_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Is it with such a benefit as I suppose? Does he become better as
to his soul, since he is chastised justly?
_Pol._ That is probable.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who is punished is freed from a vice of the soul.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Is he not freed, then, from the greatest evil? Consider the
matter thus: in the condition of a man’s property do you perceive any
other evil than poverty?
_Pol._ No other than poverty.
_Socr._ Well, in the constitution of the body? would you say that
weakness, disease, deformity, and the like, are evils?
_Pol._ I should.
_Socr._ Do you not think, too, that there is a certain depravity in the
soul?
_Pol._ How otherwise?
_Socr._ Do you not then call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and
the like?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Have you not said, then, that of these three, property, body,
and soul, there are three corresponding evils, poverty, disease,
injustice?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Then which of these evils is the most base? Is it not injustice,
and, in a word, the depravity of the soul?
_Pol._ By far.
_Socr._ But, if it is most base, then is it not also the worst?
_Pol._ How mean you, Socrates?
73. _Socr._ Thus. In every case, that which is most base is so because,
from what has been before admitted, it occasions the greatest pain, or
harm, or both.
_Pol._ By all means.
_Socr._ But injustice and the whole depravity of the soul, have been
just now admitted by us to be most base.
_Pol._ They have been so admitted.
_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, the most troublesome and most base of
these _depravities_, because it exceeds either in troublesomeness or
hurtfulness, or both?
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ Is then the being unjust, intemperate, cowardly, and ignorant,
more painful than to be poor and diseased?
_Pol._ It does not appear so to me, Socrates, from what has been said.
_Socr._ The depravity of the soul, then, is the most base of all,
because it exceeds the others by some extraordinarily great harm and
wonderful evil, since, according to your argument, it is not exceeded in
painfulness.
_Pol._ So it appears.
_Socr._ But, surely, that which exceeds in the greatest harmfulness must
be the greatest evil of all?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Then injustice, intemperance, and the other depravities of the
soul, are the greatest evils of all.
_Pol._ So it appears.
74. _Socr._ What art, then, frees from poverty? Is it not that of
money-making?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ What, from disease? Is it not the medicinal?
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ What, from depravity and injustice? If in this way you cannot
readily answer, consider it thus: whither, and to whom, do we take those
that are diseased in body?
_Pol._ To physicians, Socrates.
_Socr._ Whether those who act unjustly, and are intemperate?
_Pol._ Do you mean, to the judges?
_Socr._ Is it not, then, that they may be punished?
_Pol._ I grant it.
_Socr._ Do not then those who chastise rightly chastise by employing a
certain justice?
_Pol._ Clearly.
_Socr._ The art of money-making, therefore, frees from poverty, medicine
from disease, and justice from intemperance and injustice.
_Pol._ So it appears.
_Socr._ Which of these, therefore, is the most beautiful?
_Pol._ Of what are you speaking?
_Socr._ The art of money-making, medicine, and justice.
_Pol._ Justice, Socrates, is far superior.
_Socr._ Does it not, then, produce the greatest pleasure, or utility, or
both, since it is the most beautiful?
_Pol._ Yes.
75. _Socr._ Is it, then, pleasant to be under the care of a physician?
and do they who are under such charge rejoice?
_Pol._ It does not appear so to me.
_Socr._ But it is useful. Is it not?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ For they are freed from a great evil; so that it is advantageous
to endure pain and be restored to health.
_Pol._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ Would the man then, thus be most happy with respect to his body
who is under the care of a physician, or who is not diseased at all?
_Pol._ Clearly he that is not diseased.
_Socr._ For this is not happiness, as it seems, the being freed from
evil; but the never possessing it at all.
_Pol._ It is so.
_Socr._ But what? Of two men that have evil, either in body or soul,
which is the more miserable, he that is under the care of a physician,
and is freed from the evil, or he that is not under the care of a
physician, and retains the evil?
_Pol._ It appears to me, he that is not under the care of a physician.
_Socr._ And is not punishment the being freed from the greatest evil,
depravity?
_Pol._ It is.
_Socr._ For justice produces a sound mind, makes men more just, and
becomes the medicine of depravity?
_Pol._ Yes.
76. _Socr._ He, then, is most happy who has no vice in his soul, since
this is proved to be the greatest of evils.
_Pol._ It is evident.
_Socr._ The second, surely, is he who is freed from it.
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ But this is he who is admonished, reproved, and punished.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ He, therefore, lives worst, who is afflicted with injustice, and
is not freed from it.
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Is not, then, he one who, having committed the greatest
injustice, and employing the greatest injustice, contrives that he may
be neither admonished, nor chastised, nor punished, as you said was the
case with Archelaus, and other tyrants, rhetoricians, and powerful men?
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ For these, my excellent friend, have managed much the same as
one who being afflicted with the worst diseases should contrive not to
have his bodily maladies corrected or subjected to medical treatment,
fearing, as if he were a child, to be burnt and cut, because these
operations are painful. Does it not appear so to you?
_Pol._ It does.
_Socr._ Being ignorant, as it seems, of what health is, and a good habit
of the body. 77. Now from what we have just agreed on, Polus, those who
flee from punishment appear to do something of this kind; they look to
the pain attending it, but are blind to its utility, and are ignorant
how much more miserable than an unhealthy body it is to dwell with an
unhealthy soul, that is corrupt, unjust, and impious. Whence they do
every thing that they may not be punished, nor freed from the greatest
evil, procuring for themselves riches and friends, and the power of
speaking as persuasively as possible. But if we have agreed on what is
true, Polus, do you perceive what consequences result from our
discourse? do you wish that we should draw the conclusions from them?
_Pol._ I do, unless you think otherwise.
_Socr._ Does it not follow that injustice and to act unjustly is the
greatest evil?
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And to suffer punishment was proved to be a means of freedom
from this evil.
_Pol._ It appears to be so.
_Socr._ But not to suffer punishment is a continuance of the evil.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ To act unjustly, therefore, is the second of evils in magnitude;
but to act unjustly and not to suffer punishment is the greatest and
chief of all evils.
_Pol._ So it seems.
78. _Socr._ Was not this the point, my friend, with respect to which we
differed, you considering Archelaus happy, for that having committed the
greatest injustice he suffers no punishment; but I on the contrary
thinking, that whether Archelaus, or any other man whatever, is not
punished when he commits injustice, he must needs be far more wretched
than all other men, and that he who commits injustice is ever more
wretched than he who suffers it, and he that is not punished than he
that is. Are not these the things that I said?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And has it not been demonstrated that they were said truly?
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ Well then, if these things are true, Polus, what is the great
utility of rhetoric? For, from what has been now agreed on, every one
ought especially to beware of acting unjustly, for that, _if he does so
act_, he will sustain great evil. Is it not so?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And if a man has committed injustice, either himself, or any one
else for whom he has regard, he ought of his own accord to betake
himself thither, where as soon as possible he will be punished, to a
judge as to a physician, taking every pains lest the disease of
injustice becoming inveterate should render the soul corrupt and
incurable; or what must we say, Polus, if our former admissions are to
stand? Do not these things necessarily harmonize with the former in
this, but in no other way?