There is nothing objectionable in our system.--The objection that the
effect when being reabsorbed into its cause would inquinate the latter
with its qualities does not damage our position 'because there are
parallel instances,' i.e. because there are instances of effects not
inquinating with their qualities the causes into which they are
reabsorbed. Things, for instance, made of clay, such as pots, &c., which
in their state of separate existence are of various descriptions, do
not, when they are reabsorbed into their original matter (i.e. clay),
impart to the latter their individual qualities; nor do golden ornaments
impart their individual qualities to their elementary material, i.e.
gold, into which they may finally be reabsorbed. Nor does the fourfold
complex of organic beings which springs from earth impart its qualities
to the latter at the time of reabsorption. You (i.e. the pûrvapakshin),
on the other hand, have not any instances to quote in your favour. For
reabsorption could not take place at all if the effect when passing back
into its causal substance continued to subsist there with all its
individual properties. And[272] that in spite of the non-difference of
cause and effect the effect has its Self in the cause, but not the cause
in the effect, is a point which we shall render clear later on, under
II, 1, 14.
Moreover, the objection that the effect would impart its qualities to
the cause at the time of reabsorption is formulated too narrowly
because, the identity of cause and effect being admitted, the same would
take place during the time of the subsistence (of the effect, previous
to its reabsorption). That the identity of cause and effect (of Brahman
and the world) holds good indiscriminately with regard to all time (not
only the time of reabsorption), is declared in many scriptural passages,
as, for instance, 'This everything is that Self' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6);
'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2); 'The immortal Brahman is
this before' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'All this is Brahman' (Ch. Up. III,
14, 1).
With regard to the case referred to in the /S/ruti-passages we refute
the assertion of the cause being affected by the effect and its
qualities by showing that the latter are the mere fallacious
superimpositions of nescience, and the very same argument holds good
with reference to reabsorption also.--We can quote other examples in
favour of our doctrine. As the magician is not at any time affected by
the magical illusion produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the
highest Self is not affected by the world-illusion. And as one dreaming
person is not affected by the illusory visions of his dream because they
do not accompany the waking state and the state of dreamless sleep; so
the one permanent witness of the three states (viz. the highest Self
which is the one unchanging witness of the creation, subsistence, and
reabsorption of the world) is not touched by the mutually exclusive
three states. For that the highest Self appears in those three states,
is a mere illusion, not more substantial than the snake for which the
rope is mistaken in the twilight. With reference to this point teachers
knowing the true tradition of the Vedânta have made the following
declaration, 'When the individual soul which is held in the bonds of
slumber by the beginningless Mâyâ awakes, then it knows the eternal,
sleepless, dreamless non-duality' (Gau/d/ap. Kâr. I, 16).
So far we have shown that--on our doctrine--there is no danger of the
cause being affected at the time of reabsorption by the qualities of the
effect, such as grossness and the like.--With regard to the second
objection, viz. that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time
of reabsorption) into the state of non-distinction there would be no
special reason for the origin of a new world affected with distinctions,
we likewise refer to the 'existence of parallel instances.' For the case
is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also the
soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction;
nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old
state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakes
from its sleep or trance. Compare the scriptural passage, 'All these
creatures when they have become merged in the True, know not that they
are merged in the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a
lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a
mosquito, that they become again' (Ch. Up. VI, 9, 2; 3) For just as
during the subsistence of the world the phenomenon of multifarious
distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceeds unimpeded like
the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of
all distinction; so, we conclude, there remains, even after
reabsorption, the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded
on wrong knowledge.--Herewith the objection that--according to our
doctrine--even the finally released souls would be born again is already
disposed of. They will not be born again because in their case wrong
knowledge has been entirely discarded by perfect knowledge.--The last
alternative finally (which the pûrvapakshin had represented as open to
the Vedântin), viz. that even at the time of reabsorption the world
should remain distinct from Brahman, precludes itself because it is not
admitted by the Vedântins themselves.--Hence the system founded on the
Upanishads is in every way unobjectionable.
10. And because the objections (raised by the Sâ@nkhya against the
Vedânta doctrine) apply to his view also.
The doctrine of our opponent is liable to the very same objections which
he urges against us, viz. in the following manner.--The objection that
this world cannot have sprung from Brahman on account of its difference
of character applies no less to the doctrine of the pradhâna being the
cause of the world; for that doctrine also assumes that from a pradhâna
devoid of sound and other qualities a world is produced which possesses
those very qualities. The beginning of an effect different in character
being thus admitted, the Sâ@nkhya is equally driven to the doctrine that
before the actual beginning the effect was non-existent. And, moreover,
it being admitted (by the Sâ@nkhya also) that at the time of
reabsorption the effect passes back into the state of non-distinction
from the cause, the case of the Sâ@nkhya here also is the same as
ours.--And, further, if (as the Sâ@nkhya also must admit) at the time of
reabsorption the differences of all the special effects are obliterated
and pass into a state of general non-distinction, the special fixed
conditions, which previous to reabsorption were the causes of the
different worldly existence of each soul, can, at the time of a new
creation, no longer be determined, there being no cause for them; and if
you assume them to be determined without a cause, you are driven to the
admission that even the released souls have to re-enter a state of
bondage, there being equal absence of a cause (in the case of the
released and the non-released souls). And if you try to avoid this
conclusion by assuming that at the time of reabsorption some individual
differences pass into the state of non-distinction, others not, we reply
that in that case the latter could not be considered as effects of the
pradhâna[273].--It thus appears that all those difficulties (raised by
the Sâ@nkhya) apply to both views, and cannot therefore be urged against
either only. But as either of the two doctrines must necessarily be
accepted, we are strengthened--by the outcome of the above
discussion--in the opinion that the alleged difficulties are no real
difficulties[274].
11. If it be said that, in consequence of the ill-foundedness of
reasoning, we must frame our conclusions otherwise; (we reply that) thus
also there would result non-release.
In matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied
on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether
unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on
individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how arguments,
which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by
people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of
the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on
account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept
mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this
difficulty by accepting as well-founded the reasoning of some person of
recognised mental eminence, may he now be Kapila or anybody else; since
we observe that even men of the most undoubted mental eminence, such as
Kapila, Ka/n/âda, and other founders of philosophical schools, have
contradicted one another.
But (our adversary may here be supposed to say), we will fashion our
reasoning otherwise, i.e. in such a manner as not to lay it open to the
charge of having no proper foundation. You cannot, after all, maintain
that no reasoning whatever is well-founded; for you yourself can found
your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only; your
assumption being that because some arguments are seen to be devoid of
foundation other arguments as belonging to the same class are likewise
devoid of foundation. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the
whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end. For
we see that men act, with a view to obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain
in the future time, on the assumption that the past, the present, and
the future are uniform.--Further, in the case of passages of Scripture
(apparently) contradicting each other, the ascertainment of the real
sense, which depends on a preliminary refutation of the apparent sense,
can be effected only by an accurate definition of the meaning of
sentences, and that involves a process of reasoning. Thus Manu also
expresses himself: 'Perception, inference, and the /s/âstra according to
the various traditions, this triad is to be known well by one desiring
clearness in regard to right.--He who applies reasoning not contradicted
by the Veda to the Veda and the (Sm/ri/ti) doctrine of law, he, and no
other, knows the law' (Manu Sm/ri/ti XII, 105, 106). And that 'want of
foundation', to which you object, really constitutes the beauty of
reasoning, because it enables us to arrive at unobjectionable arguments
by means of the previous refutation of objectionable arguments[275]. (No
fear that because the pûrvapaksha is ill-founded the siddhânta should be
ill-founded too;) for there is no valid reason to maintain that a man
must be stupid because his elder brother was stupid.--For all these
reasons the want of foundation cannot be used as an argument against
reasoning.
Against this argumentation we remark that thus also there results 'want
of release.' For although with regard to some things reasoning is
observed to be well founded, with regard to the matter in hand there
will result 'want of release,' viz. of the reasoning from this very
fault of ill-foundedness. The true nature of the cause of the world on
which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive
abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts;
for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception,
because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as
it is devoid of characteristic signs, it does not lend itself to
inference and the other means of right knowledge.--Or else (if we adopt
another explanation of the word 'avimoksha') all those who teach the
final release of the soul are agreed that it results from perfect
knowledge. Perfect knowledge has the characteristic mark of uniformity,
because it depends on accomplished actually existing things; for
whatever thing is permanently of one and the same nature is acknowledged
to be a true or real thing, and knowledge conversant about such is
called perfect knowledge; as, for instance, the knowledge embodied in
the proposition, 'fire is hot.' Now, it is clear that in the case of
perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But
that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for
we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as
perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated
alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on
reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be
perfect knowledge?--Nor can it be said that he who maintains the
pradhâna to be the cause of the world (i.e. the Sâ@nkhya) is the best of
all reasoners, and accepted as such by all philosophers; which would
enable us to accept his opinion as perfect knowledge.--Nor can we
collect at a given moment and on a given spot all the logicians of the
past, present, and future time, so as to settle (by their agreement)
that their opinion regarding some uniform object is to be considered
perfect knowledge. The Veda, on the other hand, which is eternal and the
source of knowledge, may be allowed to have for its object firmly
established things, and hence the perfection of that knowledge which is
founded on the Veda cannot be denied by any of the logicians of the
past, present, or future. We have thus established the perfection of
this our knowledge which reposes on the Upanishads, and as apart from it
perfect knowledge is impossible, its disregard would lead to 'absence of
final release' of the transmigrating souls. Our final position therefore
is, that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to
Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and
substance of the world.
12. Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent
persons are explained.
Hitherto we have refuted those objections against the Vedânta-texts
which, based on reasoning, take their stand on the doctrine of the
pradhâna being the cause of the world; (which doctrine deserves to be
refuted first), because it stands near to our Vedic system, is supported
by somewhat weighty arguments, and has, to a certain extent, been
adopted by some authorities who follow the Veda.--But now some
dull-witted persons might think that another objection founded on
reasoning might be raised against the Vedânta, viz. on the ground of the
atomic doctrine. The Sûtrakâra, therefore, extends to the latter
objection the refutation of the former, considering that by the conquest
of the most dangerous adversary the conquest of the minor enemies is
already virtually accomplished. Other doctrines, as, for instance, the
atomic doctrine of which no part has been accepted by either Manu or
Vyâsa or other authorities, are to be considered as 'explained,' i.e.
refuted by the same reasons which enabled us to dispose of the pradhâna
doctrine. As the reasons on which the refutation hinges are the same,
there is no room for further doubt. Such common arguments are the
impotence of reasoning to fathom the depth of the transcendental cause
of the world, the ill-foundedness of mere Reasoning, the impossibility
of final release, even in case of the conclusions being shaped
'otherwise' (see the preceding Sûtra), the conflict of Scripture and
Reasoning, and so on.
13. If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of
enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice versâ) there would
result non-distinction (of the two); we reply that (such distinction)
may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.
Another objection, based on reasoning, is raised against the doctrine of
Brahman being the cause of the world.--Although Scripture is
authoritative with regard to its own special subject-matter (as, for
instance, the causality of Brahman), still it may have to be taken in a
secondary sense in those cases where the subject-matter is taken out of
its grasp by other means of right knowledge; just as mantras and
arthavâdas have occasionally to be explained in a secondary sense (when
the primary, literal sense is rendered impossible by other means of
right knowledge[276]). Analogously reasoning is to be considered invalid
outside its legitimate sphere; so, for instance, in the case of
religious duty and its opposite[277].--Hence Scripture cannot be
acknowledged to refute what is settled by other means of right
knowledge. And if you ask, 'Where does Scripture oppose itself to what
is thus established?' we give you the following instance. The
distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from
ordinary experience, the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls,
while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for
instance, is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of
enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence
if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versâ.
Now this passing over of one thing into another would actually result
from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the
sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable, not only
with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to
exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is
inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be
abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established
distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.
To the preceding objection we reply, 'It may exist as in ordinary
experience.' Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as
ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for
instance, that waves, foam, bubbles, and other modifications of the sea,
although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist,
sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of
conjunction, &c. From the fact of their being non-different from the
sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other; and,
again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are
not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also.
The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each
other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And
although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the
unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is
called the enjoyer (according to the passage, 'Having created he entered
into it,' Taitt. Up. II, 6), still after Brahman has entered into its
effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the
effect acting as a limiting adjunct; just as the universal ether is
divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The
conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment
is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest
cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates.
14. The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from
such terms as 'origin' and the like.
The[278] refutation contained in the preceding Sûtra was set forth on
the condition of the practical distinction of enjoyers and objects of
enjoyment being acknowledged. In reality, however, that distinction does
not exist because there is understood to be non-difference (identity) of
cause and effect. The effect is this manifold world consisting of ether
and so on; the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect it is
understood that in reality it is non-different from the cause, i.e. has
no existence apart from the cause.--How so?--'On account of the
scriptural word "origin" and others.' The word 'origin' is used in
connexion with a simile, in a passage undertaking to show how through
the knowledge of one thing everthing is known; viz. Ch. Up. VI, 1, 4,
'As, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the
modification (i.e. the effect; the thing made of clay) being a name
merely which has its origin in speech, while the truth is that it is
clay merely; thus,' &c.--The meaning of this passage is that, if there
is known a lump of clay which really and truly is nothing but clay[279],
there are known thereby likewise all things made of clay, such as jars,
dishes, pails, and so on, all of which agree in having clay for their
true nature. For these modifications or effects are names only, exist
through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no
such thing as a modification. In so far as they are names (individual
effects distinguished by names) they are untrue; in so far as they are
clay they are true.--This parallel instance is given with reference to
Brahman; applying the phrase 'having its origin in speech' to the case
illustrated by the instance quoted we understand that the entire body of
effects has no existence apart from Brahman.--Later on again the text,
after having declared that fire, water, and earth are the effects of
Brahman, maintains that the effects of these three elements have no
existence apart from them, 'Thus has vanished the specific nature of
burning fire, the modification being a mere name which has its origin in
speech, while only the three colours are what is true' (Ch. Up. VI, 4,
1).--Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity
of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others'
of the Sûtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the
True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'This
everything, all is that Self' (/Bri/. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman alone is
all this' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 11); 'The Self is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25,
2); 'There is in it no diversity' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25).--On any other
assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of
one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares).
We therefore must adopt the following view. In the same way as those
parts of ethereal space which are limited by jars and waterpots are not
really different from the universal ethereal space, and as the water of
a mirage is not really different from the surface of the salty
steppe--for the nature of that water is that it is seen in one moment
and has vanished in the next, and moreover, it is not to be perceived by
its own nature (i.e. apart from the surface of the desert[280])--; so
this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on
has no existence apart from Brahman.--But--it might be objected--Brahman
has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches,
so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers.
Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered
in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches; so
the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam; so the
clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars
and dishes made of it. On this assumption the process of final release
resulting from right knowledge may be established in connexion with the
element of unity (in Brahman), while the two processes of common worldly
activity and of activity according to the Veda--which depend on the
karmakâ/nd/a--may be established in connexion with the element of
manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay &c.
agree very well.
This theory, we reply, is untenable because in the instance (quoted in
the Upanishad) the phrase 'as clay they are true' asserts the cause only
to be true while the phrase 'having its origin in speech' declares the
unreality of all effects. And with reference to the matter illustrated
by the instance given (viz. the highest cause, Brahman) we read, 'In
that all this has its Self;' and, again, 'That is true;' whereby it is
asserted that only the one highest cause is true. The following passage
again, 'That is the Self; thou art that, O /S/vetaketu!' teaches that
the embodied soul (the individual soul) also is Brahman. (And we must
note that) the passage distinctly teaches that the fact of the embodied
soul having its Self in Brahman is self-established, not to be
accomplished by endeavour. This doctrine of the individual soul having
its Self in Brahman, if once accepted as the doctrine of the Veda, does
away with the independent existence of the individual soul, just as the
idea of the rope does away with the idea of the snake (for which the
rope had been mistaken). And if the doctrine of the independent
existence of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion
of the entire phenomenal world--which is based on the individual
soul--having an independent existence is likewise to be set aside. But
only for the establishment of the latter an element of manifoldness
would have to be assumed in Brahman, in addition to the element of
unity.--Scriptural passages also (such as, 'When the Self only is all
this, how should he see another?' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 13) declare that for
him who sees that everything has its Self in Brahman the whole
phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and results of actions is
non-existent. Nor can it be said that this non-existence of the
phenomenal world is declared (by Scripture) to be limited to certain
states; for the passage 'Thou art that' shows that the general fact of
Brahman being the Self of all is not limited by any particular state.
Moreover, Scripture, showing by the instance of the thief (Ch. VI, 16)
that the false-minded is bound while the true-minded is released,
declares thereby that unity is the one true existence while manifoldness
is evolved out of wrong knowledge. For if both were true how could the
man who acquiesces in the reality of this phenomenal world be called
false-minded[281]? Another scriptural passage ('from death to death goes
he who perceives therein any diversity,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 19) declares
the same, by blaming those who perceive any distinction.--Moreover, on
the doctrine, which we are at present impugning, release cannot result
from knowledge, because the doctrine does not acknowledge that some kind
of wrong knowledge, to be removed by perfect knowledge, is the cause of
the phenomenal world. For how can the cognition of unity remove the
cognition of manifoldness if both are true?
Other objections are started.--If we acquiesce in the doctrine of
absolute unity, the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c.,
become invalid because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of
their objects; just as the idea of a man becomes invalid after the right
idea of the post (which at first had been mistaken for a man) has
presented itself. Moreover, all the texts embodying injunctions and
prohibitions will lose their purport if the distinction on which their
validity depends does not really exist. And further, the entire body of
doctrine which refers to final release will collapse, if the distinction
of teacher and pupil on which it depends is not real. And if the
doctrine of release is untrue, how can we maintain the truth of the
absolute unity of the Self, which forms an item of that doctrine?
These objections, we reply, do not damage our position because the
entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true as long as
the knowledge of Brahman being the Self of all has not arisen; just as
the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper
wakes. For as long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the
unity of the Self, so long it does not enter his mind that the world of
effects with its means and objects of right knowledge and its results of
actions is untrue; he rather, in consequence of his ignorance, looks on
mere effects (such as body, offspring, wealth, &c.) as forming part of
and belonging to his Self, forgetful of Brahman being in reality the
Self of all. Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself,
there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious
activity should not hold on undisturbed. The case is analogous to that
of a dreaming man who in his dream sees manifold things, and, up to the
moment of waking, is convinced that his ideas are produced by real
perception without suspecting the perception to be a merely apparent
one.--But how (to restate an objection raised above) can the
Vedânta-texts if untrue convey information about the true being of
Brahman? We certainly do not observe that a man bitten by a rope-snake
(i.e. a snake falsely imagined in a rope) dies, nor is the water
appearing in a mirage used for drinking or bathing[282].--This
objection, we reply, is without force (because as a matter of fact we do
see real effects to result from unreal causes), for we observe that
death sometimes takes place from imaginary venom, (when a man imagines
himself to have been bitten by a venomous snake,) and effects (of what
is perceived in a dream) such as the bite of a snake or bathing in a
river take place with regard to a dreaming person.--But, it will be
said, these effects themselves are unreal!--These effects themselves, we
reply, are unreal indeed; but not so the consciousness which the
dreaming person has of them. This consciousness is a real result; for it
is not sublated by the waking consciousness. The man who has risen from
sleep does indeed consider the effects perceived by him in his dream
such as being bitten by a snake, bathing in a river, &c. to be unreal,
but he does not on that account consider the consciousness he had of
them to be unreal likewise.--(We remark in passing that) by this fact of
the consciousness of the dreaming person not being sublated (by the
waking consciousness) the doctrine of the body being our true Self is to
be considered as refuted[283].--Scripture also (in the passage, 'If a
man who is engaged in some sacrifice undertaken for some special wish
sees in his dream a woman, he is to infer therefrom success in his
work') declares that by the unreal phantom of a dream a real result such
as prosperity may be obtained. And, again, another scriptural passage,
after having declared that from the observation of certain unfavourable
omens a man is to conclude that he will not live long, continues 'if
somebody sees in his dream a black man with black teeth and that man
kills him,' intimating thereby that by the unreal dream-phantom a real
fact, viz. death, is notified.--It is, moreover, known from the
experience of persons who carefully observe positive and negative
instances that such and such dreams are auspicious omens, others the
reverse. And (to quote another example that something true can result
from or be known through something untrue) we see that the knowledge of
the real sounds A. &c. is reached by means of the unreal written
letters. Moreover, the reasons which establish the unity of the Self are
altogether final, so that subsequently to them nothing more is required
for full satisfaction[284]. An injunction as, for instance, 'He is to
sacrifice' at once renders us desirous of knowing what is to be
effected, and by what means and in what manner it is to be effected; but
passages such as, 'Thou art that,' 'I am Brahman,' leave nothing to be
desired because the state of consciousness produced by them has for its
object the unity of the universal Self. For as long as something else
remains a desire is possible; but there is nothing else which could be
desired in addition to the absolute unity of Brahman. Nor can it be
maintained that such states of consciousness do not actually arise; for
scriptural passages such as, 'He understood what he said' (Ch. Up. VII,
18, 2), declare them to occur, and certain means are enjoined to bring
them about, such as the hearing (of the Veda from a teacher) and the
recital of the sacred texts. Nor, again, can such consciousness be
objected to on the ground either of uselessness or of erroneousness,
because, firstly, it is seen to have for its result the cessation of
ignorance, and because, secondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by
which it could be sublated. And that before the knowledge of the unity
of the Self has been reached the whole real-unreal course of ordinary
life, worldly as well as religious, goes on unimpeded, we have already
explained. When, however, final authority having intimated the unity of
the Self, the entire course of the world which was founded on the
previous distinction is sublated, then there is no longer any
opportunity for assuming a Brahman comprising in itself various
elements.
But--it may be said--(that would not be a mere assumption, but)
Scripture itself, by quoting the parallel instances of clay and so on,
declares itself in favour of a Brahman capable of modification; for we
know from experience that clay and similar things do undergo
modifications.--This objection--we reply--is without force, because a
number of scriptural passages, by denying all modification of Brahman,
teach it to be absolutely changeless (kû/t/astha). Such passages are,
'This great unborn Self; undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is
indeed Brahman' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 25); 'That Self is to be described by
No, no' (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 26); 'It is neither coarse nor fine' (B/ri/.
Up. III, 8, 8). For to the one Brahman the two qualities of being
subject to modification and of being free from it cannot both be
ascribed. And if you say, 'Why should they not be both predicated of
Brahman (the former during the time of the subsistence of the world, the
latter during the period of reabsorption) just as rest and motion may be
predicated (of one body at different times)?' we remark that the
qualification, 'absolutely changeless' (kû/t/astha), precludes this. For
the changeless Brahman cannot be the substratum of varying attributes.
And that, on account of the negation of all attributes, Brahman really
is eternal and changeless has already been demonstrated.--Moreover,
while the cognition of the unity of Brahman is the instrument of final
release, there is nothing to show that any independent result is
connected with the view of Brahman, by undergoing a modification,
passing over into the form of this world. Scripture expressly declares
that the knowledge of the changeless Brahman being the universal Self
leads to a result; for in the passage which begins, 'That Self is to be
described by No, no,' we read later on, 'O Janaka, you have indeed
reached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4). We have then[285] to accept
the following conclusion that, in the sections treating of Brahman, an
independent result belongs only to the knowledge of Brahman as devoid of
all attributes and distinctions, and that hence whatever is stated as
having no special fruit of its own--as, for instance, the passages about
Brahman modifying itself into the form of this world--is merely to be
applied as a means for the cognition of the absolute Brahman, but does
not bring about an independent result; according to the principle that
whatever has no result of its own, but is mentioned in connexion with
something else which has such a result, is subordinate to the
latter[286]. For to maintain that the result of the knowledge of Brahman
undergoing modifications would be that the Self (of him who knows that)
would undergo corresponding modifications[287] would be inappropriate,
as the state of filial release (which the soul obtains through the
knowledge of Brahman) is eternally unchanging.
But, it is objected, he who maintains the nature of Brahman to be
changeless thereby contradicts the fundamental tenet according to which
the Lord is the cause of the world, since the doctrine of absolute unity
leaves no room for the distinction of a Ruler and something ruled.--This
objection we ward off by remarking that omniscience, &c. (i.e. those
qualities which belong to Brahman only in so far as it is related to a
world) depend on the evolution of the germinal principles called name
and form, whose essence is Nescience. The fundamental tenet which we
maintain (in accordance with such scriptural passages as, 'From that
Self sprang ether,' &c.; Taitt. Up. II, 1) is that the creation,
sustentation, and reabsorption of the world proceed from an omniscient,
omnipotent Lord, not from a non-intelligent pradhâna or any other
principle. That tenet we have stated in I, 1, 4, and here we do not
teach anything contrary to it.--But how, the question may be asked, can
you make this last assertion while all the while you maintain the
absolute unity and non-duality of the Self?--Listen how. Belonging to
the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are name and form,
the figments of Nescience, not to be defined either as being (i.e.
Brahman), nor as different from it[288], the germs of the entire expanse
of the phenomenal world, called in /S/rutî and Sm/ri/ti the illusion
(mâyâ), power (/s/aktî), or nature (prak/ri/ti) of the omniscient Lord.
Different from them is the omniscient Lord himself, as we learn from
scriptural passages such as the following, 'He who is called ether is
the revealer of all forms and names; that within which these forms and
names are contained is Brahman' (Ch. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve
names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, who having
divided all forms and given all names, sits speaking (with those names)'
(Taitt. Âr. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (/S/ve.
Up. VI, l2).--Thus the Lord depends (as Lord) upon the limiting adjuncts
of name and form, the products of Nescience; just as the universal ether
depends (as limited ether, such as the ether of a jar, &c.) upon the
limiting adjuncts in the shape of jars, pots, &c. He (the Lord) stands
in the realm of the phenomenal in the relation of a ruler to the
so-called jîvas (individual souls) or cognitional Selfs (vij/ñ/ânâtman),
which indeed are one with his own Self--just as the portions of ether
enclosed in jars and the like are one with the universal ether--but are
limited by aggregates of instruments of action (i.e. bodies) produced
from name and form, the presentations of Nescience. Hence the Lord's
being a Lord, his omniscience, his omnipotence, &c. all depend on the
limitation due to the adjuncts whose Self is Nescience; while in reality
none of these qualities belong to the Self whose true nature is cleared,
by right knowledge, from all adjuncts whatever. Thus Scripture also
says, 'Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands
nothing else, that is the Infinite' (Ch. Up. VII, 24, 1); 'But when the
Self only has become all this, how should he see another?' (B/ri/. Up.
II, 4, 13.) In this manner the Vedânta-texts declare that for him who
has reached the state of truth and reality the whole apparent world does
not exist. The Bhagavadgîtâ also ('The Lord is not the cause of actions,
or of the capacity of performing actions, or of the connexion of action
and fruit; all that proceeds according to its own nature. The Lord
receives no one's sin or merit. Knowledge is enveloped by Ignorance;
hence all creatures are deluded;' Bha. Gî. V, 14; 15) declares that in
reality the relation of Ruler and ruled does not exist. That, on the
other hand, all those distinctions are valid, as far as the phenomenal
world is concerned, Scripture as well as the Bhagavadgîtâ states;
compare B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22, 'He is the Lord of all, the king of all
things, the protector of all things; he is a bank and boundary, so that
these worlds may not be confounded;' and Bha. Gî. XVIII, 61, 'The Lord,
O Arjuna, is seated in the region of the heart of all beings, turning
round all beings, (as though) mounted on a machine, by his delusion.'
The Sûtrakâra also asserts the non-difference of cause and effect only
with regard to the state of Reality; while he had, in the preceding
Sûtra, where he looked to the phenomenal world, compared Brahman to the
ocean, &c., that comparison resting on the assumption of the world of
effects not yet having been refuted (i.e. seen to be unreal).--The view
of Brahman as undergoing modifications will, moreover, be of use in the
devout meditations on the qualified (sagu/n/a) Brahman.
15. And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is
observed.
For the following reason also the effect is non-different from the
cause, because only when the cause exists the effect is observed to
exist, not when it does not exist. For instance, only when the clay
exists the jar is observed to exist, and the cloth only when the threads
exist. That it is not a general rule that when one thing exists another
is also observed to exist, appears, for instance, from the fact, that a
horse which is other (different) from a cow is not observed to exist
only when a cow exists. Nor is the jar observed to exist only when the
potter exists; for in that case non-difference does not exist, although
the relation between the two is that of an operative cause and its
effect[289].--But--it may be objected--even in the case of things other
(i.e. non-identical) we find that the observation of one thing regularly
depends on the existence of another; smoke, for instance, is observed
only when fire exists.--We reply that this is untrue, because sometimes
smoke is observed even after the fire has been extinguished; as, for
instance, in the case of smoke being kept by herdsmen in jars.--Well,
then--the objector will say--let us add to smoke a certain qualification
enabling us to say that smoke of such and such a kind[290] does not
exist unless fire exists.--Even thus, we reply, your objection is not
valid, because we declare that the reason for assuming the
non-difference of cause and effect is the fact of the internal organ
(buddhi) being affected (impressed) by cause and effect jointly[291].
And that does not take place in the case of fire and smoke.--Or else we
have to read (in the Sûtra) 'bhâvât,' and to translate, 'and on account
of the existence or observation.' The non-difference of cause and effect
results not only from Scripture but also from the existence of
perception. For the non-difference of the two is perceived, for
instance, in an aggregate of threads, where we do not perceive a thing
called 'cloth,' in addition to the threads, but merely threads running
lengthways and crossways. So again, in the threads we perceive finer
threads (the aggregate of which is identical with the grosser threads),
in them again finer threads, and so on. On the ground of this our
perception we conclude that the finest parts which we can perceive are
ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black (the
colours of fire, water, and earth, according to Ch. Up. VI, 4); those,
again, with air, the latter with ether, and ether with Brahman, which is
one and without a second. That all means of proof lead back to Brahman
(as the ultimate cause of the world; not to pradhâna, &c.), we have
already explained.
16. And on account of that which is posterior (i.e. the effect) being
that which is.
For the following reason also the effect is to be considered as
non-different (from the cause). That which is posterior in time, i.e.
the effect, is declared by Scripture to have, previous to its actual
beginning, its Being in the cause, by the Self of the cause merely. For
in passages like, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was that only which
is' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); and, 'Verily, in the beginning this was Self,
one only' (Ait. Ar. II, 4, 1, 1), the effect which is denoted by the
word 'this' appears in grammatical co-ordination with (the word
denoting) the cause (from which it appears that both inhere in the same
substratum). A thing, on the other hand, which does not exist in another
thing by the Self of the latter is not produced from that other thing;
for instance, oil is not produced from sand. Hence as there is
non-difference before the production (of the effect), we understand that
the effect even after having been produced continues to be non-different
from the cause. As the cause, i.e. Brahman, is in all time neither more
nor less than that which is, so the effect also, viz. the world, is in
all time only that which is. But that which is is one only; therefore
the effect is non-different from the cause.
17. If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not
(the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced); (we reply)
not so, (because the term 'that which is not' denotes) another quality
(merely); (as appears) from the complementary sentence.
But, an objection will be raised, in some places Scripture speaks of the
effect before its production as that which is not; so, for instance, 'In
the beginning this was that only which is not' (Ch. Up. III, 19, 1); and
'Non-existent[292] indeed this was in the beginning' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).
Hence Being (sattvam) cannot be ascribed to the effect before its
production.
This we deny. For by the Non-existence of the effect previous to its
production is not meant absolute Non-existence, but only a different
quality or state, viz. the state of name and form being unevolved, which
state is different from the state of name and form being evolved. With
reference to the latter state the effect is called, previous to its
production, non-existent although then also it existed identical with
its cause. We conclude this from the complementary passage, according to
the rule that the sense of a passage whose earlier part is of doubtful
meaning is determined by its complementary part. With reference to the
passage. 'In the beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that
what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the
complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word
'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'
The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely)
Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or
posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also,
'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself
its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute
Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the
designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its
production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as
those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary
language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively
applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to
their differentiation.