_Socr._ For the purpose, then, of excusing injustice, our own, or that
of our parents, or friends, or children, or country, when it acts
unjustly, rhetoric is of no use to us at all, Polus, unless on the
contrary, any one supposes that he ought especially to accuse himself,
and afterwards his relatives, and any other of his friends, who may have
acted unjustly, and not conceal the crime, but bring it to light, in
order that he may be punished, and restored to health; moreover, that he
should compel both himself and the others to lay aside fear, and with
his eyes shut, and in a manly way, deliver himself up, as to a
physician, to be cut and cauterised, pursuing the good and the
beautiful, without paying any regard to what is painful; if he has
committed a wrong worthy of stripes, delivering himself up to be beaten,
if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to pay it, if of exile, to be
banished, if of death, to die, being himself the first accuser of
himself, and others his relatives, not sparing either himself or them,
but employing rhetoric for this very purpose, that, the crimes being
exposed, they may be freed from the greatest of evils, injustice. Shall
we say thus, Polus, or not?
80. _Pol._ These things appear to me, Socrates, to be absurd; but it
must be admitted, they accord with what was before said.
_Socr._ Must not, therefore, either our former conclusions be done away
with, or these results necessarily follow?
_Pol._ Yes; such is the case.
_Socr._ Contrariwise, if it is requisite to do ill to any one, whether
to an enemy, or any other person, provided only that he is not himself
injured by his enemy; for this is to be guarded against; but if an enemy
injures another, we should endeavour by all possible means, both by
actions and words, that he may not be punished, nor brought before a
judge: but, if he is brought before him, we should contrive so that our
enemy may escape, and not suffer punishment: and if he has robbed us of
a great quantity of gold, that he should not restore it, but should
retain it and spend it on himself and his associates unjustly and
impiously; and if he has committed an injustice worthy of death, we
should contrive that he may not die, if possible never, but that he may
be immortal in depravity, or if this cannot be, that he may live in this
state for as long a period as possible. 81. For such purposes, Polus,
rhetoric appears to me to be useful, since to him who does not intend to
act unjustly, its utility does not appear to me to be great, if indeed
it is of any utility at all, as in the former part of our discussion it
appeared in no respect to be.
_Cal._ Tell me, Chærephon, does Socrates say these things seriously, or
is he jesting?
_Chær._ He appears to me, Callicles, to speak most seriously; but there
is nothing like asking him himself.
_Cal._ You are right, by the gods, and I desire to do it. Tell me,
Socrates, whether we must say that you are now speaking seriously, or
jesting? For, if you are speaking seriously, and if what you say is
true, is not our human life altogether subverted, and are not all our
actions, as it seems, contrary to what they ought to be?
_Socr._ If there were not a certain passion, Callicles, common to men,
to some, one, to others, another, but each of us had a peculiar passion
different from others, it would not be easy for one to make known one’s
own affection to another. 82. I speak thus because I perceive that you
and I are now affected in the same manner; for, being two, we each of us
love two things: I, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, and philosophy, you, the
Demus[67] of the Athenians, and the son of Pyrilampes. Now I continually
perceive that you, eloquent as you are, are unable to contradict the
objects of your love, in whatever they may say, and in whatever manner
they may assert a thing takes place, but you are changed by them upwards
and downwards. For, in the assembly, if, when you say any thing, the
Athenian people say that it is not so, you, changing your opinion, say
what they wish; and you are affected in the same manner towards that
beautiful youth, the son of Pyrilampes; for you cannot bring yourself to
oppose the wishes and discourses of the objects of your love: so that,
if any one, when from time to time you say what you do to please them,
should wonder at its absurdity, perhaps you would say to him, if you
wished to speak the truth, that unless some one shall cause the objects
of your love to desist from such discourses, neither can you desist from
saying what you do. Think, therefore, that you need to hear the like
from me; and do not wonder that I speak thus, but cause philosophy, my
favourite, to desist from speaking so. For, my dear friend, she always
says what you now hear from me, and is much less fickle than my other
loves. 83. For the son of Clinias, here, says different things at
different times; but philosophy always the same. And she says the things
that you now wonder at; and you have just heard what she said. Either,
therefore, confute her, as to what I just now said, and prove that to
act unjustly, and when one has acted unjustly not to suffer punishment,
is not the worst of all evils; or, if you suffer this to remain
unconfuted, then, by the dog, the deity of the Egyptians, Callicles will
not agree with you, but will differ from you, Callicles, through the
whole of his life. However, I think, my excellent friend, that it would
be better for me that my lyre should be out of tune and discordant, and
the choir of which I might be the leader, and that most men should not
agree with me, but oppose what I say, rather than that I, being one,
should be discordant with and contradict myself.
-----
Footnote 67:
That is, “the people of Athens.” It is necessary to retain the
original word because of the play on the word _Demus_, which was the
name of the son of Pyrilampes, a person distinguished for his personal
beauty. Socrates means to insinuate that while he loves the inward
beauty of Alcibiades and philosophy, Callicles loves the external
beauty of the people and Demus son of Pyrilampes.
-----
_Cal._ You seem to me, Socrates, to act the boaster in your discourses,
as being in truth a mob-orator: and now you thus declaim, since Polus
has met with the same treatment as he objected Gorgias met with from
you. 84. For he said that Gorgias, when asked by you, whether if one
should come to him, wishing to learn rhetoric without being acquainted
with justice, Gorgias would teach him, was ashamed, and said that he
would teach him, on account of the custom among men, because they would
be displeased if any one were to refuse: and that from this admission
Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, and you were delighted with
this very circumstance; for which he then ridiculed you, as it appeared
to me, very properly. And now he himself has in turn been treated the
very same way; I, however, in this particular, do not commend Polus,
because he has conceded to you, that to commit injustice is more base
than to suffer it. For, from this admission, he being entangled by you
in the discussion, has been brought to a check, because he was ashamed
to say what he thought. For you in reality, Socrates, while you profess
to be in search of truth, lead to such vulgar and popular things as
these which are not beautiful by nature, but by law. For these are, for
the most part, contrary to each other, nature and law. 85. If any one,
therefore, is ashamed, and dares not say what he thinks, he is compelled
to contradict himself. And you, having perceived this subtle
distinction, deal unfairly in the discussion; for, if any one speaks of
any thing according to law, you cunningly ask him about it according to
nature, and if he speaks of things according to nature, you ask him
about them according to law; as just now in the present discussion,
respecting committing injustice and suffering it, when Polus spoke of
that which is more base according to nature, you followed up the law _as
if it were_ according to nature. For, by nature, every thing is more
base which is also worse, as to suffer injustice, but by law to commit
it. For to submit to injustice is not the condition of a man, but of a
slave, to whom it is better to die than to live, since, being injured
and disgraced, he is unable to defend himself or any one else for whom
he has regard. But I think, those who make the laws are the weak and the
many: they, therefore, make laws with a view to themselves and their own
advantage, and with the same view they bestow praise and impute blame;
and to terrify such men as are stronger, and who are able to acquire
more, that they may not acquire more than themselves, they say that it
is base and unjust to obtain a superiority, and that to endeavour to
acquire more than others is to commit injustice. 86. For they are
content, I think, if they, being weaker, have an equal portion. For this
reason, therefore, by law it is said to be unjust and base to endeavour
to possess more than the many, and they call this committing an
injustice. But nature herself, I think, evinces, on the contrary, that
it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more
powerful than the weaker. And it is evident in many instances that it is
so, both in other animals, and in whole cities and races of men, that
the just is so settled that the superior should rule over the inferior,
and possess more than they. For, with what justice did Xerxes make war
upon Greece, or his father on the Scythians? or ten thousand other
instances which one might adduce? But I think they do these things
according to natural justice, and, by Jupiter, according to the law of
nature; not, perhaps, according to that law which we have framed, taking
the best and strongest amongst us from their youth, like lions, we tame
them by incantations and juggleries, telling them that it is right to
preserve equality, and that this is the beautiful and the just. 87. But,
I think, if there should be a man found with sufficient natural power,
having shaken off all these trammels, and broken through, and abandoned,
and trampled under foot our written ordinances, and quackeries, and
incantations, and laws contrary to nature, he, from being our slave,
would rise up and prove himself our master; and then natural justice
would shine forth. Pindar, too, appears to me to have declared what I
now assert, in the ode in which he says that “law is the king of all,
both mortals and immortals; and,” he adds, “he with most powerful hand
makes use of might, calling it right; and this I infer from the deeds of
Hercules, since _he drove away the oxen of Geryon_ unbought.” He speaks
pretty much in this manner; for I do not remember the ode by heart. He
says, then, that Hercules drove away the oxen of Geryon, without having
either bought them, or received them as a gift, as if this were
naturally just, that both oxen, and all other possessions, when the
property of the worse and inferior, belong to the better and superior.
Such, then, is the truth; and you will know that it is so, if,
dismissing philosophy, you betake yourself to greater things. 88. For
philosophy, Socrates, is an elegant thing, if one handles it moderately
in youth; but if one dwells upon it longer then is becoming, it is the
ruin of men. For if a man should have excellent abilities, and should
study philosophy beyond the period of youth, he must necessarily become
unskilled in all things in which he ought to be skilled, who desires to
be a worthy, good, and distinguished man. For such men are unskilled in
the laws of the city, and in those arguments which any one must use, who
is conversant with the business transactions of men, both privately and
publicly: they are likewise altogether unskilled in human pleasures and
desires, and, in short, in the manners of men. When, therefore, they
engage in any private or public business, they make themselves
ridiculous, just as, I think, politicians are ridiculous when they
meddle with your disputations and arguments. For that saying of
Euripides[68] is verified: “Every one shines in this, and to this
applies himself, consuming the greater part of the day in whatever he
most excels.” But that wherein a man is weak he avoids, and abuses it,
and praises the other through self-love, thinking thereby to praise
himself: but I think the most correct way is to partake of both. 89. Of
philosophy, indeed, so far as is requisite for education, it is well to
partake, nor is it any disgrace for one who is young to study
philosophy: but when a man who has reached an advanced age, still
studies philosophy, Socrates, the thing becomes ridiculous; and I have
very much the same feeling towards those who study philosophy, as to
those who stammer and sport. For when I see a child whom it still
becomes to talk thus stammering and sporting, I am delighted, and his
conduct appears to me to be graceful and liberal, and suited to the age
of a child. But when I hear a little boy talking with precision, it
seems a disagreeable thing to me, and offends my ears, and appears to be
somewhat servile. When, however, one hears a man stammering, or sees him
sporting, it appears to be ridiculous, unmanly, and worthy of stripes.
Now I have this same feeling towards those who study philosophy. For,
when I see philosophy in a young man, I am delighted, and it appears to
me becoming, and I consider such a man to be of a liberal mind, but if
he does not study philosophy, I consider him illiberal, and one who will
never think himself worthy of any noble or generous action. When,
however, I see a man advanced in years still studying philosophy, and
not having abandoned it, such a man, Socrates, appears to me to be
deserving of stripes. 90. For, as I just now said, such a man, even
though he has excellent abilities, must needs become unmanly, by
avoiding the public places of the city, and the forum, in which, as the
poet[69] says, men acquire celebrity, and by concealing himself from the
public view, he passes the remainder of his life with three or four
boys, whispering in a corner, but never utters any thing liberal, great,
and becoming. But I, Socrates, am very friendly disposed towards you;
and I seem to have the same feeling as Zethus towards Amphion in
Euripides, whom I just now mentioned; for it occurs to me to say to you
the same that he said to his brother: that you neglect, Socrates, what
you ought to attend to, and strive to adorn the nature of a soul thus
generous by a certain juvenile form; nor in deliberations of justice are
you able to advance an argument correctly, nor lay hold of what is
probable and persuasive, nor can you suggest vigorous advice for others.
91. However, my dear Socrates, (and do not be angry with me, for I speak
out of good-will to you,) does it not appear to you to be base to be in
the state in which I think you are, and others who continually make too
great advances in philosophy? For now, if any one should arrest you, or
any other of the same character, and should take you to prison,
asserting that you had acted unjustly, when you had not, you are aware
you would not know what to do for yourself; but you would lose your head
and gape, and not have any thing to say; and when you went into a court
of justice, having met with a very vile and despicable accuser, you
would die, if he chose to charge you capitally. And indeed, Socrates,
how can this be wise, if any art meeting with a man of good natural
ability renders him worse, and neither able to assist himself, nor
preserve either himself or any one else from the greatest dangers, but
suffers him to be plundered of all his substance by enemies, and to live
in the city utterly without honour? Such a man, (if I may speak somewhat
rudely,) one may slap on the face with impunity. 92. But, my friend, be
persuaded by me, and give up confuting, cultivate harmony of conduct,
and employ yourself in what will give you a reputation for wisdom,
leaving to others these graceful subtleties, whether it is proper to
call them frivolities, or fooleries, “by which you will come to dwell in
an empty house:” and emulate, not men who are able to confute these
trifling things, but those who have wealth, renown, and many other
goods.
-----
Footnote 68:
From the Antiope of Euripides. See Valckenaer Diatrib. in Eurip.
Reliquias, p. 76.
Footnote 69:
Homer, Iliad, ix. 441.
-----
_Socr._ If I happened to have a golden soul, Callicles, do you not think
I should gladly find one of the best of those stones by which they test
gold, to which applying it, if it should allow that my soul was well
cultivated, I should then know for a certainty that I was in a good
state, and that I had no further need of any other test?
_Cal._ Why do you ask this, Socrates?
_Socr._ I will now tell you. I think that in meeting with you, I have
met with this good fortune.
_Cal._ Why so?
_Socr._ I well know, that if you agree with me in those things which my
soul entertains, such things are the very truth. For I perceive that he
who intends to examine sufficiently respecting his soul whether it lives
uprightly or not, ought to possess three qualities, all which you do
possess, viz., science, benevolence, and freedom of speech. 93. For I
meet with many who are not able to test me, through not being wise as
you are; but others are wise, indeed, but are not willing to speak the
truth to me, because they are not concerned about me as you are. Thus
these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are indeed wise, and my friends,
but they are deficient in freedom of speech, and are more bashful than
is proper. For how should it be otherwise? since they have reached such
a pitch of bashfulness that through shamefacedness each of them dares to
contradict himself before many persons, and this on the most important
subjects. You however possess all these qualities, which the others have
not. For you are both well instructed, as many of the Athenians will
affirm, and are well-disposed towards me. What proof do I use? I know,
Callicles, that you four have studied wisdom together, you, Tisander the
Aphidnæan, Andron son of Androtion, and Nausicydes the Cholargean; and I
once heard you deliberating how far wisdom ought to be cultivated, and I
know that this opinion prevailed among you, that you should not
endeavour to study philosophy with great accuracy; but you advised each
other to be cautious, lest, by becoming more wise than is proper, you
should destroy yourselves without perceiving it. 94. Since, then, I hear
you giving me the very same advice that you gave to your most intimate
friends, it is to me a sufficient proof that you are really
well-disposed towards me. Moreover, that you are able to speak boldly
and not be ashamed, both yourself say, and the speech which you just now
made, evinces. The case is evidently this, with reference to our present
discussion; if you shall agree with me in any thing, in our argument,
that point will have been sufficiently examined by you and me, and it
will be no longer necessary to put it to another test. For you would
never have assented to it, either through deficiency of wisdom, or
excess of bashfulness. Nor, again, would you have assented in order to
deceive me: for you are my friend, as you have yourself said. In
reality, therefore, your and my assent will have reached the perfect
truth. But the most beautiful consideration of all, Callicles, with
respect to the things about which you have reproved me, is that, viz.,
what kind of person a man ought to be, what he ought to study, and how
far, both when he is advanced in life and when he is young. For, with
respect to myself, if I do any thing in my life not rightly, be assured
that I do not err willingly, but through my own ignorance. 95. Do you,
therefore, as you have begun to advise me, not desist, but shew me
clearly what it is that I ought to study, and in what way I may
accomplish it. And if you find me now assenting to you, but in time to
come not doing the things to which I have assented, then consider me as
utterly stupid, and thenceforth give me no more advice, as being a man
altogether worthless. But repeat it to me again from the beginning, how
say you and Pindar is the case with natural justice? is it that the
superior should take by force from the inferior, and that the better
should rule over the worse, and that the more excellent should have more
than the depraved? Do you say that the just is any thing else than this?
or do I remember rightly?
_Cal._ These things I said then, and I say now.
_Socr._ But do you call the same person better and superior? For I was
not able at the time to understand you, what you meant: whether do you
call the stronger superior, and must the weaker submit to the stronger;
as you seemed to me to intimate when you said, that great cities attack
little ones by natural justice, because they are superior and stronger;
as if the superior, the stronger, and the better, were the same; or is
it possible to be better, and at the same time inferior and weaker, and
to be superior, but more depraved? or is there the same definition of
the better and the superior? Define this clearly for me, are the
superior, the better, and the stronger, the same, or different?
_Cal._ Then I tell you clearly, that they are the same.
96. _Socr._ Are not, then, the many by nature superior to one? since
they establish laws for the one, as you just now said?
_Cal._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ The laws, then, of the many are those of such as are superior?
_Cal._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Therefore, of the better? For, according to your account, the
superior are far better.
_Cal._ Yes.
_Socr._ Are not, then, their laws by nature beautiful, since they are
superior?
_Cal._ I admit it.
_Socr._ Now do not the many think thus, as you just now said, that it is
just to possess the equal, and that it is more base to injure than to be
injured? Is this so, or not? And take care that you are not detected
here in being shamefaced. Do the many think or not that to possess the
equal, but not more, is just? and that it is more base to injure than to
be injured? Do not refuse me an answer to this, Callicles, in order
that, if you agree with me, I may be confirmed in my opinion by you,
seeing that a man competent to decide has agreed with me.