Sm/ri/ti also declares the difference of the embodied Self and the
highest Self, viz. Bha. Gîtâ XVIII, 61, 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is seated
in the heart of all beings, driving round by his magical power all
beings (as if they were) mounted on a machine.'
But what, it may be asked, is that so-called embodied Self different
from the highest Self which is to be set aside according to the
preceding Sûtras? /S/ruti passages, as well as Sm/ri/ti, expressly deny
that there is any Self apart from the highest Self; compare, for
instance, B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23, 'There is no other seer but he; there
is no other hearer but he;' and Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 2, 'And know me also, O
Bhârata, to be the kshetiaj/ñ/a in all kshetras.'
True, we reply, (there is in reality one universal Self only.) But the
highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts, viz. the body,
the senses, and the mind (mano-buddhi), is, by the ignorant, spoken of
as if it were embodied. Similarly the ether, although in reality
unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts, such as jars and
other vessels. With regard to this (unreal limitation of the one Self)
the distinction of objects of activity and of agents may be practically
assumed, as long as we have not learned--from the passage, 'That art
thou'--that the Self is one only. As soon, however, as we grasp the
truth that there is only one universal Self, there is an end to the
whole practical view of the world with its distinction of bondage, final
release, and the like.
7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on
account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the
denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman)
has thus to be contemplated, and because the case is analogous to that
of ether.
On account of the limitation of its abode, which is mentioned in the
clause, 'He is my Self within the heart,' and on account of the
declaration as to its minuteness contained in the direct statement, 'He
is smaller than a grain of rice,' &c.; the embodied soul only, which is
of the size of an awl's point, is spoken of in the passage under
discussion, and not the highest Self. This assertion made above (in the
pûrvapaksha of Sûtra I, and restated in the pûrvapaksha of the present
Sûtra) has to be refuted. We therefore maintain that the objection
raised does not invalidate our view of the passage. It is true that a
thing occupying a limited space only cannot in any way be spoken of as
omnipresent; but, on the other hand, that which is omnipresent, and
therefore in all places may, from a certain point of view, be said to
occupy a limited space. Similarly, a prince may be called the ruler of
Ayodhyâ although he is at the same time the ruler of the whole
earth.--But from what point of view can the omnipresent Lord be said to
occupy a limited space and to be minute?--He may, we reply, be spoken of
thus, 'because he is to be contemplated thus.' The passage under
discussion teaches us to contemplate the Lord as abiding within the
lotus of the heart, characterised by minuteness and similar
qualities--which apprehension of the Lord is rendered possible through a
modification of the mind--just as Hari is contemplated in the sacred
stone called /S/âlagrâm. Although present everywhere, the Lord is
pleased when meditated upon as dwelling in the heart. The case is,
moreover, to be viewed as analogous to that of the ether. The ether,
although all-pervading, is spoken of as limited and minute, if
considered in its connexion with the eye of a needle; so Brahman also.
But it is an understood matter that the attributes of limitation of
abode and of minuteness depend, in Brahman's case, entirely on special
forms of contemplation, and are not real. The latter consideration
disposes also of the objection, that if Brahman has its abode in the
heart, which heart-abode is a different one in each body, it would
follow that it is affected by all the imperfections which attach to
beings having different abodes, such as parrots shut up in different
cages, viz. want of unity, being made up of parts, non-permanency, and
so on.
8. If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the
individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of
Brahman); we say, no; on account of the difference of nature (of the
two).
But, it may be said, as Brahman is omnipresent like ether, and therefore
connected with the hearts of all living beings, and as it is of the
nature of intelligence and therefore not different from the individual
soul, it follows that Brahman also has the same fruition of pleasure,
pain, and so on (as the individual soul). The same result follows from
its unity. For in reality there exists no transmigratory Self different
from the highest Self; as appears from the text, 'There is no other
knower but he' (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23), and similar passages. Hence the
highest Self is subject to the fruition connected with transmigratory
existence.
This is not so, we reply; because there is a difference of nature. From
the circumstance that Brahman is connected with the hearts of all living
beings it does not follow that it is, like the embodied Self, subject to
fruition. For, between the embodied Self and the highest Self, there is
the difference that the former acts and enjoys, acquires merit and
demerit, and is affected by pleasure, pain, and so on; while the latter
is of the opposite nature, i.e. characterised by being free from all
evil and the like. On account of this difference of the two, the
fruition of the one does not extend to the other. To assume merely on
the ground of the mutual proximity of the two, without considering their
essentially different powers, that a connexion with effects exists (in
Brahman's case also), would be no better than to suppose that space is
on fire (when something in space is on fire). The same objection and
refutation apply to the case of those also who teach the existence of
more than one omnipresent Self. In reply to the assertion, that because
Brahman is one and there are no other Selfs outside it, Brahman must be
subject to fruition since the individual soul is so, we ask the
question: How have you, our wise opponent, ascertained that there is no
other Self? You will reply, we suppose, from scriptural texts such as,
'That art thou,' 'I am Brahman,' 'There is no other knower but he,' and
so on. Very well, then, it appears that the truth about scriptural
matters is to be ascertained from Scripture, and that Scripture is not
sometimes to be appealed to, and on other occasions to be disregarded.
Scriptural texts, such as 'that art thou,' teach that Brahman which is
free from all evil is the Self of the embodied soul, and thus dispel
even the opinion that the embodied soul is subject to fruition; how then
should fruition on the part of the embodied soul involve fruition on the
part of Brahman?--Let, then, the unity of the individual soul and
Brahman not be apprehended on the ground of Scripture.--In that case, we
reply, the fruition on the part of the individual soul has wrong
knowledge for its cause, and Brahman as it truly exists is not touched
thereby, not any more than the ether becomes really dark-blue in
consequence of ignorant people presuming it to be so. For this reason
the Sûtrakâra says[140] 'no, on account of the difference.' In spite of
their unity, fruition on the part of the soul does not involve fruition
on the part of Brahman; because there is a difference. For there is a
difference between false knowledge and perfect knowledge, fruition being
the figment of false knowledge while the unity (of the Self) is revealed
by perfect knowledge. Now, as the substance revealed by perfect
knowledge cannot be affected by fruition which is nothing but the
figment of false knowledge, it is impossible to assume even a shadow of
fruition on Brahman's part.
9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is
immovable is mentioned (as his food).
We read in the Ka/th/avallî (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He
to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a
condiment?' This passage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and
'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the
eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no
distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the
individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that
Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].
The pûrvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from
Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be
the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater,
according to the passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.
III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of
the passage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.
Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'
The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is
mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable
and immovable are here to be taken as constituting the food, while death
is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the
consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self,
however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to
eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made
of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right
to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that
this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all
living beings is seen to be meant from the circumstance of death being
the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may
here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances
only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self
cannot be an eater on account of the passage quoted ('the other looks on
without eating'), we remark that that passage aims at denying the
fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such
fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to
negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it
is well established by all the Vedânta-texts that Brahman is the cause
of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore
the eater can here be Brahman only.
10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self
only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the passage
(Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which
shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the
general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then
knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with
difficulties; which circumstance again points to the highest Self.
11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the
highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the
same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same
nature).
In the same Ka/th/avallî we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking
the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into
the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call
them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the
Tri/n/â/k/iketa sacrifice.'
Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul
are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the
mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of
as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the
body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on
this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a
preceding passage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is
dead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know
taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand,
the passage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it
intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul;
and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question
contained in the passage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different
from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the
past and the future, tell me that.'
The doubt to which the passage gives rise having thus been stated, a
caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can
be maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in
the circumstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the
fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent
individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual
form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the
two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the
same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual
soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the
fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account
of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'
These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that
in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men)
are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which
properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to
many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them
is really drinking. Or else we may explain the passage by saying that,
while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink
because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also assume
that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument
being figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech
exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a
chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be
represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt
whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the
individual soul and the highest Self.
Here the pûrvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views
is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into
the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in
either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as
'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another
interpretation is possible, to assume that a special place is here
ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world
of their good deeds' show that the two do not pass beyond the sphere of
the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the
sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the
scriptural passage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow
smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what
is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed
to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi
and the individual soul are spoken of.
To this we make the following reply:--In the passage under discussion
the individual soul (vij/ñ/ânâtman) and the highest Self are spoken of,
because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature.
For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned,
beings of the same class are understood to be meant; when, for instance,
the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this
bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So
here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to
determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when
a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for
the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the
soul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be
meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the
cave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest
Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12),
'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.
Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'
and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not
contrary to reason to assign to the omnipresent Brahman a special
locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already
demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works,
which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual
soul, may be assigned to both, analogously to the case of the men, one
of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade
also is unobjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not
belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like
light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience,
and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore
understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and
the highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.