The word 'but' discards the pûrvapaksha.
Your assertion that this world cannot have originated from Brahman on
account of the difference of its character is not founded on an
absolutely true tenet. For we see that from man, who is acknowledged to
be intelligent, non-intelligent things such as hair and nails originate,
and that, on the other hand, from avowedly non-intelligent matter, such
as cow-dung, scorpions and similar animals are produced.--But--to state
an objection--the real cause of the non-intelligent hair and nails is
the human body which is itself non-intelligent, and the non-intelligent
bodies only of scorpions are the effects of non-intelligent dung.--Even
thus, we reply, there remains a difference in character (between the
cause, for instance, the dung, and the effect, for instance, the body of
the scorpion), in so far as some non-intelligent matter (the body) is
the abode of an intelligent principle (the scorpion's soul), while other
non-intelligent matter (the dung) is not. Moreover, the difference of
nature--due to the cause passing over into the effect--between the
bodies of men on the one side and hair and nails on the other side, is,
on account of the divergence of colour, form, &c., very considerable
after all. The same remark holds good with regard to cow-dung and the
bodies of scorpions, &c. If absolute equality were insisted on (in the
case of one thing being the effect of another), the relation of material
cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two)
would be annihilated. If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men
and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one
characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well
as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply
that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic
feature, viz. that of existence (sattâ), is found in ether, &c. (which
are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).--He,
moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to
invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must
assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the
non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the
characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other)
characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of
intelligence. The first assertion would lead to the negation of the
relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the
fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause
(for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be
distinguished). The second assertion is open to the charge of running
counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the
characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found
likewise in ether and so on. For the third assertion the requisite
proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought
forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general
assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an
effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any
such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things
has Brahman for its material cause. And that all such assertions are
contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the
purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the
world. It has indeed been maintained by the pûrvapakshin that the other
means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman,
on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be
accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely
gratuitous. For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot
become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no
characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based),
inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but,
like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy
tradition. Thus Scripture also declares, 'That doctrine is not to be
obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O
dearest! it is easy to understand' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 9). And again, 'Who in
truth knows it? Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation
sprang?' (/Ri/g-v. Sa/m/h. X, 129, 6). These two mantras show that the
cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings
(î/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.
There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect: 'Do
not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];'
'Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;' 'Not the legions
of the gods know my origin, not the great /ri/shis. For I myself am in
every way the origin of the gods and great /ri/shis' (Bha. Gî. X,
2).--And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage
enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the
sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be
allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be
taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be
understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of
intuitional knowledge. By reasoning of the latter type we may, for
instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of
dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected
with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves
the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure
Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world;
that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from
Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and
effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be
demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).--He[271], moreover, who merely on the
ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world
would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would
find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above ('He became
knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge') which teaches a distinction
of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the
doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes
non-manifested. His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sâ@nkhya),
would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly
teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.
If, then, on account of difference of character that which is
intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also
which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhâna
of the Sâ@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.--(So much
for argument's sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on
difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an
intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.
7. If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its
origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation
(without an object).
If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as
sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of
an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the
qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered
as non-existing before its actual origination. But this consequence
cannot be acceptable to you--the Vedântin--who maintain the doctrine of
the effect existing in the cause already.
This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of
its being a mere negation. If you negative the existence of the effect
previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation
without an object to be negatived. The negation (implied in
'non-existent') can certainly not have for its object the existence of
the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed
as 'existent,' through and in the Self of the cause, before its
origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this
effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to
such scriptural passages as, 'Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere
than in the Self is abandoned by everything' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 6). In
so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the
cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the
effect (as after it).--But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as
sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those
qualities)!--True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist
without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning
(of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our
doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.--This
point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the
non-difference of cause and effect.
8. On account of such consequences at the time of reabsorption (the
doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.
The pûrvapakshin raises further objections.--If an effect which is
distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts,
absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have
Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of
the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of
non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties.
As therefore--on your doctrine--the cause (i.e. Brahman) as well as the
effect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and
similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an
omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.--Another
objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions
passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction
there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of
the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the
distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which
are actually observed to exist).--A third objection is that, if we
assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all
works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying
souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest
Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have
obtained final release again appear in the new world.--If you finally
say, 'Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even
at the time of reabsorption,' we reply that in that case a reabsorption
will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect's existing
separate from the cause is not possible.--For all these reasons the
Vedânta doctrine is objectionable.
To this the next Sûtra replies.