Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha,
i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms
this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrâjins is enjoined
by the sacred law, and that for them vidyâ only is prescribed, not
action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part
of vidyâs are not mere stutis (arthavâdas), but themselves enjoin the
meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedânta-texts are not to be
used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of
glorifying--as arthavâdas--the injunctions with which they are connected
(Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the ûrdhvaretasa/h/ require
no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions
enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds,
&c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidyâ in the mind (Adhik.
VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws
regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII,
28-3l).--The â/s/ramakarmâ/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not
strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to
poverty and so on, are anâ/s/rama have claims to vidyâ (Adhik. IX,
36-39).--An ûrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation
of the fall of an ûrdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the
fallen ûrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those
meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the
sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamâna (Adhik.
XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition
to bâlya and pâ/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By bâlya is to be
understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).
Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Râmânuja, the question when the
vidyâ, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.
Sûtra 51 treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation
(abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if
there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmântara (in
which latter case the vidyâ arises later only), on account of Scripture
declaring this (in various passages).'--Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also
absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that
knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one
also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an
obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sûtras as two
adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a
somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a
more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyâs.
Notes:
[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from
Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the
case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them
'anuvâdena,' and finally negative them.]
[Footnote 17: Râmânuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability
of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one
passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a
mâtâpit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sâstra/m/ pratârakavad
apâramârthikau nirasanîyau gu/n/au pramâ/n/ântarâpratipannau
âdare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sâra/k/akraparivartanena pûrvam eva
bambhramyamânân mumukshûn bhûyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']
[Footnote 18: The /S/rî-bhâshya as well as several other commentaries
reads tadbhâvabhâvitvât for /S/an@kara's tadbhâvâbhâvitvât.]
FOURTH ADHYÂYA.
PÂDA I.
Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Âtman enjoined by
Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be
repeated again and again.
Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view
it as constituting his own Self.
Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the
so-called pratîkopâsanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is
viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano
brahmety upâsîta) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to
consider the pratîka as constituting his own Self.
Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratîkopâsanas the pratîka is to be meditatively
viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the
pratîka.--Râmânuja takes Sûtra 5 as simply giving a reason for the
decision arrived at under Sûtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a
new adhikara/n/a.
Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of
sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evâsau tapati tam udgîtham
upâsîta) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the
sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance,
the udgîtha is to be viewed as Âditya, not Âditya as the udgîtha.
Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a
sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to
those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sûtra gives
no hint to that effect.
Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in
any place, favourable to concentration of mind.
Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until
death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to
sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.
Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman
has been reached, the vidvân is no longer affected by the consequences
of either past or future evil deeds.
Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal
translation of the Sûtra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the
vidvân) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e.
of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes
place).' The last words of the Sûtra, 'but on the fall,' are separated
by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sûtra and interpreted to
mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvân, who
through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of
works).'--According to Râmânuja the whole Sûtra simply means, 'There is
likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is
reached), but on the death of the vidvân[19].'
Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding
adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anârabdhakârya works, i.e.
those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it
does not extend to the ârabdhakârya works on which the present existence
of the devotee depends.
Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted
such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so,
for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of
knowledge.
Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such
sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the
upâsanas referring to the different members of those works.
Adhik. XIV (19).--The ârabdhakârya works have to be worked out fully by
the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvân becomes united with
Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sûtra is, according to /S/a@nkara,
restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete
knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would
lead to future embodiments. According to Râmânuja a number of embodied
existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the
ârabdhakârya works are exhausted.