_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ Arithmetic, then, is an artificer of persuasion.
_Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ If, then, any one should ask us, What persuasion it produces,
and with respect to what? we should answer, That which teaches about the
quantity of even and odd. In like manner we may shew, that all the other
arts of which we spoke just now, produce persuasion, and what kind of
persuasion, and with respect to what: is it not so?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ Rhetoric then, is not alone an artificer of persuasion.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ Since then, it does not alone produce this effect, but other
arts do the same, we may justly, as in the case of the painter, next
enquire of the speaker; of what kind of persuasion, and of persuasion on
what subject rhetoric is the art? Does it not appear to you that this
question may fairly be asked?
-----
Footnote 61:
I have ventured to read ἢ οὔ for καὶ ποῦ, for which my only excuse is
that the usual reading cannot be rendered intelligibly, and that the
alteration I have ventured to import is an expression very commonly
used by Socrates on similar occasions.
-----
_Gorg._ It does.
_Socr._ Answer then, Gorgias, since this appears to you to be the case.
21. _Gorg._ I speak then, Socrates, of that persuasion which is produced
in courts of justice, and in other public assemblies, as I just now
mentioned, and with respect to matters that are just and unjust.
_Socr._ I suspected, Gorgias, that you meant that persuasion, and on
such matters. But do not be surprised if I shortly ask you a question
that may appear to be evident, but which I shall notwithstanding repeat,
for, as I before observed, I ask it for the sake of carrying on the
discussion in an orderly manner, and not on your account, but that we
may not be in the habit of catching up each other’s words on suspicion;
but do you finish what you have to say according to your own plan, just
as you please.
_Gorg._ You appear to me to act rightly, Socrates.
_Socr._ Come then, let us examine this too. Do you admit that to learn
is any thing?
_Gorg._ I do admit it.
_Socr._ Again? to believe?
_Gorg._ I do.
_Socr._ Whether, therefore, does it appear to you, that to learn and to
believe, and learning and belief are the same, or different?
_Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that they are different.
22. _Socr._ You think rightly; and you may know from this; if any one
should ask you, Is there, Gorgias, a false and true belief? I think you
would say there is.
_Gorg._ I should.
_Socr._ Well then, is there a false and true science?
_Gorg._ Certainly not.
_Socr._ It is clear, therefore, that they (belief and science) are not
the same.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
_Socr._ Yet both those who learn are persuaded, and those who believe.
_Gorg._ Such is the case.
_Socr._ Are you willing, therefore, that we lay down two kinds of
persuasion, one that produces belief without knowledge, but the other
science?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Which kind of persuasion, then, does rhetoric produce in courts
of justice and other public assemblies, respecting what is just and
unjust? is it that from which belief springs without knowledge, or that
from which knowledge arises?
_Gorg._ It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which belief
springs.
_Socr._ Rhetoric then, as it seems, Gorgias, is the artificer of a
persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches
respecting the just and unjust.
_Gorg._ It is so.
_Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, does not profess to teach courts of
justice and other public assemblies, respecting things just and unjust,
but only to produce belief. For surely he could not teach so great a
multitude in a short time things of such great importance.
_Gorg._ Certainly not.
23. _Socr._ Come then, let us see now what we ought to say of rhetoric.
For I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an
assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, or
shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case that the
rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident that,
in each election, the most skilful artist ought to be chosen. Nor _will
he be consulted_ when the question is respecting the building of walls,
or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again,
when a deliberation occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the
marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts,—but on
such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give
advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points?
For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make
others rhetoricians, it is proper to enquire of you what are the things
about which your art is concerned. And consider that I am labouring for
your benefit. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may
wish to become your disciple; for I perceive some, nay several, who
probably are ashamed to question you. 24. In being questioned,
therefore, by me, consider yourself to be questioned by them, What would
be the consequence to us, Gorgias, if we should put ourselves under your
instructions? On what subjects shall we be able to give advice to the
city? Whether about the just only and the unjust; or on those subjects
of which Socrates just now made mention? Endeavour to answer them.
_Gorg._ I will endeavour, Socrates, to develope clearly the whole power
of rhetoric: for you have admirably led the way. You doubtless know that
these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports,
were made partly on the advice of Themistocles, and partly on that of
Pericles, but not of artificers.
_Socr._ This is told of Themistocles, Gorgias: and I myself heard
Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall[62].
-----
Footnote 62:
The wall which connected the southern extremities of the long walls
and the Phaleric wall.
-----
_Gorg._ And when there is an election of any such persons as you
mentioned, Socrates, you see that the rhetoricians are the persons who
give advice, and whose opinion prevails in such matters.
25. _Socr._ It is because I wonder at this, Gorgias, that I have been
for some time asking you, what is the power of rhetoric. For when I
consider it in this manner, it appears to me almost divine in its
magnitude.
_Gorg._ If you knew all, Socrates, that it comprehends under itself
almost all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I
have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to
various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer
themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician, and when the
physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art
than rhetoric. I say too, that if a rhetorician and a physician should
go to any city you please, and it were necessary to contend by argument
in a general assembly, or any other convention, which should be chosen,
a rhetorician or a physician, the physician would be held in no account,
but he that has the power of speaking would be chosen, if he pleased.
26. And if he should contend with any other artist whatever, the
rhetorician would persuade that he himself should be chosen in
preference to any one else. For there is no subject on which a
rhetorician will not speak to the multitude more persuasively than any
other artist whatever. Such, then, and so great is the power of this
art. It is right however, Socrates, to use rhetoric in the same way as
any other exercise employed in contests: for it is not right to use
other exercises against all men alike; nor, because any one has learnt
pugilism, and the pancratium, and to fight with arms, so as to be
superior both to friends and enemies, is it therefore proper to strike,
or pierce, or slay one’s friends. 27. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one who,
by having frequented the palæstra, has made his body robust, and become
a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father or mother, or any other
of his relatives or friends, would it on that account be proper to hate,
and expel from cities, the training masters and those who teach how to
fight with arms. For they instructed their pupils in these exercises, in
order that they might make a proper use of them against enemies, and
those that do wrong, for self-defence, and not for attack; but they
contrariwise, use their strength and skill improperly. The teachers,
therefore, are not wicked, nor is their art either to be blamed, or for
this reason wicked, but they, I think, who do not use it properly. 28.
The same may be said of rhetoric. For a rhetorician is able to speak
against all men, and on every subject; so that he can best persuade the
multitude, in a word, on whatever subject he pleases: but he ought not
any the more on this account to detract from the reputation of
physicians, because he is able to do it, nor of other artificers; but he
should use rhetoric justly, as well as other exercises. In my opinion,
however, if any one having become a rhetorician abuses this power and
art, it is not proper to hate the teacher and expel him from cities, for
he imparted the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other makes a
contrary use of it. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him
who does not make a right use of it, but not the teacher.
29. _Socr._ I think, Gorgias, that you as well as I, have been present
at many discussions, and that you have observed this in them, that it is
not easy for men, on whatever subject they undertake to converse, having
propounded their ideas to each other, both learning themselves and
teaching one another, then to put an end to the conference; but if they
have a controversy about any thing, and one says that the other does not
speak correctly or clearly, they are indignant, and each thinks that the
other is speaking out of envy, from a love of contention, and not
seeking what was proposed in the discussion: and some, at length[63],
depart in a most disgraceful manner, having[64] reviled each other, and
spoken and heard such things that even the bystanders are vexed at
themselves for having deigned to listen to such men. 30. But why do I
say this? Because you now appear to me to say what does not follow from,
or accord with, what you first said respecting rhetoric. I am afraid,
therefore, to proceed with my refutation, lest you should suppose that I
do not speak with zeal for the subject, that it may be made clear, but
out of opposition to you. If, then, you are of that class of men to
which I belong, I should gladly question you: but if not, I would
forbear to do so. But to what class of men do I belong? To those who are
willingly refuted, if they say any thing that is not true, and who
willingly refute if any one says any thing that is not true; and who are
not less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I consider the former
to be the greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good one’s-self to
be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think
no evil so great to man as false opinion on the subjects we are now
discussing. If, then, you say that you are such a man, let us continue
our discussion; [31.] but if you think we ought to desist, let us give
it up, and put an end to the argument.
-----
Footnote 63:
Ficinus, I think, correctly translates τελευτῶντες, _tandem_.
Footnote 64:
Literally “being reviled.”
-----
_Gorg._ But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you
describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the
company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I
explained many things to the present company: and now, perhaps, we shall
protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore,
respect their wishes lest we detain any of them, who have something else
to do.
_Chær._ You yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, hear the noise these men
make, from their anxiety to hear, if you say any thing. For my part, may
I never have so much business, as to be obliged to leave such a
discussion and so conducted, from having any thing else more important
to do.
32. _Cal._ By the gods, Chærephon, and I too, though I have been present
at many conferences, know not whether I have ever been so delighted as
now; so that you will gratify me much, should you even be willing to
continue the discussion throughout the whole day.
_Socr._ There is no obstacle on my side, Callicles, if only Gorgias is
willing.
_Gorg._ After this, Socrates, it would be shameful in me not to be
willing, especially as I myself announced that any one might ask what he
pleased. But, if it is agreeable to the company, continue the
discussion, and ask any question you please.
_Socr._ Hear then, Gorgias, what I wonder at in what you said. For,
perhaps, you spoke correctly, and I did not rightly apprehend you. You
say that you can make any one a rhetorician, who is willing to be
instructed by you?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ So that he can speak persuasively on any subject to the
multitude, not teaching, but persuading?
_Gorg._ Exactly so.
_Socr._ You said too, that a rhetorician is able to speak more
persuasively than a physician, on the subject of health.
_Gorg._ I did say so, at least to a multitude.
_Socr._ Does not, then, this expression “to a multitude” mean to the
ignorant? for, surely, among the well-informed he will not be better
able to persuade than the physician.
_Gorg._ You say truly.
33. _Socr._ If then he shall be better able to persuade than the
physician, he is better able to persuade than one who possesses
knowledge?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ Although he is not a physician? is it not so?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ But he who is not a physician must, surely, be unskilled in
those things in which a physician is skilled.
_Gorg._ Clearly so.
_Socr._ He, therefore, who is ignorant will be more capable than one who
possesses knowledge of persuading the ignorant, since a rhetorician is
better able to persuade than a physician. Is this the result, or
something else?
_Gorg._ That is the result in this instance.
_Socr._ The case therefore is the same as concerns a rhetorician and
rhetoric with respect to all other arts: I mean, there is no need for it
to know the subjects themselves, how they are circumstanced, but only to
discover some means of persuasion, so as to appear to the ignorant to
know more than those who possess knowledge.
_Gorg._ Is it not a great advantage, Socrates, without having other
arts, but this one only, to be in no respect inferior to artificers?
34. _Socr._ Whether from this being the case, a rhetorician is inferior,
or not inferior to others, we will presently consider, if our argument
requires it. But first let us consider this: Whether a rhetorician is in
the same condition with reference to the just and the unjust, the base
and the honourable, the good and the evil, as he is with reference to
health, and other things with which other arts are concerned; I mean,
that he does not know them, what is good, or what is evil, what is
honourable or what is base, what is just, or what is unjust, but is able
to devise some means of persuasion respecting them, so that, though he
is ignorant, he appears to the ignorant to know more than one who
possesses knowledge; or is it necessary that he should know these, and
is it requisite that he who is about to learn rhetoric should have
acquired these things before he comes to you; if not, will you, who are
a teacher of rhetoric, teach him who comes to you none of these things
(for it is not your province), but make him appear to the multitude to
know these things, though he does not know them, and to seem to be a
good man when he is not so? or shall you be unable to teach him rhetoric
at all, unless he knows beforehand the truth respecting these things?
What is the case in this respect, Gorgias? And, by Jupiter, as you just
now promised, unfold the whole power of rhetoric.
35. _Gorg._ I think, Socrates, that any one, if he did not know, would
learn these things from me.
_Socr._ Stay; for you say well. If then you make any one a rhetorician,
it is necessary that he should know what is just and unjust, either
before, or afterwards from your instructions.
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ What then? Is he who has learnt carpentering, a carpenter, or
not?
_Gorg._ He is.
_Socr._ And is not he who has learnt music, a musician?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ And he who has learnt medicine, a physician? And so, in the same
way, with regard to other things, is not he who has learnt any
particular art such a person as each science respectively makes its
proficient?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ By the same reason, then, does it not follow, that he who has
learnt just things is just?
_Gorg._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ And he who is just surely performs just actions.
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ Is it not, therefore, necessary[65] that the just man should
wish to do just actions?
-----
Footnote 65:
Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι] τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι
δίκαια πράττειν. I concur with Ast and others in thinking that the
words inserted in brackets have been interpolated, and have therefore
omitted them in the translation. Their insertion would break the chain
of the argument.
-----
_Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly.
_Gorg._ Necessarily.
_Socr._ And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be
just?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?
_Gorg._ It appears not.
36. _Socr._ Do you remember that you said a little before that we ought
not to accuse the trainers of youth, nor expel them from cities, if a
pugilist does not make a good use of the pugilistic art, and acts
unjustly? And so, likewise, if a rhetorician make an unjust use of
rhetoric, that we should not accuse the teacher, nor expel him from the
city, but the person who acts unjustly, and does not make a proper use
of rhetoric? Were these things said, or not?
_Gorg._ They were said.
_Socr._ But now this very same rhetorician appears incapable of ever
acting unjustly. Is it not so?
_Gorg._ It appears so.
_Socr._ And it was said, Gorgias, at the commencement of our discussion,
that rhetoric is conversant with words, not those respecting the even
and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was it not
so?