_Theæ._ By all means.
_Socr._ And true judgments also?
_Theæ._ And true.
_Socr._ Do we, then, consider it to have been sufficiently established
that these two judgments do without doubt exist?
_Theæ._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ A talkative man, Theætetus, appears to be really troublesome and
disagreeable.
_Theæ._ How so? Why do you say this?
_Socr._ Because I am angry at my own ignorance, and, in truth,
talkativeness. For what other name can any one give it when a man drags
the conversation upwards and downwards, and cannot be persuaded through
his dulness, and is with difficulty torn from each several topic?
_Theæ._ But why are you angry?
_Socr._ I am not only angry, but I am afraid that I should not know what
to answer, if any one should ask me, “Socrates, have you found that
false judgment is neither in the perceptions compared with each other,
nor in the thoughts, but in the conjunction of perception with thought?”
I think I shall say, I have, priding myself as if we had made a very
fine discovery.
127. _Theæ._ What has just now been proved appears to me, Socrates, to
be by no means despicable.
_Socr._ Do you therefore assert, he will say, that we can never suppose
that a man whom we think of only, but do not see, is a horse, which we
neither see nor touch, but think of only, and do not perceive in any
other way? I believe I should say, that I do assert this.
_Theæ._ And rightly.
_Socr._ What then? he will say, according to this mode of reasoning, can
the number eleven, which one thinks of only, ever be supposed to be
twelve, which also one thinks of only? Come then, do you answer?
_Theæ._ I should answer, that a person seeing or touching might suppose
that eleven are twelve, but that he would never think thus respecting
numbers which he embraces only in thought.
_Socr._ What then? do you suppose that any one has ever proposed to
consider within himself of five and seven, I do not mean seven and five
men, or any thing else of the kind, but the numbers five and seven
themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax, and
that it is impossible to judge falsely respecting them,—has any man at
any time considered these very things, speaking to himself and asking
how many they are, and answered, one that he supposes they are eleven,
and another that they are twelve, or do all men say and suppose that
they are twelve?
128. _Theæ._ No, by Jupiter, but many suppose that they are eleven. And
if a person considers about a greater number, he is still more mistaken;
for I suppose that you rather speak about every number.
_Socr._ You suppose rightly, but consider whether any thing else ever
happens than this, that he supposes that the number twelve impressed in
his soul is eleven?
_Theæ._ It seems so.
_Socr._ Does it not then come back to our former statements? For he who
is in this condition supposes that what he knows is something else that
he also knows, which we said was impossible, and from which very
circumstance we demonstrated that there is no such thing as false
judgment, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know
and not to know the same thing at the same time.
_Theæ._ Most true.
_Socr._ Therefore we must show that false judgment is something else
than an interchange of mind with perception. For, if this were so, we
could never be deceived in the thoughts themselves: but now there is
either no such thing as false judgment, or it is possible for a person
not to know what he knows: and which of these two do you choose?
_Theæ._ You offer me a difficult choice, Socrates.
_Socr._ Our argument however appears as if it would not allow both these
to take place: though (for we must venture on every thing), what if we
should determine to lay aside all shame?
_Theæ._ How?
_Socr._ By taking upon ourselves to declare what it is to know.
_Theæ._ But why would this be shameless?
129. _Socr._ You do not seem to consider that the whole of our
discussion from the beginning has been an investigation respecting
science, as if we did not know what it is.
_Theæ._ I do consider it.
_Socr._ Does it not, then, appear to be a shameless thing, to explain
what it is to know, when we are ignorant of what science is? But,
Theætetus, our conversation has been all along full of defects. For we
have over and over again used the expressions, We know, and We do not
know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific
knowledge, as if we both of us understood something about it, whereas we
are still ignorant of what science is. But if you please, we will still
at the present moment use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand,
as if we could properly use them, though we are destitute of science.
_Theæ._ But how will you converse, Socrates, if you abstain from the use
of these expressions?
_Socr._ Not at all, while I am what I am. If however I were contentious,
or if a person of that kind were now present, he would say that I must
abstain from them, and would strongly object to what I say. But as we
are poor creatures, do you wish I should venture to say what it is to
know? For it appears to me that it would be worth while to do so.
_Theæ._ Venture then, by Jupiter; for you will be readily pardoned for
not abstaining from these expressions.