_Socr._ Can you tell me, then, what those studies are which produce this
effect? Or rather, if you please, on my asking, whichever appears to you
to be one of these, say so, and which not, deny it. And first of all,
let us consider flute-playing. Does it not appear to you to be such a
thing, Callicles, as pursues only our pleasure, but regards nothing
else?
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And is it not the case with all such studies, as for instance,
harp-playing in the public games?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And what as to the representation of choruses and dithyrambic
poetry? does it not appear to you to be of the same kind? Do you think
that Cinesias son of Meles cares at all to express himself in such a way
that his hearers may become better? or rather what will gratify the
crowd of spectators?
_Cal._ The latter is clearly the case, Socrates, with respect to
Cinesias.
_Socr._ But what as to his father Meles? Did he appear to you to play on
the harp, looking to that which is best? or did not he look to what was
most pleasant? For in singing he offended the audience. Consider,
however; does not all harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry appear to you
to have been invented for the sake of pleasure?
_Cal._ It does.
124. _Socr._ But what of that venerable and wonderful art, tragic
poetry, at what does it aim? Do its endeavour and aim appear to you to
be only to gratify the spectators? or does it strive, if any thing
should be pleasing and grateful to them, but mischievous, to avoid
saying this, but if it happens to be unpleasant and beneficial, to say
and sing this, whether it gratifies the spectators or not? In which of
these two ways do you think tragic poetry is framed?
_Cal._ This is clear, Socrates, that it rather aims at pleasure, and the
gratification of the spectators.
_Socr._ Did we not just now say, Callicles, that a thing of this kind is
flattery?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Come then, if any one should take from all poetry, melody,
rhythm, and measure, would any thing else than words remain?
_Cal._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Are not these words, then, addressed to a great multitude, and
to the people?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ Poetry, therefore, is a kind of popular speaking.
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Therefore it must be a rhetorical method of popular speaking:
for do not poets appear to you to employ rhetoric in the theatres?
_Cal._ They do.
125. _Socr._ Now, therefore, we have found a certain rhetoric among the
people, consisting at the same time of boys and women and men, slaves
and free-men, of which we do not altogether approve; for we have called
it flattery.
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Well then. But as to the rhetoric addressed to the Athenian
people, and the people in other cities consisting of free-men, what
shall we say as to that? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to
speak with a view to what is best, aiming at this, that the citizens may
be made as good as possible by their discourses? or do they, too,
endeavour to gratify the citizens, and neglecting the public interest
for the sake of their own private advantage, do they treat the people as
children, trying only to gratify them, without being in the least
concerned whether they shall become better or worse by these means?
_Cal._ This is not a simple question that you ask me. For there are some
who, looking to the interest of the citizens, say what they do; but
others are such as you describe.
126. _Socr._ That is enough. For, if this also is twofold, one part of
it will be flattery, and a base popular speaking, but the other will be
honourable, namely, that which endeavours to make the souls of the
citizens as good as possible, and strives to speak what is best, whether
it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers. But you have never yet seen
this kind of rhetoric. Or, if you can mention any one of the
rhetoricians who is of this stamp, why do you not tell me who he is?
_Cal._ But, by Jupiter, I cannot instance to you any of the rhetoricians
of the present day.
_Socr._ But what? Can you instance any one of the ancients through whose
means the Athenians have become better, after he had begun to harangue
them, when previously they had been worse? For I know not who such a one
is.
_Cal._ What? Have you not heard that Themistocles was a good man, and
Cimon and Miltiades, and Pericles, who died lately, whom you have also
heard?
_Socr._ If that is true virtue, Callicles, which you before mentioned as
such, namely, for a man to gratify both his own desires and those of
others. But if this is not the case, but, as we were afterwards
compelled to confess, those desires which, when satisfied, make a man
better, ought to be indulged, but those which make him worse, not so,
and if there is a certain art in this, can you say that any one of these
was a man of this kind?
_Cal._ I know not what to say.
127. _Socr._ But if you seek well, you will find out. Let us however,
consider, and see quietly if any one of these was such. For come, is it
not true that a good man, who says what he says with a view to the best,
does not speak at random, but looking to some end? just as all other
artists, looking each to his own work, does not take at random and
employ what he employs in his work, but so that the subject he is at
work upon may have a certain form: for instance, if you will look at
painters, architects, shipwrights, and any other artists you please, you
will see that each places whatever he employs in a certain order, and
compels one thing to adapt itself to and harmonize with another, until
the whole workmanship is compacted together with order and regularity.
And moreover, those other artificers, whom we just now mentioned, who
are employed about the body, teachers of gymnastics, and physicians,
adorn the body in a way, and dispose it in an orderly manner. Do we
allow that this is so or not?
_Cal._ Let it be so.
128. _Socr._ A house, then, that has acquired order and regularity will
be a good house, but when disorder, a bad one.
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And a ship in like manner?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And do we not say the same with respect to our bodies?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what as to the soul? when in a state of disorder will it be
in a good condition, or when it is in a state of order and regularity?
_Cal._ From what has been said, it is necessary to grant that the latter
must be the case.
_Socr._ What, then, in the body, is the name of that which results from
order and regularity?
_Cal._ You probably mean health and strength.
_Socr._ I do. But what, again, is the name of that which subsists in the
soul from order and regularity? Endeavour to discover and mention it, as
you did the name of the former.
_Cal._ Why do not you say what it is yourself, Socrates?
_Socr._ If it pleases you better, I will. But do you, if I seem to you
to speak well, assent, if not, confute, and do not spare me. To me,
then, it appears that the name belonging to the orderly disposition of
the body is the healthful, from which health springs, and every other
excellence of the body. Is it so, or not?
_Cal._ It is.
_Socr._ But the name belonging to the orderly and regular disposition of
the soul is the legitimate and law; whence men become obedient to law
and orderly; but these are justice and temperance. Do you admit this or
not?
_Cal._ Be it so.
129. _Socr._ Will not, then, that good rhetorician who follows the rules
of art, looking to these things, address the arguments he uses and all
his actions to souls, and if he should bestow a gift, will he not bestow
it, and, if he should take any thing away, will he not take it away
_with the same end_, always directing his attention to this, that
justice may be produced in the souls of his fellow-citizens, and
injustice banished; that temperance may be produced in them, and
intemperance banished; and, in short, that every virtue may be planted
in them, but vice driven out. Do you grant this, or not?
_Cal._ I do grant it.
_Socr._ For where is the utility, Callicles, in giving a body diseased,
and ill-disposed, abundance of the most agreeable food or drink, or any
thing else, which will not be more profitable to it than the contrary,
but, according to right reason, even less? Is this so?
_Cal._ Be it so.
_Socr._ For I think it is of no advantage for a man to live with a
miserable state of body; for thus it would be necessary for him to live
miserably: is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And do not physicians generally allow a man in health to satisfy
his desires, as, for instance, when hungry to eat as much as he pleases,
or when thirsty to drink, but when ill, they scarcely ever allow him to
satisfy himself with what he desires? Do you grant this too?
_Cal._ I do.
130. _Socr._ And should not the same method, my excellent friend, be
adopted with respect to the soul? So long as it is depraved, as being
without understanding, intemperate, unjust and unholy, one ought to
restrain it from the indulgence of its desires, and not permit it to do
any thing except what will render it better? Do you admit this or not?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ For this surely is better for the soul itself.
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And is not to restrain any one from what he desires to punish
him?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ To be punished, therefore, is better for the soul than
intemperance, as you just now thought.
_Cal._ I don’t know what you mean, Socrates: ask some one else.
_Socr._ This man will not submit to be benefited and to suffer the very
thing of which we are speaking, viz., punishment.
_Cal._ I don’t at all heed what you say; I only answered you thus far
for the sake of Gorgias.
131. _Socr._ Be it so. What shall we do then? Shall we break off the
discussion in the midst?
_Cal._ You shall determine.
_Socr._ But they say it is not right to leave even fables in the midst,
but a head should be placed on them, that they may not wander without a
head. Answer, therefore, to what remains, that our discussion may have a
head to it.
_Cal._ How importunate you are, Socrates! But, if you will be persuaded
by me, you will give up this discussion, or carry it on with some one
else.
_Socr._ Who else is willing? for we must not leave the discussion
unfinished.
_Cal._ Cannot you go through with it yourself, either speaking by
yourself or answering yourself?
_Socr._ That the saying of Epicharmus may be verified in me, “what two
men said before, I alone am able to say.” But it appears to be very
necessary. If, however, we shall do so, I think we ought all of us to
strive heartily that we may understand what is true and what false with
respect to the subject we are treating of: for it is for the common
interest of all that this should become clear. 132. I will, therefore,
go through the matter under discussion, as it appears to me to be: but,
if I shall seem to any of you to grant myself what is not true, he must
take me up and confute me. For I do not say what I say as knowing it,
but I am enquiring in common with you, so that, if he who disputes with
me should appear to say any thing to the purpose, I shall be the first
to give in to him. I say this, however, in case you think the discussion
ought to be finished; but if you do not wish it, let us give it up and
depart.
_Gorg._ But it appears to me, Socrates, that we should not depart yet,
but that you should pursue the argument: and it is evident that the
others think so. And I, for my part, wish to hear you go through the
remainder of the subject.
_Socr._ But indeed, Gorgias, I would gladly have continued to carry on
the discussion with Callicles here, until I had given him back the
saying of Amphion for that of Zethus[74]: but since you are not willing,
Callicles, to finish the discussion with me, yet listen to me at least,
and take me up if I appear to you to say any thing incorrectly. And if
you shall confute me, I shall not be angry with you, as you are with me,
but you shall be recorded by me as my greatest benefactor.
-----
Footnote 74:
See before, § 90.
-----
_Cal._ Speak then yourself, my good friend, and finish the argument.
133. _Socr._ Hear me then repeating the argument from the beginning. Are
the pleasant and the good the same? They are not the same, as I and
Callicles have agreed. But whether is the pleasant to be done for the
sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant
for the sake of the good. But is the pleasant that, with which when
present we are pleased? and the good that, by which when present we are
good? Certainly. Now we are good, both ourselves and all other things
that are good, when a certain virtue is present? To me this appears to
be necessary, Callicles. But the virtue of each thing, whether
instrument, or body, or soul, and moreover of every animal, does not
reach a high pitch of perfection by chance, but by order, and rectitude,
and the art that is attributed to each of them. Is this so? I admit it.
The virtue, then, of every thing is regulated and adorned by order? I
should say so. A certain order, then, proper to each, becoming inherent
in each, makes each thing good? It appears so to me. The soul,
therefore, that has its own order, is better than that which is without
order? Necessarily so. That, however, which has order is orderly? How
should it not? And that which is orderly is temperate? Most necessarily.
134. A temperate soul, then, is good? I am not able to say any thing
against this, my dear Callicles; but do you, if you can do so, inform
me.
_Cal._ Proceed, my good friend.
_Socr._ I say, then, that if a temperate soul is good, that which is
affected contrariwise to the temperate is base: and this surely is the
foolish and intemperate? Certainly. Moreover, a temperate man would act
becomingly both towards gods and towards men? for he would not be
temperate if he acted unbecomingly? It must needs be so. Moreover, by
acting becomingly towards men he would act justly, and towards the gods
piously; but it is necessary that he who acts justly and piously should
be just and pious? It must be so. It is moreover necessary that he
should be brave? for it is not the part of a temperate man either to
pursue or avoid what is not becoming, but to pursue and avoid those
things and men, pleasures and pains, which he ought, and to endure
patiently wherever he ought. 135. So that it is absolutely necessary,
Callicles, that the temperate man, as we have described him, being just,
brave, and pious, should be a perfectly good man, and that a good man
should do whatever he does well and honourably, and that he who does
well should be blessed and happy, but that the wicked, who does ill,
should be wretched: but this latter would be directly contrary to the
temperate man, namely, the intemperate, whom you praised. I, therefore,
thus lay down these things, and affirm that they are true. But if they
are true, as it seems, he who wishes to be happy must pursue and
practise temperance, and must avoid intemperance, every one of us with
all his might, and must endeavour never to stand in need of punishment,
but if he does need it, either he or any of his family, whether it be
the case of a private person, or a city, justice must be administered,
and punishment inflicted, if he is to be happy. This appears to me to be
the mark to which we ought to look for the guidance of our life, and
referring all private and public actions to this point, that justice and
temperance may be ever present with him who will be blessed, and to act
accordingly, not suffering his desires to be intemperate, nor
endeavouring to satisfy them, which is an irremediable evil, causing a
man to live like a robber. For such an one could neither be dear to any
other man, nor to God; for it is impossible there can be any communion
between them; and where there is no communion there can be no
friendship. 136. The sages[75] too, say, Callicles, that heaven and
earth, gods and men, are held together by communion, friendship, order,
temperance, and justice, and for this reason, my friend, they call this
universe, order[76], and not disorder or intemperance. You, however,
appear to me not to attend to these things, and this though you are
wise; but it has escaped your observation that geometrical equality has
great power both among gods and among men; on the contrary you think
that every one should strive to get more than others; for you neglect
geometry. Well then; either this argument of mine must be confuted, _and
it must be shewn_ that the happy are not happy from the possession of
justice and temperance, and the wretched, wretched from vice; or, if the
argument is true, we must consider what are its results. Now, Callicles,
all those things before mentioned, with respect to which you asked me if
I was speaking in earnest, result from it, to the effect that a man
should accuse himself, his son, and his friend, if he committed any
injustice, and should employ rhetoric for this purpose. And what you
thought Polus granted through shame was therefore true, that by how much
it is more base to do an injury than to be injured, by so much is it
worse: and that he who would be a good orator ought to be just and
skilled in the knowledge of things just; which, again, Polus said
Gorgias acknowledged through shame.
-----
Footnote 75:
The Pythagoreans, especially Empedocles.
Footnote 76:
Κόσμος, “order,” signifying also “the world.”
-----
137. This then being the case, let us consider what it is that you find
fault with in me, and whether you are right or not in saying that I can
neither assist myself, nor any of my friends or domestics, nor save
myself from the greatest dangers, but that I am in the power of any one
who chooses, like men marked with infamy, if he pleases, according to
that petulant expression of yours, to strike me on the face, or to take
away my property, or expel me from the city, or, worst of all, to kill
me, and that to be thus circumstanced, is the most disgraceful of all
things, according to your opinion. But mine is this, it has indeed been
often mentioned, yet nothing prevents its being again repeated; I deny,
Callicles, that to be struck in the face unjustly is most disgraceful,
or for my body or purse to be cut, but that to strike unjustly and to
cut me and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse, and that to rob,
enslave, break open a house, and, in short, to injure in any respect me
and mine, is both more disgraceful and worse for him who does the injury
than for me who am injured. 138. These things, that were proved to be
thus in the former part of our discussion, as I affirm, are held and
bound (though it is somewhat rude to say so) in reasons of iron and
adamant, as would really appear to be the case, so that unless you or
some one stronger than you can break them, it is not possible that any
one who says otherwise than as I now say can speak correctly; for my
statement is always the same, that I know not how these things are, but
that of all the persons with whom I have ever conversed, as now with
you, no one, who says otherwise, can avoid being ridiculous. I therefore
again assert that these things are so. But if this is the case, and
injustice is the greatest of evils to him that commits it, and if, great
as this evil is, it is still a greater, if possible, for one who acts
unjustly not to be punished, what kind of help will that be, which, if a
man cannot procure for himself, he would be really ridiculous? will it
not be that which would avert from us the greatest harm? But there is an
absolute necessity that this should be most disgraceful, for a man not
to be able to assist either himself, or his friends and domestics, next
to that, an inability to avoid the second evil, and the third, an
inability to avoid the third evil, and so on with the rest; in
proportion to the magnitude of each evil, so is it beautiful to be able
to avoid each of them, and disgraceful not to be able. Is the case thus
or otherwise, Callicles?
_Cal._ No otherwise.
139. _Socr._ Of these two things then, the doing injustice and receiving
an injury, we say that to do injustice is a greater evil, but to receive
an injury a less one. By recourse to what means, then, could a man so
assist himself as to have both these advantages, that of not doing
injustice, and that of not receiving an injury? Is it by power, or will?
I mean thus: whether, if a man wishes not to be injured, will he not be
injured, or, if he has acquired the power of not being injured, will he
not be injured?
_Cal._ It is clear that he will not, if he has acquired the power.
_Socr._ But what with respect to doing injustice? Whether, if any one
wishes not to do injustice, is this sufficient, (for in that case he
will not do it,) or, besides this, is it requisite to acquire a certain
power and art, so that, unless he has learned and practised them, he
will do injustice? Come then, answer me this question, Callicles;
whether do Polus and I appear to you to have been compelled, rightly or
not, to make that admission in the former part of our discussion, when
we admitted that no one willingly commits injustice, but that all who do
commit it do so unwillingly?
_Cal._ Let that point be granted, Socrates, in order that you may bring
the argument to a conclusion.
_Socr._ For this purpose, then, as it appears, we must acquire a certain
power and art, in order that we may not commit injustice.
_Cal._ Certainly.
140. _Socr._ What then is the art by means of which a man will receive
no injury at all, or scarcely any? Consider, if it appears to you the
same as it does to me. For to me it appears thus; either that he ought
to govern in a city or even have absolute power, or be a friend of the
existing government.
_Cal._ Do you observe, Socrates, how ready I am to praise you, if you
say any thing well? This you appear to me to have said remarkably well.
_Socr._ Consider also, whether I appear to you to say this well. Each
person seems to me for the most part to be a friend to each, according
as the ancient sages say “like to like:” does it not seem so to you?
_Cal._ It does.
_Socr._ Wherever, therefore, a savage and uneducated tyrant governs, if
there should be any one in the city much better than him, would not the
tyrant fear him, and never be able to be cordially his friend?
_Cal._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Nor yet, if any one should be much worse than the tyrant, would
he become his friend; for the tyrant would despise him, nor ever feel
any affection for him as a friend.
_Cal._ This also is true.
141. _Socr._ It remains, therefore, that he alone would be a friend,
worthy of notice, to such a man, who, having a similar disposition,
should blame and praise the same things, and be willing to be governed
by and submit to his sway. Such a person will have great influence in
this city, and no one will injure him with impunity. Is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ If, therefore, any young man in this city should consider within
himself, “How could I obtain influence, and be injured by no one?” this,
as it seems, must be his method, he must from his very youth accustom
himself to rejoice and grieve at the same things as the despot, and
contrive to make himself as like him as possible. Is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Will not he, then, have managed so as not to be injured, and to
have great power in that city, according to your argument?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Will he also manage not to commit injustice? or far from it,
since he will be like the governor, who is unjust, and will have great
influence with him? I think, for my part, that quite contrariwise he
will contrive so as to be able to commit the greatest injustice and not
to be punished for it. Will he not?
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Will not, then, the greatest evil befal him, in consequence of
being depraved in his soul, and tainted through imitation of the despot
and his influence with him?
142. _Cal._ I know not, Socrates, how you always turn the arguments
upside down. Do you not know, that he who imitates can kill him who does
not imitate _the despot_ if he pleases, and deprive him of his property?
_Socr._ I do know it, good Callicles, unless I am deaf, since I have
just now heard it often both from you and Polus, and from almost every
one else in the city. But do you in your turn listen to me: he will kill
him if he pleases, but a depraved man, one who is upright and good.
_Cal._ And is not this a thing to be indignant at?
_Socr._ Not to a man of sense, as our argument proves. Do you think that
a man should aim at this; to live as long as possible, and should study
those arts which always preserve us from dangers, as rhetoric which you
bid me study, and which saves us in courts of justice?
_Cal._ I do, by Jupiter, and therein I advise you well.
143. _Socr._ What then, my excellent friend, does the science of
swimming too appear to you to be very fine?
_Cal._ No, by Jupiter.
_Socr._ And yet this too saves men from death, when they fall into such
a danger as requires this science. But if this appears to you to be
mean, I will mention to you one more important than this, namely that of
piloting a ship, which not only saves lives, but also bodies and
property from extreme danger, just as rhetoric does. And this art is
moderate and modest, and does not brag and strut as if it accomplished
something wonderful, but when it has accomplished the same thing as the
forensic art, if it has brought us safe here from Ægina, it demands, I
think, two oboli, and if from Egypt or the Pontus, for so great a
benefit in having brought safe what I now mention, ourselves and
children, our property and wives, and in having landed them in port, it
usually demands two drachms, and the man who possesses this art, and
accomplishes these things, when he has disembarked, walks by the sea and
his ship, with a modest gait. 144. For he knows, I think, how to reason
with himself, that it is uncertain whom of his passengers he has
benefited by not allowing them to be drowned, and whom he has injured,
knowing that he has not put them ashore in any respect better than they
were when they went on board, either as to their souls or bodies. He
therefore reasons with himself, that if one who is afflicted in his body
with severe and incurable diseases should happen not to be drowned, such
a man is indeed miserable for having escaped death, and has received no
benefit from him; but if any one labours under many and incurable
diseases in that which is more precious than the body, his soul, such a
one ought[77] not to live, nor would he benefit him, if he saved him
from the sea, or from a court of justice, or from any other danger, for
he knows that it is not better for a depraved man to live, because he
must needs live badly. For this reason, it is not usual for a pilot to
boast, although he saves our lives; nor, my admirable friend, is it
usual for an engineer who is sometimes able to save, no less than a
general of an army, not to mention a pilot or any other person; for
sometimes he saves whole cities. Does it not appear to you that he is
fit to be compared with a forensic orator? though, if he chose to speak,
Callicles, as you do, extolling his own art, he would overwhelm you with
words, urging and exhorting you to the fitness of your becoming an
engineer, for that other things are of no consequence; and he would have
enough to say. 145. You, however, would nevertheless despise him and his
art, and, by way of reproach would call him an engineer, and would
neither give your daughter to his son, nor accept his daughter for your
son. Though, if from the reasons for which you praise your own art, on
what just pretext do you despise the engineer, and the others whom I
have just now mentioned? I know that you would say you are better, and
of a better family. But if that which is better is not what I say it is,
but if excellence consists in this, for a man to save himself and his
property, whatever kind of man he may be, then your contempt for the
engineer and the physician, and for whatever other arts are pursued for
the purpose of preservation, is ridiculous.
-----
Footnote 77:
The negative particle here expressed, is in the original at the
beginning of the paragraph, λογίζεται οὖν, ὅτι οὐκ. See Stallbaum’s
lucid note.
-----
But, my good friend, consider whether that which is noble and good is
not something else than to save and be saved; and whether that
principle, that one should live as long as one can, is not to be given
up by one who is truly a man, and life not too fondly loved, but that
leaving these things to the care of the deity, and believing the women,
_who say_ that no man can avoid his fate, one should consider this, by
what means one may pass the remainder of one’s life in the best possible
manner, whether by conforming one’s-self to the government under which
one dwells. 146. And in that case whether it is right that you should
resemble as much as possible the Athenian people, if you wish to be dear
to them, and to have great influence in their city? Consider whether
this is advantageous to you and to me, lest, my admirable friend, we
should suffer what they say the Thessalian[78] witches did, who drew
down the moon, and our choice of this power in the city should be
attended with the loss of what is dearest to us. If, however, you think
that any man in the world can teach you any such art, as will cause you
to have great power in this city, while you are unlike the character of
the people, whether for the better or the worse, as appears to me,
Callicles, you are not rightly advised. For you must not only be an
imitator of, but like them in your natural disposition, if you mean to
do any thing effectual towards gaining the friendship of the Athenian
people, and, by Jupiter, you must towards that of the son of Pyrilampes.
Whoever, therefore, shall make you most like them, will make you a
politician and an orator, such as you desire to be. For all men are
delighted with arguments suited to their own dispositions, but are angry
with such as are strange to them; unless you, my dear friend, have any
thing to say to the contrary. 147. Have we any objection to make to
this, Callicles?
-----
Footnote 78:
They are said to have lost the use of their eyes and feet.
-----
_Cal._ I do not know how it is, Socrates, you appear to me to speak
well. Yet that which happens to most happens to me; I am not quite
persuaded by you.
_Socr._ For the love of the people, Callicles, dwelling in your soul,
resists me; but perhaps, if we should often and more fully examine into
these same matters, you would be persuaded. Remember, then, that we said
there were two methods for the cultivation of each, both the body and
the soul, and that one had reference to pleasure, but the other to that
which is best, not by gratifying, but opposing the inclinations. Is not
this what we before settled?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ The one, then, that looks to pleasure is ignoble, and nothing
else than flattery; is it not?
_Cal._ Be it so, if you please.
_Socr._ But the other endeavours that that which we cultivate may be
made as excellent as possible, whether it be the body or the soul?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Must we then so endeavour to cultivate the city and the
citizens, that we may make the citizens themselves as good as possible?
For without this, as we discovered before, it is of no advantage to
confer any other benefit upon them, unless the mind of those who are
about to receive either great riches, or dominion or any other power, be
upright and good. Shall we lay this down, as being so?
_Cal._ Certainly, if it is more agreeable to you.
148. _Socr._ If, therefore, Callicles, when setting about some public
works, we were to exhort one another to works of architecture, as to
very large buildings of walls, or docks or temples, would it be
necessary that we should consider and examine ourselves, first, whether
we are skilled or not in the art of architecture, and from whom we
learnt it? Would this be necessary or not?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Then, secondly, we should consider this, whether we have ever
constructed any private building, either for any one of our friends, or
for ourselves, and whether this building is beautiful or ugly. And if on
examination we found that our masters had been good and famous, and that
we have constructed, in conjunction with our masters, many and beautiful
buildings, and many privately by ourselves, after we had left our
masters, in that case it would become men of sense to undertake public
works: but if we were not able to shew that we had a master, nor any
building at all, or many and those of no account, it would surely in
that case be foolish to attempt public works, and to exhort one another
to undertake them. Shall we admit that this is well said, or not?
_Cal._ Certainly.
149. _Socr._ And is not this the case with all other things, and if,
attempting to serve the public in the capacity of physicians, we should
exhort each other, as if we were skilful physicians, should not you and
I examine each other thus: By the gods, in what state is Socrates with
respect to bodily health? Has any other person, whether slave or
freeman, been cured by Socrates of any disease? And I too, I think,
should make similar enquiries about you. And if we did not find that any
one, whether stranger or citizen, man or woman, had been improved in
health by our means, by Jupiter, Callicles, would it not be truly
ridiculous, that men should come to such a pitch of folly, as before
they had practised much in private, as best they could, and had
succeeded in many cases, and thoroughly exercised the art, to attempt to
learn the potter’s art in making a pitcher, as the proverb goes, and
attempt to serve the public in the capacity of physician, and exhort
others to do the same? Does it not appear to you that it would be
foolish to act thus?
_Cal._ It does.
150. _Socr._ But now, O best of men, since you have yourself just now
begun to busy yourself in affairs of state, and you exhort and reprove
me because I do not busy myself about them, should we not examine each
other; Come then, whom of the citizens has Callicles yet made better? Is
there any one who, being before depraved, unjust, intemperate, and
foolish, has become upright and good through Callicles, whether stranger
or citizen, slave or free-man? Tell me, Callicles, if any one should ask
you these questions, what will you say? Who will you say has been made
better by associating with you? Are you ashamed to answer, whether you
have done any such work while you were in a private capacity, before you
attempted to interfere in public affairs?
_Cal._ You are cavilling, Socrates.
_Socr._ I do not ask you from a desire to cavil, but really wishing to
know in what way you think public affairs ought to be conducted by us;
whether on undertaking the management of affairs of state we ought to
attend to any thing else than how we may become as good citizens as
possible. Have we not already often admitted that a politician ought to
do this? Have we admitted it or not? Answer. We have admitted it; I will
answer for you. 151. If, then, a good man ought to endeavour to procure
this for his city, now call to mind and say with respect to those men
whom you a little before mentioned, whether they still appear to you to
have been good citizens, Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades and Themistocles.
_Cal._ To me they do.
_Socr._ If, therefore, they were good citizens, it is evident that each
of them made their fellow-citizens better instead of worse. Did they so,
or not?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ When Pericles, therefore, began to speak in public, were the
Athenians worse than when he addressed them for the last time?
_Cal._ Perhaps so.
_Socr._ There is no ‘perhaps’ in the case, my good friend, but this is a
necessary consequence from what has been admitted, if he really was a
good citizen.
_Cal._ But what then?
_Socr._ Nothing. But tell me this moreover, whether the Athenians are
supposed to have become better through Pericles, or quite the contrary,
to have been corrupted by him. For so I hear, that Pericles made the
Athenians idle, cowardly, talkative and avaricious, having been the
first to give them pay.
_Cal._ You hear this, Socrates, from those whose ears have been
bruised[79].
-----
Footnote 79:
The Spartans; see the Protagoras, § 80.
-----
152. _Socr._ However, I no longer hear this, but I know well and so do
you, that Pericles at first bore a high character, and that the
Athenians passed no ignominious sentence upon him, when they were worse,
but when by his means they had become upright and good, towards the
close of the life of Pericles, they condemned him for peculation, and
were on the point of sentencing him to death, clearly as being a bad
citizen.
_Cal._ What then? Was Pericles on this account a bad man?
_Socr._ Such an one, indeed, would be thought a bad manager of asses,
horses, and oxen, if having received them, neither kicking, nor butting,
nor biting, he should make them do all these things through vice. Does
not every trainer of any animal whatever appear to you to be a bad one,
who, having received it gentle, has made it more vicious than he
received it? Does he appear so, or not?
_Cal._ Certainly, that I may gratify you.
_Socr._ Gratify me, then, by answering this too, whether man is of the
class of animals, or not?
_Cal._ How should he not be?
_Socr._ Had not Pericles, then, the care of men?
_Cal._ Yes.
153. _Socr._ What then? Ought they not, as we just now admitted, to have
become more just, instead of more unjust, under his management, if he
who took charge of them was a good politician?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And are not the just gentle, as Homer[80] says? What say you? Is
it not so?
-----
Footnote 80:
Odyss. vii. 120.
-----
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ However, he made them more savage than he received them, and
this against himself, which he would least of all have wished.
_Cal._ Do you wish that I should agree with you?
_Socr._ If I seem to you to speak the truth.
_Cal._ Be it so, then.
_Socr._ If, then, he made them more savage, he must have made them more
unjust, and worse?
_Cal._ Be it so.
_Socr._ According to this reasoning, then, Pericles was not a good
politician?
_Cal._ Not, as you say.
_Socr._ By Jupiter, nor as you say either, from what you have admitted.
But, again, tell me with respect to Cimon. Did not they whom he took
care of pass a sentence of ostracism upon him, in order that they might
not hear his voice for ten years? And did they not do the very same to
Themistocles, and beside punish him with exile? And did they not
sentence Miltiades, the conqueror at Marathon, to be thrown into the
Barathrum, and but for the Prytanis, would he not have been thrown into
it? These, however, if they had been good men, as you say, would never
have suffered these things. 154. Good drivers, surely, do not at first
keep themselves from falling from their cars, but, when they have
trained their horses, and have themselves become better drivers, then
fall off. This is never the case, either in driving, or in any other
employment. Does it appear so to you?
_Cal._ To me it does not.
_Socr._ Our former statements, then, as it appears, are true, that we do
not know any man who has been a good politician in this city. You admit
that you know of none at present, but you say that formerly there were
some, and you have selected these men: but these have appeared to be
much the same as those of the present day, so that, if they were
orators, they did not make use of the true rhetoric, for in that case
they would not have fallen, nor yet did they employ flattery.
_Cal._ However, Socrates, it is far from being the case, that any one of
the present day will ever do such deeds as were done by any one of
those.
_Socr._ Neither, my excellent friend, do I blame these men, as servants
of the city, but they appear to me to have been more efficient than
those of the present day, and better able to procure for the city what
it desired. But in changing and repressing their desires, by persuading
and compelling them to such a course as would make the citizens become
better, they scarcely differed at all from those of the present day; yet
that is the only duty of a good citizen. But, with respect to providing
ships, walls, and docks, and many other such things, I agree with you,
that they were more able than the men of our day. 155. You and I,
however, act ridiculously in our discussion. For during the whole time
that we have been conversing we have not ceased to go round and round
the same subject, and to misunderstand each what the other says. I think
that you have often admitted and acknowledged that there is a twofold
method of treatment, both with respect to the body and with respect to
the soul: and that the one is ministerial, by which we are enabled to
procure food, if our bodies are hungry, drink, if they are thirsty, and
if they are cold, garments, coverlids, shoes, and all other things which
the body stands in need of. And I purposely speak to you through these
images, in order that you may understand me more easily. For when any
one supplies these things, being either a retail tradesman or a
merchant, or a manufacturer of any of them, a baker, a cook, a weaver, a
shoemaker, or tanner, it is not at all surprising that such a person
should appear, both to himself and others, to be concerned in the care
of the body, that is, to all who are ignorant that, besides all these,
there is a gymnastic and medicinal art, to which the care of the body
really belongs, and whose duty it is to rule over all these arts, and to
use their respective productions, through knowing what meats or drinks
are good and bad for the health of the body, whereas all those others
are ignorant of this; for which reason all those other arts are servile,
ministerial, and base, as regards the management of the body, but the
gymnastic art and medicine are justly the mistresses of these. 156. That
the case is the same with respect to the soul, you, at one time,
appeared to me to have understood, and admitted it as if you knew what I
meant; but shortly afterwards you went on to say that there have been
good and upright men in this city, and when I asked you who they were,
you appeared to me to adduce men very similar with respect to politics,
as if, on my asking with respect to gymnastics, who have been or are
good managers of the body, you had very seriously said to me, Thearion
the baker, Mithæcus, who wrote on Sicilian cookery, and Sarambus the
tavern-keeper, and that they take wonderful care of the body, the first
making admirable bread, the second, made-dishes, and the third, wine.
Perhaps, then, you would be angry if I said to you, My friend, you know
nothing about gymnastics; you tell me of men who are ministers and
purveyors to desires, but who do not understand any thing great and good
respecting them, and who, it may so happen, having filled men’s bodies,
and made them gross, and having been praised by them, end by ruining
their old flesh. These men, on the other hand, through their ignorance,
will not blame those who have pampered their appetites, as being the
causes of their diseases, and of the loss of their old flesh, but they
who may happen to have been with them, and to have given them some
advice, when, after a long time, repletion, having been indulged in
without any regard to health, comes bringing disease with it, these they
will accuse and blame, and do them some mischief if they can, but those
others, who are the causes of their maladies, they will extol. 157. And
now you, Callicles, act in very much the same way; you extol men who
have pampered the Athenians by satiating their desires, and who they say
have made the city great; and they do not perceive that it is swollen,
and unsound through means of those ancient politicians: for, without
considering temperance and justice, they have filled the city with
harbours and docks, and walls and tributes, and such trifles. When,
therefore, the crisis of their weakness comes, they will blame the
advisers who are then present, but will extol Themistocles, Cimon, and
Pericles, who were the causes of the mischief: and you perhaps, unless
you are on your guard, and my friend Alcibiades, they will seize, when
they have lost what they had before in addition to what they have
acquired, although you are not the causes of the mischief, but perhaps
accomplices. 158. Moreover, I both now see a very foolish thing
happening, and I hear of it with respect to men of former times. For I
perceive that when a city punishes any of its politicians as guilty of
wrong, they are angry, and complain bitterly that they are treated
shamefully; and having done the city many good services, they are then
unjustly ruined by it, as they allege. But the whole is a falsehood. For
no president of a city can ever be unjustly ruined by the very city over
which he presides. For the case seems to be the same with such as
profess themselves to be politicians, as it is with the sophists. For
the sophists, though wise in other things, commit this absurdity;
whereas they affirm that they are teachers of virtue, they often accuse
their disciples of acting unjustly towards them, by defrauding them of
their wages, and not making other requitals for the benefits they have
received from them. But what can be more unreasonable than such language
as this, that men who have become good and just, who have been freed
from injustice by their teacher, and have acquired justice, should yet
act unjustly from that very quality which they have not? Does not this,
my friend, appear to you to be absurd? Of a truth, Callicles, you have
compelled me to make a speech by your unwillingness to answer me.
159. _Cal._ But should you not be able to speak unless some one answered
you?
_Socr._ It seems as if I could: for now I have carried my discourse to a
great length, seeing that you will not answer me. But my good friend,
tell me, by Jupiter, the guardian of friendship, does it not appear to
you unreasonable, that a man who says he has made another person good,
should blame that person, because having been made good through his
means, and being so, he has afterwards become bad?
_Cal._ To me it appears so.
_Socr._ Do you not, then, hear those speak in this manner who profess to
instruct men in virtue?
_Cal._ I do. But what can you say of men of no worth?
_Socr._ What then can you say of those, who, while they profess to
preside over the city, and to take care that it shall be as good as
possible, then accuse it, when it so happens, as being very bad? Do you
think that these differ at all from the former? My good man, a sophist
and an orator are the same thing, or nearly so, and very like, as I said
to Polus[81]. But you, through ignorance, think that rhetoric is
something exceedingly beautiful, and despise the other. But, in truth,
the sophist’s art is as much more beautiful than rhetoric, as the
legislative is than the judicial, and the gymnastic art than medicine.
160. But I for my part think that public speakers and sophists alone
ought not to complain of the very thing that they teach, as being
mischievous to themselves, or that in the very same charge they should
at the same time accuse themselves for not having at all benefited those
whom they profess to have benefited. Is it not so?
-----
Footnote 81:
See § 46.
-----
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And surely to impart a benefit without a stipulated reward, as
is probable, is proper for these men only, if they assert what is true.
For one who has received any other kind of benefit, as, for instance,
who has acquired swiftness of foot through the instructions of a teacher
of gymnastics, perhaps might deprive him of his gratuity, if the teacher
of gymnastics had left it to him, without having made an agreement for a
fixed price, that he should be paid the money as nearly as possible at
the same time that he imparted his skill to him. For men, I think, do
not act unjustly through slowness, but through injustice. Do they not?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ If, therefore, any one should take away this, I mean injustice,
there would be no danger of his ever being treated unjustly, but he
alone might safely impart this benefit, if in truth he is able to make
men good. Is it not so?
_Cal._ I admit it.
161. _Socr._ For this reason then, as it appears, it is not at all
disgraceful to take money for giving advice about other things, as, for
instance, about architecture, or other arts.
_Cal._ So it appears.
_Socr._ But with respect to this study, by what means a man may become
as good as possible, and may best govern his own family or a city, it is
reckoned disgraceful to withhold advice, except one should give him
money. Is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ For it is evident that this is the reason that this alone of all
benefits makes the person who has received it desirous of requiting it;
so that it appears to be a good sign, if he who has imparted this
benefit shall be recompensed in return; but otherwise not. Is this so?
_Cal._ It is.
_Socr._ To which method, then, of taking care of the city do you advise
me? explain to me; whether to that of thwarting the Athenians, in order
that they may become as good as possible, as if I were a physician, or
to that by which I should serve them, and curry favour with them. Tell
me the truth, Callicles. For, as you begun to speak freely to me, it is
right you should continue to say what you think. And now speak well and
nobly.
_Cal._ I say, then, that I advise you to serve them.
162. _Socr._ You advise me, therefore, most noble Sir, to employ
flattery.
_Cal._ Unless you prefer calling him a Mysian[82], Socrates; for if you
will do so—
-----
Footnote 82:
A name of the utmost contempt.
-----
_Socr._ Do not repeat what you have often said, that any one who pleases
will kill me, lest I too should say again, that a bad man would slay a
good one; nor that he will take away my property, if I have any, lest I
too should say again, that after he has taken it away he will not be
able to make any use of it, but as he has unjustly taken it from me, so
having got it, he will make an unjust use of it; and if unjustly,
basely; and if basely, wickedly.
_Cal._ How confident you seem to me to be, Socrates, that you will never
suffer any of these things, as being one who lives out of harm’s way,
and who can never be brought before a court of justice by a man,
perhaps, utterly depraved and vile!
_Socr._ I should indeed be foolish, Callicles, if I did not think that
any one in this city might suffer any thing that might happen. This
however I well know, that if I should go before a court of justice, and
be exposed to any of the dangers you mention, he who takes me thither
will be a bad man. For no good man would accuse one who has not
committed injustice. And it would not be at all wonderful, if I should
be condemned to death. Do you wish I should tell you why I expect this?
_Cal._ By all means.
163. _Socr._ I think that I, in conjunction with a few Athenians, (that
I may not say alone,) apply myself to the true political art, and alone
of those of the present day perform the duties of a citizen. Since,
then, in the conversations which I enter into from time to time, I do
not speak for the purpose of conciliating popular favour, but with a
view to that which is best, and not to that which is most agreeable, and
as I am not willing to do those fine things that you advise, I shall not
have any thing to say in a court of justice. And the same illustration
occurs to me that I mentioned to Polus. For I should be judged as a
physician would be judged by children, with a cook for his accuser. For
consider what defence such a man would make when taken before them, if
one should accuse him as follows: ‘O boys, this man has done you a great
deal of mischief, and destroys both you and even the youngest of you,
for, by cutting, cauterizing, weakening and choking you, he reduces you
to great straits, giving you the bitterest draughts, and compelling you
to hunger and thirst; not as I do who feed you with many sweet and
various dainties.’ What do you think a physician when brought to such an
extremity would have to say? If he should say the truth, ‘I did all
these things, boys, for your health,’ what a clamour do you think such
judges would raise against him? Would it not be loud?
_Cal._ Probably; one must think so, at least.
164. _Socr._ Do you not think, then, that he would be altogether at a
loss what to say?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And I know that I should be treated just in the same way, if I
came before a court of justice. For I should not be able to mention any
pleasures which I had procured for them, which they consider as benefits
and advantages; but I neither envy those who procure them, nor those for
whom they are procured. And if any one should say that I corrupt younger
men, by causing them to doubt, or that I revile the elder men, by
speaking bitter words, either privately or publicly, I should not be
able to say the truth, that “I say and do all these things justly, and
for your advantage, judges, and nothing else.” So that I should probably
suffer whatever might happen.
_Cal._ Does a man, then, appear to you, Socrates, to be well off in a
city who is thus circumstanced, and is unable to help himself?
165. _Socr._ If there is that in him, Callicles, which you have often
allowed, namely, if he can assist himself, by neither having said or
done any thing unjust towards men or towards gods. For this aid has
often been acknowledged by us to be the best that a man can have for
himself. If, therefore, any one could convict me of being unable to
afford this assistance either to myself or another, I should be ashamed,
whether convicted before many or few, or alone by myself, and if I
should be put to death for this inability I should be deeply grieved:
but if I should die through want of flattering rhetoric, I well know
that you would behold me meeting death cheerfully. For death itself no
one fears, who is not altogether irrational and cowardly, but he does
fear to commit injustice; for to go to Hades with a soul full of crimes
is the worst of all evils. But, if you please, I will tell you a story
to shew that such is the case.
_Cal._ Since you have brought the rest to a conclusion, bring this to a
conclusion also.
166. _Socr._ Hear then, as they say, a very beautiful tale, which you
will consider a fable, as I think, but I a tale; for what I am about to
tell you, I tell you as being true. As Homer says[83], then, Jupiter,
Neptune, and Pluto, divided the government among themselves, after they
had received it from their father. This law, then, respecting men was in
existence in the time of Saturn, and always was, and still is,
established among the gods, that a man who has passed through life
justly and piously when he dies should go to the isles of the blessed,
and dwell in all perfect happiness free from evil, but that he who has
lived unjustly and impiously should go to a prison of punishment and
justice, which they call Tartarus. During the reign of Saturn, and even
recently when Jupiter held the government, there were living judges of
the living, who passed sentence on the very day on which any one was
about to die. In consequence of this sentences were awarded badly.
Pluto, therefore, and the guardians of the blessed isles, went to
Jupiter, and informed him that men came to them who did not deserve
either sentence. 167. Jupiter, therefore, said, I will prevent this in
future. For now sentences are badly awarded, because those that are
judged are judged clothed, for they are judged while living. Many,
therefore, he continued, whose souls are depraved are invested with
beautiful bodies, nobility of birth, and riches, and when the judgment
takes place, many witnesses come in their behalf, to testify that they
have lived justly. Hence the judges are awed by these things, and
moreover, they too pass sentence when clothed, for their minds are
veiled with eyes and ears, and the whole body. All these things, then,
are obstacles to them, as well their own clothing as that of those that
are judged. First of all, then, they must no longer be allowed to know
beforehand the time of their death: for at present they do know it
beforehand. Prometheus, therefore, has orders to deprive them of this
power: next they must be judged divested of all these things; for they
must be judged after they are dead: the judge too must be naked and
dead, and examine with his soul the soul of each immediately after
death, destitute of all his kindred, and leaving all that ornament on
the earth, in order that the judgment may be just. 168. Now I had
observed these things before you, and accordingly have appointed my sons
as judges, two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe,
Æacus. These, then, when they are dead, shall judge in the meadow, at
the three roads, of which two lead one to the isles of the blessed, the
other to Tartarus. And Rhadamanthus shall judge those from Asia, and
Æacus those from Europe. But to Minos I will give the prerogative of
deciding in case any doubt occurs to the two others, in order that the
judgment respecting the path men are to take may be as just as possible.
-----
Footnote 83:
Iliad, xv. 187.
-----
These are the things, Callicles, which I have heard, and believe to be
true: and from these statements I infer the following results. Death, as
it appears to me, is nothing else than the separation of two things, the
soul and the body, from each other. But when they are separated from
each other, each of them possesses pretty much the same habit that the
man had when alive, the body its own nature, culture and affections, all
distinct. 169. So that if any one’s body, while living, was large by
nature, or food, or both, his corpse when he is dead is also large; and
if corpulent, his corpse is corpulent when he is dead; and so with
respect to other things. And if again he took pains to make his hair
grow long, his corpse also has long hair. Again, if any one has been
well whipped, and while living had scars in his body, the vestiges of
blows, either from scourges or other wounds, his dead body also is seen
to retain the same marks. And if the limbs of any one were broken or
distorted while he lived, these same defects are distinct when he is
dead. In a word, of whatever character any one has made his body to be
while living, such will it distinctly be, entirely or for the most part,
for a certain time after he is dead. The same thing too, Callicles,
appears to me to happen with respect to the soul; all things are
distinctly manifest in the soul after it is divested of body, as well
its natural disposition, as the affections which the man has acquired in
his soul, from his various pursuits. 170. When, therefore, they come to
the judge, those from Asia to Rhadamanthus, Rhadamanthus, having made
them stand before him, examines the soul of each, not knowing whose it
is, but often meeting with the soul of the great king, or of some other
king or potentate, he sees nothing sound in the soul, but finds it
thoroughly marked with scourges and full of scars, through perjuries and
injustice, which the actions of each has imprinted on his soul, and _he
finds_ all things distorted through falsehood and arrogance, and nothing
upright, in consequence of its having been nurtured without truth; he
also sees the soul full of disproportion and baseness through power,
luxury, wantonness and intemperate conduct. On seeing it he forthwith
sends it ignominiously to prison, where on its arrival it will undergo
the punishment it deserves. But it is proper that every one who is
punished, if he is rightly punished by another, should either become
better, and be benefited by it, or should be an example to others, that
they, beholding his sufferings, may be made better through fear. 171.
But those that are benefited, at the same time that they suffer
punishment both from gods and men, are such as have been guilty of
curable offences; their benefit however both here and in Hades, accrues
to them through means of pain and torments; for it is not possible to be
freed from injustice in any other way. But those who have committed the
most extreme injustice, and have become incurable through such crimes,
serve as examples to others, and these are not benefited at all, as
being incurable, but others are benefited by beholding them suffering
for ever the greatest, most bitter, and most dreadful punishments for
their sins, being suspended in the prison of Hades altogether as
examples, a spectacle and warning to the unjust men who are constantly
arriving. Of these, I say, Archelaus will be one, if Polus says true,
and every other tyrant that resembles him. I think too, that the most of
these examples will consist of tyrants, kings, and potentates, and such
as have governed the affairs of cities; for these through their power
commit the greatest and most impious crimes. 172. Homer[84] also bears
witness to this; for he makes those to be kings and potentates, who are
punished for ever in Hades, Tantalus, Sisyphus and Tityus; but
Thersites, or any other private man who was depraved, no one has
represented as suffering great punishments as if incurable; for I think
it was not in his power to commit them; on which account he was more
happy than those who had the power. But, Callicles, the most wicked men
are amongst the powerful; nothing however hinders but that good men may
be found amongst them; and when they are found they deserve the highest
admiration: for it is a difficult thing, Callicles, and deserves high
praise, when one who has great power of acting unjustly, passes through
life justly. There are however a few men of this kind; for they have
existed both here and elsewhere, and I think there will be hereafter
good and upright men, endued with the virtue of administering justly
whatever is committed to their charge. There has been one who is very
celebrated among all the Greeks, Aristides, son of Lysimachus. But, my
excellent friend, the generality of potentates prove wicked. 173. As I
said, then, when Rhadamanthus has got any such person in his power, he
knows nothing else about him, neither who he is, nor who are his
parents, but only that he is wicked; and on discerning this, he sends
him away to Tartarus, signifying at the same time whether he appears to
be curable or incurable; but he arriving thither suffers according to
his deserts. Sometimes, Rhadamanthus beholding another soul that has
passed through life piously and with truth, whether it be of some
private man, or any other, but I say, Callicles, especially of a
philosopher, who has attended to his own affairs, and has not made
himself very busy during life, he is delighted, and sends it to the
isles of the blessed. Æacus too, does the very same things. And each of
them passes sentence, holding a rod in his hand. But Minos sits apart
looking on, and is the only one that has a golden sceptre, as the
Ulysses of Homer[85] says he saw him; “bearing a golden sceptre, and
administering justice to the dead.” I therefore, Callicles, am persuaded
by these accounts, and consider how I may exhibit my soul before the
judge in the most healthy condition. Wherefore, disregarding the honours
that most men value, and looking to the truth, I shall endeavour in
reality to live as virtuously as I can, and when I die, to die so. 174.
And I invite all other men, to the utmost of my power, and you too I in
turn invite to this life and this contest, which I affirm surpasses all
contests here, and I upbraid you because you will not be able to assist
yourself, when you will have to undergo the sentence and judgment which
I have just now mentioned; but when you shall come before the judge, the
son of Ægina, and when he shall seize you and bring you before his
tribunal, you will there gape and become dizzy, no less than I should
here, and perhaps some one will strike you ignominiously on the face,
and treat you with every species of contumely.
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Footnote 84:
Odyss. xi. 575, &c.
Footnote 85:
Odyss. xi. 568.
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Perhaps, however, these things appear to you to be like an old woman’s
fable, and you accordingly despise them. And it would not be at all
wonderful that we should despise them, if on investigation we could find
any thing better and more true than them. But now you see that you
three, who are the wisest of the Greeks of this day, you, Polus, and
Gorgias, are unable to prove that we ought to live any other life than
such as appears to be advantageous hereafter, but among so many
arguments, while others have been refuted, this alone remains unshaken,
that we ought to beware of committing injustice rather than of being
injured, and that above all a man ought to study not to appear good, but
to be so, both privately and publicly: and that if any one is in any
respect wicked, he should be punished, and that this is the next good to
the being just, to become so[86], and to submit to the punishment one
deserves; and that all flattery, whether of one’s-self or others,
whether of few or many, must be avoided; and that rhetoric, and every
other action, is always to be employed with a view to what is just.
175. Be persuaded by me then, and follow me to that place, by going to
which you will be happy, both living and after you are dead, as your own
argument proves. And suffer any one to despise you as senseless, and to
treat you with contumely, if he pleases, and by Jupiter, do you
cheerfully let him strike that ignominious blow; for you will suffer
nothing dreadful, if you are in reality upright and good, and devoted to
the practice of virtue. And when we have thus exercised ourselves in
common, we will then, if it should appear desirable, apply ourselves to
politics, or we will deliberate on whatever we shall think desirable,
being better qualified to deliberate than we now are. For it is
disgraceful, being in the condition in which we appear to be at present,
to pride ourselves, like youths, as if we were something, who yet never
retain the same opinion on the same subjects, and these of the greatest
moment; to such a pitch of ignorance have we reached! Let us use as our
guide, then, the reasoning that has now been made clear to us, which
teaches us, that this is the best mode of life, to live and to die in
the exercise of justice and the other virtues. This, then, let us
follow, and invite others to do the same, not that, to which you
confidently invited me: for it is of no value, Callicles.
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Footnote 86:
Τὸ γίγνεσθαι καὶ κολαζόμενον διδόναι δίκην, Stallbaum translates “to
become just by undergoing the punishment one deserves;” I cannot
extract this meaning from the passage.
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