_Socr._ I will explain it to you more clearly. Since we have agreed, you
and I, that there is something good, and something pleasant, and that
the pleasant is different from the good, and that there is a certain
study and preparation for the acquirement of each of them, one being a
search after the pleasant, and the other after the good—however, first
of all, grant me this, or not; do you grant it?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ Come then, concede to me also what I said to these men, if at
the time I appeared to you to speak the truth. I said that cookery does
not appear to me to be an art, but a skill; and that medicine is an art;
for I said that medicine considers the nature of that which it cures,
and the cause of the things that it does, and is able to give an account
of each of these: but that the other, being concerned about pleasure, to
which its whole attention is directed, proceeds to it without any art at
all, neither considering the nature nor the cause of pleasure,
altogether without reason, and in a word incapable of giving any account
of itself, a mere practice and skill, only preserving the memory of that
which usually takes place, by which also it supplies pleasures. 122.
First of all, then, consider whether these things appear to you to have
been sufficiently established, and that there are also certain other
corresponding studies relating to the soul, of which some follow rules
of art, and regard what is best for the soul; but others that neglect
this, and consider only, as in the former case, the pleasure of the
soul, in what way it may be procured; but paying no attention to which
pleasure is better or worse, nor caring for any thing else than
gratification only, whether it be better or worse. For my part,
Callicles, there appear to me to be such studies; and I say that such a
thing is flattery, as well in relation to the body as the soul, and to
any thing else the pleasure of which one sedulously attends to, without
paying any regard to the better and the worse. But do you entertain the
same opinion as we do respecting these things, or do you gainsay it?
_Cal._ No, but I yield this point in order that our discussion may be
brought to a close, and that I may gratify Gorgias here.
_Socr._ Does this take place with respect to one soul, but not with
respect to two and several?
_Cal._ No; but it takes place with respect to two and several.
_Socr._ Is it not, then, possible to gratify a number of souls collected
together, without considering at all what is best?