_Socr._ Recollect, then, whether you have ever said to yourself, that
the beautiful is certainly ugly, or the unjust, just, or even, chief of
all, consider whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself, that
one thing is certainly another, or, quite contrariwise, whether you have
ever ventured even in sleep to say to yourself, that undoubtedly odd is
even, or any thing else of the kind.
_Theæ._ You say truly.
_Socr._ But do you think that any one else in his senses or even mad
would venture to say seriously to himself, being himself persuaded, that
an ox must needs be a horse, or two one?
_Theæ._ Not I, by Jupiter.
_Socr._ If, therefore, to speak to one’s-self is to form judgments, no
one, who speaks and forms judgments of both objects, and touches upon
both with his soul, would say and judge that one is another. You must
therefore give up what you said about the other. For I assert this, that
no one thinks that the ugly is beautiful, or any thing else of the kind.
_Theæ._ I give it up then, Socrates, and it appears to me as you say.
_Socr._ It is impossible, then, for one who forms judgments about both,
to think that the one is the other.
_Theæ._ It seems so.
116. _Socr._ He, however, who judges one thing only, but the other in no
respect, will never judge that the one is the other.
_Theæ._ You say truly: for he would be compelled to touch upon that also
of which he does not judge.
_Socr._ It is not possible then for a person who judges either both or
one of the two, to judge that one is the other: so that if any one
should define false judgment to be the judgment of one thing instead of
another, he would say nothing to the purpose; for neither in this way,
nor in those before mentioned, does it appear that false judgment
pertains to us.
_Theæ._ It seems not.
_Socr._ However, Theætetus, if this should appear not to be so, we shall
be compelled to admit many absurdities.
_Theæ._ What are they?
_Socr._ I will not tell you, until I have endeavoured to consider the
matter in every point of view; for I should be ashamed for both of us,
if, while we are in the difficulty we are, we should be compelled to
admit what I now say. But if we discover the object of our search and
become free, then we will speak of others, as subject to this, being
ourselves placed beyond the reach of ridicule: but if we shall continue
still involved in difficulties, we must humble ourselves, I imagine, and
give ourselves up to discussion, like those who are sea-sick, to be
trampled on and treated as it pleases. Hear, then, how I still find a
way out of our enquiry.