_Socr._ However, I do not think you mean to call any one of these
rhetoric, although in the expression you used you so said, that rhetoric
has its efficiency by means of words; and any who wished to catch at
your words might reply, Do you say then, Gorgias, that arithmetic is
rhetoric? But I do not think that you call either arithmetic or geometry
rhetoric.
_Gorg._ You think rightly, Socrates, and apprehend my meaning correctly.
_Socr._ Come then, complete the answer to my question. Since rhetoric is
one of those arts which make great use of words, and there are others of
the same kind, endeavour to tell me in reference to what rhetoric has
its efficiency in words. 13. Just as if any one should ask me respecting
any of the arts which I but now mentioned: Socrates, what is the
arithmetical art? I should say to him, as you did just now, That it is
one of the arts that have their efficiency in words. And if he should
further ask me, In reference to what? I should answer, In reference to
the knowledge of even and odd, how many there may be of each. But if
again he should ask me, What do you mean by the art of computation? I
should answer, that this also is one of those arts whose whole
efficiency consists in words. And if he should further ask me, In
reference to what? I should answer, as they do who draw up motions in
the assemblies of the people, That in other respects computation is the
same as arithmetic, for it has reference to the same object, that is to
say, the even and the odd; but it differs in this respect, that
computation considers what relation even and odd have to themselves and
to each other in regard to quantity. 14. And if any one should ask me
about astronomy, and after I had said that its whole efficiency consists
in words, should say, But Socrates, to what do words employed about
astronomy refer? I should answer, That they are employed about the
course of the stars, and of the sun and the moon, how they are related
to each other with respect to velocity.
_Gorg._ And you would answer rightly, Socrates.
_Socr._ Now then do you answer, Gorgias. For rhetoric is one of those
arts which accomplish and effect every thing by means of words: is it
not so?
_Gorg._ It is so.
_Socr._ Tell me then in reference to what? what is the particular thing
about which these words are, which rhetoric uses?
_Gorg._ The greatest of all human concerns, Socrates, and the best.
_Socr._ But, Gorgias, what you say is questionable, and by no means
clear. For I think you must have heard at banquets men singing that song
in which the singers enumerate that the best thing is health, the second
beauty, and the third, as the author of the song says, riches gained
without fraud.
_Gorg._ I have heard it; but with what object do you mention this?
15. _Socr._ Because the artificers of those things which the author of
the song has commended, namely, the physician, the master of gymnastics,
and the money-getter, will forthwith present themselves, and the
physician will say: Socrates, Gorgias deceives you. For his art is not
employed about the greatest good to men, but mine is. If, then, I should
ask him, Who are you that say this? he would probably answer, I am a
physician. What then do you say? that the object of your art is the
greatest good? How can it be otherwise, Socrates, he would probably say,
since its object is health? and what greater good can men have than
health? And if after him again the master of gymnastics should say, I
too should wonder, Socrates, if Gorgias could shew you any greater good
from his art than I can from mine, I should again say to him, And who
are you, Sir, and what is your employment? A master of gymnastics, he
would say, and my employment is to make men beautiful and strong in
their bodies. 16. After the master of gymnastics, the money-getter would
say, as I imagine, despising all others, Consider, I beg, Socrates,
whether there is any greater good than riches, either with Gorgias, or
any one else? I should thereupon say to him, What, then, are you the
artificer of this good? He would say, I am. Who are you then? A
money-getter. What then? Do you consider riches to be the greatest good
to men? I shall say. Assuredly, he will answer. However, Gorgias here
contends that his art is the cause of greater good than yours. It is
clear then that after this he would ask, And what is this good? let
Gorgias answer. Come then, Gorgias, suppose that you are asked by them
and by me, and answer, What is this, which you say is the greatest good
to men, and of which you are the artificer?
_Gorg._ That which is in reality, Socrates, the greatest good, and is at
the same time the cause of liberty to men, and of their being able to
rule over others in their several cities.
_Socr._ What then do you say it is?
_Gorg._ I say it is the power of persuading by words judges in a court
of justice, senators in the senate-house, and the hearers in a public
assembly, and in every other convention of a political nature. Moreover,
by this power you will make the physician your slave, and the master of
gymnastics your slave, and the money-getter will be found to have gained
money, not for himself, but for another, for you who are able to speak,
and persuade the multitude.
_Socr._ At length you appear to me, Gorgias, to have shewn as nearly as
possible what kind of art you consider rhetoric to be; and if I
understand you rightly, you say that rhetoric is the artificer of
persuasion, and that its whole employment and the sum of it terminates
in this. Can you say that rhetoric has any further power than that of
producing persuasion in the minds of the hearers?
_Gorg._ By no means, Socrates; but you appear to me to have defined it
sufficiently. For that is the sum of it.
18. _Socr._ Listen then, Gorgias. Be assured that I, as I persuade
myself, if there is any one, who in conversing with another, wishes to
know the very thing about which the conversation is, be assured, I say,
that I am such a person; and I think that you are too.
_Gorg._ What then, Socrates?
_Socr._ I will now tell you. The persuasion which you speak of as
resulting from rhetoric, what it is, and with what particulars it is
conversant, be assured I do not clearly understand, not but that I have
a suspicion of what I suppose you mean, and about what it is employed:
yet I will not the less ask you what persuasion you mean results from
rhetoric, and with what particulars it is conversant. Why then do I who
have a suspicion ask you, and not rather myself speak? Not on your
account, but on account of the discussion, that it may proceed in such a
manner as to make the subject of the discussion most clear to us. 19.
For consider whether I seem to you right in putting the question to you:
just as if I should ask you what kind of a painter is Zeuxis? if you
were to tell me that he paints animals, might I not justly enquire of
you, what kind of animals he paints? is it not so[61]?
_Gorg._ Certainly.
_Socr._ And would it not be for this reason, because there are also
other painters who paint many other animals?
_Gorg._ Yes.
_Socr._ But if no one else but Zeuxis painted them, you would have
answered properly.
_Gorg._ Assuredly.
_Socr._ Come then, with respect to rhetoric, tell me, whether it appears
to you that rhetoric alone produces persuasion, or do other arts produce
it likewise? My meaning is this: Does he who teaches any thing persuade
what he teaches, or not?
_Gorg._ He does certainly persuade, Socrates.
_Socr._ Again, if we speak of the same arts of which we just now made
mention, does not arithmetic teach us such things as relate to number?
and does not an arithmetician the same?
_Gorg._ Certainly.