That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from
the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural
passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us
that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or
earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain
determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who
wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to
make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which
teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production),
all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all
effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then
should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars
from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the
asatkâryavâdin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of
any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance
has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some
particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance,
milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay
only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in
return, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it
the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination),
you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause,
and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the
other hand, you understand by the ati/s/aya a certain power of the cause
assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined
effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause
and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be
different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than
cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the
particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with
the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of
that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand
and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones,
as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that
the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and
its qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent
rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are
not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called
samavâya connexion[293].--If, we reply, you assume the samavâya
connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the
samavâya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which
are connected by samavâya, and then that connexion will again require a
new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and
you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of
connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavâya is not
joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from
that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two
terms of the samavâya relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins,
let us assume that the samavâya connexion as itself being a connexion
may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any
further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also must be
connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the
samavâya connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of
connexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are
apprehended as standing in the relation of identity, the assumption of
the samavâya relation has really no purport.
In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect
are joined by the samavâya relation--assume a substance consisting of
parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material
parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken
together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all
parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived,
as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the
organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be
apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides
in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not
apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are
apprehended.--Let it then be assumed that the whole abides in all the
parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].--In that
case, we reply, we should have to assume other parts in addition to the
primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those
other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner
indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another
abides there by means of parts different from those of that other
thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of
parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an assumption of that
kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to
explain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always
have to assume further parts[297].--Well, then, let us maintain the
second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular
part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one
part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than
Devadatta can be present in /S/rughna and in Pâ/t/aliputra on one and
the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several
wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/ñ/adatta, who, as
being two different persons, may live one of them at /S/rughna and the
other at Pâ/t/aliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole
may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the
cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the
generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual
cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.
If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be
that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its
parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.
But such things are not seen to take place.
We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine
that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the
conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent
and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and
as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To
speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you
deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be
assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken
of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist)
but something else, and again that when the origination of the two
halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but
something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is
originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative)
causes are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence
is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that
at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in
existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is
the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its
obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something
which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something
else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one
existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To
something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is
moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when
maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for
experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and
houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,
for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren
woman was king previously to the coronation of Pûr/n/avarman' the
declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in
reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere
non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren
woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of
some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the
non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the
activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take
place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son
of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never
be.--But, the asatkâryavâdin here objects, from your doctrine there
follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether
purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in
the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to
bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause
which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as
a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and
it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether
useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its
origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration
that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a
purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the
effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something
previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already
because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have
already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance
merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time
be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another
time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same
substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also
by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c.,
remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and
attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers,
and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on
the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial
beings, because the different states in which they appear are not
separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for
instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has
undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon
as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this
objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for
instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the
condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no
right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those
cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as,
for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there
spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout)
only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by
becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles
of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession
of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of
visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and
death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes
existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would
also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born
babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.
It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood,
manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are
illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute
the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].
The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual
origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the
causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be
an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other
weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the
inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that
from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the
inherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if
(in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say
that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a
certain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby
would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists
in the cause already.
We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other
substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so
on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to
bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental
cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last
effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes,
and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms
concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that
the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different
from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As
under the preceding Sûtra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of
the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sûtra
is the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That
passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a
second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being
the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the
beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that
which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the
view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The
circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the
word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its
origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'
proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.
If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in
its cause by samavâya, it would be something different from the cause,
and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the
passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI,
1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the
comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from-the
cause.