In this dialogue Socrates relates to a friend, whose name is not given,
a discussion which he had just had with Protagoras the sophist, of
Abdera.
Hippocrates, a young Athenian, had roused Socrates very early in the
morning and entreated him to accompany him on a visit to Protagoras, who
was then at Athens staying at the house of Callias, and whose pupil he
was anxious to become. On arriving there, they find the sophist attended
by a crowd of admirers, and moreover Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of
Ceos, surrounded by their respective followers[87].
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Footnote 87:
§ 1-18.
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After Socrates had made known the object of his visit to Protagoras,
Callias proposes that the whole party should sit down and listen to the
conversation. When all are seated, Socrates repeats to Protagoras, that
Hippocrates is desirous of becoming his pupil, and wishes to know what
advantage he may expect to derive from associating with him. Protagoras
tells him that from the very first day of their intercourse he will
become a better man than he was before, and will daily make further
progress. But, asks Socrates, in what will he become better, and in what
make further progress? In the management of his domestic and public
affairs, that is to say, in the political art. To this Socrates objects
that the general opinion is that political virtue cannot be taught, and
that, whereas with respect to arts and sciences it was usual only to
consult persons who had made them their study and were skilled in them,
in affairs of state every one, of whatever condition, was at liberty to
give his opinion; he therefore begs Protagoras to prove that virtue can
be taught[88]. To this end Protagoras relates a fable in which he
explains how the capacity of becoming virtuous was imparted by Jupiter
to mankind; and then argues that as men are punished for injustice,
impiety, and the like, it follows that they must think that these
virtues ought to be possessed and may be acquired by all men, for that
they would not punish them for a mere defect of mind any more than of
body, if it were natural and not attributable to the fault of the
individual[89].
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Footnote 88:
§ 19-29.
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Socrates having complimented him on his eloquence, according to his
usual method, begs that he will answer his questions briefly; and then
expresses his surprise at having heard Protagoras speak of justice,
temperance, holiness, and the like, as if they were collectively virtue.
He therefore wishes to know whether virtue is one thing, and justice,
temperance and holiness, parts of it, or whether they are all names of
one and the same thing. Protagoras answers that virtue is one thing, and
these several qualities parts of it. Are they then parts like the parts
of a face, the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears, or like the parts of gold,
which do not differ from each other? Like the former. In that case
holiness and justice must be different from each other, which, as
Protagoras is at length compelled, though unwillingly, to admit, is
absurd[90].
Again, each several thing has only one contrary; for instance, strength
is contrary to weakness, swiftness to slowness, ugliness to beauty, evil
to good; in the same way each virtue must have its contrary. This being
granted, Protagoras is led to admit that folly is contrary to
temperance, and also to wisdom; but in that case wisdom and temperance
cannot be different from each other, as was before stated, but must be
one and the same thing. A similar course of enquiry is instituted by
Socrates, in order to shew that justice and prudence likewise are one
and the same, but the impatience of Protagoras at finding himself driven
to repeated admissions which contradict the theory with which he set
out, interrupts the discussion; at length, however, the breach is
repaired by the interference of the company, and it is agreed that each
shall question the other in turn. Protagoras begins by getting Socrates
to allow that an ode of Simonides is beautiful, but that it cannot be
beautiful if the poet contradicts himself. He then shews that in one
part of the ode it is said “that to become a good man is difficult,” and
in another part, “that he is not pleased with the saying of Pittacus,
where he says that it is difficult to continue to be good.” Socrates,
however, justifies the opinion he had expressed by a minute and subtle
examination of the object the poet had in view in composing the ode[91].
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Footnote 89:
§ 30-39.
Footnote 90:
§ 40-56
Footnote 91:
§ 57-90.
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Having concluded his criticism of the ode, Socrates is anxious to bring
back the discussion to the original subject, and having with difficulty
prevailed on Protagoras to consent to this, repeats the question with
which they set out, which was to this effect: whether wisdom,
temperance, courage, justice, and holiness are five parts of virtue,
differing from each other as the parts of the face do? Protagoras
answers that they all are parts of virtue, four of them very like each
other, but the fifth, courage, very different from all the rest. But
this distinction Socrates overthrows as follows: you admit that the
courageous are daring; but they who, like divers, are bold in a matter
in which they are skilled are commended as courageous, whereas they who
are unskilled and yet bold are not courageous but mad; so that according
to this reasoning wisdom and courage are the same. Protagoras, however,
tries to avoid this conclusion by saying that Socrates has mis-stated
his former admission, for that he allowed only that the courageous are
bold, not that the bold are courageous. But Socrates, with a view more
certainly to convict his opponent of error, changes his ground, and asks
whether all pleasant things are good, and all painful things evil?
Protagoras is in doubt what answer to give; Socrates, therefore, shews
that pleasure is in itself a good, but that men mistake as to what
things are pleasant; for knowledge alone ought to govern man, and if a
man knows good and evil he will never be overcome by any thing so as to
do any thing else but what knowledge bids him. Yet there are some who
say that they are overcome by pleasure or pain; but what is it to be
overcome by pleasure? nothing else than to choose present pleasure which
will result in greater evil; in other words, to embrace a greater evil
rather than a greater good; they, therefore, who are overcome by
pleasure are so from ignorance[92].
Having established this, Socrates recurs to the statement of Protagoras,
that courage differs from the other parts of virtue, because the most
unholy, most unjust, most intemperate, and most ignorant men, are
sometimes most courageous. It is admitted that no one willingly exposes
himself to things that he believes to be evil; a brave man, therefore,
incurs dangers which he knows to be honourable and good, and therefore
pleasant, and is influenced by no base fear, nor inspired with base
confidence; but the coward, on the contrary, is influenced by base fear
and inspired by base confidence; he errs, therefore, through ignorance
and want of knowledge, whence it follows that courage is contained in
knowledge. The result of the whole is that virtue, since it consists in
knowledge, can be taught, and so it turns out that Socrates, who began
by maintaining that it could not be taught, has been arguing all along
that it can, and Protagoras, who asserted that it could be taught, has
been arguing that it cannot.
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Footnote 92:
§ 91-118.
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