_Socr._ But he probably would think us ridiculous, just as if we, when
asked concerning your name and having answered syllable by syllable,
thereby judging and saying correctly what we do say, should think
ourselves grammarians, and that we know and speak grammatically the
definition of the name of Theætetus; whereas it is not possible to say
any thing scientifically, before one has given a complete account of
each thing by means of its elements, together with true judgment, as was
observed before, if I mistake not.
_Theæ._ It was observed.
_Socr._ So, too, we have a correct judgment respecting a chariot, but he
who is able to describe its nature by means of those hundred pieces, by
adding this, both adds _logos_ to true judgment, and instead of forming
a mere judgment becomes an artist and knowing in the nature of a
chariot, in that he gives a complete account of the whole, by means of
its elements.
_Theæ._ Does not this appear to you, Socrates, to be well said?
_Socr._ If it appears to you, my friend, and you allow that the
description of each thing by its element is _logos_, and that that made
by syllables, or even larger parts is devoid of _logos_, tell me, that
we may examine it.
_Theæ._ I certainly do allow it.
_Socr._ Whether do you think that any one has a scientific knowledge of
any thing, when the same thing appears to him at one time to belong to
the same thing and at another to a different thing, or when he forms at
one time one judgment and at another a different judgment about the same
thing?
_Theæ._ By Jupiter, not I.
152. _Socr._ Have you forgotten then, that in learning your letters at
first both you and others did this?
_Theæ._ Do you mean that we thought that at one time one letter, and at
another time another, belonged to the same syllable, and that we placed
the same letter at one time to its proper syllable, and at another time
to another?
_Socr._ I do mean that.
_Theæ._ By Jupiter, I do not forget, nor do I think that they have
knowledge who are in this condition.
_Socr._ What then? when a person at that time of life writing the name
Theætetus, thinks that he ought to write and does write _Th_ and _e_,
and again attempting to write Theodorus, thinks that he ought to write
and does write _T_ and _e_, shall we say that he knows the first
syllable of your names?
_Theæ._ We have just now admitted, that a person in this condition does
not yet know.
_Socr._ Does any thing, then, hinder the same person from being in this
condition with respect to the second, third, and fourth syllable?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
153. _Socr._ Will he not then have the description by means of the
elements, and write Theætetus with correct judgment, when he writes it
in its proper order?
_Theæ._ Clearly.
_Socr._ Will he not still be void of science, though he judges
correctly, as we said?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And yet he has _logos_ together with correct judgment; for he
wrote it knowing the order of the elements, which we allowed to be
_logos_.
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ There is, therefore, my friend, correct judgment accompanied
with _logos_ which must not yet be called science.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ We have been enriched then, as it appears, in a dream, in
thinking that we possess the truest definition of science: or shall we
not condemn it yet? For perhaps some one may not define _logos_ in this
manner, but may consider it to be the remaining species of the three,
one of which we said would be adopted by him who defined science to be
correct judgment accompanied with _logos_.
_Theæ._ You have rightly reminded me; for there is still one left. For
the first was an image of the thought as it were expressed by the voice:
and that just now mentioned was a proceeding to the whole by means of
the elements: but what do you say the third is?
_Socr._ That which most men would say it is, the being able to mention
some mark by which the object of enquiry differs from all other things.
_Theæ._ Can you give me a _logos_ of any thing by way of example?
154. _Socr._ For instance, if you please, with respect to the sun, I
think it would be sufficient for you to admit, that it is the most
luminous of the heavenly bodies that move round the earth.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Observe then why this was said. It is that which we just now
mentioned, that when you find the difference of each thing, by which it
differs from all others, you will find, as some say, the _logos_; but as
long as you lay hold of some common quality, you will have the _logos_
of those things to which this common quality belongs.
_Theæ._ I understand; and it appears to me very proper to call such a
thing _logos_.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who together with correct judgment respecting any
thing whatever can find out its difference from all other things, will
have arrived at the knowledge of that of which he before only formed a
judgment.
_Theæ._ We say it certainly is so.
_Socr._ Now, however, Theætetus, since I have come near what has been
said, as if it were a picture in perspective, I find that I do not
understand it in the least, but while I stood at a distance it appeared
to me to have some meaning.