With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the work
begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled
by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be
determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more
particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to
each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The
reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the
different /s/âkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly
identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the
same /s/âkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The
reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and
philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the
composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different
priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear
in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing
dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school
to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the
fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar
contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not
any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances
enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/âkhâ were found
described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other
/s/âkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long
before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the
Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever
regards sacrificial acts, one /s/âkhâ may indeed safely follow its own
texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/âkhâs; that, however, all
texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the
relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into
one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all
Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts
may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition
is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one
only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the
one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met
with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what
sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the
same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The
latter is the special task of the present pâda.
Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those
vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one
sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one
vidyâ only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those
vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the
non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of
course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently
in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or
some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as
manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later
adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/â/nd/ilyavidyâ
which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in
B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the
/S/atapathabráhma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation
on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified
in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva),
while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prâ/n/a/s/arîratva
and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya
Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka
Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to
in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether
the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the
devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of
immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held
apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on
the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of
Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one
meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of
the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages
shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation
also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the
three texts.
Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate,
although apparently identical. The examples selected are the
udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain
similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in
both identified with prâ/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the
subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the
sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad represents
the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.
Sûtra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV),
proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the
O/m/kâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the
other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kâra which,'
&c.--According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more
satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter
merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in
the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the
so-called prâ/n/a-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the
different qualities of the prâ/n/a, which are mentioned in the different
texts, within one meditation.
Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The
point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its
qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special
vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of
Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account
everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance,
the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.)
are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to
/S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11
is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than
everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ only.--Adhik. VIII
(16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in
Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called
sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this
place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest
Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.
According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a
whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a.
Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sûtra 12,
however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head,
&c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to
be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities,
difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would
involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the
discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If
priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman,
for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sûtra 14
replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the
purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of
delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having
limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sûtra
15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya) is applied to it.'--But
in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pra/n/amaya,
&c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in âtmâ
ânandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies,
'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages
(âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage,
viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not
the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding
clauses about the prâ/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the
Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and is not the context of
greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the
former half of 17 (anvayâd iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it
denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of
the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz.
II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'
Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the
prâ/n/asa/m/vâda.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated
already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a
contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as
abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we
therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two
separate vidyâs.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain
attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila have not to be
introduced into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the stated
difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.--Adhik. XIII
(24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.
Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhma/n/a
passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance,
a brâhma/n/a about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the
Aitareya-âra/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to
connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they
show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.
Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the
possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and
affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the
effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies
of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.
Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of
which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good
and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road
to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the
body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken
literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate
question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds
in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or
not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond
the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who
knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any
other place.
The /S/rî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras as one adhikara/n/a whose two
first Sûtras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sûtra 29 raises an
objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the
path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its
works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death,
partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a
contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were
all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise
perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to
proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sûtra 30 replies, 'The
complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible,
since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since
scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely
annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet
connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir
upasampadya svena rûpe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krî/d/an
ramamâna/h/ sa svarâ/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâma/k/âro
bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's
vidyâmâhâtmya.--That the explanation of the /S/rî-bhâshya agrees with
the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show;
especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam
ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case,
and non-arthavattva in the other case.
The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that
the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs
which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are
acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyâs of Brahman.--The explanation given
in the /S/rî-bhâshya (in which Sûtras 31 and 32 have exchanged places)
is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on
Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and
sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The
/S/rî-bhâshya reads 'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvâsâm,'
all sagu/n/a-vidyâs.)
Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true
knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as
have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of
discharging certain offices.--In the /S/rî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra
follows immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close
connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule
divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body
which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain,
yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman,
remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain
until they have fully performed certain duties.
Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned
in some vidyâs--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be
included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that
Kâ/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ only,
because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to
Râmânuja the Sûtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the
conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36)
maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5,
constitute one vidyâ only, the object of knowledge being in both cases
Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the
contrary decides that the passage Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not
one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the
vidyâ of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one
only--According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a
only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.
Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.
IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidyâ, since the former refers to
Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with
Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats,
according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V,
11 ff.--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya, Sûtras 39-41 form one
adhikara/n/a whose first Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion
as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general
question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an
opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are
predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakâmatva, &c.--cannot be
considered real (pâramârthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti,
and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those
qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final
release.--To this objection Sûtra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not
to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage
under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with
emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he
who meditates on Brahman as satyakâma, &c. obtains a mere perishable
reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in
Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not
include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection
Sûtra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the
worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom
(i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of
(the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous
of release, may include satyakâmatva, &c. in his meditations.)
Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected
with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions,
are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the
latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a
similar Ch. Up. passage, Vâyu and Prâ/n/a are not to be identified, but
to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made
of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute
parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of
the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but
merely subjects of meditations.
Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of
digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent
of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists
maintain).--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya the adhikara/n/a does not
refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more
immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question
as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the
meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sûtras then have to be
translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has,
in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which
belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/ñ/at/ri/tva and the like),
because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next
Sûtra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e.
the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final
release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to
the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in
the condition of final release).'
Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent
elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of
difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that
/s/âkhâ in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all
/s/âkhâs.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vânara Agni of Ch.
Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single
parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to
one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be
held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidyâ,
/S/a/nd/ilyavidyâ, &c. remain separate.
Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which
the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no
reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those
meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be
cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI
(61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with
constituent elements of action, such as the udgîtha.