_Socr._ Therefore, if pleasantly, also happily?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Will this be the case if he only itches in his head, or must I
ask you still further? Consider, Callicles, what answer you would give,
if any one asks you respecting all the parts of the body in succession.
And to take that which is the chief of all, is not the life of catamites
dreadful, base, and wretched? Will you dare to call them happy, if they
have what they desire, without stint?
_Cal._ Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to lead the discussion to such
subjects?
_Socr._ Do I lead it hither, noble Sir, or does he who asserts thus
broadly, that such as rejoice, in whatever way they rejoice, are happy,
and does not distinguish between pleasures, what are good and what are
bad? But tell me further still, whether do you say that the pleasant and
the good are the same: or that there is something pleasant which is not
good?
_Cal._ In order that my argument may not contradict itself, if I should
say they are different, I say that they are the same.
109. _Socr._ You subvert your former statements, Callicles, and no
longer search for the truth with me properly, if you speak contrary to
your real opinion.
_Cal._ And you do the same, Socrates.
_Socr._ Neither, then, do I act rightly, if I do so, nor do you. But,
good Sir, consider whether to rejoice in any way be not good. For it is
clear that many base consequences, which were just now hinted at, will
follow, if this should be the case, and many others besides.
_Cal._ As you think, at least, Socrates.
_Socr._ Do you in reality, Callicles, persist in your assertion?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ Shall we then enter on the discussion, as if you were in
earnest?
_Cal._ Most certainly.
_Socr._ Come, then, since you are of that opinion, explain this to me.
Do you call science any thing?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ And did you not just now say, that there is a certain courage
joined with science?
_Cal._ I did say so.
_Socr._ Did you speak of these two, as if courage was different from
science?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But what? Are pleasure and science the same, or different?
_Cal._ Different, surely, most wise friend.
_Socr._ Is courage also different from pleasure?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
110. _Socr._ Come, then, let us retain these things in our memory; that
Callicles of Acharne said that the pleasant and the good are the same;
but that science and courage are different both from each other and the
good.
_Cal._ But Socrates of Alopecia does not agree to this; does he agree?
_Socr._ He does not agree: and I think neither will Callicles when he
has rightly examined himself. For tell me, do you not think that those
who fare well are affected in a manner quite contrary to those who fare
ill?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ If these, therefore, are contrary to each other, is it not
necessary that the case should be the same with them as it is with
health and disease? For, surely, a man is not at the same time well and
diseased, nor at the same time separated from health and disease.
_Cal._ How say you?
_Socr._ For instance, take any part of the body you please, and
consider. Has not a man sometimes a disease in the eyes, which is called
ophthalmia?
_Cal._ Undoubtedly.
_Socr._ And his eyes, surely, are not at the same time well?
_Cal._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ But what? When he is freed from the ophthalmia, does he then
also lose the health of his eyes, and, in a word, is he at the same time
freed from both?
_Cal._ By no means.
_Socr._ For that, I think, would be wonderful and absurd. Would it not?
_Cal._ Assuredly.
111. _Socr._ But I think he, alternately, receives one, and loses the
other.
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And will it not be the same with regard to strength and
weakness?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ And swiftness and slowness?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And with respect to things good and happiness, and their
contraries, things evil and wretchedness, does he receive and part from
each of these alternately?
_Cal._ Most assuredly.
_Socr._ If, therefore, we should find certain things which a man at the
same time parts from and possesses, it is clear that these would not be
both good and evil. Do we agree to this? Consider well and answer me.
_Cal._ I agree entirely.
_Socr._ Let us then recur to what was before agreed on. Did you say that
to be hungry is pleasant, or painful? I mean the very fact of being
hungry.
_Cal._ I said it was painful: though to eat when hungry is pleasant.
_Socr._ I understand you: but to be hungry of itself is painful; is it
not so?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ And also to be thirsty?
_Cal._ Assuredly.
112. _Socr._ Whether, then, shall I ask you any more questions? Or do
you allow that all want and desire is painful?
_Cal._ I allow it; so do not ask.
_Socr._ Be it so. And do you not say that for a man to drink when he is
thirsty is pleasant?
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ In the instance then of which you are speaking, to be thirsty
is, doubtless, painful?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ But to drink is the satisfying of a want, and a pleasure?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Therefore as to drinking you say that the man rejoices?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But as to being thirsty?
_Cal._ I say—
_Socr._ That he suffers pain?
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Do you perceive then what follows? that you say he who is in
pain at the same time rejoices, when you say that he who is thirsty
drinks. And does not this happen at the same place and time, with
respect either to the soul or body, whichever you please? For I think
there is no difference. Is this so, or not?
_Cal._ It is.
_Socr._ You admitted, however, that it was impossible for one who fares
well at the same time to fare ill.
_Cal._ I allow it.
_Socr._ But you have granted that it is possible for one who is in pain
to rejoice.
_Cal._ It appears so.
_Socr._ To rejoice, therefore, is not to fare well, nor to be in pain,
ill: so that the pleasant is different from the good?
_Cal._ I know not what subtleties you are using, Socrates.