_Socr._ I shall deny that we made a correct admission, when we admitted
that it is impossible for a person to judge that what he knows is what
he does not know and be thus deceived; but in some respect it is
possible.
_Theæ._ Do you mean that which I suspected at the time when we said
this, might be the case, that sometimes I knowing Socrates, and seeing
another person at a distance whom I do not know, have thought it was
Socrates, whom I do know? For what you mention happens in a case of this
kind.
_Socr._ Are we not, then, driven from that position, because it made us,
while we know, not know the things that we do know?
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Let us not, then, make our assumption in this way but as
follows; and perhaps it will in some respect succeed for us, and perhaps
it will oppose us. For we are in a condition in which it is necessary to
examine out whole argument in every point of view. Consider, therefore,
whether I say any thing to the purpose. Is it possible for a person who
did not know something before, afterwards to learn it?
_Theæ._ It is indeed.
_Socr._ And can he not also learn another thing after another?