_Theæ._ Of what kind?
_Socr._ If a person sees something, and yet sees nothing.
_Theæ._ But how can that be?
_Socr._ But if he sees some one thing, he sees something that exists;
and do you think that one thing is ever among things that do not exist?
_Theæ._ I do not.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who sees some one thing sees that which exists.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And, therefore, he who hears something, both hears some one
thing, and hears that which exists.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ And doubtless he who touches both touches some one thing, and
that which exists, since it is one thing?
_Theæ._ And this too.
_Socr._ Does not he then who judges, judge some one thing?
_Theæ._ Of necessity.
_Socr._ And does not he who judges some one thing, judge something that
exists?
_Theæ._ I grant it.
_Socr._ He therefore who judges what does not exist, judges nothing.
_Theæ._ It appears not.
_Socr._ But he who judges nothing, does not judge at all.
_Theæ._ That is evident, as it seems.
_Socr._ It is impossible, therefore, to judge that which is not, either
with respect to real objects or abstract essences.
_Theæ._ It appears not.
_Socr._ To form false judgments, therefore, is different from judging
things that do not exist.
_Theæ._ It seems to be different.
_Socr._ Neither then in this way nor in the way we considered a little
before, is false judgment formed in us.
_Theæ._ On no account.