Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to
/S/a@nkara the three first Sûtras discuss the question whether the
creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages
produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded,
or not; Sûtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the
dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the
character of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ,
yet have a prophetic quality. Sûtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the
question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such
participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its
dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and
power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.
The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by
Râmânuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sûtras with
each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations
of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the
individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sûtras 1 and 2
set forth the pûrvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the
individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of
some /s/âkâs declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sûtra
states the siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Mâyâ, i.e.
are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the
individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not
fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuja remarks,
'mâyâ/s/abdo hy â/sk/aryavâ/k/î janaka/s/ya kule jâtâ devamâyeva nirmitâ
ityâdishu tathâ dar/s/anât.' The three remaining Sûtras are exhibited in
the /S/rî-bhâshya in a different order, the fourth Sûtra, according to
/S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Râmânuja. Sûtras 4 and 5
(according to Râmânuja's numeration) are explained by Râmânuja very much
in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of
the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves
more intimately with the preceding Sûtras than is possible on
/S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sûtra 6 (sû/k/aka/s/ /k/â hi) Râmânuja
sees a deduction from the siddhânta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the
images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore
they have prophetic significance.'
Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul
abides within Brahman in the heart.
Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul
awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9)
explains the nature of a swoon.
Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question
as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is
merged in the state of deep sleep. Sûtra 11 declares that twofold
characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes,
nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman
even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all
passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be
destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sûtra 12 continues,
that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive
attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned
limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially
stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sûtra 13
adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected
to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sûtra 14), is the pre-eminent
meaning of all Vedânta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That
Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to
its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of
the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature
of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka expressly
declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the
same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At
the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the
limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is
compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the
surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised
that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material
like the sun, and there are no real upâdhis separate from it as the
water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that,
as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase,
decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains
unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes
of the upâdhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is
affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the
upâdhis, Scripture declares (21).
From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given
in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. According to Râmânuja the
adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to
the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end)
affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within
the soul as antaryâmin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self
within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections)
because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold
characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil,
apahatapâpman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed
with all auspicious qualities, satyakâma, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.)
(11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially
free from evil--according to the Prajâpativâkya in the Chândogya--yet is
liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies,
so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny
this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryâmin
(in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the
ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the
jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and
the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord
(dvâ supar/n/â sayujâ sakhâyâ) (13).--Should it be said that, according
to the Chândogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the
elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence
participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sára;
we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is
in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent;
pradhâna) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to
'âkâ/s/o ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).--But does not the passage
'satya/m/ j/ñ/ânam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but
light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage
'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to
deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their purport,
we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that
Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which
those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover
the Taittirîya passage only asserts so much, viz. the prakâ/s/arûpatâ of
Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti
neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the
sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti
(17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by
their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether
limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that
the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is
apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryâmin really
abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their
defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely
that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate
in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both
similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be
employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).
Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a
(VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti
neti; B/ri/hadâr) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms
of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26
further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive
attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis. The last four Sûtras
return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so
many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory
hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all
difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.
According to Rámânuja, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in
Sûtra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman
be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the
B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes
(prakâra), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmâtra)?--The
reply given in Sûtra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of
Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it
would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them
again[16]), but merely denies the prâk/ri/taitâvattva, the previously
stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses
only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that
subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further
qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the
object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra
23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the
intuition (sákshâtkkâra) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/râdhana,
i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as
Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti'
is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as
prakâ/s/a, luminousness, j/ñ/âna, intelligence, &c., so also the quality
of being differentiated by the world (prapa/ñk/avsish/t/atâ) is intuited
as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that
prakâ/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated
practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vâmadeva) in the work of
sa/m/râdhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is
connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious
qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in
Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the
a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the
b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the
latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as
special arrangements (sa/m/sthanaviseshâ/h/) of Brahman, as the coils
are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e.
sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as
different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in
the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous
to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both
being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that
stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls
(whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29,
30).
Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly
implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be
truly understood.
Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini
opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called
apûrva, but is allotted by the Lord.