_Pol._ Does he, then, who slays whom he pleases, slaying him justly,
appear to you to be wretched, and an object of pity?
_Socr._ Not at all; nor indeed is he to be envied.
_Pol._ Did you not say just now that he was wretched?
_Socr._ I said, my friend, that he is wretched who slays another
unjustly, and more than that, to be pitied; but that he who slays
another justly is not to be envied.
_Pol._ He surely who dies unjustly is to be pitied, and is wretched.
_Socr._ Less so, Polus, than he who slays him; and less than he who dies
justly?
_Pol._ How so, Socrates?
_Socr._ Thus; because to act unjustly is the greatest of evils.
_Pol._ But is this really the greatest of evils? Is it not a greater
evil to suffer unjustly?
_Socr._ By no means.
_Pol._ Had you, then, rather suffer unjustly than act unjustly?
_Socr._ I should wish neither of these: but if I must necessarily either
act unjustly or suffer unjustly, I should choose rather to suffer
unjustly than to act unjustly.
_Pol._ Would you not, then, consent to be a tyrant?
_Socr._ I would not, if by being a tyrant you mean the same that I do.
_Pol._ I mean by it what I just now said, to have the power to do in a
city whatever one pleases; to slay and banish, and do every thing
according to one’s own pleasure.
56. _Socr._ My excellent friend, attend to what I say, and confute me if
you can. If, when the forum is full, I should take a dagger under my
arm, and say to you, Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has
just now fallen to my lot: for, if it seems fit to me that any one of
these men whom you see ought immediately to die, he shall die; and if it
seems fit to me that any one of them ought to have his head broken, he
shall immediately have it broken; or if that his garment should be torn
to pieces, it shall be torn to pieces: so great is the power I possess
in the city. And if, on your disbelieving me, I should shew you the
dagger, perhaps, on seeing it, you would say: According to this,
Socrates, all men may have great power, since any house that you please
might be burnt in this way, and even the dock-yards of the Athenians,
and the triremes, and all the shipping, as well public as private. But
surely this is not to possess great power, to do whatever one pleases:
do you think so?
_Pol._ Certainly not in this way.
_Socr._ Can you tell me, then, why you blame a power of this kind?
_Pol._ I can.
_Socr._ Why then? tell me.
_Pol._ Because it must needs be that one who acts thus should be
punished.
_Socr._ But is not the being punished an evil?
_Pol._ Certainly.
57. _Socr._ Therefore, my excellent friend, to have great power appears
to you to be, when advantage attends one’s doing what one pleases, and
then it is a good; and this, as it seems, is to have great power; but if
not, it is an evil, and to have little power. Let us consider this too.
Are we not agreed that it is sometimes better to do the things which we
just now spoke of, to slay, to banish men, and deprive them of their
property, and sometimes not?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ This, then, as it seems, is agreed on both by you and me?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me
what limit you establish?
_Pol._ Do you, Socrates, answer this question.
_Socr._ I say, then, Polus, since it is more agreeable to you to hear it
from me, when any one does these things justly, it is better, but when
unjustly, it is worse.
_Pol._ Forsooth, it is difficult to confute you, Socrates! but could not
even a child convince you that you do not speak the truth?
_Socr._ I should be very much obliged to the child, and equally so to
you, if you can confute me, and free me from my extravagances. But be
not weary in obliging a man who is your friend, but confute me.
58. _Pol._ However, Socrates, there is no need to confute you by ancient
examples. For things that have recently happened are sufficient to
confute you, and to prove that many men who have acted unjustly are
happy.
_Socr._ What are these?
_Pol._ Do you not see, for instance, this Archelaus, son of Perdiccas,
ruler of Macedonia?
_Socr._ If not, at all events I hear of him.
_Pol._ Does he appear to you to be happy or miserable?
_Socr._ I do not know, Polus: for I have never yet had any intercourse
with him.
_Pol._ What then? if you had intercourse with him, should you know? And
do you not know otherwise, from the circumstances of the case, that he
is happy?
_Socr._ By Jupiter, certainly not.
_Pol._ It is evident then, Socrates, you will say, that you do not even
know whether the great king is happy?
_Socr._ And I should say the truth. For I do not know what his state is
with regard to enlightenment and justice.
_Pol._ What? Does all happiness consist in this?
_Socr._ In my opinion, Polus. For I say that an honest and good man or
woman is happy; but an unjust and wicked one is miserable.
_Pol._ This Archelaus, then, is miserable, according to your account?
_Socr._ At least, my friend, if he is unjust.
59. _Pol._ But how can he be otherwise than unjust, who had no right to
the empire which he now possesses, as he was born of a woman who was the
slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, and according to justice was the
slave of Alcetas, and, if he had wished to do what is just, would have
served Alcetas as a slave, and would have been happy, according to your
account? whereas now he has become wonderfully miserable, since he has
committed the greatest injustice. For, first of all, having sent for
this his master and uncle, as if he would restore the government which
Perdiccas had taken from him, and having entertained and intoxicated
both him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, and nearly his equal in
age, he forced them into a carriage, and having carried them off by
night, had their throats cut and made away with them both. And after he
had committed these wrongs, he was not aware that he had become most
miserable, and did not repent, but shortly afterwards, he did not wish
to become happy by nurturing his legitimate brother, the son of
Perdiccas, a child about seven years of age, to whom the government of
right belonged, and by restoring it to him; but having thrown him into a
well, and suffocated him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had
fallen in in pursuing a goose, and so met with his death. 60. Wherefore
since he has committed the greatest wrongs of all in Macedonia, he is
the most miserable of all the Macedonians, and not the most happy. And
perhaps there are some among the Athenians, beginning with you, who
would rather be any other of the Macedonians than Archelaus.
_Socr._ At the beginning of our conference, Polus, I praised you,
because you appeared to me to be well instructed in rhetoric, though you
had neglected the art of dialectics. And now, what else is this
reasoning, by which even a child could confute me, and I, as you
suppose, am now confuted by this reasoning of yours, when I said that a
man who acts unjustly is not happy? How so, my friend? For I do not
grant you any one of the things you assert.
_Pol._ Because you are not willing to do so; though it appears to you as
I say.
_Socr._ My excellent friend, you attempt to confute me rhetorically,
like those who think they confute their adversaries in courts of
justice. For there some fancy they confute others when they produce many
reputable witnesses in favour of what they say, whereas the adverse
party produces some one only, or none at all. 61. But this mode of
confutation is worth nothing with reference to truth. For sometimes a
man may be borne down by the false testimony of many witnesses who seem
to be somewhat. And now, with respect to what you say, almost all the
Athenians and strangers will agree with you, and if you wish to produce
witnesses against me to prove that I do not speak the truth, there will
testify for you, if you wish it, Nicias, son of Niceratus, and his
brothers with him, who gave the tripods that stand in a row in the
temple of Bacchus; or again, if you wish it, Aristocrates, son of
Scellius, who gave that beautiful offering in the temple of Pythian
Apollo; or if you wish it, the whole house of Pericles, or any other
family, that you may think proper to choose out of this city. But I, who
am but one, do not agree with you. For you do not convince me by
arguments, but producing many false witnesses against me, you endeavour
to eject me from my substance and the truth. But I, unless I shall be
able to adduce you, who are one, as a witness agreeing with what I say,
shall think that I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention with
respect to the subject of our discussion; nor shall I think that you
have done so, unless I, being one, alone testify for you, and you
dismiss all those others. 62. This, then, is one mode of refutation, as
you and many others think: but there is also another mode, which, on the
contrary, I adopt. Let us, therefore, compare them with each other, and
consider whether they differ at all from one another. For the matters
about which we differ are by no means trifling; but they are indeed such
as to know which is most honourable, and not to know most disgraceful,
for the sum of them is to know, or to be ignorant, who is happy, and who
is not. For instance, in the first place, with respect to the subject of
our present discussion, you think it possible that a man may be happy
who acts unjustly and is unjust; since you think that Archelaus, though
unjust, is happy. Must we not suppose that such is your opinion?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But I say it is impossible. On this one point, then, we differ.
Be it so. But will he who acts unjustly be happy if he meet with justice
and is punished?
_Pol._ By no means, for in that case he would be most miserable.
_Socr._ If, therefore, he who acts unjustly does not meet with the
punishment he deserves, according to your account he will be happy.
_Pol._ So I say.
63. _Socr._ But, according to my opinion, Polus, he who acts unjustly,
and is unjust, is in every way miserable; though more miserable if he
does not suffer punishment, and does not meet with chastisement for his
unjust actions; but less miserable if he suffers punishment, and meets
with his just deserts both from gods and men.
_Pol._ You attempt, Socrates, to advance strange paradoxes.
_Socr._ Yet I shall endeavour, my friend, to make you say the same
things as I do: for I consider you as a friend. Now, then, the things
about which we differ are these: and do you also consider. I said in a
former part of our discussion, that to commit an injustice is worse than
to suffer one.
_Pol._ Just so.
_Socr._ But you say it is worse to suffer an injustice.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And I said that they who act unjustly are miserable, and was
confuted by you.
_Pol._ You were so, by Jupiter.
_Socr._ At least as you think, Polus.
_Pol._ And I probably thought the truth.
_Socr._ But you, on the contrary, said that they who act unjustly are
happy, if they do not suffer punishment.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ But I say that they are most miserable; and that they who suffer
punishment are less so. Do you wish to refute this also?
64. _Pol._ But this is more difficult to refute than the former,
Socrates.
_Socr._ By no means, Polus, but it is impossible; for truth can never be
refuted.
_Pol._ How say you? If a man should be detected acting unjustly, as in
attempting to compass absolute power, and being detected should be put
to the torture, be mutilated, and have his eyes burnt out, and after
having himself suffered many other great and various torments, and
having moreover seen his children and wife suffer the same, should at
last be crucified, or covered with pitch and burnt, will he be more
happy, than if, having escaped punishment, he should become a tyrant,
and ruling in the city, should pass through life doing whatever he
pleases, being envied, and accounted happy, both by citizens and
strangers? Do you say that it is impossible to refute these things?
_Socr._ You are now trying to terrify me, noble Polus, and do not refute
me; but just now you adduced witnesses. However, remind me of a trifling
circumstance; did you say, if a person should attempt unjustly to
compass absolute power?
_Pol._ I did.
_Socr._ In that case, neither of them will ever be happier than the
other, neither he who has unjustly acquired absolute power, nor he who
has been punished. For, of two miserable persons, one cannot be happier
than the other; but he is more miserable who escapes punishment and
acquires absolute power. 65. What is this, Polus? do you laugh? Is this
another species of refutation, when any one asserts any thing, to laugh
at him, and not refute him?
_Pol._ Do you not think you are already refuted, Socrates, when you say
such things as no man in the world would assert? for ask any one of
these.
_Socr._ Polus, I am not among the number of politicians: and last year,
happening to be chosen a senator, since my tribe held the presidency and
it was necessary for me to collect the votes, I occasioned laughter,
because I did not know how to collect them. Do not, then, require me to
collect the votes of those who are present. But if you have no better
mode of refutation than this, as I just now said, give the question up
to me in my turn, and make trial of that mode of refutation which I
think ought to be adopted. For I know how to procure one witness of what
I say, that is, the person with whom I am discoursing, but I let alone
the multitude; and I know how to take the vote of one person, but I do
not even discourse with the multitude. Consider, then, whether you are
willing in your turn to give me an opportunity of refuting by answering
the questions I shall put to you. For I think, that you and I, and other
men, are of opinion, that to commit injustice is worse than to suffer
it; and not to be punished, than to be punished.
66. _Pol._ But I, on the contrary, think that neither myself nor any
other man is of this opinion. For would you rather suffer injustice than
commit it?
_Socr._ Yes, and you, and all other men.
_Pol._ Far from it; neither would you, nor I, nor any other man.
_Socr._ Will you not answer, then?
_Pol._ By all means. For I am anxious to know what you will say.
_Socr._ Tell me then, that you may know, as if I asked you from the
beginning: whether does it appear to you, Polus, worse to commit an
injustice or to suffer one?
_Pol._ To suffer one, in my opinion.
_Socr._ What then? whether is it more base to commit an injustice or to
suffer one? Answer me.
_Pol._ To commit an injustice.
_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, worse, since it is more base?
_Pol._ By no means.
_Socr._ I understand. You do not think, as it seems, that the beautiful
and the good, and the evil and the base, are the same?
_Pol._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ But what do you say to this? Beautiful things in general, such
as bodies, colours, forms, sounds, and pursuits, do you call them
severally beautiful, without reference to any thing else? As, for
instance, first of all, with respect to beautiful bodies, do you not say
that they are beautiful, on account of their usefulness, in reference to
the particular thing for which each is useful, or on account of some
pleasure, if in being seen they give delight to the beholders? Have you
any thing else besides this to say respecting beauty of body?
_Pol._ I have not.
67. _Socr._ Do you not, then, denominate all other things in the same
manner beautiful, such as forms and colours, either on account of some
pleasure, or utility, or both?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ And is not the case the same as to sounds, and every thing that
relates to music?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And moreover, with respect to laws and pursuits, they surely are
beautiful, for no other reason except that they are either useful, or
pleasant, or both?
_Pol._ So it appears to me.
_Socr._ And is it not the same with the beauty of the sciences?
_Pol._ Certainly. And now, Socrates, you define beautifully, in defining
the beautiful by pleasure and good.
_Socr._ Must not, therefore, the base be defined by the contrary, by
pain and evil?
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ When, therefore, of two beautiful things, one is more beautiful
than the other, it is more beautiful because it excels in one or both of
these, either in pleasure, or utility, or both.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And when of two things one is more base than the other, it must
be more base because it exceeds in pain or evil: is not this necessarily
so?
_Pol._ Yes.
68. _Socr._ Come then; what did we say just now respecting committing
injustice and suffering it? Did you not say that to suffer injustice is
more evil, but to commit it, more base?
_Pol._ I did say so.
_Socr._ Therefore, since it is more base to commit injustice than to
suffer it, it must be more base because it is more painful and exceeds
in pain, or evil, or both. Is not this also necessary?
_Pol._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ First, then, let us consider whether to commit injustice exceeds
in pain the suffering it; and whether they who commit injustice feel
greater pain than they who suffer it.
_Pol._ This is by no means the case, Socrates.
_Socr._ It does not, then, exceed in pain?
_Pol._ By no means.
_Socr._ Therefore, if it does not exceed in pain, it will no longer
exceed in both.
_Pol._ It appears not.
_Socr._ It remains, therefore, that it exceeds in the other.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ In the evil.
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ Since, therefore, to commit injustice exceeds in evil, it must
be more evil than to suffer injustice.
_Pol._ Evidently so.
69. _Socr._ Was it not admitted by men in general, and by you to me
formerly, that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Now, however, it appears to be worse.
_Pol._ So it seems.
_Socr._ Would you, then, rather choose that which is worse and more
base, than that which is less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus, (for
you will not be injured by so doing,) but answer, giving yourself up
generously to the discussion as to a physician; and either admit or deny
the question I ask.
_Pol._ Then I should not rather choose it, Socrates.
_Socr._ Would any other man in the world?
_Pol._ To me it appears not, according to what has been said.
_Socr._ I therefore said truly, that neither you, nor I, nor any other
man in the world, would rather choose to commit injustice than to suffer
it; for it is worse to do so.
_Pol._ So it appears.
_Socr._ You see then, Polus, that my mode of proof when compared with
your mode of proof, does not at all resemble it; but all others agree
with you, except myself. For my part you alone are sufficient for my
purpose, agreeing with me and testifying for me; and I, having asked
your opinion only, disregard that of others. Let this then be settled
between us. 70. And next, let us proceed to consider that which we
doubted about in the second place, viz. whether it is the greatest of
evils for one who has committed injustice to be punished, as you
thought, or whether it is not a greater evil not to be punished, as I
thought. And let us consider it thus: To suffer punishment and to be
justly chastised, when one has committed injustice, do you not call the
same thing?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ Can you say, then, that all just things are not beautiful, so
far as they are just? When you have well considered, answer me.
_Pol._ It appears to me that they are, Socrates.
_Socr._ Consider this also: When a man does any thing, must there not
necessarily be something which is passive to him as an agent?
_Pol._ It appears so to me.
_Socr._ And does not the patient suffer what the agent does, and just
such a thing as the agent does? I mean in this way: If any one strikes,
is it not necessary that something should be struck?
_Pol._ It is necessary.
_Socr._ And if the striker strikes hard or swiftly, must not the thing
struck be stricken accordingly?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ That which is struck, then, undergoes a passion corresponding to
that which the striker does.
_Pol._ Certainly.
71. _Socr._ In like manner, if any one burns, is it not necessary that
something should be burnt?
_Pol._ How can it be otherwise?
_Socr._ And if he burns vehemently or painfully, that which is burnt
must be burnt according as the burner burns?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ So, if any one cuts any thing, is not the reasoning the same?
for something is cut.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And if the cut is large or deep, or painful, that which is cut
is cut with such a cut as the cutter cuts.
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ In a word, then, see if you grant what I just now said
respecting every thing, viz., that according as the agent does, so the
patient suffers.
_Pol._ I do grant it.
_Socr._ These things, then, being agreed on, whether is the being
punished, to suffer, or to do something?
_Pol._ Necessarily, Socrates, it is to suffer.
_Socr._ Must it not, therefore, be by some agent?
_Pol._ Undoubtedly: by him who chastises.
_Socr._ But does not he who chastises rightly, chastise justly?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Doing what is just, or not?
_Pol._ What is just.
_Socr._ Then, does not he who is chastised, when he is deservedly
punished, suffer justly?
_Pol._ It appears so.
_Socr._ But what is just has been acknowledged to be beautiful.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Of these, then, the one does, and the other, he that is
chastised, suffers that which is beautiful.
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ And if beautiful, then good; for _that which is beautiful_ is
either pleasant or useful.
_Pol._ Necessarily so.
_Socr._ He therefore who is punished suffers that which is good.
_Pol._ So it seems.