_Theæ._ How?
_Socr._ We say that a mistaken judgment is a false judgment, when any
one says that any real object is another real object, changing one for
the other in his thoughts. For thus he always judges that which exists,
but one thing instead of another, and erring in that which he was
considering, he may be justly said to form a false judgment.
_Theæ._ You now appear to me to have spoken most correctly: for, when
any one forms a judgment that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or
beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly forms a false judgment.
_Socr._ It is evident, Theætetus, that you esteem me lightly and have no
fear of me.
_Theæ._ How so?
_Socr._ I do not seem to you, I imagine, likely to lay hold of your
“truly false,” by asking whether it is possible for swift to take place
slowly or light heavily, or any other contrary, not according to its own
nature, but according to the nature of its contrary, contrariwise to
itself. This, however, I dismiss, that your confidence may not be in
vain. But are you satisfied, as you say, that to form false judgments is
to form mistaken judgments?
_Theæ._ I am.
114. _Socr._ It is possible, then, according to your opinion, for one
thing to be comprehended in the mind as another, and not as it is.
_Theæ._ It is possible.
_Socr._ When, therefore, any one’s mind does this, is it not necessary
that it should think about both objects, or one of them?
_Theæ._ Quite necessary.
_Socr._ Either together or in turns?
_Theæ._ Very well.
_Socr._ But by thinking do you mean the same that I do?
_Theæ._ What do you mean by it?
_Socr._ The discourse which the soul holds with itself about the objects
that it considers. I explain this to you as a person who does not know
what he says. For the soul, when it thinks, appears to me to do nothing
else than discourse with itself, asking itself questions and answering
them, affirming and denying; but when it has decided, whether it has
come to its decision more slowly or more rapidly, and now asserts and
does not doubt, this we call judgment. So that to form a judgment I call
to speak, and judgment a sentence spoken, not indeed to another person
nor with the voice but in silence to itself. But what do you call it?
_Theæ._ The same.
_Socr._ When any one, therefore, forms a judgment that one thing is
another, he says to himself, as it seems, that one thing is another.