_Socr._ Let us then dismiss the rest of their system, whether they speak
this way or that way; and let us keep to that point alone which concerns
our discussion and ask, Are all things in motion and in a state of flux,
as you say? Is it not so?
_Theo._ Yes.
_Socr._ And by both those kinds of motion which we have distinguished,
removal and change?
_Theo._ Undoubtedly; if they are to be perfectly moved.
_Socr._ If, therefore, they were only removed, but not changed, we
should surely be able to say what kind of things are removed. Must we
not say so?
_Theo._ Just so.
_Socr._ But since not even this continues in the same state, namely that
that which flows continues to flow white, but it changes so that there
is also a flux of this very thing, whiteness, and a transition into
another colour, in order that it may not be found continuing in the same
state, will it ever be possible to call any thing a colour, so as to
designate it correctly?
_Theo._ How is it possible, Socrates? or any thing else of the kind,
since, while we are speaking about it, it is constantly escaping, as
being in a state of flux?
_Socr._ But what shall we say of any kind of perception, for instance of
seeing or hearing? Does it ever continue in the state of seeing or
hearing?
_Theo._ It ought not, since all things are in motion.
99. _Socr._ We must not affirm then, that any one sees rather than not
sees, or has any other perception rather than not, since all things are
in constant motion.
_Theo._ Surely not.
_Socr._ Yet perception is science, as Theætetus and I said.
_Theo._ That is the case.
_Socr._ On being asked, therefore, what science is, we answered, that it
is not at all science rather than not science.
_Theo._ You appear to have done so.
_Socr._ A fine correction of our answer it would be, if we endeavour to
prove that all things are in motion, in order that our former answer may
appear correct. But this, as it seems, is the result, if all things are
in motion, every answer on whatever subject it may be given, will be
equally correct, whether we say that a thing is so or is not so, or, if
you will, becomes so, that we may not fix them by a definite expression.
_Theo._ You say rightly.
_Socr._ Except, Theodorus, that I said “so and not so.” But we ought not
to use this word “so,” for in this way it will no longer be in motion;
nor again must we use the expression “not so,” for neither does this
express motion; but they who maintain this doctrine must find out some
other term, since at present they have not words suited to their
hypothesis, except perhaps, this, “not in any manner.” This would suit
them best, as having an indefinite meaning.
_Theo._ This manner of speaking would indeed be most proper for them.
100. _Socr._ We have done then with your friend, Theodorus, nor can we
by any means concede to him, that any man is the measure of all things,
except he is wise: nor can we concede to him that science is perception,
at least according to the doctrine that all things are in motion; unless
Theætetus here says otherwise.
_Theo._ You say admirably well, Socrates; for since these things are
brought to a conclusion, it is right that I too should have done with
answering according to our agreement, now that our discussion about the
doctrine of Protagoras has come to end.
_Theæ._ Not so, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the
doctrine of those who say that the universe is at rest, as you just now
proposed to do.
_Theo._ Do you who are so young, Theætetus, teach old men to act
unjustly, by violating their compacts. But prepare to give account to
Socrates of what remains to be discussed.
_Theæ._ If he wishes it, though I should be very glad to hear you on the
subject I mentioned.
_Theo._ You are challenging riders to a race in challenging Socrates to
a discussion. Ask therefore and you will hear.
_Socr._ But I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of
Theætetus.
_Theo._ Why not comply?
101. _Socr._ Though I am ashamed of examining with too much freedom
Melissus and others, who say that the universe is one and immoveable,
yet I am less ashamed to do so with respect to them than Parmenides
alone. For Parmenides appears to me, that I may use the words of
Homer[162], “both venerable and formidable.” For I was acquainted with
him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to
possess a depth of wisdom altogether extraordinary. I am afraid,
therefore, that we should not understand his words, and that we should
be much less able to discover the meaning of what he said, and above
all, I fear lest with respect to the main subject of our discussion,
science, what it is, should be left unconsidered by reason of the
digressions that will rush across us, if we listen to them. Besides, the
question which we have now raised is of immense extent, and if one
should consider it only by the way, it would be treated unworthily, but
if as it deserves, the discussion, being extended to too great length,
will put out of sight the subject of science. But neither of these
things ought to happen; but we ought to endeavour, by the midwife’s art,
to deliver Theætetus of his conceptions respecting science.
-----
Footnote 162:
Iliad, iii. 172.
-----
_Theæ._ It is proper to do so, if you think well.
102. _Socr._ Again, therefore, Theætetus, consider this with respect to
what has been said. You answered that perception is science; did you
not.
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ If then any one should ask you, with what a man sees things
white and black, and with what he hears sounds sharp and flat, you would
say, I think, with the eyes and ears.
_Theæ._ I should.
_Socr._ The free use of names and words and without excessive precision,
is for the most part not unbecoming a person of education, but rather
the contrary to this is illiberal, though sometimes it is necessary; as
in the present case it is necessary to find fault with your answer, so
far as it is not correct. For consider, which answer is more correct,
that it is the eyes with which we see or by which we see, and the ears
with which we hear, or by which we hear?
_Theæ._ By which we receive each perception, it seems to me, Socrates,
rather than with which.
_Socr._ For surely it would be strange, my boy, if many senses were
seated in us, as in wooden horses, and they did not all tend to one
certain form, whether it is soul, or whatever it is proper to call it,
with which, by means of these as instruments, we perceive all objects of
perception.
_Theæ._ The case appears to me to be rather in this way than in that.
103. _Socr._ But why do I require so much accuracy from you on this
point? For this reason, that we may discover whether by some one and the
same part in us we, by means of the eyes, attain to things white and
black, and again other things by means of the other senses, and whether,
when questioned, you will be able to refer all such things to the bodily
organs. But perhaps it will be better that you should say this by
answering my questions, than that I should take all this trouble for
you. Tell me, then; the things by which you perceive things hot and dry,
and light and sweet, do you refer each of them to the body, or to any
thing else?
_Theæ._ To nothing else.
_Socr._ Are you also willing to allow, that such things as you perceive
by means of one faculty it is impossible for you to perceive by means of
another, for instance, that what you perceive by means of hearing you
cannot perceive by means of sight, and what you perceive by means of
sight, you cannot perceive by means of hearing?
_Theæ._ How should I not be willing to allow it?
_Socr._ If, then, you form a notion of them both together, you cannot
receive this perception of both together by means of one organ or the
other.
_Theæ._ Surely not.
104. _Socr._ Now with respect to sound and colour, is not this the very
first notion that you have of them both, that they both exist.
_Theæ._ It is.
_Socr._ Is it not also, that each is different from the other, and the
same with itself?
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ And that both are two, but each one?
_Theæ._ And this also.
_Socr._ Are you not also able to consider whether they are like or
unlike each other?
_Theæ._ Probably.
_Socr._ By means of what, then, do you acquire all these notions about
them? For it is not possible by means either of hearing or sight to
apprehend that which is common between them. Moreover, this too is a
proof of what we say. For, if it were possible to examine respecting
them both, whether they are salt or not, you know you would be able to
say with what you would make this examination, and this proves to be
neither sight nor hearing, but something else.
_Theæ._ How not, and that the faculty of taste by means of the tongue?
_Socr._ You say well. But in what does the faculty consist which shews
you that which is common to all things, and to these two, to which you
give the name of existence and non-existence, and those other names
about which we were just now asking? what organs will you attribute to
all these, by means of which our perceptive faculty perceives these
several things?
105. _Theæ._ You speak of existence and non-existence, similitude and
dissimilitude, identity and difference, and moreover of unity and other
numbers: and it is evident that you ask about the even and odd and
whatever else depends on them, by which of the organs of the body we
perceive these things in our soul.
_Socr._ You follow me exceedingly well, and these, Theætetus, are the
very things about which I ask.
_Theæ._ But by Jupiter, Socrates, I know not what to say, except that it
seems to me that there is no organ at all peculiar to these things as
there is to the others, but the soul of itself appears to me to examine
that which is common in all things.
_Socr._ You are beautiful, Theætetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus said;
for he who speaks beautifully is beautiful and good. But, besides being
beautiful, you have done well in having released me from a very long
discussion, if it appears to you that the soul beholds some things by
itself, and others by the faculties of the body. For this was the very
thing that seemed to me, and I wished it might likewise seem so to you.
_Theæ._ And indeed it does appear so to me.
106. _Socr._ To which of the two classes, then, do you refer existence?
For this especially attaches to all things.
_Theæ._ I refer it to those things which the soul of itself reaches
after.
_Socr._ Is it the same with similarity and dissimilarity, identity and
difference?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ What then? with the beautiful and the ugly, good and evil?
_Theæ._ It appears to me that the soul especially considers the essence
of these in reference to each other, comparing within itself things past
and present with the future.
_Socr._ Stay: will it not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by
the touch, and the softness of that which is soft in like manner?
_Theæ._ Yes.
_Socr._ But their essence, both what they are, and their opposition to
each other, and the nature of this opposition, the soul itself,
examining them repeatedly and comparing them with each other, endeavours
to determine for us.
_Theæ._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Are not, then, both men and beasts by nature able to perceive as
soon as they are born those things that pass by means of the bodily
organs to the soul, but comparisons of these with reference to their
essence and use they arrive at with difficulty, and after a long time,
by means of much labour and study, if ever they do arrive at it?
_Theæ._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ For is it possible to apprehend the truth of that of which we
cannot apprehend the existence?
_Theæ._ Impossible.
107. _Socr._ But can any one possess a scientific knowledge of a thing,
of which he cannot apprehend the truth?
_Theæ._ How can he, Socrates?
_Socr._ There is, therefore, no science in sensations, but in reasoning
on them; for in this way, as it seems, it is possible to touch upon
essence and truth, but in that way impossible.
_Theæ._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Can you, therefore, call that and this the same, when there is
so great a difference between them?
_Theæ._ It would not be right to do so.
_Socr._ What name, then, do you give to that, to sight, hearing,
smelling, tasting, being hot, and being cold?
_Theæ._ Perceiving; for what other name can be given?
_Socr._ Do you, therefore, call the whole of this perception?
_Theæ._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ To which, as we said, it does not appertain to touch upon truth,
for it does not ever touch upon essence.
_Theæ._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ Nor, therefore, upon science?
_Theæ._ No.
_Socr._ Perception, therefore, and science, Theætetus, can never be the
same?
_Theæ._ It appears not, Socrates.
108. _Socr._ And now it has been made perfectly clear that science is
something different from perception. But we did not commence this
conversation with this view, that we might find out what science is not,
but what it is. However, we have advanced so far as not to seek it at
all in perception, but in that name, whatever it is, which the soul
possesses when it employs itself about things that exist.
_Theæ._ But this, I think, Socrates, is called, to judge.
_Socr._ You think rightly, my friend. And now consider again from the
beginning, having obliterated all that has been said before, if you see
at all more clearly, now that you have come to this point. And tell me
again what science is.
_Theæ._ It is impossible, Socrates, to say that it is every judgment,
because there is also false judgment. But it appears that true judgment
is science, and let this be my answer. For if, as we proceed, it shall
not appear to be so, as it does at present, we will endeavour to say
something else.
109. _Socr._ Thus, then, Theætetus, you must speak more promptly, and
not, as at first, hesitate to answer. For if we do so, one of two things
will happen; we shall either find that which we are in search of, or we
shall in a less degree think that we know what we do not know at all;
though this would be no despicable reward. Now, then, what do you say?
Since there are two species of judgment, one true, and the other false,
do you define science to be true judgment?
_Theæ._ I do; for this at present appears to me to be the case.
_Socr._ Is it, then, worth while again to resume the discussion
respecting judgment?
_Theæ._ What do you mean?
_Socr._ Somehow this matter troubles me just now, and has often done so
at other times, so that I have had great doubt with respect to myself
and others, from not being able to say what this affection in us is, and
in what way it is produced.
_Theæ._ What affection?
_Socr._ This, that any one forms false judgments; and I even now still
consider and am in doubt whether we shall let this alone, or examine it
in a different manner than we did just now.
_Theæ._ How not, Socrates? at least if it appears necessary to be done
in some way or other? For you and Theodorus just now remarked, not
badly, respecting leisure, that there is no urgency in matters of this
kind.
110. _Socr._ You have reminded me very properly. For perhaps it will not
be foreign to our purpose in a manner to retrace our steps. For it is
better to finish a little well than much insufficiently.
_Theæ._ Why not?
_Socr._ How then? what do we say? do we not affirm that sometimes
judgments are false? or that one of us forms false judgments and another
true ones, as if this was naturally the case?
_Theæ._ We doubtless do affirm this.
_Socr._ Does not this happen to us with regard to things in general and
each particular, that we either know it or do not know it? For learning
and forgetting, as being between these, I pass by for the present, for
now they have nothing to do with our discussion.
_Theæ._ However, Socrates, there is no other alternative with respect to
each particular, except knowing or not knowing it.
_Socr._ Then, is it not necessary, that he who judges should judge
either what he does know, or does not know?
_Theæ._ It is necessary.
_Socr._ But that a person who knows should not know the same thing, or
that he who does not know it should know it, is impossible.
_Theæ._ How not?
_Socr._ Does not he, then, who forms a false judgment about what he
knows, think that these are not the same, but different from what he
knows, and thus while he knows both, he is at the same time ignorant of
both?
_Theæ._ But this is impossible, Socrates.
111. _Socr._ Does he, then, think that things which he does not know are
certain other things that he does not know, and is it possible for one
who knows neither Theætetus nor Socrates, to imagine that Socrates is
Theætetus, or Theætetus Socrates?
_Theæ._ How could that be?
_Socr._ Neither, surely, does any one think that the things which he
knows are the same as those that he does not know, nor again that the
things which he does not know, are the same as those that he does know.
_Theæ._ For that would be monstrous.
_Socr._ How then can any one form false judgments? For it is impossible
to form judgments in any other way than this, since we either know or do
not know all things, and in these it appears to be by no means possible
to form false judgments.
_Theæ._ Most true.
_Socr._ Ought we, then, to consider the object of our enquiry, not by
proceeding according to knowing and not knowing, but according to being
and not being?
_Theæ._ How do you mean?
_Socr._ Whether it is not universally true, that he who thinks things
that are not, with respect to any thing whatever, must unavoidably form
a false judgment, however intelligent he may be in other respects.
_Theæ._ That is reasonable, Socrates.
_Socr._ How then? what shall we say, Theætetus, if any one should ask
us, “Is it possible for any one to do what you say, and can any man
think that which is not, whether respecting any real object or abstract
essence?” And we, it seems, shall say to this, “When he who thinks does
not think what is true.” What else can we say?
_Theæ._ Nothing else.