_Theæ._ Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.
_Socr._ They say, I believe, that it is to have science.
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ Let us, then, change it a little, and say that it is to possess
science.
_Theæ._ But in what will you say this differs from that?
_Socr._ Perhaps in nothing: but whether it seems to differ or not,
listen and examine with me.
_Theæ._ I will, if I am able.
_Socr._ To possess, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as
to have: for instance, if any one having bought a garment, and having it
in his power, should not wear it, we should not say that he has it, but
that he possesses it.
_Theæ._ And very properly.
_Socr._ See then whether it is possible thus to possess science without
having it: just as if any one having caught some wild birds, as doves or
any others, and having constructed a dove-cote at home, should feed
them; we should probably say that in some respects he always has them,
because he possesses them: should we not?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But in another respect we should say that he has none of them,
but that he has acquired a power over them, since he has brought them
under his control, in an enclosure of his own, so as to take and have
them when he pleases, by catching whichever he wishes, and again of
letting them go: and this he is at liberty to do as often as he thinks
fit.
_Theæ._ Such is the case.
131. _Socr._ Again, therefore, as in a former part of our discussion we
constructed I know not what kind of waxen figment in the soul, so now
let us make in each soul a kind of aviary of all sorts of birds, some
being in flocks, apart from others, and others few together, and others
alone, flying amongst all the rest wherever it may chance.
_Theæ._ Suppose it to be made: but what next?
_Socr._ While we are children, we must say, that this receptacle is
empty, and instead of birds we must understand sciences; whatever
science, then, one has become possessed of and shut up in this
enclosure, one must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of
which this is the science, and that this is to know.
_Theæ._ Be it so.
_Socr._ Again, therefore, when any one wishes to catch any one of these
sciences, and, when he has taken it, to have it, and again to let it go,
consider what words he requires, whether the same as before, when he
possessed them, or different ones. But from what follows you will more
clearly understand what I mean. Do you call arithmetic an art?
_Theæ._ Yes.
132. _Socr._ Suppose this to be a catching of the sciences of every even
and odd number.
_Theæ._ I do suppose it.
_Socr._ By this art, then, I think, he has the sciences of numbers under
his control, and, if he pleases, transfers them to others.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And we say that he who transfers them teaches, and that he who
receives them learns, but that having them, by possessing them in that
aviary, he knows them.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
Socr. Attend now to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect
arithmetician know all numbers? for the sciences of all numbers are in
his soul.
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Does not then such a person sometimes calculate either something
within himself, or something else that is external, that is capable of
being calculated.
_Theæ._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ But to calculate we shall say is nothing else than to examine
what is the quantity of any number.
_Theæ._ Just so.
_Socr._ What therefore he knows, he appears to examine, as if he did not
know, though we admitted that he knows all number. You surely hear such
questions as these.
_Theæ._ I do.
133. _Socr._ We, therefore, carrying on our comparison with the
possession and catching of doves, will say that this catching is of two
kinds, one before possessing for the sake of possessing, the other when
one has already obtained possession, for the purpose of taking and
having in the hands what was already possessed. So with respect to the
things of which a person has already acquired the science by learning,
and which he knew, he may learn these same things again, and recover and
retain the science of each, which he formerly possessed, but had not
ready in his mind.
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ On this account, I just now asked, what words it is proper to
use in speaking of these things, when an arithmetician sets about
calculating, or a grammarian reading any thing. Shall we say that
knowing such a subject he again applies himself to learn from himself
what he knows?
_Theæ._ This would be absurd, Socrates.
_Socr._ Shall we say, then, that he is going to read or calculate what
he does not know, though we have granted him that he knows all letters
and all numbers?
_Theæ._ This too would be unreasonable.
134. _Socr._ Will you, then, that we say, that we care nothing at all
about words, in what way any one chooses to employ the words knowing and
learning, but, since we have settled that it is one thing to possess a
science, and another to have it, we maintain that it is impossible for a
person not to possess what he does possess, so that it never happens
that any one does not know what he knows, though it is possible for him
to form a false judgment respecting it? For it is possible for him not
to have the science of this particular thing, but another instead of it,
when hunting after some one of the sciences that he possesses as they
are flying about, he may by mistake take one instead of another;
accordingly when he thinks that eleven is twelve, he takes the science
of eleven instead of that of twelve, as it were taking a pigeon that he
possessed instead of a dove.
_Theæ._ It is reasonable to suppose so.
_Socr._ But when he takes that which he endeavours to take, then he is
not deceived, and judges truly: and thus we will say that false and true
judgment subsist, and none of the things which occasioned difficulty
before will any longer stand in our way. Perhaps you agree with me, or
what will you do?
_Theæ._ Agree with you.
135. _Socr._ We are freed then, from the dilemma of a man’s not knowing
what he knows: for it never happens that we do not possess what we do
possess, whether we are deceived respecting any thing or not. However,
another much worse inconvenience appears to me to present itself.
_Theæ._ What is that?
_Socr._ If the interchange of sciences can ever become false judgment.
_Theæ._ But how?
_Socr._ In the first place, that having the science of any thing one
should be ignorant of that thing, not through ignorance, but through the
science of the thing itself, and in the next place, that one should
judge this thing to be another thing and another thing this, how is it
not a great piece of absurdity, that when science is present the soul
should know nothing, but be ignorant of all things? For, from this mode
of reasoning, nothing hinders but that ignorance when present should
make us know something, and blindness should make us see, if science
will ever make a man ignorant.
_Theæ._ Perhaps, Socrates, we have done wrong in making sciences only
take the place of the birds, and we ought to have supposed that various
kinds of ignorance were flying about in the soul with them, and that the
sportsman at one time taking science, and at another time ignorance,
with respect to the same thing, judges falsely through ignorance, but
truly through science.
136. _Socr._ It is not by any means easy, Theætetus, to forbear praising
you: however, examine again what you have just said. For suppose it to
be as you say. He who takes ignorance, will judge falsely you say; is it
not so?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ Yet surely he will not think that he judges falsely.
_Theæ._ How should he?
_Socr._ But truly, and he will fancy that he knows the things about
which he is deceived.
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ He will therefore judge that by sporting he has taken science,
and not ignorance.
_Theæ._ Clearly.
_Socr._ Having therefore made a long circuit, we have come back again to
our first doubt. For that critic will laugh at us and say, “Can any one,
my excellent friends, who knows both, science as well as ignorance,
think that what he knows is some other thing that he knows? or, knowing
neither of them, can judge that what he does not know, is some other
thing that he does not know? or, knowing one, and not the other, can he
suppose that what he knows is what he does not knew, or what he does not
know is what he does know? Will you tell me again, that there are
sciences of sciences and ignorances, which their possessor having
enclosed in some other ridiculous aviaries, or waxen figments, knows as
long as he possesses them, though he has them not ready in his soul? And
will you be thus compelled to revolve perpetually round the same circle,
without making any progress?” What answer shall we give to this,
Theætetus?
137. _Theæ._ By Jupiter, Socrates, I have no notion what ought to be
said.
_Socr._ Does not the argument, then, my boy, reprove us very properly,
and shew that we did wrong in searching for false judgment before
science, and neglecting that? But it is impossible to know this until we
have sufficiently discovered what science is.
_Theæ._ It is necessary, Socrates, at present to think as you say.
_Socr._ Again therefore, what shall one say from the beginning about
science? For we surely must not give it up yet.
_Theæ._ By no means, unless you refuse to persevere.
_Socr._ Tell me, then, how can we best speak concerning science so as
not to contradict ourselves.
_Theæ._ As we attempted to do before, Socrates, for I know of no other
plan.
_Socr._ What is that?
_Theæ._ That true judgment is science. For to judge truly is surely free
from error, and whatever results from it is beautiful and good.
_Socr._ He who acted as guide in fording a river, Theætetus, said that
it would shew its own depth; so if we go on in our enquiries, perhaps
the impediment that we meet with will shew us what we are in search of,
but if we stop nothing will be clear.
_Theæ._ You say well; let us go on then and examine it.
138. _Socr._ This then requires but a brief examination, for one whole
art shews that it is not science.
_Theæ._ How so? and what art is it?
_Socr._ That which belongs to those who are most renowned for wisdom,
whom they call orators and lawyers. For they, in fact, persuade, not by
teaching, but by making men form such judgments as they please. Do you
think that there are any teachers so clever as, when persons have not
been present while others were robbed of their money, or treated with
some other violence, to be able, while a little water is running, to
teach those persons sufficiently of the truth of what took place?
_Theæ._ I by no means think so, but that they can persuade.
_Socr._ But do you not say that to persuade is to make a person form a
judgment?
_Theæ._ How otherwise?
_Socr._ When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about things which
can only be known by seeing and in no other way, then judging these
things from hearsay, do they not, when they form a true opinion, judge
without science, being persuaded properly, since they decide correctly?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
139. _Socr._ But, my friend, if true judgment and science are the same,
a perfect judge could never form a correct judgment without science; but
now each appears to be different from the other.
_Theæ._ I had forgotten, Socrates, what I heard some one say, but now I
remember it: he said that true judgment in conjunction with reason is
science, but that without reason it is out of the pale of science, and
that things for which a reason cannot be given cannot be known; these
were his very words; and that things for which a reason can be given are
known.
_Socr_. You speak admirably well. But how do you distinguish the things
that can be known from those that cannot? tell me, for perhaps you and I
have heard the same thing.
_Theæ._ I know not whether I can explain it; but I could follow another
person describing it, I think.
_Socr._ Hear, then, a dream for a dream. For I too seem to myself to
have heard some people say, that the first elements, as it were, from
which we and all other things are composed, cannot be explained by
reason; for that each several element by itself can only be named, but
that nothing else can be predicated of it, neither that it exists nor
does not exist; for that this would be to attribute to it existence or
non-existence, whereas nothing ought to be added to it, if one means to
speak of the thing itself only; neither must we add to it the term the,
or that, or each, or only, or this, or many others of the same kind; for
these are constantly varying and are applied to all things, and are
different from the things to which they are added. 140. But we ought, if
it were possible, to speak of the thing itself, and, if it has a
definition peculiar to itself, to speak of it without the addition of
any thing else. Now, however, it is impossible for any of the first
elements to be explained by a definition, for it does not admit of any
thing else than being named, for it has only a name; but the things that
have been composed from these, as they are complex, so their names, when
connected together, constitute a definition; for a connection of names
is the essence of definition. Thus the elements themselves cannot be
defined or known, but only perceived, but things compounded of them can
be both known and defined, and apprehended by true judgment. When,
therefore, any one forms a true judgment of any thing, without
explanation, his soul indeed perceives the truth respecting it, but does
not know it, for he who is not able to give and receive an explanation
of a thing must be ignorant of that thing, but when he adds an
explanation to it then he is capable of knowing all these things, and
may be perfect in science. Is it thus that you have heard the dream, or
in some other way?
_Theæ._ In this way precisely.
141. _Socr._ Are you willing then that we should settle it thus, that
science is true judgment in conjunction with reason?
_Theæ._ Exactly so.
_Socr._ Have we, then, Theætetus, thus on this very day discovered what
of old so many sages sought for and grew old before they found it?
_Theæ._ For my part, Socrates, it appears to me that what has been now
stated is well said.
_Socr._ And it is reasonable that this very thing should be the case;
for what science could there be without reason and right judgment?
However one of the things that were stated displeases me.
_Theæ._ Which is that?
_Socr._ That which seems to be very forcibly said, that the elements are
unknown, but that the natures of things compounded of them are known.
_Theæ._ Is not that right?
_Socr._ We must see. For we have as sureties for this doctrine the
examples which he used who said all these things.
_Theæ._ What are they?
_Socr._ The elements of letters and syllables: do you think that he who
said what we have mentioned had any thing else in view when he said it?
_Theæ._ No, but these.
142. _Socr._ Let us, then, apply ourselves to these and examine them, or
rather ourselves, whether we learnt letters in this way, or not. First
of all then do syllables admit of a definition, but are the elements
undefinable?
_Theæ._ Probably.
_Socr._ It certainly appears so to me, too. If, then, any one should ask
thus respecting the first syllable of the word Socrates, “Theætetus,
tell me, what is _So_?” what would you answer?
_Theæ._ That it is _S_ and _o_.
_Socr._ Have you not, then, this definition of the syllable?
_Theæ._ I have.
_Socr._ Come then, in the same way give me the definition of the letter
_S_.
_Theæ._ But how can any one speak of the elements of an element? For
_S_, Socrates, is a consonant, only a sound, as of the tongue hissing;
again the letter _B_ has neither voice nor sound, nor have most of the
elements. So that it is very right to say that they are undefinable,
since the most distinct among them, to the number of seven, have only a
sound, but do not admit of any definition.
_Socr._ Thus far, then, my friend, we have determined rightly with
respect to science.
_Theæ._ We appear to have done so.
143. _Socr._ What then? have we shewn rightly that the element cannot be
known, but that the syllable can?
_Theæ._ It is probable.
_Socr._ Come then, do we say that a syllable is both the elements, and,
if there are more than two, all of them, or some one form resulting from
their conjunction?
_Theæ._ All, we appear to me to say.
_Socr._ Observe, then, with respect to the two letters _S_ and _o_; both
of them together form the first syllable of my name, does not then he
who knows this syllable know both of them?
_Theæ._ How should he not?
_Socr._ He knows, therefore, _S_ and _o_.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But what? is he ignorant of each of them, and knowing neither,
does he know both?
_Theæ._ That would be strange and absurd, Socrates.
_Socr._ However, if it is necessary to know each, in order that he may
know both, it is quite necessary for a person who is ever to know a
syllable to know the elements first, and thus our former statement will
escape us and be off.
_Theæ._ And very suddenly too.
_Socr._ For we did not guard it well. For, perhaps, we ought to suppose
that a syllable does not consist of the elements, but of some one
species resulting from them, which has a form peculiar to itself,
different from the elements.
_Theæ._ Certainly; and perhaps the case is rather in this way than in
the other.
144. _Socr._ We must examine it, and not so unmanfully abandon a weighty
and venerable statement.
_Theæ._ We ought not, indeed.
_Socr._ Let it be then as we just now said; let the syllable be one form
resulting from the several elements, connected together, as well in
letters as in all other things.
_Theæ._ Just so.
_Socr._ It must, therefore, have no parts.
_Theæ._ Why not?
_Socr._ Because where there are parts, the whole must necessarily be the
same as all the parts: or do you say that a whole resulting from parts
is one certain species different from all the parts?
_Theæ._ I do.
_Socr._ Whether do you call all and the whole the same, or each
different from the other?
_Theæ._ I cannot say any thing for certain, but since you bid me answer
boldly, I venture to say that they are different.
_Socr._ Your boldness, Theætetus, is right; but whether your answer is
so, must be considered.
_Theæ._ It must indeed.
_Socr._ Does not the whole, then, differ from all, according to your
present statement?
_Theæ._ Yes.
145. _Socr._ But what, is there any difference between all the parts,
and the all? for instance when we say one, two, three, four, five, six,
or twice three, or thrice two, or four and two, or three and two and
one, or five and one, whether in all these cases do we say the same
thing, or that which is different?
_Theæ._ The same thing.
_Socr._ Do we say any thing else than six?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
_Socr._ And in each mode of speaking did we not mention all the parts of
six?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ Again, therefore, when we say all the parts do we say nothing?
_Theæ._ We necessarily do say something.
_Socr._ Do we say any thing else than six?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
_Socr._ In all things, then, that consist of number, do we not call the
all and all the parts the same thing?
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Thus then let us speak of them; the number of an acre and an
acre are the same; is it not so?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And the number of a stadium in like manner?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And moreover the number of an army, and an army, and in like
manner with respect to all other things of the kind? For all number is
all that which each of them is.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But is the number of each of them any thing else than its parts?
_Theæ._ Nothing.
_Socr._ Such things, then, as have parts must consist of parts?
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ But it is admitted that all the parts are the all, since all
number is the all.
_Theæ._ Just so.
_Socr._ The whole, therefore, does not consist of parts; for it would be
all, if it were all the parts.
_Theæ._ It seems not.
_Socr._ But is a part a part of any thing else than a whole?
_Theæ._ Yes, of the all.
146. _Socr._ You fight manfully, Theætetus. But is not this very all,
the all when nothing is wanting to it?
_Theæ._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ And will not the whole be this very same thing when nothing is
wanting to it? but when any thing is wanting, it is neither the whole,
nor all, each becoming the same thing from the same cause?
_Theæ._ It appears to me now, that the whole and the all in no respect
differ from each other.
_Socr._ Did we not say, that where there are parts, the whole and the
all will be all the parts?
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Again, therefore, to return to what I just now attempted to
prove, if a syllable is not the elements, does it not necessarily follow
that it has not elements as parts of itself, or that, if it is the same
with them, it must be equally known with them?
_Theæ._ Just so.
_Socr._ In order that this might not follow, did we not suppose it to be
different from them?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ What then? if the elements are not parts of a syllable, can you
mention any other things that are parts of a syllable, and yet not its
elements?
147. _Theæ._ By no means; for if, Socrates, I should admit that it has
parts, it would surely be ridiculous to reject the elements and search
for other things.
_Socr._ From what you now say, therefore, Theætetus, a syllable must
certainly be some one indivisible form.
_Theæ._ So it seems.
_Socr._ Do you remember then, my friend, that we admitted a little
before, and thought it was well said, that there cannot be a definition
of first elements, of which other things are composed, because each
considered by itself is uncompounded, and neither can the term “being”
be correctly attributed to it nor the term “this,” because these things
would be said as different and foreign to it; and indeed this very cause
makes it undefinable and unknown.
_Theæ._ I do remember.
_Socr._ Is there any other cause, then, than this of its being simple
and indivisible? I for my part see no other.
_Theæ._ There does not appear to be any.
_Socr._ Does not the syllable, then, fall under the same class as the
elements, since it has not parts, and is one form?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
148. _Socr._ If, therefore, a syllable is many elements, and a whole,
and these are its parts, syllables and elements may be equally known and
defined, since all the parts have been found to be the same as the
whole.
_Theæ._ By all means.
_Socr._ But if it is one and indivisible, a syllable equally as an
element must be undefinable and unknown; for the same cause will make
them alike.
_Theæ._ I cannot say otherwise.
_Socr._ We must not, therefore, allow this, if any one should say, that
a syllable is known and definable, but an element the contrary.
_Theæ._ We must not, if we admit this reasoning.
_Socr._ What then? should you pay any more attention to one who should
assert the contrary of what you are conscious happened to yourself in
learning your letters?
_Theæ._ What is that?
_Socr._ That in learning you did nothing else than endeavour to
distinguish the elements both by sight and hearing, each separated by
itself, in order that their position when pronounced or written, might
not confuse you.
_Theæ._ You say most truly.
_Socr._ And at your music-master’s was learning perfectly any thing else
than the being able to follow each note, and distinguish to what chord
it belonged, which every one would allow is called the elements of
music.
_Theæ._ Nothing else.
149. _Socr._ If, therefore, we may conjecture from the elements and
syllables in which we are skilled, to others, we shall say that the
class of elements are capable of a much more clear and distinct
knowledge than that of syllables, in order to our acquiring each study
in perfection; and if any one should say that a syllable is known, but
that an element is by nature unknown, we shall think that he is jesting
either intentionally or unintentionally.
_Theæ._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ Moreover, other proofs of this might still be found, as it
appears to me; but let us not lose sight of the question before us by
considering them, that is to say, what is meant by the statement, that
reason united to true judgment is the most perfect science.
_Theæ._ This, then, we must consider.
_Socr._ Come then, what is the signification of the word _logos_[164]:
for it appears to me to mean one of three things.
-----
Footnote 164:
As no one English word will express the three different meanings
contained in the word λόγος, I have thought it better to retain the
original word throughout this part of the argument.
-----
_Theæ._ What are they?
_Socr._ The first would be to make one’s thought clear by the voice,
through the means of verbs and nouns, impressing one’s judgment on what
flows from the mouth, as it were on a mirror, or water; does not _logos_
appear to you to be something of this kind?
_Theæ._ It does: and we say that he who does this speaks.
150. _Socr._ Every one, therefore, is able to do this more quickly or
slowly, that is, can shew what he thinks about every thing, unless he is
altogether dumb or deaf, and thus all who form right judgments on any
matter, will be found to do so in conjunction with _logos_, and right
judgment will never subsist without science.
_Theæ._ True.
_Socr._ We must not, therefore, too readily condemn him as having spoken
nothing to the purpose, who asserted that science is that which we are
now examining. For perhaps he who said it did not mean that, but that a
person, when asked what each thing is, should be able to give an answer
to the questioner by means of each thing’s element.
_Theæ._ For instance, how do you mean, Socrates?
_Socr._ As Hesiod for instance says of a chariot, that it is made of a
hundred pieces of wood, which I, for my part, could not enumerate,
neither do I think could you, but we should be contented, if when asked
what a chariot is, we could say wheels, axle, frame, rails, and yoke.