12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only

with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent

passage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be

the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual

soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory

existence and final release, while the passage (9), 'He reaches the end

of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents

the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding

passage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his

Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has

entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the

abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same

two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The

highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause,

'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special

class of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted

(as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the

passage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest

Self.

The same reasoning applies to the passage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two

birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general

topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore

conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the

passage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is

meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and

of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without

eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again

the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged

into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own

impotence (anî/s/â), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord

(î/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief passes away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra,

'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision

of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is

differently interpreted in the Pai@ngi-rahasya Brâhma/n/a. According to

the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other

being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/ñ/a); so

that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/ñ/a). The

objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the

word kshetraj/ñ/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in

the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/ñ/a have the settled

meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second

place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the Pai@ngi-rahasya,)

'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one,

the seer, is the kshetraj/ñ/a; the two are therefore the internal organ

and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall

under the pûrvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting

forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by

the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting

and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes

connected with the sa/m/sâra and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is

pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on

without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti

passages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the

individual soul' (Bha. Gîtâ XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the

passage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in

the concluding passage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the

kshetraj/ñ/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity

attaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the

non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an

enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet

fruit?'--The whole passage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the

fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the

intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of

Brahman. To that end[143] the passage under discussion metaphorically

ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so

far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting

and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the

soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in

reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not

the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is

not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be

considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere

presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here

maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one

sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical

assumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the assumption of the

existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the

sphere of Nescience only; while the passage, 'But when the Self only is

all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically

postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative

knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement

(of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is

the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even

though they drop melted butter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on

both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this passage refers to the reflected Self

which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of

some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the pûrvapakshin argues as follows: What is

meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image

of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well

known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the

eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately

take the passage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual

Self (cognitional Self, vij/ñ/ânâtman) which perceives the colours by

means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and,

moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the passage) favours this

interpretation. Or else the passage is to be understood as referring to

the soul animating the sun which assists the sense of sight; compare the

passage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his

rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as

immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the

scriptural passage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord,

on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality

is spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by

the person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the

qualities mentioned in the passage accord with the nature of the highest

Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the

highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we

know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality

and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The

location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest

Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free

from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the

eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the

passage, 'Even though they drop melted butter or water on it it runs

away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the

qualities of sa/m/yadvâma, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord

only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvâma, for all blessings

(vâma) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vâmanî, for he leads

(nayati) all blessings (vâma). He is also Bhâmanî, for he shines (bhâti)

in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within

the eye is the highest Lord.

The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Sacred Books of the East, Volume 1 · 第 35 / 68 题