_Cal._ Proceed still further, trifling as you are, that you may know how
wise you are who take upon yourself to admonish me.
_Socr._ Does not each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to
receive pleasure from drinking?
_Cal._ I do not know what you mean.
_Gorg._ Say not so, Callicles; but answer for our sakes, that the
discussion may be brought to a conclusion.
_Cal._ But this is always the way with Socrates, Gorgias, he asks
trifling questions, and things that are of no consequence, and then
refutes them.
_Gorg._ But what difference does that make to you? That is no concern at
all of yours: but suffer Socrates to argue in whatever way he pleases.
_Cal._ Ask, then, these trifling and petty questions, since Gorgias
thinks proper.
_Socr._ You are happy, Callicles, in that you have been initiated in the
great mysteries before you were in the small: but I thought that was not
allowed. Answer me, then, from the point where you left off, does not
each of us at the same time cease to be thirsty, and to receive
pleasure?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And does not one cease to be hungry and to feel other desires
and pleasures at the same time?
_Cal._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Does one not, then, at the same time cease to feel both pains
and pleasures?
_Cal._ Yes.
114. _Socr._ However one does not at the same time cease to experience
good and evil, as you admitted; but now do you not admit it?
_Cal._ I do. But what then?
_Socr._ It follows, my friend, that good things are not the same with
such as are pleasant, nor evil things with such as are painful. For,
from these one ceases at the same time, but not from those, because they
are different. How, therefore, can pleasant things be the same with such
as are good, or painful things with such as are evil? But, if you
please, consider it in this way: for I think that you are not even thus
agreed with yourself. Consider then. Do you not call the good good, from
the presence of good things, just as you call those beautiful to whom
beauty is present?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ But what? Do you call foolish men and cowards good men? For you
did not just now; but you said the brave and prudent were so. Do you not
call these good?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what? Have you ever seen a boy without understanding,
rejoicing?
_Cal._ I have.
_Socr._ And have you not also seen a man without understanding,
rejoicing?
_Cal._ I think I have. But to what purpose is this?
_Socr._ Nothing: answer however.
_Cal._ I have seen it.
_Socr._ But what? have you seen a man endued with intellect grieving and
rejoicing?
_Cal._ I have.
115. _Socr._ But which rejoice and grieve the more; the wise, or the
foolish?
_Cal._ I think there is not much difference.
_Socr._ That is enough. In war have you ever seen a coward?
_Cal._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ What then? On the departure of the enemy which appeared to you
to rejoice the more, the cowards or the brave?
_Cal._ Both appeared to me to rejoice more: or, if not, in nearly the
same degree.
_Socr._ It is of no consequence. Cowards, then, also rejoice?
_Cal._ Very much so.
_Socr._ And the foolish, as it seems?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But, when the enemy approaches, do cowards only grieve? or do
the brave also?
_Cal._ Both.
_Socr._ In an equal degree?
_Cal._ Cowards perhaps more.
_Socr._ But, when the enemy departs, do they not rejoice more?
_Cal._ Perhaps so.
_Socr._ Do not, therefore, as you say, the foolish and the wise, cowards
and the brave, similarly grieve and rejoice, much in the same degree,
but cowards more than the brave?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ The wise however and the brave are good, but cowards and the
foolish bad?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ The good and the bad, therefore, rejoice and grieve equally?
_Cal._ I admit it.
116. _Socr._ Are, then, the good and the bad, good and bad in an equal
degree? or are the bad yet more good and bad?
_Cal._ By Jupiter, I do not know what you mean.
_Socr._ Do you not know that you said the good are good, through the
presence of good things, and the bad through the presence of evil
things? And that pleasures are good things, and pains evil?
_Cal._ I did.
_Socr._ Are not, therefore, good things, viz., pleasures, present with
those that rejoice, if they do rejoice?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ And since good things are present are not they who rejoice good?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But what? Are not evil things, viz., pains, present with those
that suffer pain?
_Cal._ They are present.
_Socr._ But do you not say that the bad are bad, through the presence of
evil things? Or do you say so no longer?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ Those, therefore, that rejoice, are good; but those that suffer
pain are bad?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And those that are more so, more, but those that are less so,
less? and those that are equally so, equally?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Do you not say, then, that the wise and the foolish, cowards and
the brave, rejoice and grieve in an equal degree, or cowards even more?
_Cal._ I do.
117. _Socr._ Now in common with me, draw the inferences that result from
these admissions. For, they say, it is beautiful to repeat and consider
beautiful things twice, and even thrice. We say, that the prudent and
brave man is good; do we not?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But that the foolish man and a coward is bad?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Again, that he who rejoices is good?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And that he who suffers pain is bad?
_Cal._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ And that the good and the bad suffer pain and rejoice equally,
but perhaps the bad more?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Therefore, the bad man becomes equally bad and good, with the
good man, or even more good? Do not these results follow, as well as the
former ones, if one says that the pleasant and the good are the same?
Are not these consequences necessary, Callicles?
_Cal._ I have been long listening to you, Socrates, and making
concessions, considering with myself that if any one grants you any
thing, even in jest, you seize it eagerly as boys do. And can you
suppose that I or any other person in the world does not believe that
some pleasures are better, and others worse?
118. _Socr._ Ho, Ho! Callicles, how cunning you are! You treat me as a
child, now asserting that these things are in this manner, and now in
another manner; trying to deceive me. Though, at the outset, I did not
think that I should be purposely deceived by you, because you are my
friend. But now I have been mistaken, and as it seems, must needs,
according to the old proverb, make good use of what I have, and receive
what you give me. What you now say, as it appears, is this, that some
pleasures are good, others bad; is it not so?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And are not the profitable good, and the noxious bad?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And those which effect a certain good, are profitable, but those
which effect a certain evil, bad?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ Do you not speak then of such as the following; as for instance,
with respect to the body, those pleasures which we just now mentioned of
eating and drinking; and if some of these produce in the body health or
strength, or some other bodily excellences, are they not good, but those
that produce the contraries of these, evil?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And are not pains, in like manner, some beneficial, others
injurious?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ Ought we not, therefore, both to choose and to exercise
ourselves in such pleasures and pains as are beneficial?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But not such as are injurious?
_Cal._ That is evident.
119. _Socr._ For, if you remember, it was agreed between us, Polus and
me, that all things should be done for the sake of what is good. And do
you agree with us in thinking, that the good is the end of all actions,
and that all other things ought to be done for its sake, but not it for
the sake of other things? Do you accord with us and make up the third?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ We ought, then, to do both all other things and such as are
pleasant, for the sake of things good, but not good things for the sake
of such as are pleasant?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Is every man, therefore, able to choose among pleasant things
such as are good, and such as are evil? or is there need of a person
skilled in each case?
_Cal._ Of a person skilled.
_Socr._ Let us then again call to mind what I said to Polus and Gorgias.
I said, if you remember, that there are certain occupations which regard
pleasure, and are occupied in this alone, but are ignorant of the better
and the worse; but that there are others that know both what is good and
what is evil. And I have placed among those which have pleasure for
their object, cookery, as a skill relating to the body, but not an art;
and among those that have the good for their object I placed the
medicinal art. 120. And by the god of friendship, Callicles, think not
that you ought to jest with me, nor give any answer that may occur to
you contrary to your opinion, nor receive what I say as if I were in
jest. For you see that our discourse is on a subject, than which there
is none that a man endued even with the smallest understanding would
take more pains about, namely in what way we ought to live, whether in
such a way as that to which you exhort me, engaging in such employments
of a man, as speaking among the people, cultivating rhetoric, and
applying oneself to political affairs, in the manner which you now do;
or whether we should devote ourselves to a philosophic life, and in what
the latter differs from the former. Perhaps, then, it is best, as I just
now attempted, to make a distinction; and when we have distinguished and
agreed with each other, that these are two kinds of life, then to
consider in what they differ from each other, and which of them ought to
be pursued. Perhaps, however, you do not yet understand what I mean.