_Socr._ Not only so, Callicles, but on the same subject.
_Cal._ By the gods, you never cease talking about shoemakers, fullers,
cooks, and physicians, as if our discourse were about them.
_Socr._ Will you not tell me, then, with respect to what things a person
should be superior and more wise, who having more than others, justly
has more? Will you neither permit me to suggest, nor say yourself?
_Cal._ But I have said some time since. First, by the superior I do not
mean shoemakers, or cooks, but those who are skilled in the affairs of a
city, in what way they can be well administered, and not only skilled,
but also brave, able to accomplish what they have conceived, and who do
not fail through effeminacy of soul.
_Socr._ Do you see, most excellent Callicles, that you do not make the
same objection to me that I do to you? For you allege that I always say
the same things, and blame me for it; and I, on the contrary, complain
of you, that you never say the same things on the same subjects; but at
one time you defined the better and the superior to be the stronger, and
at another time the more wise: and now again you come with something
else; and certain persons that are braver are said by you to be the
superior and better. But, my friend, tell me once for all, whom you call
the better and superior, and in reference to what.
102. _Cal._ I have already said that they are such as are wise and
brave, with respect to the affairs of a city. For it belongs to them to
govern cities, and it is just that they should have more than others,
the governors than the governed.
_Socr._ But what? my friend, as governing themselves, or being governed?
_Cal._ What mean you?
_Socr._ I mean that each person governs himself. Is there no occasion
for this, that a man should govern himself, but only others?
_Cal._ What do you mean by governing himself?
_Socr._ Nothing uncommon; but as men frequently say, that a man is
temperate, and master of himself, controlling the pleasures and desires
that are within himself.
_Cal._ How ridiculous you are! By the temperate you mean the foolish.
_Socr._ How otherwise? There is no one but would know that that is my
meaning[71].
-----
Footnote 71:
I have followed Stallbaum’s reading, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ ἂν γνοίη, ὅτι
οὕτω λέγω . Socrates grants his opponent’s erroneous inference, that
so he may be led on to a still greater absurdity.
-----
_Cal._ Most assuredly, Socrates; since how can a man be happy who is a
slave to any one? But this it is which is beautiful, and just according
to nature, and which I now freely tell you, _namely_, that a man who
lives rightly should suffer his desires to be as great as possible, and
should not restrain them; but should be able, when they are at their
height, to minister to them by his courage and prudence, and satisfy
each desire as it springs up. 103. This, however, I think, is not
possible for the generality of men; wherefore they blame such persons
through shame, to conceal their own impotency, and say that intemperance
is base; as I said before, enslaving men of a better nature, and
themselves not being able to satisfy their own pleasures, they praise
temperance and justice, on account of their own effeminacy. For to those
whom it has befallen from the first either to be the sons of kings, or
who are able by nature to procure for themselves a government, or
tyranny, or dynasty, what can be more disgraceful and base than
temperance? who, when it is in their power to enjoy the good things of
this life, and no one hinders them, impose a master on themselves, the
law, discourse, and censure of the multitude? Or how should they be
otherwise than miserable through the beauty of justice and temperance,
while they impart no more to their friends than to their enemies, and
this though they have supreme power in their own city? Thus, then, it
stands with the truth, Socrates, which you say you are in search of:
luxury, intemperance, and liberty, if they have the proper aids, these
are virtue and felicity; but all those other fine things, those compacts
contrary to nature, are extravagancies of men, and of no value.
104. _Socr._ Not at all ignobly, Callicles, have you expressed your
opinions, speaking freely; for you now plainly say what others think,
indeed, but are unwilling to say. I beg of you, therefore, on no account
to relax, in order that it may really become evident how we ought to
live. Come tell me: do you say that our desires ought not to be checked,
if one intends to be such as one ought, and that, suffering them to be
as great as possible, one ought to provide for their satisfaction from
every possible source, and that this constitutes virtue?
_Cal._ I do say so.
_Socr._ They, therefore, who need nothing, are not rightly said to be
happy.
_Cal._ For thus stones and the dead would be most happy.
_Socr._ But, indeed, even as you say, life is grievous. For in truth I
should not wonder if Euripides speaks the truth when he says: “Who knows
whether to live is not death, and to die, life?” And we, perhaps, are
really dead; as I have heard from one of the wise, that we are now dead,
and that the body is our sepulchre, and that the part of the soul in
which the desires are is of such a nature that it can be persuaded
different ways, and change upwards and downwards; and this, some skilful
man, perhaps a Sicilian, or Italian, turning into a fable, by a slight
change of the word[72], called a cask, from its being credulous and
easily persuaded, but the foolish he called uninitiated. He further
compared that part of the soul of the uninitiated in which the desires
are, namely, its intemperate and unclosed part, to a pierced cask, on
account of its insatiable greediness. 105. This man, too, quite contrary
to you, Callicles, shews that of those in Hades (meaning thereby the
invisible world) the most miserable must be the uninitiated, and that
they carry water to a perforated cask by a similarly perforated sieve.
The sieve, as he who spoke to me said, is the soul. But he likened the
soul of the foolish to a sieve, as being perforated and not able to
retain any thing, through incredulity and forgetfulness. This probably
is somewhat absurd, nevertheless it shews that by proof of which I wish,
if by any means I can, to persuade you to change your opinion, and to
prefer to an insatiable and intemperate life one that is well regulated,
and that is satisfied and contented with the things that are from time
to time present. But do I persuade you at all, and do you change your
opinion, and admit that the moderate are more happy than the
intemperate? or have I produced no impression, and though I tell you
many such fables, will you not be any the more disposed to change your
opinion?
-----
Footnote 72:
The English language does not enable a translator to preserve the play
on the words πιθανὸν and πίθον, nor the equivoque in ἀμυήτους, which
means “leaky,” as well as “uninitiated.”
-----
_Cal._ In this you have spoken more truly, Socrates.
106. _Socr._ Come, then, I will mention to you another similitude from
the same school as the preceding. For consider whether you would speak
thus of each kind of life, the temperate and the intemperate, as if two
men had each many casks; and that those of one were sound and full, one
of wine, another of honey, a third of milk, and many others of other
things; that the fountains of each were rare and difficult to be
obtained, and could only be procured by many and severe toils; the one,
then, having filled his casks, pours no more into them, nor is at all
concerned about them, but on this score is at ease; that the fountains
of the other, as of the former one, are possible to be procured, though
with difficulty, that his vessels are perforated and defective, and he
compelled, both night and day, to fill them, or suffer the most extreme
pain. When such is the life of each, do you say that of the intemperate
is more happy than that of the moderate man? Do I persuade you at all,
by relating these things, to grant that a moderate life is better than
an intemperate one, or do I not persuade you?
_Cal._ You do not persuade me, Socrates. For he that has filled his
casks has no longer any pleasure: but this is, what I just now
mentioned, to live like a stone, when he has filled them, neither
rejoicing any more nor grieving: but a pleasant life consists in as much
flowing in as possible.
107. _Socr._ Is it not, therefore, necessary, if much flows in, that
much also should go out, and that there should be certain large holes
for its flowing out?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ You speak now of the life of a sea-lark[73], and not of a
corpse, or a stone. But tell me, do you mean such a thing as being
hungry, and, when hungry, eating?
-----
Footnote 73:
Χαραδριὸς, a bird which Aristotle tells us (Hist. Anim., l. ix. c. 11)
“appears in the night and runs off in the day.” See note to Cary’s
Birds of Aristophanes, act i. sc. 4.
-----
_Cal._ I do.
_Socr._ And of being thirsty, and, when thirsty, drinking?
_Cal._ I do mean that, and that he who has all other desires, and,
having the power to do so, satisfies them, lives a joyful and happy
life.
_Socr._ Well done, my excellent friend! Proceed as you have begun, and
take care not to be ashamed. But it is right, too, as it seems, that
neither should I be ashamed. And first of all, tell me if, when a man,
who is scabby and itches, is able to scratch himself without stint, and
passes his life in scratching himself, this is to live happily?
_Cal._ How absurd you are, Socrates, and a mere babbler.
_Socr._ Hence it is, Callicles, that I have astonished Polus and
Gorgias, and made them ashamed. You, however, will not be astonished nor
ashamed, for you are courageous: but only answer me.