1. That which is inferred (by the Sâ@nkhyas, viz. the pradhâna) cannot
be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of
the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).
Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of
the Vedânta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or
refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is incumbent on
thorough students of the Vedânta to refute the Sâ@nkhya and other
systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this
purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation
of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the
Vedânta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the
Vedânta-passages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first,
by means of such a determination, established our own position, since
this is a task more important than the refutation of the views
entertained by others.
Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed entitled
to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which
is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is
apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of
nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some
danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the Sâ@nkhya and
similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those
systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative
persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might
therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were
propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in
them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic
worthlessness.
But, it might be said, the Sâ@nkhya and similar systems have already
been impugned in several Sûtras of the first adhyâya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4,
28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are
now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.
As the Sâ@nkhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to
establish their own positions, the Vedânta-passages and interpret them
in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have
hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether
fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an
independent manner, without any reference to the Vedânta-texts.
The Sâ@nkhyas, to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as
jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of
consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so
we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and
animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure,
pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness
in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together
constitute the threefold pradhâna. This pradhâna which is
non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform
modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.
enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence
of the pradhâna is to be inferred from other circumstances also, such as
the limitation of all effects and the like[316].
Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sânkhyas base your
theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent
thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously
produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular
person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses,
palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according
to circumstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the
avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now
look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external
(i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling
(the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the
other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the
different classes of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs,
and are therefore capable of constituting the abodes of fruition; look,
we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even
form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent
principle like the pradhâna is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent
things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to
possess analogous powers. We rather must assume that just as clay and
similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if
worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhâna also (when
modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent
principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause
(of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those
attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as
clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such
as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter
into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary,
are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent
cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of
the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a
non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word
'and' (in the Sûtra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhâna
cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of
endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and
inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and
dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states,
while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a
different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the
operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the
sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing
to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences
exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it
pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next
Sâ@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhâna from the
limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all
inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things,
because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that
some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the
conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the
three constituents of the pradhâna, viz. Goodness, Passion, and
Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several
antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is
impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for
assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for
their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in
the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence
presides.