_Socr._ I will tell you, if I can. If, when I have a correct judgment
respecting you, I likewise find your _logos_, then I know you, but if
not, I only form a judgment.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But _logos_ was the explanation of your difference.
_Theæ._ It was.
_Socr._ When, therefore, I formed a judgment only, is it not true that I
reached by my thought none of those things by which you differ from
others?
_Theæ._ It seems that you did not.
_Socr._ I, therefore, thought of some common qualities, none of which
belong to you more than to any one else.
_Theæ._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Come, then, by Jupiter, how in such a case did I form a judgment
of you rather than of any one else? For suppose me to be thinking that
this is Theætetus, who is a man, and has nose, eyes, a mouth, and so on
with each several member. Will this thought cause me to think of
Theætetus rather than of Theodorus, or, as the saying is, the last of
the Mysians?
_Theæ._ How should it?
156. _Socr._ But if I not only think of one who has nose and eyes, but
also of one who has a snub nose and prominent eyes, shall I in that case
think of you rather than of myself, or any other persons of that
description?
_Theæ._ Not at all.
_Socr._ But I think I shall not form the image of Theætetus in my mind,
until his snubbiness shall have impressed on me and left with me some
mark different from all other instances of snubbiness that I have seen,
and so with respect to the other parts of which you are made up; which,
if I should meet you to-morrow, would recal you to my mind, and make me
form a correct judgment respecting you.
_Theæ._ Most true.
_Socr._ Right judgment, therefore, respecting each object has to do with
difference.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ What then will become of adding _logos_ to correct judgment? For
if it means that we should moreover form a judgment of the manner in
which any thing differs from others, the injunction will be very
ridiculous.
_Theæ._ How so?
_Socr._ It bids us add a right judgment of the manner in which things
differ from others, when we have a right judgment of the manner in which
they differ from others. And thus the turning round of a scytala, or a
pestle, or any other proverb of the kind, would be nothing compared with
this injunction, though it might more properly be called the advice of a
blind man; for to bid us add those things that we already have, in order
that we may learn what we already have formed judgments about, seems
remarkably suited to one who is utterly blind.
_Theæ._ Tell me, then, what did you mean by asking me just now?
157. _Socr._ If, O boy, in bidding us add _logos_ it bids us know, but
not form a judgment of the difference, this most beautiful of all the
definitions of science would be a delightful thing: for to know, surely,
is to acquire science. Is it not?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ When asked, therefore, as it appears, what science is, he will
answer, that it is correct judgment with the science of difference. For,
according to him, this will be the addition of _logos_.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ But it is altogether foolish, when we are searching for science,
to say that it is correct judgment with science, either of difference or
any thing else. Neither perception, therefore, Theætetus, nor true
judgment, nor _logos_ united with true judgment, can be science.
_Theæ._ It seems not.
_Socr._ Are we, then, still pregnant and in labour, my friend, with
reference to science, or have we brought forth every thing?
_Theæ._ And by Jupiter, with your help, I have said more than I had in
myself.
_Socr._ Does not, then, our midwife’s art pronounce that all these
things are empty, and not worth rearing?
_Theæ._ Assuredly.
158. _Socr._ If, therefore, after this you should wish to become
pregnant with other things, Theætetus, and if you do become so, you will
be full of better things by means of the present discussion; but if you
should be empty, you will be less troublesome to your companions, and
more meek through modesty, in not thinking that you know what you do not
know. For thus much only my art is able to accomplish, but nothing more,
nor do I know any of the things which others do who are and have been
great and wonderful men. But this midwife’s art I and my mother received
from the deity; she about women, and I for young and noble men and such
as are beautiful. Now, however, I must go to the king’s porch, to answer
the indictment which Melitus has preferred against me: to-morrow,
Theodorus, let us meet here again.