_Socr._ Prove, therefore, that rhetoricians are possessed of
understanding, and that rhetoric is an art, and not flattery, if you
mean to confute me. But, if you will leave me unconfuted, rhetoricians
and tyrants, who do in cities whatever they please, will derive no good
from thence. Power is, as you say, good; but to do, without
understanding, whatever one pleases, you yourself admit is an evil. Is
it not so?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ How then can rhetoricians or tyrants have great power in cities,
unless Socrates is persuaded by Polus to admit that they do what they
wish?
_Pol._ What a strange man!
_Socr._ I deny that they do what they wish: but confute me.
_Pol._ Did you not just now admit that they do what appears to them to
be best?
_Socr._ And I now admit it.
_Pol._ They do, therefore, what they wish.
_Socr._ I deny it.
_Pol._ But they do what appears best to them?
_Socr._ I grant it.
_Pol._ You speak absurdly and monstrously, Socrates.
[51.] _Socr._ Do not accuse me, most excellent Polus, that I may address
you in your own style; but, if you have any other question to ask me,
shew that I am deceived; if not, do you answer me.
_Pol._ I am willing to answer, in order that I may know what you mean.
_Socr._ Whether, then, do men appear to you to wish the thing that they
do from time to time, or that for the sake of which they do the thing
that they do? As for instance, do those who drink medicine from
physicians appear to you to wish the thing that they do, viz., to drink
the medicine, and suffer pain, or do they wish to be well, for the sake
of which they drink the medicine?
_Pol._ It is clear they wish to be well, for the sake of which they
drink the medicine.
_Socr._ In like manner those who sail on the sea, and those who carry on
any other commercial business, do not wish the thing that they do from
time to time: for who wishes to sail and to encounter danger, and to be
harassed with business; but the object for which they sail is to acquire
riches; for they sail for the sake of riches.
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Is it not so then in all cases? whosoever does any thing for the
sake of some thing else, does not wish the thing that he does, but that
for the sake of which he does it.
_Pol._ Yes.
52. _Socr._ Is there any thing in the world, then, that is not either
good or evil, or between these, neither good nor evil?
_Pol._ It must needs be so, Socrates.
_Socr._ Do you not admit then, that wisdom, and health, and riches, and
other things of the same kind, are good, but their contraries evil?
_Pol._ I do.
_Socr._ By the things that are neither good nor evil do you not mean
such as sometimes partake of good, sometimes of evil, and sometimes of
neither, as to sit, to walk, to run, and to sail, and again, stones,
wood, and other things of the same kind? Are not these the things that
you mean? Or do you call certain other things neither good nor evil?
_Pol._ No, but these.
_Socr._ Whether, therefore, do men, when they do these intermediate
things, do them for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of
the intermediate.
_Pol._ The intermediate, surely, for the sake of the good.
_Socr._ Pursuing the good, therefore, we both walk when we walk,
thinking it better, and, on the contrary, we stand when we stand, for
the sake of the same thing, viz., the good. Is it not so?
_Pol._ Yes.
53. _Socr._ Do we not, therefore, if we slay any one, slay, or banish,
or deprive him of his possessions, thinking that it is better for us to
do so than not?
_Pol._ Certainly.
_Socr._ They, therefore, who do these things do them all for the sake of
good.
_Pol._ I allow it.
_Socr._ Are we not agreed, then, that we do not wish those things which
we do for the sake of something else, but that for the sake of which we
do them?
_Pol._ By all means.
_Socr._ We do not, then, wish simply to slay, or banish from cities, or
deprive any one of his possessions; but if these things are useful we
wish to do them, but if they are hurtful we do not wish to do them. For
we wish, as you admit, things that are good, but we do not wish such as
are neither good nor evil, nor such as are evil. Is it not so? Do I seem
to you, Polus, to speak the truth, or not? Why do you not answer?
_Pol._ You speak the truth.
_Socr._ Since then we are agreed on these things, if any one slays,
banishes from a city, or deprives another of his possessions, whether he
is a tyrant or a rhetorician, thinking that it is better for him so to
do, though it is really worse, he surely does what seems fit to him: is
it not so?
_Pol._ Yes.
_Socr._ Does he, then, do what he wishes, if these things are really
evil? Why do you not answer?
_Pol._ He does not appear to me to do what he wishes.
54. _Socr._ Is it possible, then, that such a man can have great power
in the supposed city, if, according to your admission, to have great
power is a good?
_Pol._ It is not possible.
_Socr._ I spoke truly, then, when I said that it is possible for a man
to do what he pleases in a city, and yet not have great power, nor do
what he wishes.
_Pol._ As if, Socrates, you yourself would not like to be allowed to do
what you please in a city, rather than not, and would not be envious
when you saw any one either slaying whom he pleased, or taking away his
possessions, or putting him in bonds.
_Socr._ Do you mean justly or unjustly?
_Pol._ Whichever he should do, is he not in either case to be envied?
_Socr._ Good words, I pray you, Polus.
_Pol._ But why?
_Socr._ Because it is not right, either to envy those that are not to be
envied, or the wretched; but to pity them.
_Pol._ What say you? Does such appear to you to be the case with the men
of whom I am speaking?