâ@nkhya again brings a countercharge--The system of the
Vedântins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it
does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes
suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders
futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and
suffering beings). For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of
everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the
two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which
suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of
beings). If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self,
it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches
perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering,
loses all its meaning. For--to adduce a parallel case--a lamp as long as
it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving
heat and light. And if the Vedântin should adduce the case of water with
its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves,
&c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently,
although they by turns manifest themselves, and again enter into the
state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of
waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and
light.--That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers
constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from
ordinary experience. For (to consider the matter from a more general
point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are
understood to be separate existences. If the object of desire were not
essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state
of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the
object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would
already essentially be established in him (belong to him). The latter
state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for
instance. Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter
never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if
the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.
(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire
and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of
desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and
would be an object for itself only. As a matter of fact, however, this
is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), 'object of desire' and
'desiring person,' imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation
exists in two things, not in one only. Hence the desiring person and the
object of desire are separate.--The same holds good with regard to what
is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person
(anarthin).
An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person,
an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person
enters into relation by turns. On account of the comparative paucity of
the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of
aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, 'object of
aversion.' Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term
'causes of suffering,' while by the term 'sufferer' we understand the
soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e.
the objects of desire and the objects of aversion). If, then, the causes
of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedânta
teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.--But if, on the
other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the
possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion
of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.
All this reasoning--we, the Vedântins, reply--is futile, because on
account of the unity of the Self the relation, whose two terms are the
causes of suffering, and the sufferer cannot exist (in the Self).--Our
doctrine would be liable to your objection if that which causes
suffering and that which suffers did, while belonging to one and the
same Self, stand to each other in the relation of object and subject.
But they do not stand in that relation just because they are one. If
fire, although it possesses different attributes, such as heat and
light, and is capable of change, does neither burn nor illumine itself
since it is one only; how can the one unchangeable Brahman enter with
reference to itself into the relation of cause of suffering and
sufferer?--Where then, it may be asked, does the relation discussed
(which after all cannot be denied altogether) exist?--That, we reply, is
not difficult to see[339]. The living body which is the object of the
action of burning is the sufferer; the sun, for instance, is a cause of
suffering (burning).--But, the opponent rejoins, burning is a pain, and
as such can affect an intelligent being only, not the non-intelligent
body; for if it were an affection of the mere body, it would, on the
destruction of the body, cease of itself, so that it would be needless
to seek for means to make it cease.--But it is likewise not observed, we
reply, that a mere intelligent being destitute of a body is burned and
suffers pain.--Nor would you (the Sâ@nkhya) also assume that the
affection called burning belongs to a mere intelligent being. Nor can
you admit[340] a real connexion of the soul and the body, because
through such a connexion impurity and similar imperfections would attach
to the soul[341]. Nor can suffering itself be said to suffer. And how
then, we ask, can you explain the relation existing between a sufferer
and the causes of suffering? If (as a last refuge) you should maintain
that the sattva-gu/n/a is that which suffers, and the gu/n/a called
passion that which causes suffering, we again object, because the
intelligent principle (the soul) cannot be really connected with these
two[342]. And if you should say that the soul suffers as it were because
it leans towards[343] the sattva-gu/n/a, we point out that the
employment of the phrase, 'as it were,' shows that the soul does not
really suffer.
If it is understood that its suffering is not real, we do not object to
the phrase 'as it were[344].' For the amphisbena also does not become
venomous because it is 'a serpent as it were' ('like a serpent'), nor
does the serpent lose its venom because it is 'like an amphisbena.' You
must therefore admit that the relation of causes of suffering and of
sufferers is not real, but the effect of Nescience. And if you admit,
that, then my (the Vedântic) doctrine also is free from objections[345].
But perhaps you (the Sâ@nkhya) will say that, after all, suffering (on
the part of the soul) is real[346]. In that case, however, the
impossibility of release is all the more undeniable[347], especially as
the cause of suffering (viz. the pradhâna) is admitted to be
eternal.--And if (to get out of this difficulty) you maintain that,
although the potentialities of suffering (on the part of the soul) and
of causing suffering (on the part of the pradhâna) are eternal, yet
suffering, in order to become actual, requires the conjunction of the
two--which conjunction in its turn depends on a special reason, viz. the
non-discrimination of the pradhâna by the soul--and that hence, when
that reason no longer exists, the conjunction of the two comes to an
absolute termination, whereby the absolute release of the soul becomes
possible; we are again unable to accept your explanation, because that
on which the non-discrimination depends, viz. the gu/n/a, called
Darkness, is acknowledged by you to be eternal.
And as[348] there is no fixed rule for the (successive) rising and
sinking of the influence of the particular gu/n/as, there is also no
fixed rule for the termination of the cause which effects the
conjunction of soul and pradhâna (i.e. non-discrimination); hence the
disjunction of the two is uncertain, and so the Sâ@nkhyas cannot escape
the reproach of absence of final release resulting from their doctrine.
To the Vedântin, on the other hand, the idea of final release being
impossible cannot occur in his dreams even; for the Self he acknowledges
to be one only, and one thing cannot enter into the relation of subject
and object, and Scripture, moreover, declares that the plurality of
effects originates from speech only. For the phenomenal world, on the
other hand, we may admit the relation of sufferer and suffering just as
it is observed, and need neither object to it nor refute it.
Herewith we have refuted the doctrine which holds the pradhâna to be the
cause of the world. We have now to dispose of the atomic theory.
We begin by refuting an objection raised by the atomists against the
upholders of Brahman.--The Vai/s/eshikas argue as follows: The qualities
which inhere in the substance constituting the cause originate qualities
of the same kind in the substance constituting the effect; we see, for
instance, that from white threads white cloth is produced, but do not
observe what is contrary (viz. white threads resulting in a piece of
cloth of a different colour). Hence, if the intelligent Brahman is
assumed as the cause of the world, we should expect to find intelligence
inherent in the effect also, viz. the world. But this is not the case,
and consequently the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the
world.--This reasoning the Sûtrakâra shows to be fallacious, on the
ground of the system of the Vai/s/eshikas themselves.
II. Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long
originate from the short and the atomic.
The system of the Vai/s/eshikas is the following:--The atoms which
possess, according to their special kind[349], the qualities of colour,
&c., and which are of spherical form[350], subsist during a certain
period[351] without producing any effects[352]. After that, the unseen
principle (ad/ri/sh/ta/), &c.[353], acting as operative causes and
conjunction constituting the non-inherent cause[354], they produce the
entire aggregate of effected things, beginning with binary atomic
compounds. At the same time the qualities of the causes (i.e. of the
simple atoms) produce corresponding qualities in the effects. Thus, when
two atoms produce a binary atomic compound, the special qualities
belonging to the simple atoms, such as white colour, &c., produce a
corresponding white colour in the binary compound. One special quality,
however, of the simple atoms, viz. atomic sphericity, does not produce
corresponding sphericity in the binary compound; for the forms of
extension belonging to the latter are said to be minuteness (a/n/utva)
and shortness. And, again, when two binary compounds combining produce a
quaternary atomic compound, the qualities, such as whiteness, &c.,
inherent in the binary compounds produce corresponding qualities in the
quaternary compounds; with the exception, however, of the two qualities
of minuteness and shortness. For it is admitted that the forms of
extension belonging to quaternary compounds are not minuteness and
shortness, but bigness (mahattva) and length. The same happens[355] when
many simple atoms or many binary compounds or a simple atom and a binary
compound combine to produce new effects.
Well, then, we say, just as from spherical atoms binary compounds are
produced, which are minute and short, and ternary compounds which are
big and long, but not anything spherical; or as from binary compounds,
which are minute and short, ternary compounds, &c., are produced which
are big and long, not minute and short; so this non-intelligent world
may spring from the intelligent Brahman. This is a doctrine to which
you--the Vai/s/eshika--cannot, on your own principles, object.
Here the Vai/s/eshika will perhaps come forward with the following
argumentation[356]. As effected substances, such as binary compounds and
so on, are engrossed by forms of extension contrary to that of the
causal substances, the forms of extension belonging to the latter, viz.
sphericity and so on, cannot produce similar qualities in the effects.
The world, on the other hand, is not engrossed by any quality contrary
to intelligence owing to which the intelligence inherent in the cause
should not be able to originate a new intelligence in the effect. For
non-intelligence is not a quality contrary to intelligence, but merely
its negation. As thus the case of sphericity is not an exactly parallel
one, intelligence may very well produce an effect similar to itself.
This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound. Just as the qualities of
sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce
corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two
cases are parallel so far. Nor can the circumstance of the effects being
engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of
sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the
power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another
form of extension begins to exist. For it is admitted that the substance
produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon
only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist. Nor, again,
can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on
originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not
originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own;
for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other
causes; as the Sûtras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/âda) themselves declare
(Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 9, 'Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in
the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;'
VII, 1, 10, 'The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;' VII, 1, 17,
'Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]').--Nor, again, can it
be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like
effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are
supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not
standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new
quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same
relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which
they inhere). For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not
originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of
sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with
regard to intelligence[359].
Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction
(sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class
different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows
that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes
from which they spring is too wide. If you remark against this last
argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.
Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction)
as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain
the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.
Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to
be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.
Your own Sûtrakâra adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a
substance (Vai/s/. Sût. IV, 2, 2, 'On account of the conjunction of
things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body
is not composed of five elements'). Just as the conjunction which
inheres in the perceptible earth and the imperceptible ether is not
perceptible, the body also, if it had for its inherent cause the five
elements which are part of them perceptible, part of them imperceptible,
would itself be imperceptible; but, as a matter of fact, it is
perceptible; hence it is not composed of the five elements. Here
conjunction is a quality and the body a substance.--The origin of
effects different in nature (from the cause) has, moreover, been already
treated of under II, 1; 6.--Well then, this being so, the matter has
been settled there already (why then is it again discussed
here?)-Because, we reply, there we argued against the Sâ@nkhya, and at
present we have to do with the Vai/s/eshika.--But, already once, before
(II, 1, 3) a line of argument equally applicable to a second case was
simply declared to extend to the latter also; (why then do you not
simply state now that the arguments used to defeat the Sâ@nkhya are
equally valid against the Vai/s/eshika?)--Because here, we reply, at the
beginning of the examination of the Vai/s/eshika system we prefer to
discuss the point with arguments specially adapted to the doctrine of
the Vai/s/eshikas.
12. In both cases also (in the cases of the ad/ri/sh/t/a inhering either
in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence
absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).
The Sûtrakâra now proceeds to refute the doctrine of atoms being the
cause of the world.--This doctrine arises in the following manner. We
see that all ordinary substances which consist of parts as, for
instance, pieces of cloth originate from the substances connected with
them by the relation of inherence, as for instance threads, conjunction
co-operating (with the parts to form the whole). We thence draw the
general conclusion that whatever consists of parts has originated from
those substances with which it is connected by the relation of
inherence, conjunction cooperating. That thing now at which the
distinction of whole and parts stops and which marks the limit of
division into minuter parts is the atom.--This whole world, with its
mountains, oceans, and so on, is composed of parts; because it is
composed of parts it has a beginning and an end[360]; an effect may not
be assumed without a cause; therefore the atoms are the cause of the
world. Such is Ka/n/âda's doctrine.--As we observe four elementary
substances consisting of parts, viz. earth, water, fire, and air (wind),
we have to assume four different kinds of atoms. These atoms marking the
limit of subdivision into minuter parts cannot be divided themselves;
hence when the elements are destroyed they can be divided down to atoms
only; this state of atomic division of the elements constitutes the
pralaya (the periodical destruction of the world). After that when the
time for creation comes, motion (karman) springs up in the aerial atoms.
This motion which is due to the unseen principle[361] joins the atom in
which it resides to another atom; thus binary compounds, &c. are
produced, and finally the element of air. In a like manner are produced
fire, water, earth, the body with its organs. Thus the whole world
originates from atoms. From the qualities inhering in the atoms the
qualities belonging to the binary compounds are produced, just as the
qualities of the cloth result from the qualities of the threads.--Such,
in short, is the teaching of the followers of Ka/n/âda.
This doctrine we controvert in the following manner.--It must be
admitted that the atoms when they are in a state of isolation require
action (motion) to bring about their conjunction; for we observe that
the conjunction of threads and the like is effected by action. Action
again, which is itself an effect, requires some operative cause by which
it is brought about; for unless some such cause exists, no original
motion can take place in the atoms. If, then, some operative cause is
assumed, we may, in the first place, assume some cause analogous to seen
causes, such as endeavour or impact. But in that case original motion
could not occur at all in the atoms, since causes of that kind are, at
the time, impossible. For in the pralaya state endeavour, which is a
quality of the soul, cannot take place because no body exists then. For
the quality of the soul called endeavour originates when the soul is
connected with the internal organ which abides in the body. The same
reason precludes the assumption of other seen causes such as impact and
the like. For they all are possible only after the creation of the world
has taken place, and cannot therefore be the causes of the original
action (by which the world is produced).--If, in the second place, the
unseen principle is assumed as the cause of the original motion of the
atoms, we ask: Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in
the soul or in the atom? In both cases it cannot be the cause of motion
in the atoms, because it is non-intelligent. For, as we have shown above
in our examination of the Sâ@nkhya system, a non-intelligent thing which
is not directed by an intelligent principle cannot of itself either act
or be the cause of action, and the soul cannot be the guiding principle
of the ad/ri/sh/t/a because at the time of pralaya its intelligence has
not yet arisen[362]. If, on the other hand, the unseen principle is
supposed to inhere in the soul, it cannot be the cause of motion in the
atoms, because there exists no connexion of it with the latter. If you
say that the soul in which the unseen principle inheres is connected
with the atoms, then there would result, from the continuity of
connexion[363], continuity of action, as there is no other restricting
principle.--Hence, there being no definite cause of action, original
action cannot take place in the atoms; there being no action,
conjunction of the atoms which depends on action cannot take place;
there being no conjunction, all the effects depending on it, viz. the
formation of binary atomic compounds, &c., cannot originate.
How, moreover, is the conjunction of one atom with another to be
imagined? Is it to be total interpenetration of the two or partial
conjunction? If the former, then no increase of bulk could take place,
and consequently atomic size only would exist; moreover, it would be
contrary to what is observed, as we see that conjunction takes place
between substances having parts (prade/s/a). If the latter, it would
follow that the atoms are composed of parts.--Let then the atoms be
imagined to consist of parts.--If so, imagined things being unreal, the
conjunction also of the atoms would be unreal and thus could not be the
non-inherent cause of real things. And without non-inherent causes
effected substances such as binary compounds, &c. could not originate.
And just as at the time of the first creation motion of the atoms
leading to their conjunction could not take place, there being no cause
of such motion; thus at the time of a general pralaya also no action
could take place leading to their separation, since for that occurrence
also no definite seen cause could be alleged. Nor could the unseen
principle be adduced as the cause, since its purport is to effect
enjoyment (of reward and punishment on the part of the soul), not to
bring about the pralaya. There being then no possibility of action to
effect either the conjunction or the separation of the atoms, neither
conjunction nor separation would actually take place, and hence neither
creation nor pralaya of the world.--For these reasons the doctrine of
the atoms being the cause of the world must be rejected.
13. And because in consequence of samavâya being admitted a regressus in
infinitum results from parity of reasoning.
You (the Vai/s/eshika) admit that a binary compound which originates
from two atoms, while absolutely different from them, is connected with
them by the relation of inherence; but on that assumption the doctrine
of the atoms being the general cause cannot be established, 'because
parity involves here a retrogressus ad infinitum.' For just as a binary
compound which is absolutely different from the two constituent atoms is
connected with them by means of the relation of inherence (samavâya), so
the relation of inherence itself being absolutely different from the two
things which it connects, requires another relation of inherence to
connect it with them, there being absolute difference in both cases. For
this second relation of inherence again, a third relation of inherence
would have to be assumed and so on ad infinitum.--But--the Vai/s/eshika
is supposed to reply--we are conscious of the so-called samavâya
relation as eternally connected with the things between which it exists,
not as either non-connected with them or as depending on another
connexion; we are therefore not obliged to assume another connexion, and
again another, and so on, and thus to allow ourselves to be driven into
a regressus in infinitum.--Your defence is unavailing, we reply, for it
would involve the admission that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being
eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavâya,
not require another connexion[364]. If you say that conjunction does
require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply
that then samavâya also requires another connexion because it is
likewise a different thing. Nor can you say that conjunction does
require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavâya
does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference)
the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both
cases[366], and not that which is technically called 'quality' is the
cause (of another connexion being required)[367].--For these reasons
those who acknowledge samavâya to be a separate existence are driven
into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the
impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire
series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can
be accounted for.--For this reason also the atomic doctrine is
inadmissible.
14. And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or
non-activity).
Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially
active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there
being no fifth alternative. But none of the four alternatives stated is
possible. If they were essentially active, their activity would be
permanent so that no pralaya could take place. If they were essentially
non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could
take place. Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.
If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to
depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the
ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent
activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being
taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent
non-activity on the part of the atoms.--For this reason also the atomic
doctrine is untenable.
15. And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the
Vai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.
Let us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts
to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached
beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued. What
constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent),
belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c.,
and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its
colour, form, and other qualities.
This fundamental assumption of the Vai/s/eshikas we declare to be
groundless because from the circumstance of the atoms having colour and
other qualities there would follow the contrary of atomic minuteness and
permanency, i.e. it would follow that, compared to the ultimate cause,
they are gross and non-permanent. For ordinary experience teaches that
whatever things possess colour and other qualities are, compared to
their cause, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth, for instance, is
gross compared to the threads of which it consists, and non permanent;
and the threads again are non-permanent and gross compared to the
filaments of which they are made up. Therefore the atoms also which the
Vai/s/eshikas admit to have colour, &c. must have causes compared to
which they are gross and non-permanent. Hence that reason also which
Ka/n/âda gives for the permanence of the atoms (IV, 1, 1, 'that which
exists without having a cause is permanent') does not apply at all to
the atoms because, as we have shown just now, the atoms are to be
considered as having a cause.--The second reason also which Ka/n/âda
brings forward for the permanency of the atoms, viz. in IV, 1, 4, 'the
special negation implied in the term non-eternal would not be
possible[368]' (if there did not exist something eternal, viz. the
atoms), does not necessarily prove the permanency of the atoms; for
supposing that there exists not any permanent thing, the formation of a
negative compound such as 'non-eternal' is impossible. Nor does the
existence of the word 'non-permanent' absolutely presuppose the
permanency of atoms; for there exists (as we Vedântins maintain) another
permanent ultimate Cause, viz. Brahman. Nor can the existence of
anything be established merely on the ground of a word commonly being
used in that sense, since there is room for common use only if word and
matter are well-established by some other means of right knowledge.--The
third reason also given in the Vai/s/. Sûtras (IV, 1, 5) for the
permanency of the atoms ('and Nescience') is unavailing. For if we
explain that Sûtra to mean 'the non-perception of those actually
existing causes whose effects are seen is Nescience,' it would follow
that the binary atomic compounds also are permanent[369]. And if we
tried to escape from that difficulty by including (in the explanation of
the Sûtra as given above) the qualification 'there being absence of
(originating) substances,' then nothing else but the absence of a cause
would furnish the reason for the permanency of the atoms, and as that
reason had already been mentioned before (in IV, 1, 1) the Sûtra IV, 1,
5 would be a useless restatement.--Well, then (the Vai/s/eshika might
say), let us understand by 'Nescience' (in the Sûtra) the impossibility
of conceiving a third reason of the destruction (of effects), in
addition to the division of the causal substance into its parts, and the
destruction of the causal substance; which impossibility involves the
permanency of the atoms[370].--There is no necessity, we reply, for
assuming that a thing when perishing must perish on account of either of
those two reasons. That assumption would indeed have to be made if it
were generally admitted that a new substance is produced only by the
conjunction of several causal substances. But if it is admitted that a
causal substance may originate a new substance by passing over into a
qualified state after having previously existed free from
qualifications, in its pure generality, it follows that the effected
substance may be destroyed by its solidity being dissolved, just as the
hardness of ghee is dissolved by the action of fire[371].--Thus there
would result, from the circumstance of the atoms having colour, &c., the
opposite of what the Vai/s/eshikas mean. For this reason also the atomic
doctrine cannot be maintained.